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Foreword to the Special Issue
SENATOR GEORGE MCGOVERN

The Bicentennial offered us the opportunity to reflect upon our history,
to examine what we have achieved in the past two hundred years, and to review
our current role -- at home and in the world.
We have six percent of the earth's population. We hold thirty percent
of the world's wealth. Yet we contribute less than a quarter of one percent
of our national product to the development of the third world. Half of the
world is ill-housed, ill-clad and ill-fed. They cry out for our compassion.
We must be more than the least help of that earth, for which we once were
the last, best hope.
How many people now see America as a worthy influence, as a witness to
the world for what is noble and just in human affairs? A militarist, interventionist foreign policy has placed us at odds both with our own principles
and with the aspirations of most of the planet.
Born in revolution, we have become the leading counter-revolutionary
force in the world. Conceived in liberty, we most often find ourselves defending one kind of totalitarianism out of fear that it might be replaced by
another. Endowed with vast wealth, the Pentagon lavishes it on arms while
the President vetoes jobs, housing, and health care.
This is not billions for defense, but for nonsense. We must meet real
threats, but we need not exaggerate them in order to recognize them.
We have long since passed the point when mounting arms amounted to more
safety. A new internationalism must pass beyond that sterile condition. It
lies instead in a clear recognition of global interdependence; in a common
resolve to feed the hungry, to revive the economy, to repair the ecology, to
reverse the mindless population growth of a small planet where the great issue
no longer is who will prevail, but whether humanity will survive.
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Social warfare has become institutionalized as a social benefit in the
culture of the United States in contrast to social wvelfare which remains
in the status of a marginal activity. This fact is a disgusting and ludicrous reflection of the morals and deceit of the leadership control of
our nation.
The complete integration of warfare conceptions and practices into the
social fabric acts antithetically to counter the growth of mores that
advance the quality of Americans' lives. The dominance of the economic structure (capital production, Federal budget and bureaucracy)
by the military-industrial marriage under the sanction of national
defense, the perpetuation of the mythology of weapons strength, the
ideological control of communications, the permanent educational
structures and operations of the military demonstrate the universality of the social warfare phenomenon.
Dependency upon the warfare economy is accepted as natural and necessary.
On the other hand, social welfare is not accepted as a fundamental
social benefit essential to the well-being of all and a desirable part
of the social structure. Rather, it is treated as a residual requirement to be gained through qualification on individual merit by a special group of citizens. Social security is employment -qualified,
medicare is age-qualified, AFDC is single-headed family-based. Few
social welfare programs are universal or comprehensive.
The societal position of social welfare in 1976 is contrasted with social
warfare in the simple illustration: the defense budget projections received automatic additions for inflationary factors, the welfare budgets
did not.
Yet the necessity for social welfare measures continues to escalate,
challenging the entrenched position of the warfare base for a greater
share of national resources. Each societal institution - health, education, justice, emplyment, religion and even the military - increasingly requires a social services component to remain functional. This
development, with its claim on part of national and local expenditures,
creates the opposition to the warfare mentality and special interests.
The analysis and exposure of the warfare-welfare dialectics is a singularly important task, one that continues the historic mission to raise
humans to a new level of social life. Eventually the social welfare outlook must substitute for the social warfare tradition if we are to survive.
The National Association of Social Workers, representing 70, 000 professional members, has always participated in this crusade through its
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policies and actions.
It supports and applauds the contributors to this
publication for their leadership in trying to change the conception and
nature of social benefits for the American people.
Chauncey Alexander
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INTRODUCTION: WARFARE-WELFARE AS A SERIOUS SOCIAL
PROBLEM FOR STUDY AND ACTION
by L. K. Northwood

Throughout the Journal reference will be made to "The Warfare/Welfare State."
When the term is used by the editors it refers to activities and programs in the
public (governmental) sector having to do with the growth, development, and
interrelationship of two of the major institutional complexes of society, the
military and the social welfare.
There are two major reasons for the term:
First of all, it signals the findings of current research, that nations having
large military budgets also have large budgets for social welfare. Both welfare
and warfare seemingly are necessary components of the modern industrial state.
Second, it embodies a central contradiction that exists for these nations: The
goals and processes of social welfare are usually conceived as being in direct
opposition to the goals and processes of warfare. Hence, attention is directed
to many of the critical issues that are examined in this Journal. Some of the most
important are: To what extent has there been growth in the military and/or social
welfare institutions over time? What are the measurable effects of the growth
and development of one institutional complex on the other, on the society at
large? Who benefits and who suffers from such a development? Can typical social
welfare services be provided under military auspices? What services, for whom
and under what conditions? Above all, the imperative question is: Should the
social, political, and economic development of the nation be directed toward the
acquisition of overwhelming military power which will allow the state to enforce
its will domestically and on the rest of the world, or should the state direct its
efforts to the enhancement of the social welfare and to the equitable sharing of
its national resources with less fortunate and "underdeveloped" nations of the
world?
There are many popular characterizations of the United States and other major
industrial nations: Warfare State, Garrison State, Pentagon Capitalism, Military
Industrial Complex, Welfare State, Leading Imperialist Nation, Leader of the
Free World, and so forth. 1 Our selection of the term, Warfare/Welfare State, in
part, was motivated by the desire to avoid a polar typology which emphasizes one
2
form of social development at the cost of minimizing the other.
To be sure, there is a certain merit in emphasizing the difference between a
Warfare State and a Welfare State. The social welfare can be defined positively
in concrete terms which have a common meaning. Although there is no unanimity
about the range of programs that are needed to provide for the social welfare,

-305-

most authors would agree that they include "government protected minimum standards
of income, nutrition, health, housing, and education for every citizen, assured
to him as a political right, not a charity." 3 The concept, Welfare State, can alsc
be given an empirical context which is often lacking in the use of the ambiguous
term "peace" which literally means the absence of war or freedom from public
disturbances or quarrels. The Welfare State
• . . is a state in which organized power is deliberately used (through
politics and administration) in an effort to modify the play of market
forces in at least three directions--first, by guaranteeing individuals
and families a minimum income irrespective of the market value of their
work or their property; second, by narrowing the extent of insecurity by
enabling individuals and families to meet certain "social contingencies"
(for example, sickness, old age, and unemployment) which lead otherwise to
individual and family crises; and third, by ensuring that all citizens without
distinction of status or class are offered the best standards available in
4
relation to a certain range of social services.
In short, the social welfare is something that can be measured empirically in
contrast to the ambiguous qualitative state of peace. It spells out the social
media through which the conditions of peace can be defined. The Welfare State is
a tangible model for some of the necessary functions of the Peaceful State. 5
However, such a dichotomy obscures the reality of the vital interconnections
between warfare and welfare. Warfare and welfare are the realities of the modern
industrial nation. Through the use of the concept, Warfare/Welfare State, the
analyst begins to get at the etiology of social conflict and warfare. Universal
provision for the social welfare can reduce the likelihood of conflict domestically
and internationally.
Moreover, it is sometimes forgotten that "The Welfare State" had its origins in
times of war and, in fact, has been characterized as a "war strategy." The
Parliament of Great Britain commissioned Sir William Beverage to draw up a plan
for the reform of social services in June, 1941, when the bombs were falling in
the streets next to Westminster. The plan called for the maintenance of full
employment, comprehensive free health care and rehabilitation services, and social
insurance from the cradle to the grave. By 1945, the term "Welfare State" had
achieved popular currency. Titmuss, the eminent welfare historian, characterizes
this movement as "an imperative for war strategy . . . that the war could not be
won unless millions of ordinary people, in Britain and overseas, were convinced
better to offer than had our enemies--not only during but
that we had something
6
after the war."
A similar movement occurred in the United States during and after World War II,
based on broad social benefits to war workers and their families, and to the
veterans. However, the outline of the "Welfare State" took shape somewhat earlier
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and for somewhat different reasons.
of the 1930's

Romanyshin says that the "New Deal" measures

• . . were designed to preserve the capitalistic system from total collapse.
Establishing measures of income security, social legislation in this
period also served to bolster a badly shaken economy and to preserve rather
than dismantle the market system. One may indeed say that social welfare7 is,
in part, the answer of liberal capitalism to the challenge of socialism.
These welfare reforms during the war and shortly thereafter had vanished by the
early 1950's when the New York Times reported: "It seems that apart from manifestations like social security, which have become so built into the structure
that no one thinks of suggesting their elimination, we live under what
8 might be
described as a reluctant or emergency variety of the Welfare State."
The broadening of social welfare programs is only one governmental response to
unsettled conditions. Many nations have turned to other "solutions" which in
effect lead to the aggrandizement of the military. The militarization of society
may occur gradually and imperceptibly, rather than abruptly through such means as:
maintenance of a part-time army or a large standing army as a "solution" to unemployment; increasing public investment in military hardware, the staffing of government
offices with military personnel, including social services; the replacement by
the military of institutions traditionally under citizen control; the exporting of
the military goods and services, etc. All of these activities occur in the building
of the warfare/welfare state.
Furthermore, it is evident that national goals are seldom set in advance with
programs undertaken rationally step-by-step to achieve them. Rather, the goals
gradually emerge as a residual product, as a characterization of the modal tehavior
of the society. Therefore, the modal behavior should be studied empirically
together with a description of the types of activities and the processes that
occur during institutionalization.
The residual product of the gradual institutionalization of military and social
welfare programs and activities is The Warfare/Welfare State.
How This Issue Came Into Being
Every article in this issue is concerned with the effects of war on the growth and
development of social welfare and/or the interrelationship of warfare and welfare
institutions and is intended to serve as a continuing reference for social policy
analysts, welfare professionals, and peace activists.
The editors as well as
many of the contributors have more than a detached interest in the warfare-welfare
issue. They view warfare-welfare as a serious social problem, requiring continued
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study, publication, and action. 9 Consequently, readers are encouraged to syvmit
their comments and articles to the Journal for possible future publication.
Moreover, in editing this special topical issue of the Journal, several steps
were taken to encourage such a development.
First, several magazines and newsletters were requested to publish the "call for
papers." Among those responding favorably were the editors of Society, ArmedForces and Society, and the newsletters of several professional associatlons
representing sociologists, social workers, psychologists, problems analysts,
and welfare historians.
Second, several dozen social policy analysts and peace and welfare activists
were asked to comment about key issues in the warfare-welfare controversy. The
findings are reported in the article edited by Kenneth Kirkpatrick and
L. K. Northwood, in the following section.
Third, sponsorship of the Special Issue was requested of the Peace and Social
Welfare Task Force of the National Association of Social Workers. The Task Force
is an official body of the professional association comprised of the leaders of
chapter committees engaged in pertinent local, state, and national affairs. Through
its auspices several of the authors were encouraged to submit articles, and steps
have been taken to publicize and distribute the topical issue. The Task Force
is partially financed by the Institute for World Order, which is also collaborating
on the project.
Fourth, a small editorial committee of three helped in all phases of the work and
management of the project: Ann Blalock, Charles Maynard, and Kenneth Kirkpatrick.
Blalock and Maynard are students in the University of Washington School of Social
Work; Kirkpatrick is a leader in the peace movement, formerly a leading staff
member of the American Friends Service Committee. Hubert Blalock, Roger Roffman,
and Olga Northwood also served as readers of selected manuscripts.
Finally, a small grant was received from the Graduate School of the University
of Washington to facilitate the project, and secretarial services were provided
by Rexine Casey of the School of Social Work.
The format of the Journal is designed to implement its major purposes. In all,
there are 39 contributors: 26 authors of 22 articles; poetry and graphics; and
18 respondents to the survey, five of whom are also authors.
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Summary of Contents of Journal

I
The first section, "Crisis in the Warfare/Welfare State," largely provides
documentation for the assertion that the warfare-welfare issue is a very serious
social problem at a critical stage in its development.
We start with a review of the answers to the survey, edited by Kennth Kirkpatrick
and L. K. Northwood. The survey respondents find that the struggle between the
"haves" and the "have-nots" over the maldistribution of the world's resources
remains unabated and unresolved. This struggle takes many forms: between social
classes and ethnic groups, among nations and groups of nations. Despite the growth
of massive warfare as in the case of Vietnam, there is still subscription to
violence and militarism as "solutions" to these conflicts. National budgets
continue to expand and divert needed resources from economic development and
enhanced social welfare. The experts are almost unanimous in the belief that
increasing armaments do not guarantee national security, and for the most part
they do not see how one nation--even the most rich and powerful--can afford
both guns and butter in the long run.
The same themes characterize the position of the Hon. Elizabeth Holtzman, Congresswoman from New York. Her testimony is reproduced in part from the debate of the
recommendations of the Congressional Budget Committee for Fiscal 1977. The Holtzman
Amendment, introduced in the debate, asks for more flexibility in the budgeting
process, for the direct transfer of funds from one appropriations category to
another, in this case from the defense budget to certain social program budgets.
Both Holtzman and Congressman Mitchell of Maryland, who supported her in the
debate, warn of dire consequences if Congress continues to ignore rising inflation,
unemployment, and the fiscal crisis of cities.
Joseph Harris details the facts and figures of the New York City fiscal crisis.
New York City is not alone in facing financial difficulties. Harris inquires
into the reasons and causes of urban fiscal crisis. It is not because of "high
living" in the cities; it is not because of mismanagement of welfare programs.
Rather, for Harris, the fiscal crisis is an inevitable consequence of a state
dominated by giant corporations and rigged to pay off for them. The resources of
cities are drained off in the form of federal taxes and privileges for the rich
To ease the crisis it will be necessary to restructure the economy and the
political system. One of the needed first steps is demilitarization and transfer
of the savings to domestic programs.
This is a theme that will be repeated over and over again in slightly different
versions by many of the contributors; Adams, Dykema, Lo, Birchard, Dumas and Gil.
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It is not simply an imbalance in warfare and welfare expenditures in the Warfare/
Welfare State that brings about the crisis. The reasons pertain to the flawed
principles that govern the production and distribution of the resources of the
nation; they pertain to the fundamental nature of the capitalist enterprise.
II
The second section of the journal describes "The Rise of the Warfare/Welfare
State." Two major lines of development appear in the six articles that comprise
this section.
The first three articles (Peroff, Miller/Clark, and Clayton) examine the existence
and magnitude of the warfare-welfare tradeoff in the United States and other
nations. The warfare-welfare tradeoff refers to the proportion of the national
resources that are allocated to military and welfare expenditures.
Kathleen Peroff holds that there is a tradeoff: where there are large national
expenditures for the military, there is an undermining of welfare expenditures.
Public aid programs are most undermined by defense with a lesser effect on health
and housing programs. Peroff bases her conclusion on a sample of one nation, the
United States from 1929-1971.
James Clayton compares the United States with the United Kingdom during a similar
time span. He concludes that both nations have similar defense spending patterns,
whereas welfare effort in the United Kingdom exceeds that of the United States.
There is no statistically significant correlation between defense spending and
welfare spending over time in either country, Clayton states. "Both defense and
welfare have a life of their own and neither grows primarily at the expense of the
other. . . . The limits of declining defense budgets (relative to the GNP) seem to
have been reached in the U.S., but not in the U.K."
Leonard Miller and Marleen Clark sample a broader time span, ask more questions
of their data, and derive their answers from a larger sample of nations. Their
tentative conclusions are: that it is inappropriate to characterize the United
States as a "welfare laggard" performing below reasonable expectations; that
military spending does erode welfare spending, but not to the extent that international comparisons might lead us to believe; that in the long run the proportion
of the families in the nation that are female headed and the proportion of the
persons age 65 and older are better predictors of the size of the welfare effort
than either changes in the unemployment rates or changes in the amount of military
expenditures.
The authors of these papers demonstrate that it is no simple matter to establish
a general theory of warfare-welfare tradeoff among nations that vary in political,
economic, social, and cultural development. They are characterized by careful
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methodologies of statistical reasoning: the selection of social indicators of
"known" reliability and validity; care in sampling; explicit assumptions for
estimating parameters derived from time series data; caution in generalization-that is, specifying where findings are based on the research at hand and where
they represent less documentation. In general, these are technically sound
papers, assembling the existing statistical information, and reporting limited
"hard" results.
However, the reader will be well advised to consider the stringent limitations
which inhere in the research methodology employed. For example, where quantitative
social indicators are compared for a sample of nations, the analysis must be limited
to the data which are available for all of the nations in the sample. Each nation's
indicators must be comprised of similar information for valid comparison. The
reliability of each indicator must be assessed before it is adopted. When comparisons are made over time as well as among many nations, these problems are compounded.
Although population and economic statistics on which the social indicators are
based have been gathered for a considerable period of time in the leading industrial
nations, they are frequently reported in a form that makes analysis difficult and
dubious. Military statistics, for instance, are often state secrets. National
statistics are sometimes "rectified" after the fact and to suit national purposes.
Once identified and collected, the analyst faces notty problems of interpretation
from limited data. What time periods should be used in the analysis? How can the
statistics of a particular nation be provided with a valid social and economic
context? Which data may be used to provide context for a particular nation which
are not common to the sample of nations? How are these particular data to be
selected and interpreted? What kinds of statistical averages should be used?
Are there distortions produced by averaging, and how are these to be indicated?
These are just a few questions that must be answered in quantitative comparisons,
as well as those of a more qualitative order.
The balance of the articles in the section are concerned less with the warfarewelfare tradeoff and statistical methodology than with the societal context
which affects the growth and development of warfare and welfare institutions.
Paul Adams proposed a framework in which the relationship between war, the state,
and social policy can be examined, using a comparison of the United States and
the United lingdom as examples. He shows how warfare and welfare are both
essential to the growth of modern capitalist society. According to Adams, social
welfare policy is a function of the "needs of capital" and the "struggles of labor
and/or specially oppressed groups such as blacks or women." The impact of war
on social policy depends upon the demands it places upon the state, and upon the
balance of the class forces.
This framework is substantially different from that of Richard Titmuss, who has
made a similar analysis. Titmuss postulates that the aims and the content of
social policy are determined by the extent to which the cooperation of the masses
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is essential to the successful prosecution of a war--the critical variable being
the percent of individuals in the society used militarily to prosecute the war.
A high Military Participation Ratio (MPR) will tend to result in both equalitarian
and totalitarian (statist) outcomes, whereas a low MPR will widen social inequalities. Adams feels that MPR is only one of the variables to look at, and that
Titmuss' conclusions are based too narrowly on WWII, and on two particular
societies. Titmuss also fails, he says, to take into account the similar effects
produced by non-military "social crises," in terms of a new level of state intervention into the economy and other sectors of a society, and of the response of
the state and the elites to pressures from below. He implies that the competitive
nature of capitalism, which generates unusual social costs, forces the "capitalist
class" to strengthen the state to solve the problems created by these dislocations.
Analyzed within Adams' framework, contemporary limited wars on considered likely
to involve a low MPR and to be socially regressive, as compared with WWII. However,
he agrees with Titmuss that ruling groups in a class society will try to benefit
the health and welfare of subordinate strata when the latter's demands can no
longer be ignored. (The existence of such nee-T,however, is not of itself of any
real influence on social policy.) He disagrees with Titmuss that the "state" in
a class society represents the collective interest of the society. In fact he
claims that the opposite i.strue, that the "capitalist class" and the "worker class"
are inevitably in conflict, that social policy reflects the needs of the capitalist
class for a healthy, educated, secure work force and for social order. Providing
social benefits through the state if necessary--even at a short-run sacrifice--is
capital's way of assuring proper accumulation. Social crises--war being one
variety--tend to negate the characteristic separation of the "political" and the
"economic" in a capitalist society, accelerating new "corporatist" trends.
The differences between the U.S. and Britain in social policy spinoffs (health and
family as the primary examples) dramatize the different distribution of class
forces in society. In both instances war exposed the weakness of existing arrangements, elicited an unprecedented level of state intervention in economic and social
life. The main differences in impact were that Britain experienced a more severe
war threat, a higher MPR, more thorough and long-lasting state intervention, more
vulnerability in the capitalist class.
Both Adams and Clayton use the United States and the United Kingdom as examples in
their analyses of the warfare-welfare issue. Therefore, a comparison of their
findings is productive.
Like Adams and Harris, the two remaining articles in the section draw heavily on
Marxist theory. Both of the authors, Christopher Rhoades Dykema and
Clarence Y. H. Lo, base their papers on a critique of the political economy of
monopoly capitalism. The inner contradictions and shortcomings of capitalist
society are seen to lie at the roots of the social problems they analyze.
Dykema attributes the growth of social welfare institutions in the United States
largely to the recurrent depressions and the inability of the economy either to
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consume the products it produces or to provide steady work at living wages to a
large sector of the population. This creates functions which the warfare and
welfare institutions are expected to assume: the control of the impoverished
subproletariat through the provision of marginal subsistence and the creation
of jobs in the public sector; the maintenance of control over domestic disorder;
the development of new markets for the excess productivity; the consumption (waste)
of vast amounts of men and material through defense and war expenditures, etc.
Lo, on the other hand, described how similar contradictions in monopoly capitalism
led to the domination of conservative political regimes headed by Eisenhower,
de Gaulle and Nixon during the Korean, Algerian and Vietnamese Wars. He shows how
these regimes pushed for reduction in social spending and a reassertion of national
military and economic power, and were somewhat successful in mobilizing public
support around this program.
Lo, like Adams, is much concerned with the impact of war on social policy and the
development of social welfare programs. Both authors view social policy as kind
of an ideology. Whether a war encourages progressive social policy depends both
on the nature of the war and on the balance of the class forces in society, according to Adams. The new element that Lo adds to this analysis is the thesis that
anti-colonialist wars produce inflation and fiscal crisis for the colonialist
motherland and provide the opportunity for conservative elites to come into power.
The conservative response to fiscal crisis during and after warfare is to drastically
slash social programs, expand military programs, and increase the public debt. Lo's
article helps the reader to understand the political forces that underlie the
warfare-welfare state.
Ill

The third section of the journal contains four articles by social welfare scholars
analyzing different facets of "Social Work and the Military." A recurring question
is asked: can effective social services be provided under military auspices?
Ann Blalock and Charles Maynard in the lead article describe selected aspects of
the military establishment in the United States and conclude that there are many
problems intrinsic to the nature of military organization and its mission that prevent the full flowering of a "welfare state" under its auspices. There are serious
shortcomings in the social security programs designed for servicemen and in military
social services. They cite: inequities in income and occupational entitlements
for minority and low income personnel, women and early retirees; difficulties in
the provision of psychiatric and social services to military personnel and their
families during and following wars. Many of the accepted professional standards
for social and health workers are undermined and negated. In all, an uncertain
future is predicted for any growth of the welfare state under military auspices.
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George Ayers is similarly disillusioned with the social welfare efforts of the
military establishment. His dissatisfaction stems from an analysis of two
programs to facilitate the enlistment of military personnel, Project 100,000 and
the Medically Remedial Enlistment Program, and one program, Project Transition,
designed to provide educational, vocational and job counseling for enlisted personnel prior to release from active military duty. Ayers concludes that these
programs were (a) unnecessary, (b) disproportionate in terms of resources expended
to benefits received, (c) philosophically were not in keeping with either social
welfare values or the values of the military establishment.
On the other hand, Walter Friedlander's article describing the origin and scope
of social services for military personnel and veterans does not carry the negative
connotations of the preceding articles. He points out that there are many opportunities for social and health personnel to ameliorate the conditions and problems
of servicemen and veterans. There is also a substantial role for welfare organizations and agencies to assist in liaison, relief, and rehabilitation before,
during, and after wars.
Quentin Schenk discusses a different theme. He examines the military presence of
the United States in Ethiopia and some of its effects on the modernization of the
economic and agricultural infrastructure of that country. He believes that the
military presence was the single most important factor in accounting for the
alienation of youth in Ethiopia, which in turn became the dominant factor for the
current revolution in that country. U. S. military personnel were instrumental in
helping to establish schools and a host of social programs. But they set a style
of life and standards, which, Schenk asserts, were readily adopted by the elite
youth with whom they were in contact. This in turn resulted in discontinuities
and a rift in traditional patterns, and increasing opposition from the "old ruling
class" to the entire program for modernization. Schenk raises several pertinent
questions about the nature of military organization and whether it should or can
become the advance agent for welfare reform.
IV
The 13 articles in the first three sections, taken in combination, document the
first major thesis of the topical issue, namely: that moral, economic, and social
crises are engendered when a predominant share of the resources of the society is
allocated to military aggrandizement rather than to the amelioration of the social
welfare. This deployment of resources is costly, wasteful, inefficient and selfdestructive. It is impossible to sustain in the long run.
With the warfare-welfare problem thus defined, the final section of the journal
is devoted to a second major theme, that there is much that can be done now and
in the future by citizens, policy makers, social scientists, and social welfare
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professionals to alleviate the situation. Four "Strategies for Defusing the
Welfare State and Promoting the Welfare Society" are suggested in the final
section and the articles grouped accordingly. The four strategies are: (a) converting the Military-Industrial Complex, (b) educating for non-violence,
(c)imaging the future, and (d) legislative and political action.
The first article in the strategy section of the Journal is Bruce Birchard's
"Human Security or National Defense: The Question of Conversion." Birchard undertakes the examination of five interrelated questions: (a) What is the scope of
military spending in the United States? (b) What are the benefits of conversion
from military to non-military? (c) What is the technical feasibility of conversion?
(d)What are the obstacles to reconversion from a "liberal" point of view, from
a "radical" point of view? (e) What strategies exist for change? Birchard is
encyclopedic in his review of existing studies on the subject, many of which are
entirely relevant but buried is hard-to-locate government documents. He indicates
that there are many benefits in the conversion from military to non-military:
money, production, and services are released for scientific and technological
development and for meeting human needs; more jobs are provided; there is curtailment of waste and a lessening of inflation. Although the conversion to a peacetime economy is a complex, disruptive process, it is an entirely feasible one for
which standby plans are already in existence. And there are already many documented
cases of successful conversion experiences which are cited by the author. Birchard
discusses conversion obstacles and strategies from the standpoint of "liberal" and
"radical" ideologies. He gives several examples of these strategies.
Lloyd J. Dumas also deals with the nitty-gritty problems of conversion. He is
particularly concerned with the technical and social aspects of the process: the
retraining and reorientation of skilled workers and management; the retooling
and relocation of selected industries to mitigate hardships; the need for advance
planning, the mobilization of support services during the transition period; the
nature of reeducation, publicity, and community organization programs that are
required.
Dumas' paper also buttresses and goes beyond Birchard in its discussion of the
economic effects of military spending. Military spending has contributed much to
the economic deterioration of the United States in recent years, according to the
author. Four interrelated factors account for this; the uneconomic nature of
military goods; the wasteful nature of military procurement processes; the negative
effect of military expenditures on the international balance of payments; and their
baneful effects on technological development. It is for these reasons among
others that Dumas advocates conversion to peacetime production immediately.
Both Birchard and Dumas, as well as Marion Anderson, whose paper appears in this
section of the Journal are keenly aware that without public support any conversion
program is likely to fail. One of the major arguments used by the supporters of
the military industrial complex is that it provides many jobs for American workers.
It is this half-truth that Anderson cooly and rationally attempts to explore.
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Through a detailed analysis of government statistics, she is able to demonstrate,
state by state, that spending money on the military causes unemployment because
fewer jobs are created for each billion dollars spent on the military than if the
money were spent in any other way. It is through exposing such myths as this that
Anderson believes the general public will come to accept peacetime conversion.
Both Birchard and Dumas state the same theme in their papers, and Birchard, furthermore, describes a community action program for citizens concerned with this issue.
Another strategy for defusing the warfare state is the dismantling of armed forces
and the proliferation of the philosophy of non-violence throughout society.
Mulford Q. Sibley is an eloquent spokesman for this position. In his article,
"Social Welfare and Some Implications of Non-Violence," Sibley postulates that the
philosophy which guides social work is a non-violent one. He says: "Implicitly,
the profession of social work is committed to the notion of non-violence in personal
relations, else it denies its reason for being."
However, there are many sources in society which foster the practice of violence.
One of these is the armed forces. Therefore, to build a non-violent, welfare-based
society the armed forces must be reduced to a minimum. This can be accomplished
by unilateral disarmament, if necessary. Sibley makes a strong case for unilateral
disarmament and he indicates how the savings, thus realized, could be used for the
social welfare and the improvement of the standard of living of people everywhere.
The police would remain active as needed, though unarmed. Moreover, a nation could
prepare itself for invasion by outside military forces by setting up a corps of
community organizers and teachers of non-violent resistance who would instruct the
citizenry how to cope successfully with invading or occupying forces.
Orabelle Connally provides a partial test for the viability of Sibley's general
premise. She reports on non-violent resistance in the Navy during the Vietnamese
War. To be sure, there are many differences between a ship's complement and the
citizens in the open community. Connally has many questions about the feasibility
and effectiveness of non-violent tactics for organizing resistance and promoting
ameliorative change in this relatively restrictive setting.
The issue of non-violence appears in many different contexts. Elise Boulding
deals with one of these in her article, "A Disarmed World: Problems in Imaging
the Future." She refers to the relatively new field of future studies. The
futurists, Boulding claims, have largely failed to deal with the issue of disarmament, and this draws into question any estimates of alternative futures they may
make. Instead, images of the future appear in "the language of conquest: conquest
of nature, of territories, of people, of ideas." Boulding proposes that a nonconquest imagery be incorporated in futurist models. She sees social welfare
welfare
philosophy and practice as the source of non-conquest imagery and social
professionals as "Creators of Peaceable Futures."
roots
David Gil has a much more pessimistic (and realistic?) view of the common
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functions, and both are rooted in identical societal values, institutions, and
dynamics," according to Gil. Their underlying function is to serve as a balance
wheel for social orders based on injustice, privilege, force, and structural
violence. Consequently, there is no temporizing solution to the warfare/welfare
state and its corresponding institutions. They must be abolished and replaced by
"a coordinated, egalitarian, cooperative federation of self-reliant, free
communities, each directing its own affairs and life style through genuine
democratic processes, each guaranteeing to its members equality of rights
and responsibilities, and all participating in exchanges of raw materials
and human-created goods and knowledge on fair, egalitarian terms."
The final articles return to the strategies of political and legislative action,
a theme which receives much attention throughout the Journal. Bertram Weinert
calls for "Social Work Skills and Political Action in the Current Crisis." Ann
Blalock proposes that increasing numbers of social workers have the expertise and
are in positions where they can influence warfare-welfare priorities through the
new Congressional budgetary process. Both articles are realistic about the many
obstacles that will have to be overcome to affect changes in the Warfare/Welfare
State. They are also realistic in their estimate that such changes will not come
about spontaneously. Social workers and their constituents have a vested interest
in the provision of greater social welfare-benefits. The authors believe that
professionals can make a significant contribution to reform.
Toward Further Research on the Subject
At the time when the "call for papers" was issued, the editors of this Journal
asked eighteen social policy analysts the following:
"What questions should be dealt with in order to put the warfarewelfare issue in proper focus? Given the broad scene of the subject,
which aspects do you believe should be given priority in research,
study, and action?
We report the results of this survey. Our reason for doing this is to draw
attention to some topics given insufficient attention in the Journal, and to
encourage prospective authors to submit manuscripts for a future edition. First,
the results of the survey are presented; then the topics receiving insufficient
attention are identified.
Three priorities for research, study, and action on warfare-welfare issues are
identified by the respondents:
1. On the militarization of the United States and its social consequences:
The statement of Alfred McClung Lee permeates the commentary of many of those
answering:
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"War has been an integral part of our national life every year since the
United States came into existence. It has long been the principal focal
point of our Federal budget. Especially since we embarked on a series of
thrusts towards international imperialism and even worldwide hegemony beginning with the Spanish-American War, the United States has come to
resemble more and more a latter day Roman empire, adapted to the exigencies
of our day's technology and world conditions. I should like to see research
aimed at discovering steps of any sort that would reveal and offset the
militarization and imperialization of our society."
Some respondents, such as Sanford Gottlieb and Albert Schrekinger, propose that
the militarization of the United States should be measured in terms of the nature
of the threats faced internationally and domestically. Schrekinger asks:
"What dangers to national and international security are inherent in
continuing the "military-industrial-complex" values and policies
guiding our national government, particularly since the end of
World War II, particularly during the past decade?"
Gottlieb assigns first priority to research undertaken to determine the nature of
the threats, their reality, and their societal consequences.
2.
William
highest
to play

On the symbiotic relationship of warfare and welfare institutions:
Gamson, Mulford Q. Sibley, and Edward Snyder, and others propose that the
priority in research be given to the kind of role the United States wants
in the world and the kind of society we should develop at home.

"Is there a symbiotic or competitive relationship between the welfare
system and military-industrial complex? What would be the implications
of given reorientations of American military and foreign policy on the
welfare system in the U.S.? In what way, if any, does the existing
military and foreign policy of the U.S. place constraints on the welfare
system other than those arising from consuming scarce resources? What
would be the implications of given reorientations of the welfare system
for the military and foreign policy of the U.S.?" (Gamson)
"Priorities should include: questioning the notion that military 'defense'
defends; questioning whether, within the premises of the present economic
system, we can provide enough 'welfare,' even if we cut military expenditures;
efforts to study whether large military establishments give any kind of guarantee against invasion; serious consideration of non-violent resistance and
of unilateral disarmament." (Sibley)
"The outlines and cost of various alternative foreign policies, including
peace through law and the role of non-violent resistance, should be investigated. There should be a realistic examination of the concept of sovereignty'
and the extent to which world interdependence is already an inescapable fact."
(Snyder)
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3. On strategies for change: Richard Levy, Lloyd Dumas, David Gil, Albert
Schrekinger and others stressed that the focus of research, study and action be
placed on strategies for change rather than upon the abstract analysis of the
sources of abuse.
"The focus should be on developing strategies for change. Such a strategy
can, of course, only begin with a clear understanding of the source of the
problem, but it must also contain suggestions on ways to change the situation
for it to be useful.
In terms of specific questions I would be interested in articles on: how
to increase mass awareness of the costs of military spending (both economic
and social); analysis of the position of unions in defense plants on changes
in the defense budget and what types of arguments could be used to eliminate
the dichotomy between the long and short term interests of these people, etc."
(Levy)
"There are three key points: (a) to make clear the enormous cost of high
levels of military spending in terms of goods and services foregone, and
in terms of social and economic deterioration--economic costs'; (b) to
focus on the clear demonstration that the present size of the U.S. military
is far in excess of what is required for national security purposes and may
actually be counterproductive regardless of the size of the military forces
of our adversaries--'military realities'; and (c) that conversion from
military to civilian orientation of our economy is perfectly possible
without generating serious economic and social difficulties--'conversion
feasibility'." (Dumas)
"The foremost question is survival through restructuring our basic institutions
of resource management, work organization, rights distribution and governance
in accordance with genuinely democratic, egalitarian, and libertarian values.
Within this question there are many details to be worked out. Beyond that
question we have to deal with matters of strategy: How can people discover
what their real interests are and how to move toward them." (Gil)
"What major changes need to and can be made in developing domestic U.S.
priorities, particularly in regard to 1) reconversion of the economy from
'warfare' to purposes meeting human needs, 2) effective utilization of
limited energy resources, and 3) protection of the environment." (Schrekinger)
In each of the priority areas, additional research is needed.
are cited:

A few examples

1. The warfare-welfare priorities of a nation are frequently expressed in
its budgetary and fiscal policies. While the national budgetary and fiscal
policies are referred to in many papers included in this Journal; nowhere is
there a careful analysis and critique of the technical research shortcomings of
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these procedures. Such an analysis should be grounded in the social organization
of the national budgeting process. It should deal with how information actually
flows in the system; who has access to the information and who does not; how the
message is shaped and channeled at each stage; whom information is reported to
or not reported to; how the information is used and with what effects. Such a
social analysis could facilitate the assessment of the reliability and validity
of information used in studies of warfare and welfare. And it could have strategic
implications for ameliorative intervention. Those who control the flow of information in society become the shapers of existing myths and facts on which social
policy is based. An open information system is one of the pillars on which
scientific knowledge and representative democracy rests. Therefore, clarification
of the technical and social processes which govern information flow is essential
to knowledge of the warfare-welfare issue.
2. The Journal is also lacking in detailed papers concerning the psychological
and social effects of war and the effects of war on the society and its members.
Although many of the papers touch on this subject, there is need for more profound
It is alleged that war and the threat of war have important social conanalysis.
sequences for the existing norms of society, especially as concerns beliefs about
Moreover, it is alleged that there
violence, scapegoating, and ethnocentrism.
has been a diffusion of military protocols and behavior into the civil order,
particularly in the arena of law and justice, industrial organization and management, and the control or guidance of the mass media. It would be useful to have
careful studies of the subject.
3. A valid social science depends upon a representative sampling of behavior
in space and time. Detailed case studies are needed of nations and comparisons
among nations of what happens to social welfare institutions when warfare results
in the devastation of home territory as well as depletion of resources. We would
hypothesize that national survival takes precedence and military expenditures
dominate under such conditions. But what happens during the period of maximum
devastation when war prevails? What happens in the post-war period? Is there a
substantial difference for the "victors" in a costly devastating war than for the
vanquished? What happens if there is a major transformation in the social, political, and economic structure of the nation? The proposal for investigation is that
a sample of nations be selected and rank ordered according to the relative costs
and consequences of the war for each nation. Then detailed case studies are made
of the growth, development, and changes in the social welfare institutions, i.e.,
the warfare-welfare tradeoff. Such a strategy of research is needed to rectify
based on
or validate the findings of Peroff, Miller/Clark and Clayton which are
nations,
homogeneous
relatively
of
sample
limited
a
or
a single (atypical) nation
within or
which employ statistical techniques that average out major differences
to the costs and
among nations, and which fail to assign appropriate weights
development.
social
nation's
consequences of wars on a particular
it will take
4. For the most part, the authors in this Journal believe that coalition of
conscious
politically
a
or
party
political
at least a well organized
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citizen and welfare groups to change the warfare-welfare priorities of the nation.
However, with few exceptions, notably Birchard and Anderson, they have little to
say about the nitty-gritty of effective organizational strategies. Therefore,
there is need for such research.
The editors invite you to join in the dialogue.
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EIGHTEEN LEADING SOCIAL CRITICS COMMENT:
WHAT IS THE REAL THREAT TO WORLD PEACE AND SOCIAL SECURITY?
Edited by Kenneth A. Kirkpatrick and L. K. Northwoodl
What is the real threat to world peace and social security? Is it the prevalent ideology of violence, aggressive nationalism, and militarism? Or is it the
maldistribution of resources, technology, and social welfare benefits? How much of
itsnational budget must the U.S. allocate to military expenditures? How can the
national budget priorities be changed so there is a more realistic funding of social
programs? Do we face as great a threat of nuclear annihilation in the '70's and the
'80's as we did in the early '60's?
These are some of the questions the editors asked of 96 "experts" on the warfare-welfare problem. In all, 18 persons responded to the invitation, including 22%
of the social scientists (N=11), 10% of the writers and editors (N=l), 25% of the
executives of peace organizations (N=5), 10% of the elected government officials
(N=l), and none of the military leaders. The names and affiliations of participants
are indicated on the following page.
The report that follows faithfully attempts to reproduce the opinions of these
respondents on five of the questions asked. Other findings of the survey appear
elsewhere in the Journal.
QUESTION 1. Despite the ending of the war in Southeast Asia and a general lessening
of tensions among the major world powers, there has been a great increase in military expenditures in the United States. How much of its
national budget must the U.S. allocate to military expenditures to
guarantee its security in the world today-- What is your estimate?
National security by military means is no longer a viable policy for the United
States. With few exceptions, this is the strongly held opinion of the experts on
warfare-welfare problems who responded to the survey. It is their estimate that
modern weapons systems, e.g., intercontinental ballistic missiles carrying thermonuclear warheads, cannot defend this country from attack because if such weapons
were used they would inevitably bring about retaliation and our demise. Furthermore, they say that the present U.S. policy of thermonuclear deterrence is a constant threat to our existence and the survival of the human race. It is unable to
give us or others a sense of security. In fact, the fear of technological breakthrough generates a continuous search for new weapons of increasing destructiveness
which create an escalating and immensely costly nuclear arms race.
One of the erroneous assumptions underlying the present commitment to building a
vast military machine is that national security is exclusively or even primarily a
military matter. These respondents consider a society with a strong economy and
dedicated to social justice of prime importance. In this perspective, national
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security is more likely to be realized in a society which treats people in a fair
and humane way than one that is committed to a "will-o'-the-wisp" search for nationA fair and humane society
al security by ever-increasing military expenditures.
would serve as a model for other countries to emulate.
There are many risks associated with a national policy of thermonuclear deterrence,
according to the respondents, such as hidden, irrational, or accidental attacks and
theft by terrorists or hostile governments. With the proliferation of nuclear

weapons, there is decentralization of control and a greater risk of human error and
miscalculation.
The respondents estimate that military expenditures need to be cut drastically by:
$25 billions (Gulick); $30 to $40 billions (Clark); $57 billions (Dumas and Rosen);
and $75 to $85 billions (Gamson and Snyder). Herbert Gans suggests a cut in the
military budget by over 90%--this would mean a reduction for the Pentagon (not including military-related expenditures) from its present S113 billions "to $5 to S10
billions." But he points out that such a recommendation is "mere fantasy" because
"no leader has enough power to neutralize his or her own military establishment, and
my fantasy ignores the geopolitical and other group factors that push nations into
war or belligerence."
David Gil and Mulford Sibley recommend that no funds at all be provided for military
purposes because the armed forces today are unable to guarantee the national security. In addition, Mulford Sibley notes that one major obstacle preventing such a
turnabout is our enslavement to "the mythology that military violence and its threat
can somehow provide security for human beings and democratic institutions." Also:
"With the elimination of the armed forces, all expenditures budgeted for
military functions in the national budget should be transferred to functions
meeting genuine human needs at home and abroad." (Gil)
However, Morris Janowitz suggests a relatively small cut of $7 to $8 billions. This
would mean, according to his view, that the Pentagon's budget would be "reduced over
the years ahead to 6 or 7 percent without endangering national security."
Others call for an immediate cut of $40 billions in military spending and the elimination of two specific programs: the multi-billion dollar weapon systems, the B-l
Bomber and Trident (missile) submarine (Clark).
Still others did not specify the amount of military cuts, and Albert Schrekinger
cautions that military spending islarger than it appears. For example, many military and military-related programs (e.g., veterans' benefits, about 80% of the
national debt, etc.) are hidden under other categories in the Federal Budget.
. . . about two-thirds of our national budget have been allotted to the
military in recent years, and that the Nixon-Ford administration has been
juggling figures to support their false contention that there has been an
increasing share of our national budget for what they call 'human resources.'"
Several examples are cited:
"Payments from Social Security trust funds have been included under the
latter heading [human resources] ; so have also been payments to war
veterans, while money expended for military purposes in interest for
war debts and for the space program has been juggled away from the
'defense' designation."
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In summary, the consensus indicates the need to reduce significantly military and
military-related (hidden) expenditures in the Federal Budget. The reason is evident: the present U.S. overkill posture not only would destroy our adversaries but
also ourselves and the rest of the world. Moreover, a decision to use such weapons,
according to the respondents, would be an insane decision that would bring down
upon us and the rest of the world Armageddon.
Therefore, it becomes a primary goal to end the arms race, to support peace initiatives for meaningful cutbacks in arms production and stockpiling.
QUESTION 2. Given the quantity and distribution of world resources, do you think it
possible for any single nation by itself to provide for both its social
security and national defense at the same time? Is the policy of both
guns and butter a feasible one for the United States today?
Only two respondents give an unqualified positive response to this question: Walter
Friedlander's affirmative answer is with no further comment, but Morris Janowitz
adds:
"The U.S., or any advanced industrialized society, could adequately provide
both for Social Security [social programs] and national defense. This is
especially the case for the U.S., where the basic issue is that of reducing
unemployment and especially increasing the proportion of the gross national
product allocated to investment and capital goods. In the developing countries, the task of raising the standard of living is staggering, but in no
sense is it critically related to the level of military expenditures in
those countries. Reduction in the level of military expenditures would be
desirable but would hardly produce the necessary changes in the social and
political institutions of these countries required for effective societal
change."
Associated with several other ostensibly affirmative answers are comments which significantly change their initial positive responses. An example of this is:
"The key to doing so [providing both adequate social and military security],
however, is understanding realistically which level and composition of
expenditures on military forces are actually effective in providing good
military security, and which are either useless or counterproductive.
Presently the military sector commands far too great a share of the nation's
limited resources. A policy of 'unlimited guns and butter' is not feasible
for the U.S. today--but a policy of 'security and butter' is." (Dumas)
Alfred Lee and Pauline Rosen believe that providing both adequate social and military
But both agree
security might be possible for the U.S. for a limited period of time.
out. Very
wiped
or
crippled
are
programs
social
escalate,
as military expenditures
contention:
recent experience seems to bear out this
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"Guns and what they control become progressively more costly and lead to the
loss of colonial and neocolonial controls as well as to the destruction of
the nation's own internal morale. Our Korean and Vietnam ventures have, for
the time, taught a lot of rank-and-file Americans how costly such imperialistic efforts are, but our politicians do not appear to have ceased being
tools of international adventurers." (Lee)
Nine respondents give an unqualified "no" to this question. Their general reasoning
is:
"No country, even the richest, can realistically undertake a military/foreign
policy of playing world policeman and running an arms race in nuclear weapons,
and, at the same time, meet complex domestic needs. In theory, guns and
butter are possible. In practice, guns prevail because governments generally
are willing to pay for the resources--both physical and human--that go into
military preparations." (Gottlieb)
"Without regard to other nations, I believe the U.S. can provide for both its
social security and its national defense at the same time if, and only if,
national 'defense' is not national 'offense'. Assuredly, the continental
limits of the U.S. can be adequately defended, while at the same time, provision can be made for the legitimate social and economic requirements of our
people. In the classic sense I do not believe that we can have both guns and
butter." (Clark)
The remaining seven respondents state explicitly that a policy of both "guns and
butter" is not feasible, appropriate, or politically possible for the U.S. (Gil,
Gulick, Harris, Snyder, Sibley, Costigan, and Schrekinger) Sibley identified the
basic incompatibility between the two policies:
"Guns, whether possessed by individuals or States, are a heart-thrust at
welfare and bread and butter. The gun mythology so characteristic of the
United States, whether in the form of so-called military defense or in that
of individual weaponry, simply has to be eroded. We have to choose between
guns and butter. But it should not be a difficult choice since guns cannot
feed us, clothe us, house us, or protect us."
In summary, with only two exceptions, the respondents believe that it is not possible to have an adequate military defense and provide for the social needs of the
American people. Adequate military defense and provision for social needs are in
irreconcilable conflict because human and natural resources are limited.
Most respondents realize that military defense in the thermonuclear age is not only
prohibitively costly, but also there is no defense against such barbaric instruments
of indiscriminate mass destruction. With this recognition, these respondents advocate moving resources from the military to the civilian sector. They make a priority choice for using scarce resources to meet some unmet social and economic needs
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of tens of millions of Americans and billions of our neighbors. The results of
such efforts would bring some semblance of social justice on the planet in which
we all live.
QUESTION 3.

Is it possible to have an equitable redistribution of the world
resources without recourse to war and the threat of war?

All respondents answered in the negative. These answers, however, reflect two different but related ways of looking at the question. One perspective emphasized the
need for major changes by peaceful means of the status quo to effect a more equitable distribution of the world's resources, but recognized that such changes are
unlikely because of the political climate and related factors. (Clark, Costigan,
Dumas, Friedlander, Gamson, Harris, Levy, Rosen, and Schrekinger)
The other perspective stressed the reactionary nature of modern war. War not only
serves to perpetuate present inequities, but also creates many new ones. (Gil,
Gottlieb, Gulick, Janowitz, Lee, Sibley, and Snyder)
Only in a theoretical or abstract sense can this question be answered positively;
when political and related factors are weighed, the question must be answered negatively. This conclusion was reached by our respondents because they believe that an
equitable redistribution of the world's resources is realizable only in a reconstituted international framework. Numerous statements represent this view:
"It is entirely possible to have equitable distribution of world resources without recourse to war or threat of war. However, this will take far more skillful multi-lateral diplomacy than either the U.S. or the countries of the Third
World are engaging in at present. In essence it requires a far stronger role
in international affairs by the U.N."
(Clark)
"Theoretically, it is perfectly possible [to have an equitable redistribution of
the world's resources], but this would involve international planning and cooperation on a scale that seems unlikely at present."
(Costigan)
"It is economically possible through the development and expansion of mutually
beneficial, non-exploitive trade, and some international transfers, though
considerable time may be required. But as to whether it is politically possible, that is a different matter entirely."
(Dumas)
The theoretical versus the practical dichotomy is echoed:
"It is possible to have an equitable distribution of the world's resources without recourse to war, if the international community could move rapidly toward a
New International Order which guarantees to all nations the right to develop
and use their own resources."
(Rosen)
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The lack of an appropriate consensus and the absence of the necessary world institutions to bring about an equitable redistribution of the world's resources are clearly recognized, but few respondents attempt to identify what needs to be done to make
this possible. However, they do not hesitate to condemn modern war because its
results would destine the human race to a new form of barbarism where even more
gross disparities of wealth would exist between nations than at present.
According to Lee:
"Given the nature of the principal power centers of the world, it is highly
unlikely that an equitable distribution of world resources can come about
without recourse to war. Such a war would be of such destructive and revolutionary magnitude that it would achieve results far different from those
presumably sought. It would probably return humanity to a lower technological level of barbarism than the present one."
The double-edged nature of the modern war machine is well-stated in this brief
quotation:
"In the age of nuclear weapons, recourse to war would likely destroy many of
the resources themselves. The threat of war will likely lead to widespread
waste of resources in needless military preparations." (Gottlieb)
The validity of the first statement in the above quotation is easily understood, but
the same thing cannot be said about the last statement. Even if the world is lucky
enough to avoid a man-made catastrophe, humankind is still faced with the spectacle
of unimaginable amounts of both natural and human resources being ravenously devoured by an unsatiable war machine which is not under rational control.
War and the threat of war require huge military expenditures and a resulting drain
not only on this country's but also the world's limited resources. The dimensions
of waste are better understood when considering the amount of human and natural
resources expended not only in waging war but also in maintaining the Nixonian
"structure of peace." War seen in this light becomes of primary concern to the
conservationist; not only war, but preparations for war, are conservation issues.
Joseph Harris believes the present U.S. economic system and related foreign policy
are the primary barriers preventing the shift of resources from the rich to the poor
countries:
"Equitable redistribution of the world's resources from ownership and control
by large corporations to the control of the working people of each nation is
possible, but not inevitable, without recourse to war and threat of war . .
If the U.S. government could be forced to keep its hands off other nations,
peaceful change would become the rule rather than the exception."
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And, along similar lines:
"In the abstract it would be possible to distribute . . . the world's resources equally. However, in fact, large amounts of these resources are
controlled by different countries and different multinational corporations
which have demonstrated that they are unwilling to give up their fiefdoms
without resort to violence. Therefore the answer . . . is no, although the
source of violence will be found in those who already dominate world resources
and who will seek to expand their control of them." (Levy)
Lloyd Dumas and William Gamson offer a glimmer of hope for change by peaceful means
of the present imbalance of the world's resources:
"If we are talking about a pure redistribution of resources, that would require
that these individuals living in the more developed countries would have to
voluntarily undergo considerable reduction in their own standards of living in
order to enhance the material quality of life of people in the less developed
countries. It seems doubtful that they would ever do so, and it is difficult
to blame them for offering resistance. However, if, instead, we are talking
about the convergence of the standards of living in the world's nations over
time by faster growth of the less developed relative to the more developed
countries . . . a supporting consensus could be developed peacefully and without coercion. I don't know that such a consensus should be expected to
develop automatically, but it certainly could be developed.
"It would also be helpful to put greater emphasis on the developments of technologies associated with resources which are already fairly equitably distributed. Solar energy is probably the outstanding example. Sunlight is probably
the most equitably distributed and abundant energy resource available. It
cannot be monopolized, cartelized, or otherwise restricted or embargoed,
either internationally or intranationally. The full development and dissemination of solar technology would provide even resource-poor nations with at
least the critical energy resources required for economic development and the
continued operation of modern technical society." (Dumas)
be"War is unlikely to be the means for redistribution of the world's wealth
given
cause the have-nots are unlikely to fare very well in such conflicts,
the best hope for
that they are militarily weaker as well as poorer. Probably
the peaceful
within
forces
and
redistribution comes from internal movements
and wealthier countries." (Gamson)
is and will be as great a threat
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defense against nuclear annihilation possible?
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Of the 16 respondents answering this question, 13 believe that the threat of
nuclear war will be as great (4) or greater (9) in the 1970's and 1980's as it was
in the 1960's. Only three thought it would be less of a threat; the reason given
is the lessening of tensions between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. (two of the respondents
specifically mentioned detente). But two of these respondents believe that nuclear
proliferation is increasing the danger of a nuclear war being launched by smaller
nations who have recently acquired nuclear capability in the form of licensed
nuclear power plants provided by the established nuclear powers.
The 13 respondents who see imminent dangers in the present thermonuclear arms race
cite numerous reasons for the heightening of world tensions and the ominous threat
of nuclear destruction. They range from mistrust of present leadership and attitudinal changes toward nuclear war to current nuclear strategies. Of the threat of
nuclear war, Senator Joseph Clark makes this observation:
"This is because of the short-sighted and stupid diplomacy on behalf of not
only the Soviet Union and the U.S. but also of the many of the dictatorships
in other nations . . . I call attention to the statement of five nuclear
scientists at MIT and Harvard, who recently declared the threat of nuclear
warfare is increasing, not decreasing."
Paralleling the above statement, Richard Levy says:
"As long as people like Nixon, Ford, and Kissinger are in a position to plunge
the world into nuclear catastrophe, the possibility of such an occurrence
cannot be ignored. With regard to the U.S., I feel the change in Administration will make little difference in the likelihood of nuclear war: Kennedy
brought us to the brink in Cuba; Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Ford all
viciously bombed Southeast Asia. Nixon perhaps was more dangerous in some
ways, due to his mental instability; Ford, on the other hand, is perhaps
more dangerous because of his 'quiet' conservatism and his desire to be
,resolute', e.g. the Mayaguez slaughter."
Lloyd Dumas comments on the significant attitudinal changes occurring during the
past three decades which have increased the dangers inherent in the present nuclear
arms race:
"It seems as though people, having lived with nuclear weapons longer, have
become less afraid of them. An entire generation, not yet born at the time
of the [atomic] bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, has grown to maturity.
Children in their infancy at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis are now in
their mid-teens. The trauma of the conventional war in Vietnam diverted
attention from the nuclear arena for the better part of a decade. All this
may have led to a combination of ignorance and diminished fear of nuclear
annihilation which is not justified by hard military and political reality."
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Several respondents emphasize the recent dangerous shift in U.S. nuclear weapons
strategy. The comments of Admiral La Roque and Lloyd Dumas are illustrative:
"In addition to building increasing numbers of new weapons, the Pentagon has
initiated a series of significant and dangerous changes in U.S. nuclear
weapons' doctrine. These doctrinal changes will make nuclear war more likely
and increase the danger. . . . The new U.S. nuclear doctrine involves, first,
increased emphasis on counterforce and the desirability and possibility of
fighting small nuclear wars, and second, increased emphasis on possible first
use of both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons in response to aggression
in Europe and Asia. The idea of limited counterforce wars--or a selective
limited Soviet first strike against a few U.S. missile silos--and a comparable U.S. response--is an extremely dangerous idea. There is no way nuclear
war can be kept limited. . . . We and the Soviets have no actual combat
experience with such wars, and the idea that we can actually fight such a
war is the product of academic theorists with no significant military experience. . . . The U.S. has no way of determining that a nuclear attack is in
fact limited, and military prudence would likely result in rapid escalation
of such a limited war." (La Roque)
"The resurrection of the strategic doctrine of 'counterforce' or 'pre-emption',
i.e. first strike destruction of enemy [nuclear] weaponry, has clearly increased the danger of general nuclear war. The easiest way for an enemy to
assure that its deterrent (or first strike) force will not 'be destroyed' by
a pre-emptive attack is for it to launch its weapons before the attack force
arrives. Thus, the brilliant counterforce strategy has merely succeeded in
providing an incentive for the enemy to move its finger closer to 'the button'
and to press it more readily when serious confrontation occurs. . . . In
addition, scenarios and strategies for fighting 'limited' nuclear wars have
apparently proliferated despite the fact that no one has yet been able to
offer a persuasive logic for how such wars can be prevented from degenerating
into all-out nuclear holocaust. But the more we play with these limited war
scenarios, and the more we fantasize about being able to fight limited and
hence 'acceptable' nuclear wars, the more we are at risk of fooling ourselves
into believing our own fantasies. Under these conditions the 'unthinkable'
act of purposely precipitating a nuclear war becomes 'thinkable', and this is
an extraordinarily dangerous situation." (Dumas)
Several other factors are seen as perpetuating the fears and anxieties associated
with the continuing nuclear arms race: the increasing numbers of nuclear weapons,
with more people having access to them; the increase probability of accident, miscalculation, and unauthorized use. (Gottlieb, Janowitz, Rosen, and Snyder) Also,
Alfred Lee believes nuclear annihilation is not only "likely to become a greater
threat, but it is likely to be linked with even greater horrors still germinating
in our laboratories, possibly in the areas of novel poisons and diseases."

Several respondents refer to civilian defense, but in several instances there is a
lack of clarity on what that term means. In these cases the term "civilian defense"
is interpreted as civil defense. The latter, of course, is commonly understood to
mean comprehensive planning and preparations for protecting a civilian population
from nuclear attack by planes or missiles. Gorman, Gottlieb, Janowitz, and Snyder
unanimously agree that civil defense cannot protect a nation from nuclear attack,
in fact may even tend to provoke it. This point is dealt with by Edward Snyder:
".. . A determined civil defense program might well make an attack more likely
if viewed by the 'enemy' as part of a first-strike policy. If by 'civilian
defense' you mean a nation organized along lines of non-violent resistance,
that policy might well prevent a nuclear attack from occurring and be at least
as feasible a way to defend against aggression as the present bankrupt military
defense policy."
A similar view of civilian defense is embraced by Mulford Sibley:
"The only hope against nuclear annihilation is the destruction of this mythology
[of the efficacy of military violence] and reliance solely on non-violent means
of 'defense'. Non-violence means--the promotion of justice and the organization of non-violent resistance--cannot guarantee security, to be sure, but they
are far more compatible with it than threat of military violence. The question
is one of where we pin our faith. Both reliance on violence and reliance on
justice and non-violence involve acts of faith and a measure of uncertainty.
On the basis of historical experience, however, it seems to me that reliance on
justice and non-violence is a more justifiable faith than confidence in military might."
All respondents recognize the immense dangers involved in the present nuclear arms
race and see the risks increasing unless there is a reversal of present policies.
Several concrete proposals are made to reduce the level of present nuclear stockpiles and the number of delivery systems. Albert Schrekinger proposes:
"There is an increasing threat to life on this planet, even from the proliferation of 'peaceful' uses of nuclear energy, until safe ways have been found for
the operation of nuclear plants and for the disposal of nuclear waste. To
safeguard human and any other life on this planet, first a world-wide moratorium on any kind of further construction of nuclear energy plant is necessary.
Simultaneously, serious steps must be taken towards complete universal disarmament as the top priority in the gradual complete disarmament, as a vital part
of the development toward an international order of peace and welfare. In the
meantime, international compacts need to be made for effective controls against
any abuses of nuclear devices for violence against human beings."
The Hon. Joseph Clark lists several initial steps:
1. A comprehensive nuclear test ban.
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2. Elimination of all land-based nuclear delivery systems and their warheads.
3. Both U.S. and U.S.S.R. make drastic cuts in nuclear-armed, missilecarrying submarines (eventually leading to the destruction of them).
4. Stop all trade in arms to other countries.
A third list is made by Admiral Gene La Roque:
1. All nuclear powers renounce the use of such weapons against countries
that do not possess them.
2. A "no first use" agreement among the present nuclear powers.
3. The U.S. should announce that under no circumstances will it be the first
to use nuclear weapons.
4. Both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. take immediate steps to limit and reduce their
stockpiles of nuclear weapons.
QUESTION 6. How can the national budget priorities in the United States be
changed so that there is a more realistic funding of social programs?
Eleven of 14 respondents believe that a political movement or new political party
is necessary to bring about changes in national budget priorities to provide adequate funds for social programs. Present priorities are determined by groups
which shape and control the decision-making processes; thus it is possible for
them to promote their interests successfully. However, there is no common agreement of how these processes work.
Some tend to see power residing with established institutions and political structures; others see power abiding with less clearly definable groups which are outside or marginal to the established political processes. Regardless of these
differences in perception and analyses, all believe that if you want to determine
budget priorities then it is necessary to be in a position to influence these
priorities by having access to the decsion-making processes; access, of course,
is not limited to being a part of the formal power structure. Clark, Costigan,
and Janowitz believe significant changes can be achieved by working through the
established political parties and structures.
"The national budget priorities can be changed only by the strongly expressed
will of the people, manifested in the elections for Congress, the Senate, and
the Presidency." (Clark)
In contrast, "broader political processes" are seen as necessary for social change
and the desired budget priorities. William Gamson believes that the process involves ". . . more than electoral and other established institutional means, and
includes social protest and social movements as well." David Gil expresses this
view:
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"Changes require a political movement committed to work for them for a long
time. Social systems are intrinsically conservative. To overcome a prevailing order, one has to overcome the dominant consciousness and definitions of
interest of the people which maintain it. This is an extended process."
Sibley and Lee believe that a new political party or a different economic system are
vehicles for social change:
This ". . . will probably require a broadly based new political party no longer
tied to the cliches and evasions of the two major parties. The party will have
to be divorced from the war machine and will have to be critical of the citadels of an economy which is not designed primarily to serve human needs.
Basically, the party should be pacifist." (Sibley)
"As long as our elected officials depend upon special interest donors to win
elections, our national budget priorities will continue to represent--as they
do now--those special interests. The situation can only be changed through
democratizing the control of the means of production and of the means for the
provision of services in this country. That means a change to democratic
socialism." (Lee)
The need for a broad political movement or a new political party is also shared by
Gans, Gulick, Harris, Levy, and Schrekinger.
Eleven respondents emphasize the important role of public education in reshaping
national budget priorities. Sibley describes how this would work:
"Only by a vast expansion of our educational efforts, particularly in the adult
education area [will the desired changes take place]. This will entail the
efforts of millions of unpaid persons and considerable sacrifices of money and
time. Essentially, we have to debunk certain mythologies while at the same
time building the constructive case for a welfare society. ...
". .. Most of us, in one way or another, still labor within the framework of
such mythologies as that military defense defends; that somehow there is something wrong about making 'welfare' central; that human beings must be goaded
by threat of starvation to get them to work; that all technological development benefits mankind."
Two important problem areas where concentrated educational efforts are needed are
identified by Gans:
"First . . .. every society develops the social programs that benefits its
dominant power blocs. In the U.S., the business community is surely still
one of these blocs, and it gets plenty of the social programs that benefit it,
i.e. low taxes, tax loopholes, and government subsidies. Second, I do not
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think there will ever be sufficient political support for social programs of
the kind you ask about until people discover that such programs are essential
to them--either being deprived of them, or by obtaining them at a very high
quality, as they define quality. Until then, people will continue to think
of government spending as waste and as a deduction from income they can spend
privately."
One of the sources of undue political influence not specifically mentioned, but
assumed by the respondents, is the military establishment. How the military influences the political processes in this country is one of the important questions
that need to be answered; it is of primary concern of individuals in groups working for social change in this country. Former Senator J. W. Fulbright several
years ago wrote of the influence of the Pentagon on public opinion in his book,
The Pentagon Propaganda Machine. This study not only needs to be brought up to
Some examples are: What roles do
date, but also new ground needs to be broken.
retired officers' and veterans' organizations play in promoting military spending?
What role does the C.I.A. play in our domestic politics in promoting the need for
a strong U.S. military posture? How can we get our Congressmen or Senators to
vote against military appropriations when many of their constituents hold jobs
directly or indirectly supported by such funds? How can we get rid of this selfperpetuating system (the tie between Congress, the Pentagon, and the people)?
What roles do institutions and associations (Chambers of Commerce, Unions, Professional Organizations, Trade and Defense Contractors' Associations, Universities
and Colleges, and many others) play in moulding public sentiment in support of a
big military establishment?

1 The charts in this article are reproduced with the permission of the author,
Ruth Leger Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures, 1976 (WMSE Publications, Box 1003, Leesburg, Virginia).
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A MOMENT OF TRUTH IN THE WARFARE-WELFARE DEBATE:
THE TRANSFER AMENDMENT
BY HON. ELIZABETH HOLTZMAN

A "moment of truth" occurred on Capitol Hill in Spring, 1976, according to Tristam
1
Coffin, veteran journalist and editor of The Washington Spectator.
"Very occasionally, the murmuring, restless, oblong hall that is the U.S. House of
Representatives seems to stall in time and, unexpectedly, there is truth and wisdom.
Loud conversations on the floor abruptly cease. The drowsy press gallery wakes up.
The Speaker looks up from his letter-reading. The figure at the microphone is no
longer a puppet droning out empty words, but an oracle.
"Such a moment took place during the House debate on the budget and passed unnoticed
by the media, which are not geared to catch and record human passions as they attack
the cold facade of government.
"The drama began when Rep. Elizabeth Holtzman (D-N.Y.)--young, serious, dark-haired,
a member of the Budget Committee--offered an amendment. The idea, she explained,
was to increase by $2.5 billion 'the money for desperately needed programs here in
the U.S., and to accomplish this by moderating the enormous growth of the military
budget. The budget resolution contains the largest increase for military expenditures in peacetime in our history--an increase of $11 billion in the budget authority and $8.7 billion in outlays.'
She said those who want this rilitary increase do
so because they believe we are threatened by events in Angola, Portugal and Italy.
Miss Holtzman added in despair:
'Do the proponents of this increase really expect
us to believe that adding $11 billion to our military budget can compensate for 50
years of dictatorship in Portugal, for three centuries of colonial oppression in
Angola, and for 25 years of corrupt political parties in Italy? . . . There is
nothing in the $11 billion increase that signals to anyone that we are going to be
any more sympathetic to the needs of people for self-determination, any less supportive of oppressive dictatorships, or any less tolerant of corrupt regimes
abroad. Military hardware alone is no substitute for a sensible foreign policy,
and it is about time we acknowledged that.'"
The controversy over the budget is much more than a debate about how much should be
It is more than a struggle bespent in 1977 on the military, or social programs.
tween two branches of the federal government--the legislative and the executive-over which body should determine the national priorities. Ultimately questions are
raised about the viability of the democratic planning process in the warfare/welfare
state, and how the people--the governed--can be adequately represented in the process. All of these issues are touched on explicitly or implicitly by Congresswoman
Holtzman in the debate (although, to be sure, she was most concerned with improving
the flexibility of the budgeting process). For these reasons, the discussion is
worth preserving.
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The Holtzman Amendment lost 317-85 with 30 not voting. However, the warfarewelfare controversy still remains with us. As the military budget continues to
increase, with a consequent lessening of resources available for social development, the crisis will be sharpened.
2
DISSENTING VIEWS OF HON. ELIZABETH HOLTZMAN

I cannot support the First Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for the fiscal year
1977, because it fails to deal with the most serious (national) problems and locks
the Federal government into military expenditures that will shortchange domestic
needs for many years to come.
The purpose of the Congressional budget process was to give Congress an overview of
Federal revenues and expenditures, and enable it to develop a constructive alternative to a President's budget. The Congressional budget, it was hoped, would
control spending and be more responsive to the needs and concerns of all Americans
than recent Executive budgets.
This resolution fails to live up to that promise. Instead, it would commit the
country to a massive and unjustifiable increase in military spending, and as a
result, to a reckless neglect of human needs. Except for employment and energy,
there is no real program growth in domestic functions. The resolution also continues wasteful and inefficient programs, and fails to stop the loss of revenues
through our inequitable, loophole-ridden tax structure. In sum, this budget resolution does not offer a genuine alternative to President Ford's shortsighted and distorted national priorities, but only a mildly altered, moderately improved version
of the same thing.
I. Increased Military Spending
The Budget Committee's central failure is in its recommendation of an enormous and
unprecendented increase in defense spending, for which the Committee received no
justification.
The Committee proposes to increase military spending by $11.8 billion in budget
authority over fiscal 1976 levels. This is the largest peacetime increase in our
history. It includes a 21% increase in weapons purchases: $3.6 billion to offset
inflation and $8.3 billion for real growth. This is by far the largest real program growth in the Federal budget. The result is a budget in which military spending accounts for one-quarter of all spending, almost 50% all Federal revenues
not earmarked for trust funds, and 70% of all "controllable outlays."'3
No real need for this level of military spending was shown to the Committee, Instead we, and the entire country, were subjected to a persistent scare campaign
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about "dollar gaps," "American determination," and the like. Neither the empty
slogans, nor the specific increases authorized, can withstand close scrutiny.
Defense Department arguments boil down to a plea for increased military spending
allegedly to meet Soviet increases. The fundamental fact remains, however, that the
and that overall Russian military strength
U.S. nuclear deterrent is second to none,
2
does not and will not surpass our own.
The country has learned in the past few years that claims of "national security"
have been used as a pretext for a great many administration crimes. It is unfortunate that the Budget Committee did not recognize that the same spurious claim has
been used as a pretext for unnecessary and wasteful military expenditures.
If the increase in military spending cannot be justified by comparisons between
Soviet and American strength, does it make sense in terms of the programs funded?
Again, the answer is no. A 7.2% increase is allowed for inflation, despite the fact
that inflation is anticipated at only 5.51. S1.4 billion goes to the ordering of
four SSN-668 Nuclear Attack Submarines. However, as one Committee member noted, 28
of these submarines are already on order; not one has been delivered; and the last
one is not scheduled for delivery until 1983. What conceivable need is there to
order four more in 1977? Another $1 billion goes to the unnecessary B-l bomber
which may well be obsolete before it is built. The list could go on and on.
The Committee noted that the Defense Department now has about $70 billion in unexpended balances on hand. Under this resolution, the unspent funds will rise to $84
billion by the end of fiscal 1977. If the Defense Department cannot spend the
money it already has, and if it cannot spend the new money it is getting, why is
this new money needed?
If,as many members of the Budget Committee recognized, increased defense spending
has no military justification, why has it been approved? The answer given was to
"send a message" to the Russians, et al.
I believe this budget does indeed "send a
message"--that a weak President worried about a right wing political challenge is
willing to panic this country, this Committee, and the Congress into a pointless
arms race and a dangerous neglect of national problems. That message, I fear,
offers far more comfort than concern to our adversaries.
II. Neglect of Human Needs
The trade-off between military spending and domestic needs has produced a budget
that provides for no real growth in most existing domestic programs. They are
budgeted at or below the inflation rate. Education, for example, is budgeted at a
6% increase over 1976 levels, barely keeping pace with inflation. General revenue
sharing receives only a 2.9- increase--totally inadequate in the face of inflation
and recession. Non-mandated health programs, such as family planning, bio-medical
research, and health training, are given a 3.2% funding increase, despite a projected 10%-15% inflation rate for health costs.
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In addition to starving existing programs, this resolution contains no new initiatives (except for token gestures toward studying national health insurance and full
employment programs). It fails to deal with the nation's unconscionably high levels
of illiteracy and infant mortality, the poverty and despair of our elderly, inadequate public transportation, the rapidly rising crime rate, and the lack of decent
affordable housing.
The Budget Resolution commendably includes funding for the creation of approximately
1.1 million jobs. I supported this important effort at reducing unemployment. The
Committee projects, however, that unemployment will still be at 6% by the end of
1977--a level that would ordinarily indicate a severe recession.
Perhaps the most disturbing omission in this resolution is the absence of any effort
to rescue and rehabilitate America's financially strapped cities. New York City's
fiscal crisis is only the most visible example of the desperate condition of our
urban areas. Boston, Chicago, Detroit, Philadelphia, and others all face the steady
erosion of their revenue bases, the decline of municipal services, and an ever increasing tax burden for remaining businesses and middle class taxpayers.
I offered an amendment to allow the Federal government to begin assuming 75% of total
AFDC costs. My amendment would have provided $1.5 billion to help relieve the
inequitable burden which welfare places on our cities. The Committee, however,
rejected my amendment, putting off once again any substantial attempt to deal with
urban problems. Unless these problems are confronted in the near future, America's
cities will become empty, poisonous wastelands a few years down the road.
III.

Waste, Inflation and the Deficit
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Cutting military
Defense spending
useful goods and
tionary pressure

spending would also have reduced its uniquely inflationary effect.
increases money in the hands of consumers but does not add to the
services produced by the economy. The result is aggravated inflaas more dollars compete for the same amount of consumables.

The Committee could have lowered the deficit by eliminating various tax expenditures
--the tax "loopholes." It is estimated that the Treasury loses Sl00 billion a year
because of various tax preferences. In addition to reducing revenue, tax expenditures shift the burden of Federal taxation from business and the wealthy to working
people. In the past decade, while payroll taxes have increased from 22. to 30% of
The Budget
total Federal revenues, corporate taxes have declined from 23% to 16.
Committee has done nothing to offset this growing dependence on regressive taxes.
IV. The Mortgaged Future
This year's military budget will produce continued starvation of domestic programs
and deficit spending for years to come. The massive defense increase is only a
downpayment on future expenditures. The budget funds the initial procurement of
several major weapons systems, including the B-1 bomber, Trident submaries, and
counterforce missiles, as well as a substantial shipbuilding effort. These programs
will cost more than $90 billion over the next five years.
The following table demonstrates the consequences of this commitment:
FIVE-YEAR IMPLICATIONS OF FISCAL 1977 BUDGET
(In Billions of Dollars)
1979
1978
1977
Total revenues .......................... 363.0
401.0
448.0
Outlays:
Presently mnndated .................... 188.9
210.1
224.8
For defense .......................... 92.2
100.5
109.6
All other programs--no growth ......... 132.5
132.5
132.5
Total outlays ..................... 413.6
443.1
466.9
Surplus/deficit ............. -50.6
-42.1
-18.9
Adjustments for inflation "all other programs"
Category: Medicare ..........................
3.4
7.0
Medicaid ..........................
1.1
2.1
Grants to States ..................
2.0
4.0
Veterans benefits .................
2.0
2.9
Civilian agency purchases .........
1.0
2.1
Federal employees pay .............
5.1
10.5
Total inflation adjustments ................. 14.0
28.6
Potential deficits .................... -56.1
-47.5
IInterest on the national debt, social security, SSI, etc.
2
Excluding military retirement pay. Outlays assumed to rise at 9%
recommended for this year).
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1980

1981

497.0

550.0

237.8
119.4
132.5
489.7
+ 8.3

250.1
130.2
132.5
512.8
+37.2

11.1
3.1
6.1
4.0
3.2
16.2
43.7
-35.4

15.8
4.2
8.3
5.0
4.3
22.1
59.7
-22.5

annually (rate

The table shows that increasing military spending will force health, education,
state and local aid, and other domestic programs to remain at their 1977 levels
in order to avoid a deficit. If these programs are allowed to keep pace with inflation, the result will be large deficits over the next five years. These deficits will occur without spending one dollar on program growth or new initiatives.
The Committee's approval of increased military spending, thus, forces us to choose
between continued large deficits and neglecting pressing domestic needs for many
years. I cannot concur in this decision to mortgage our nation's future.
Conclusion
The Budget Resolution is substantially improved over the president's budget. It
rejects his proposed cuts in a number of domestic programs; it makes a real commitment to reducing unemployment. But much more needs to be done before we have a
budget that is truly responsive to America's needs in 1977 and for years to come.
THE HOLTZMAN AMENDMENT AND 5
EXCERPTS FROM THE DISCUSSION
Mr. Chairman, I propose to amend the budget resolution by increasing by $2.5
billion the money for desperately needed programs here in the United States, and
to accomplish this by moderating the enormous growth of the military budget.
This budget resolution contains the largest increase for military expenditures in
peacetime in our history--an increase of $11 billion in budget authority and $8.7
billion in outlays.
My amendment also allows an increase over last year's military budget, but one
that is more consistent with our real needs for a strong military defense.
Mr. Chairman, let me add at this point that this amendment is introduced as well on
behalf of the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers) and the gentleman from New York
(Mr. Ottinger). ...
Let me summarize what my amendment would do.

It would:

First, lower this resolution's increase in military spending by $2.5 billion in
outlays and $7.5 billion in budget authority--that is, allow 2 percent for real
growth over last year and 5.5 percent for inflation;
Second, provide $1.5 billion to States and localities to help pay for welfare
costs, thus saving or creating 127,500 jobs;
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Third, make available $200 million for mass transit construction--a program kept at
1975 levels--providing 15,000 jobs;
Fourth, create 33,000 jobs by adding $200 million to the job opportunities program;
Fifth, provide $100 million to create 29,000 jobs for senior citizens;
Sixth, add $100 million to bring Federal anticrime aid up to 1976 levels;
Seventh, make available $200 million for direct loans through the Small Business
Administration, creating 33,000 jobs;
Eighth, provide $100 million to assure that biomedical research, health training,
and other health programs can operate at 1976 levels; and
Ninth, increase the opportunity for needy students to attend college by adding $100
million to work-study and other higher education programs ....
It is also time to send a signal to the American people--a signal that we can
respond to their hopes and dreams for this country and not unwarranted fears created
by election year rhetoric. Let us send a signal in this budget that we believe
Americans are entitled to walk their streets without fear, entitled to a fair chance
for useful work, productive jobs, to the opportunity for good education, to adequate
health care, to improved mass transit, to decent housing, and to solvent state and
local governments.
Mr. Chairman, without my amendment crime-fighting programs will be cut below last
year's levels, biomedical research will be cut, training of health professionals
will be cut, construction of new mass transit systems and purchases of new mass
transit equipment will be cut, job training for senior citizens will be cut, college
programs for low-income students will be cut, and we will not create an adequate
number of jobs to deal with the serious unemployment in this country. By what logic
do we cut these programs and then turn around and say to the American people that we
want to send a wasteful, costly, extravagant signal at their expense to our enemies?
My amendment brings all of the programs I mentioned before up to last year's levels
in terms of inflation. It will also add a substantial jobs component, through
senior citizen employment programs and SBA direct wars. It will also create jobs in
areas of high unemployment, through title X of the Economic Development Act. . ..
Perhaps most significantly, my amendment begins to address the problem of the insolvency confronting our cities and localities. The present welfare system imposes an
extraordinary burden on States, cities, counties, villages, and towns. This sector
of the economy has been one of the hardest hit by the present recession. Let us be
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frank to acknowledge that somebody has to foot the bill for welfare costs. The
real question is: Who is going to foot the bill? Is it going to be the cities,
counties, and States which have the narrowest tax base and the severest fiscal
problems? Or should we place the responsibility for this national problem on the
Federal Government which has the resources to bear the burden and distribute it
equitably?
My amendment, Mr. Chairman, would do the latter. It would allow the Federal Government to begin paying 75 percent of welfare costs around the country. This will
prevent cutbacks in local services and layoffs or provide relief to State and local
taxpayers; 29 States would get at least $10 million as a result of my amendment
and 17 States would get over $20 million.
Everyone has been talking about welfare reform and it seems to me that we should
begin to deal with this problem in this resolution instead of waiting until October
1977, the start of the next fiscal year ...
Mr. Chairman, let me point out as well that the jobs created through my amendment
will be substantial. My amendment will provide, under the Older Americans Act,
employment for 29,000 needy senior citizens and rescue them from the prospect of
welfare. It will create about 31,000 jobs through the Job Opportunities Program
and about 15,000 jobs through mass transit construction. We will create about
33,000 private sector jobs through expansion of the SBA direct loan program.
Finally, we will create or save approximately 127,500 jobs by having the Federal
Government pick up a larger portion of welfare costs from States and localities.
We have the opportunity through this amendment to do what the Budget Act originally
promised--to set priorities in our budgetary process that reflect the real needs of
the American people and direct Federal spending to meeting these needs.
There is no justification for an extraordinary growth in the military budget which
starves domestic programs and prevents us from engaging in new initiatives to deal
with the problems of the recession, the devastation of our cities, the plight of
our elderly, among others. I would urge that we take this opportunity to begin to
realize the promise of the Budget Act. ...
Mr. John L. Burton: The provision of the gentlewoman's amendment that would transfer welfare costs in a greater degree to the Federal Government will provide more
economic relief for local governments in this Nation than will any revenue-sharing
program and that will allow them the flexibility of raising their own funds and
spending their own funds. That is an area where those who are concerned about
local government should be concerned about their property tax paying taxpayers who
would have this burden taken off their backs by the assumption of this, in lieu of
building a couple more missiles that do not do much in the way of providing for
property tax relief. . ..
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Mr. Mitchell of Maryland: Mr. Chairman, my colleagues, on yesterday when we were
debating the Giaimo amendment, my colleague from Florida (Mr. Gibbons) made a very
forceful and dramatic presentation against any further cuts in the defense budget.
The burden of his argument was that in order to prevent war, he would rather make an
error on the side of "waste" or over-spending rather than see this country find
itself short of the wherewithal necessary to protect our national security.
I listened very intently to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Gibbons) yesterday. It
was a very forceful and dramatic speech. What I would like to do is take his argument and turn it around in terms of national security in this country. For a long
period of time I have been insisting and maintaining that the threat to America, the
real threat to democracy, does not lie in the Soviet Union or in the Peoples Republic of China, nor does it lie anywhere outside the geographic boundaries of this
country. The most grave and real threat to democracy is found within the boundaries
of this country, and it is found in this situational mosaic which I shall attempt to
lay out.
When we have people who, year after year, do not get fitted into the economic system,
they become alienated from our system of government, and sooner or later that alienation is going to reflect itself by one means or another. I think the danger to the
democratic process in this country--indeed, the danger to the country itself--lies
in the fact that we have permitted structural unemployment to persist in this
country since 1930; structural unemployment for blacks and other minorities, structural unemployment for our young people.
I think the danger to this country lies in the fact that, somehow or other, despite
the best efforts of this Budget Committee, we did not start off with a zero-based
budget so that we could place need against income, hurt against income, want against
income. We did not do that. We were almost forced to accept the normal budgeting
process, and as a result, despite the best efforts of the chairman--for whom I have
a great deal of admiration, as I do for all the members of the committee--this
Budget Committee has not yet gotten into the business of establishing priorities.
Let me give the Members just one other illustration of what I am talking about.
If any of the Members have read Karl Marx--and I suggest that they read him, not to
subscribe to his theories, but to know who the ideological opponent is. If they
read Marx they will know that somewhere in his writings he says that in order for
capitalism to survive there has to be an unemployed reserve in this country. He
states it very simply.
When I look at the persistent structural high rate of unemployment found within
America, particularly for blacks and for other minorities, I am forced to conclude
that what we do here is to give some element of credence to that Marxist theory. I
know that no one in this House wants to do that, but to the extent that we do not
address the real needs of this country, that theory unfortunately assumes a greater
validity in the minds of many people.
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Mr. Chairman, let me say that I have supported the budget, the work of the Committee
on the Budget, and I will continue to do so. However, let me also say that as long
as I am on that Budget Committee I will work as arduously as I can to begin to
establish real priorities for this country. We cannot continue along the same road
that we have been following without inviting disaster, not from without but from
within.
I urge support of the gentlewoman's amendment ....
Ms. Holtzman: Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the gentleman whether the problem
is not only that we have failed to address the real needs of the country today in
this budget, but that the enormous increase in military spending locks us in to
starving domestic programs for many years to come? One of the real problems that
confronts us now is that the implications we make today will affect the choices we
make next year and the year after and the year after that. My amendment cuts an
additional $5 billion in budget authority which gives us the room in the next few
years to begin to address some of the human needs we have here at home.
Mr. Mitchell: The gentlewoman is absolutely correct. If my colleagues will recall,
yesterday, in the discussion on the Giaimo amendment, I attempted to point out that
the present level of spending for the defense category will, over the next 5 years,
cost us somewhere around $159 billion. If that is true--and indeed it is true--it
means we are going to inevitably have to cut programs necessary for the survival of
the people in this country.
I think that the gentlewoman is absolutely right. Few Members of this House are
paying attention to the long-range impact of the President's defense budget.
Mr. Chairman, I would certainly again reiterate my support for the amendment offered
by the gentlewoman, and I urge my colleagues to do so. ...
Ms. Holtzman: Mr. Chairman . . . I am deeply disturbed that the budget we are presented with this time fails to carry out the essential promise of the Budget Act-to set congressional priorities and to address the serious problems facing this
country.
Perhaps part of the problem was that the Budget Committee's starting point was
wrong. The process was distorted because we were confronted with and started from
the President's budget, which called for enormous military increases and tax reductions for corporations and wealthy individuals to be financed essentially by massive
cuts in domestic spending and increases in social security taxes.
The committee, I think, did an obvious and important service for the Congress in
rejecting most of the President's proposals, but that only left us no worse off than
we were before.
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The committee did commendably add an important measure to stimulate the economy and
create new jobs but under the committee's resolution, we are still left at the end
of the fiscal year 1977 with 6-percent unemployment. We have no other significant
new initiatives or program growth in the budget for next year, however, besides the
jobs program.
Yet think of the problems that confront us as a Nation. Our cities are becoming
wastelands plagued by crime, increasingly unlivable, and this as we celebrate the
200th anniversary of this country's birth. We are being outstripped by Western
European countries in the rate of literacy, in the rate of infant survival , and in
the rate of life expectancy. Yet there is nothing in this budget in essence that
will seriously address the serious problems we have at home.
I would suggest that we really change the priorities reflected in this budget, and
that we deal, in the first instance, with the enormous increase that this congressional budget calls for in military spending. I am concerned not only because this
is the largest increase in peacetime military spending in this country's history-an increase, by the way, that was not adequately justified before the Budget Committee--but also because that increase costs us the ability to deal with the domestic
needs of this country. Furthermore, this increase locks us into high defense spending over the next 5 years. In fact, the high increase in military spending this
year, if it continues as expected at the same rate over the next 5 years, is going
to mean that the only way we can balance our budget in 1981 is by funding such
programs as medicare, medicaid, and veterans' benefits at the same level they were
funded at in 1977 and by allowing for no new programs or program growth.
How can we lock ourselves in this way, but unjustified military spending, in view of
the pressing domestic needs of this country? . . .
Mr. Chairman, I would suggest that this is an opportunity for us to begin to redirect national priorities and to say, not only for this year but for years to come,
that we will not starve our domestic programs by financing wasteful and extravagant
military spending, that we will seriously address the needs this country has, and
that we are going to start doing it now.
FOOTNOTES
1. Tristam Coffin. "A Moment of Truth on Capitol Hill," The Washington Spectator,
2, 10 (June 1, 1976), p. 1.
2. This is the Dissenting Minority Report of the Congresswoman from New York included in the First Concurrent Resolution on the Budget--Fiscal Year 1977.
Report of the Committee on the Budget, House of Representatives (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), pp. 127-131.
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3. The "controllability" of outlays is a relative concept referring to the amount
of discretion over a program's spending that can be exercised in a single year.
"The relatively uncontrollables" include all the entitlements (such as Social
Security and SSI), outlays from prior year commitments, and some specific programs, e.g., general revenue sharing, interest on the debt.
4. One particularly meaningless argument used by the Defense Department to support
a huge budget increase was that the percentage of Gross National Product which
military spending represents has been decreasing. This,DoD claims, has weakened our defense posture. The foolishness of this argument is plain. If
defense spending remains constant, an improving economy will mean a rising GNP
and a lower defense percentage. A failing economy means lower GNP and a higher
defense percentage. This would mean that we are militarily weaker with a good
economy and stronger with a bad economy.
Other arguments used to support the increase in defense spending are equally
fallacious. The Defense Department warns that the Russians have more missiles
than the United States. But it admits that the United States has far more warheads. DoD warns that the Russians have more armed forces than we. It neglects
to mention that the Soviet army performs many functions which in the United
States are performed by civilians, that a substantial portion of that army is
massed on the Chinese border, and that U.S. forces have technological superiority. The Administration warns that the Russians spend more in terms of dollars
on defense than we do. However, as others have pointed out, this estimate includes computing the cost of drafted Soviets as if each were paid at U.S.
volunteer army pay rates. If defense spending is measured in Russian rubles,
the U.S. spends more than the U.S.S.R. In addition, if the defense spending of
all NATO powers is compared to that of all Warsaw Pact nations, the West far
outspends the Communist bloc, even in terms]f dollars.
5. Extracted from The Congressional Record of the U.S. House of Representatives,
April 27-29, 1976, pp. 3455, 3619-22.
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NEW YORK CITY AND THE ECONOMIC CRISIS
by Joseph Harris

The crisis of New York City and the crises affecting many hundreds of other cities,
counties, school districts, and other local and state governments are not accidents.
They are a direct result of the neglect that social welfare receives at the hands
of a government interested only in furthering the profits and position of the
monopolies. Some people call the U.S. government a "warfare/welfare" state. I
prefer to call it a state dominated by the giant corporations which control the
economic and hence the political life of our nation. As long as federal policy
continues to stress profits before people, the problems afflicting our nation will
not be alleviated. Instead, they will worsen. The government insists on a policy
of "malicious neglect" toward workers, racial minorities, the poor, the elderly,
the youth, women, children--toward all but the very rich and powerful.
The Joint Economic Committee of Congress recently stated: "Chronically depressed
regional and area economies are characterized by exceptionally high unemployment
rates, net losses of private sector jobs, rapidly declining shares of national
income, growing percentages of the national poverty population, and deteriorating
public and private infrastructure. ' l
The JEC recognizes that the Northeast especially, but also the Great Lakes and MidAtlantic, are becoming "chronically depressed." It asks for "additional Federal
assistance" although it "realizes that the Federal Government cannot completely offset the effects of economic decline." Instead, it can only "provide stabilization
assistance to cushion the impact of decline . . ." The JEC suggests a variety of
measures to slow the decline, including directing the Federal government to let
contracts especially in areas of high unemployment, to establish a development
bank, and to provide tax breaks for businesses that invest in depressed areas.
What must be emphasized is that the Joint Economic Committee does not feel that the
Federal government can stop the decline of the cities. Since it admits that
private businesses are deserting the cities in search of higher profits elsewhere,
the conclusion is inescapable that the JEC is writing off the depressed cities and
regions of the country.
Had the JEC engaged in a serious search for funds to rebuild and revitalize the
cities, it would have looked at the $100 billion plus "defense" budget. This is a
main source--but not the only source, as we shall see--for funds to overcome the
fiscal crisis of the cities. The JEC evidently does not comprehend the scale of
the repercussions which will result if the cities of the Northeast, the Great
Lakes, and the Mid-Atlantic continue their rapid decline. Tremendous suffering
and deprivation, accompanied by social unrest, militancy, mass radicalization, and
struggle--the like of which the nation has never experienced--will cause U.S.
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ruling circles to rue their earlier cavalier attitudes. Large problems cannot be
solved by using run-of-the-mill, business-as-usual approaches. Yet the two parties
which share power approach the crisis of the cities as if it can either be ignored
or can be successfully dealt with, with the usual rhetoric and small-potatoes
programs. They approach the crisis with a singular lack of serious concern.
This paper is a revised version of a speech given before a conference of activists
mobilizing against inflation, unemployment, and the crisis of the cities. Its
purpose, to paraphrase a famous activist and scholar, is not only to examine the
city crisis, but to help bring about the conditions necessary to eliminate the
crisis. It draws upon the experiences and wisdom of the many who are consciously
embarked on the path of class struggle as the road to social progress.
We shall examine the meaning of "default," a few of its alleged causes, and some of
the real reasons driving cities, other local governments, and state governments
toward fiscal disaster. The experiences of New York City and its lessons are emphasized. Then follows a summary of the steps the bankers and industrialists took in
New York City on their way to gaining open and legal jurisdiction over its financial affairs. The results of the coup d'etat are documented. We discuss the
approaches toward the NYC crisis of various politicians, including President Ford
and some liberal Democrats, and we present an outline of the Federal government's
intervention in the NYC crisis. Finally, suggestions for ameliorating the crisis
are made.
What About Default?
"Default" has many meanings. For the bankers and the lawyers, it means that cities
and states do not pay back loans or make interest payments on time. Default means
that a financial contract is broken. For the resident of New York City, Yonkers,
Detroit, Cleveland, San Antonio, and many other places, default means massive
losses of jobs, frozen and lowered wages, cutbacks in welfare, larger class sizes,
cutbacks in hospitals and daycare centers, and elimination of services of many
kinds. It is entirely possible for cities to fail in their financial obligations
to city employees, school children, retired workers, the jobless, mothers and
their children on welfare--and yet not legally default--as long as the bondholders,
those to whom the city owes its loans, are paid on time.
But when cities do legally default, the impact on workers is even more severe.
When the 6,195 legal defaults of the past 135 years occurred, the government apparatus swung into action to ensure that the defaulting governmental unit paid its
bills to the bankers and other large bondholders. How was this accomplished? By
extremely severe cutbacks in city services, wage freezes and reduction, job losses,
and increased taxes--sometimes combined with varying amounts of federal and/or
state financial assistance. For example, Detroit was on the edge of default in
1931. To meet its obligations to bankers, the major and city council were forced
in 1931:
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".. . to reduce the number of employees and to approve a 10% reduction of
salaries up to $4,000 and a 20% reduction for salaries above that level. In
April 1932, the city temporarily defaulted on its payrolls because the banks
refused further short-term advances until salary reductions were effected. A
temporary 50% reduction in all salaries and prearranged credit from New York
and Chicago were sufficient to carry Detroit through June 1932. In July, in
order to obtain additional funds by the sale of notes or bonds, the city
adopted a permanent 5-day salary ordinance which reduced salaries another 13$.
City employees were paid at this level by means of script from July 1932
through mid-1934 . . . As economic conditions in the city began improving,
there were large cash flows from past delinquent taxes. The cash flows were
sufficient to enable the city to meet refunding debt service payments due in
the mid and late 1930's and to restore the salary reductions forced on city
employees.
World War II and the automobile boom following it enabled the city to
meet the remaining refunding debt service payments. "2
During each major depression, defaults skyrocket. From 1930 to 1939, 4,770 local
governments defaulted in the U.S. These included 1,430 incorporated cities, 30% of
the total; and school districts numbering 1,240, over 25% of the total. Did these
4,770 local governments default because their employees received "extravagant"
wages, or because employees were loafing on the job, thus cheating the taxpayers?
No! They defaulted because the depression, for which they were not responsible,
caused massive unemployment, and drastic reductions in taxes while needed services,
including welfare for the jobless, rose.
The depression which began in late 1973 officially ended, although mass unemployment
remained. Officially the unemployment rate temporarily peaked at 9.2% in May of
1975. In March 1976, the official unemployment rate still stood at 7.5%, while unofficial estimates, including those of the National Urban League, stated that unemployment was about 15%. Among Black and other nationally oppressed peoples, the
unemployment rate during the fourth quarter of 1975 was 26%, according to the Urban
League. Officially, the figure was 14%, depression level unemployment! While the
national unemployment average was 8.3% in September 1975, the unemployment was
spread unevenly over the nation. For example, the official New York State unemployment rate was 12.1%. In general, the nation's largest cities, where the Black,
Puerto Rican, Chicano, and other oppressed nationalities are concentrated, suffer
from the greatest unemployment. If a spirited upswing does not occur, the spectre
of default will settle over many hundreds of local governments and will even reach
into many state governments.
While national attention has been riveted on New York City's plight, the fact is
that New York City is not an isolated example of a default, Yonkers, the 4th largest city in New York state, narrowly averted default in mid-November, 1975. Further,
itis estimated that 16 New York cities will default if New York defaults. Ripples
from New York City's financial plight are not the main reason for the crippled position of many other local and state governments--as has been alleged by many who want
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to blame New York for high interest rates and financial crises all across the nation.
For example, Massachusetts would have defaulted in early December 1975, according to
the New York Times (11/10/75), had the state Legislature not signed a bill in early
November providing for "a $3 billion budget with sharp tax increases and cutbacks in
social programs." In one paragraph, the Times described this as "a fallout from New
York City's financial disaster," but in another paragraph noted that the signing of
the bill "ended a 10-month struggle with the state Legislature." However, when the
struggle began, New York had not yet been acutely threatened by default.
The banks caused the fiscal crisis in Massachusetts by insisting that they "would
not be able to" lend Massachusetts $131 million to pay off short-term local housing
authority loans unless the state instituted severe cutbacks in aid to the working
poor and medically indigent, while raising taxes on working people. "Massachusetts
was not in immediate danger of going bankrupt"; so there was no valid financial
reason for First National Bank of Boston to refuse the loans. Using the New York
City crisis as their excuse for their hold-up of the working people of Massachusetts,
the Boston banks insisted upon $364 million in tax increases, including a 2-cent
rise in the state sales tax--the most regressive of all taxes. Cutbacks include
"ending aid for 22,000 persons in nursing homes and another 110,000 of the 'working
poor.'" Meanwhile, business taxes were dropped $33 million a year.
The New York City Crisis
Let's examine the continuing New York City crisis. Is "high living" the cause, as
President Ford, Senator Proximire, and Senator Adlai Stevenson claim? Ford, in a
speech to the National Press Club on October 29, 1975 claimed that "New York City's
wages and salaries are the highest in the United States." But the Bureau of Labor
Statistics of the U.S. Government ranks New York City "fourth among the nation's
largest cities in the average salaries paid all employees. After BLS adjusted
to the cost of living in each city, the city's salaries
those fourth-ranked wages
3
dropped to tenth-rank."
Ford claims that "New York City is the only major city in the country that picks up
the entire (pension) burden." The truth is that almost every one of the approximately 20 New York city employee pension plans is "contributory," that is, employees
contribute part of their salaries toward their pensions. President Ford also claims
that "25 percent of the hospital beds are empty" in New York's 18 municipal hospitals. Again, Ford "improves" the life of New Yorkers in the telling. In reality,
the vacancy rate in New York municipal hospitals is about 20%, while the national
vacancy rate for state and local government hospitals was about 30% in 1973, according to the American Hospital Association.
For the working people of New York City, life is not easy: "55.7% of the residents
of New York City fall below the Bureau of Labor Standards on the deprivation scale,
15% are in dire poverty." 4 At least one-half million workers, probably 800,000,
are unemployed. One of every eight persons is on welfare. Few workers own their
own homes; instead, they pay outrageous rents for old, broken-down apartments.
Rent-control, more a myth than a reality, is rapidly being undermined.
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Over the years, New Yorkers have won some achievements. If the rulers of our nation have their way, these gains will be erased. Already, since the advent of the
financial crisis, the City University system's no tuition and open admissions
policies have been eliminated. As a result of these policies "43 percent of senior
college students come from families with annual incomes under $10,000. "5 Nationally, 47.5% of all high school graduates enroll in college, but in New York, with its
City University system, 79% enroll in college. Is this bad? Should this be
stopped? On the contrary, the right to an education, including college--which is
needed for most better-paying jobs--should be a right for all Americans, in whatever state they live, and regardless of their economic status.
IfNew York residents do not have such high living standards, you may ask, why is
the city government of New York practically bankrupt? Why can't it pay its bills?
Itmight seem that the answers must be very complex since so many and conflicting
ones have been offered, but actually the answers are fairly obvious--once we put
aside the nonsense being peddled to confuse and divide and inmmobilize us.
First, New York City manufacturers and other businessmen have eliminated more than
500,000 jobs since 1969. They either cut back their workforce because of automation, speedup, or declines in production, or they moved their businesses to more
profitable areas, both domestically and foreign. They moved to areas where trade
unions are weaker, wages are lower, taxes fewer, land more plentiful and cheaper-in short, where profits are greater. They took with them the profits which the
workers in New York produced, and they left behind them workers without jobs, many
of whom will never find other work. As a result, no tax revenues were collected
from these businesses. Nor were income taxes collected from the many workers who
did not manage to find other jobs. Mayor Beame, in testimony before the Joint
Economic Committee of Congress (10/10/75), estimated that the city's economic
decline since 1969 caused a loss of tax revenues totalling more than $1.2 billion.
In the past year alone, the loss was $400 million.
On the other hand, city services for the 500,000 abandoned workers had to be maintained: fire, police, transit, sanitation, education, hospitals, and many others
including welfare for the most unfortunate. City contributions to welfare cost
rose $650 million since 1969, according to Mayor Beame, as the result of the city's
depressed economic condition. Together, the decreased revenues and increased costs
from the economic decline total $2 billion since 1969.
A second factor is the depression which began in late 1973. It sharply increased
the long-run problems of business and job loss in the midst of service cost increases.
A third cause of New York City's financial crisis is the huge discrepancy between
what NYC gives to the federal government and what it gets back. According to one
source, NYC sent $26 billion to Washington, D.C., and received back $3 billion in
fiscal year 1974.
What happened to the $23 billion that Washington kept? At
least $8 billion went directly to the military. Another $6 billion went to the
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CIA, FBI, other repressive agencies, subsidies to business interests, and other giveaways. Since 55% of the federal budget goes to the military, to repressive agencies,
and to various subsidies and giveaways, we can assume that 55% of New York City's
contribution to the federal budget, or $14 billion, was similarly allocated. That's
more than the entire city budget of $12 billion. Another economist estimated that
by 1973 "the net annual outflow of tax dollars from New York City, in excess of all
to $7.5 billion,
federal payments for all purposes into New York City, had increased
7
more than 7 times the estimated New York City deficit for 1976."
The main manufacturing states of the Northeast lost $55 billion in 1973, up from
$23 billion a year during the 1965-67 period. Over a period of 10 years, the yearly
deficit to the federal government from these main industrial states rose 140%. What
happened to the $55 billion the federal government pocketed from these 8 industrial
states, and the $15 billion pocketed from another 18 states? Part went to the 24
states (mainly in the South) which were net gainers ($12 billion), but most of the
money ($58 billion) was not returned to any state through federal aid of any kind,
defense contracts, federal payrolls (military or civilian), social security, or
veterans benefits. Most of the missing $58 billion went to pay interest to the
banks, mainly on past and present budget deficits caused by war spending ($23
billion), international affairs and finance ($3 billion), general government ($5
billion), "intelligence" agencies, and overseas military spending.
A fourth, and very important, cause of New York City's financial crisis, of its
budget being out of balance, is that the "business community"--as the New York
Times and Wall Street Journal call the calculating cut-throats who are systematically wrecking people's livelihoods, educations, safety, and health, while shouting
for the city to act "responsibly--is not paying its share of the city's taxes.
If Mayor Beame and Governor Carey enforced the laws they have sworn to uphold, New
York City's financial crisis would disappear. The banks and other large corporations escaped paying $22 million in real estate taxes due to lowering of the original valuations on their property during 1975. In 1975, $670 million in real
estate taxes was lost due to initial under-valuations of all big business properties. Over the past 10 years, billions of dollars have been lost this way. In
addition, $500 million in back real estate taxes, mainly from large businesses, is
uncollected. A recent study of 7,300 businesses, picked at random out of the total
430,000 businesses that collect sales tax in the state, showed that the sample
businesses owe $40 million to the state. Billions of dollars must be owed by all
430,000 businesses.
Why don't Beame and Carey enforce the law and collect these taxes? Perhaps because
both hold public office due to the generosity of the oil industry and the major New
York banks.
Since the "business community" does not pay its share of the taxes, the burden on
the working class is increased. For example, the real estate tax, which is paid
primarily by businesses and the upper stratum of workers, constituted 39% of New
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York City's operating budget in fiscal year 1964. By 1974, it had dropped to
26%. On the other hand, New York State taxes on workers such as the personal
and sales taxes comprised 65% of the general fund in fiscal year 1958, but by
the figure rose to 80%. On the federal level, corporate income taxes dropped
30% of all tax receipts in 1955 to 15% in 1974.

a mere
income
1974
from

A fifth reason for New York City's financial bind is that the city is discriminated
against by the state and federal governments. The formulas which determine the
amounts of aid the city is to receive are rigged against all cities, and especially
against New York City, the symbol of national and local representation especially
for national minorities. For example, New York City pays 30% of the cost--$370
million in 1974--of its welfare recipients, more than any other city in the country.
Only 21 states require local governments to pay any share at all of welfare costs.
Chicago pays 2.9%; Philadelphia, 0%; Detroit, 4.3%; Houston, 4%.8
Together, the five reasons given above provide the basis for understanding the
crisis of New York City: the long-term trend of businesses to run away from New
York, seeking higher profits; the depression of 1974-75; heavy federal taxes which
are wasted and which do not return to New York; the corporate non-payment of taxes
and shifting of the tax burden from those able to pay to those who cannot; and discrimination by the state and federal governments in providing aid. Of course, there
are additional reasons, but these are the primary ones. These five reasons apply
not only to New York City: change the figures and you have the basic ingredients to
the financial crises hitting city after city.
After the above factors have been in operation for a while, deficits mount. The
banks do not mind lending money to the cities; in fact, they encourage it. Although
there have been 6,195 defaults, almost all have been very temporary. The money has
been repaid. Permanent losses have not occurred. Lending money to the government,
at all levels from local to federal, has always been a good, safe investment. After
a time, the deficits grow larger. Cities finally come to the point where they are
at the mercy of the banks. They need to borrow money, and only the banks can
provide it.
Who Runs New York City Now?
A brief summary of the events of the past few months in New York may help to bring
home what the rulers of our country have in mind for other cities and local governments. By 1975, New York City was paying 18% of its budget--about $1.9 billion-to pay back loans, primarily to the major banks. To pay off back debts, finance
the new deficit, finance capital expenditures such as school construction, and
borrow money to pay bills that come due before revenues come in, New York City
needed to borrow $8 billion in 1975. Then the banks decided that New York City was
a bad risk--and it was, in the sense that it was getting deeper and deeper into
debt. Interest rates rose to more than 10%, as the banks held back their loans at
lower interest rates. One state agency, the Urban Development Corporation, defaulted on one of its loans in February, but was quickly bailed out by the state government.
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In June, 1975, the New York State Legislature established what became known as Big
MAC: the Municipal Assistance Corporation. Big MAC's purpose was to borrow money
for the city--a total of $3.3 billion--since the banks were refusing to lend money
to New York City. The theory was that the banks would be willing to lend money to
Big MAC for two reasons: because MAC's loans were backed by the state government,
as well as the fact that money collected by New York City through its sales tax and
stock transfer tax was to be used directly to pay off MAC's loans. The theory was
only partially successful. Big MAC was able to borrow only two-thirds of the $3.3
billion--at rates up to 10%.
In return for Big MAC's "help," New York City "agreed to tighten its budget process"
The result was that in July, one month after MAC was
under MAC's supervision.
established, it imposed "a far-reaching M.A.C.-dictated laundry list of economies,
including a municipal wage freeze and changes in the city's governmental structure."'0 The subway fare went up from 35t to 50t, an increase of 43%. Large-scale
layoffs began.
Who was put in charge of MAC's financial policies by Governor Carey? Felix Rohatyn,
a member of the Board of Directors of I.T.T., Owens Illinois, and the giant investment banking firm of Lazard Freres and Co. In Washington, D.C., Rohatyn is known
for his role in "fixing" three major antitrust cases against I.T.T. through behindthe-scenes meetings with then Assistant Attorney General Kleindienst.
In September, since New York City's financial crisis had not been solved, the state
legislature, in special session, established the Emergency Financial Control Board
(EFCB). It "displaced the city's Budget Bureau" and ordered the "appointment of a
The EFCB has the power to review and
bank-dictated deputy mayor for finance. '"
reject all contracts entered into by the city or by any of the city's agencies.
Under this provision, the EFCB rejected the United Federation of Teachers contract,
and the Transport Workers' settlement, calling for cost-of-living increases, has
been declared illegal.
The EFCB goes far beyond Big MAC. Whereas Nixon's wage freeze lasted only 90 days,
and prices were also frozen, the EFCB's freeze on wages will last up to three years
--while prices are free to rise at the dictate of the market and of monopoly power.
After three years of 10% inflation, workers will have absorbed a 30% decrease in
real wages!
The EFCB is also forcing huge cuts in social service jobs. Already at least 75,000
municipal jobs have been lost, and the expectation is that the total may exceed
100,000, a third of all municipal employees. Under the Emergency Financial Control
Board, New York City elections have become essentially meaningless. The City
Council's powers have been usurped by the EFCB. And now Yonkers, the fourth largest city in New York state, has been saddled with its own EFCB after narrowly
escaping default.
The political takeover of New York City by the bankers and their EFCB is a test.
If the bankers can succeed with this in New York City, then they will try to do it
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elsewhere. The Nixon program was subversion of the democratic rights of the people;
itincluded a wage freeze and wage controls while prices skyrocketed. The Ford
program--and all who support his ideas on New York City--calls for eliminating selfgovernment of the cities. It calls for disenfranchising the majority of the Black
population on a local level. It calls for eliminating the right of unions to decide
contracts with their employers. It is aimed at crippling the ability of working
people and oppressed nationalities to protect their standard of living. The step of
replacing local elected officials by bankers is a big step in the direction toward
repression and fascism.
The EFCB plans to balance New York City's budget by slashing expenditures and raising taxes. The EFCB is projecting a "real reduction in controllable expenditures by
fisca ,year 1978" of 18% based on its unlikely assumption of a 3% rate of inflation.'1 But assuming the more realistic figure of 10% inflation each year, the
EFCB's projected cuts become 32% of controllable expenditures (everything except the
debt service, state mandated welfare expenditures, pension payments, and other
smaller assorted items).
Here are a few items clipped from the New York Times which show the impact of the
budget cuts: "The Aid to Dependent Children program has been forced to discontinue
classes in nutrition and consumer education, and complaint time on buildings violations has been increased from three weeks to three months." "Last month the last of
the Police Department-sponsored school-crossing guards were let go as a budgetcutting measure." "Ineastern Queens there are no school crossing guards." "Fordham Hospital, the only municipal hospital serving the people of central Bronx
County" is being closed. "Within the last four months, 200 people were laid off in
the branch libraries . . . resulting in cuts in people, hours, and the closing of

some branches." "The State Dormitory Authority, citing a lack of investor confidence and inability to market its bonds, said yesterday that it was suspending work
on $229 million in construction at three senior colleges of the City University."
"More than 15,000 jobs in private industry will disappear as a direct result of
city budget reductions already imposed . . . occur primarily in trade, construction,

and services ranging from hotels to computers."
Seven schools have already been closed and 13 more closings are scheduled. Eight
firehouses have closed, resulting in the fire engine response time climbing 25%.
The climb in needless deaths and injuries has not yet been calculated. Severe cutbacks inthe capital budget mean that no new construction of a major sort will take
place during the next three years. School and hospital facilities will not expand
or be replaced. The deterioration of the city's facilities will accelerate still
further. Mayor Beame, on November 11, detailed a new plan to eliminate another
13,000 City employees and stated that "the burden of the cuts will fall most heavily
on social services, hospitals and education, which account for almost half of the
economies. . . The Social Services Department is closing 28 day-care centers and
three centers for the elderly."
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In more "scientific" terms, 2,100 sanitation workers, or 15% of the total, were eliminated between January 1975 and November 1975, as were 19% of all hospital employees, 30% of the employees of the board of education, 17% of cultural employees, 12%
of police, 11% of firemen, and 11% of social services workers. All together, about
16% of all municipal employees lost their jobs during 1975.
The pink slips have not been evenly distributed. The last hired have been the first
to go. Black and Puerto Rican people and youth have been hit far out of proportion
to their numbers in the population: "40% of the Black males" and "51.2% of Hispanic
workers" lost their jobs. 13
The service cutbacks have not been evenly distributed. Ghetto and barrio communities, poor communities, have had their garbage collections reduced beyond any
reasonable limit. In Crown Heights, a section of Brooklyn, residents protested by
taking huge piles of uncollected garbage and stacking them in the streets. When 90
families live in one apartment building, or when 500 families live in one apartment
building, then 90 or 500 bags of garbage accumulate daily. But in many areas,
garbage is only collected twice each week! Classroom enrollment sizes have been
stretched past 50 elementary' students per classroom in many areas of the city.
Recreation periods have been eliminated in many schools. Governor Carey and Mayor
Beame find Ford's pressure an excellent excuse for further taxing working people
and cutting benefits.
But only one side has been presented: the repression and the losses suffered by the
working people of New York City. The other side is the tremendous fightback against
these cuts. While so far the protests have not been coordinated, our estimate is
that at least 300,000 New Yorkers have marched and struck against the budget cuts.
Teachers, students, sanitation men, poverty workers, clerks, social workers, hospital workers, police and firemen, senior citizens, daycare mothers and staff,
commuters against the fare hikes--at one time or another, organized protests involving thousands of persons in each of the above categories have been held.
The New York Coalition to Fight Inflation and Unemployment has played a very helpful
role in encouraging unity and understanding among the many thousands of protestors.
And on December 9, 1975 it held the first united demonstration to save New York City,
along with other groups in the Ad Hoc Committee to Demonstrate Against the Budget
Cuts. The fightback has a tremendous task ahead. Arrayed against the interests of
working people in the cities are the united forces of the giant banks, monopoly
corporations, and their servants in all levels of government.
A successful struggle to save the cities involves joining two struggles together:
the struggle for full employment and the struggle for massive federal aid to the
cities. A victory for either will help the other. And neither can be successful
without unity with the other. As mass unemployment continues, so will the financial crisis of local governments. Federal aid to the cities--to prevent massive
municipal layoffs (and repercussions in private industry) and to create instead many
hundreds of thousands of jobs for the unemployed city dwellers--necessarily must be
a focal point of concern.
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President Ford's policy of forcing drastic cutbacks in New York City's budget, in
order to "punish" its residents for supposedly having lived beyond their means, will
only intensify unemployment among those already hardest hit by the depression and
racist discrimination, and the flight of corporations to higher-profit locations.
Presenting New York City to the American people as "sin city," as a city of lazy
workers and welfare cheats, Ford mounted a national campaign to convince the public
that the financial crisis facing the city was of its own making. In speeches at
home and abroad, his message was the same: New York City must solve its problems
without federal aid, even if it had to default or declare bankruptcy. Ford's
message was loud and clear: any city in financial crisis must lay off thousands of
already hard-pressed workers, cut pensions, increase classroom sizes, reduce college
enrollments and raise tuition fees, reduce medical and hospital care, increase
transportation fares, cut daycare, close libraries, reduce fire and police protection, and slash welfare payments.
President Ford made the issue of federal aid to New York City a major part of his
strategy for first winning the Republican Party presidential nomination--of outflanking Ronald Reagan on the right--and then going on to win the general election.
Ford wishes to pit the rest of the nation against New York City and its large Black,
Puerto Rican, Jewish, and other minority populations. He is attempting to build an
anti-labor, anti-Black, anti-Puerto Rican, anti-foreign born, anti-Jewish coalition.
Appealing to the most backward sentiments of the population, fomenting all the
prejudice he can muster, Ford hopes to win a majority to his policy of making New
York City an "example" for the entire nation of what will happen to any city not
living within its budget.
According to the polls, Ford is losing his gamble. Working people are not buying
his slurs about New Yorkers. Increasing sentiment is being expressed for federal
assistance to New York and to other hard-pressed cities. And so our honest President shifted his ground, gave some aid to New York City, and then claimed the credit
for NYC's last second escape from default.
On the one hand, Ford used the New York City crisis to divert national attention
away from the continuing national mass unemployment. On the other hand, he and
Arthur Burns of the Federal Reserve Board laid the groundwork for placing the blame
on New York City if the economic upswing fails. Ford, the banks, and most major
politicians are blaming other cities' financial crises on New York City. Their
chorus is that bankers' fears of a default by New York City are causing bankers
across the nation to hesitate before lending money to other cities and states-except at higher interest rates. Current estimates are that, since the New York
City crisis began, banks have raised their interest rates to local and state governments sufficient to bring in extra profits of more than $2 billion.
Almost all the Democrats in Congress joined Ford in his campaign.
the liberal, wrote in his November 1975 newsletter:

Senator Proxmire,

"How about the argument that New York City has been wasteful, lived-beyondher-means, and now she should be required to pay for it? I agree with that
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argument entirely. New York has been wasteful. She has paid
pensions that are too high. She has provided free tuition at
versity. She has undoubtedly had thousands of people on city
do nothing but draw pay and loaf. This has to be stopped and

salaries and
her city unipayrolls who
now."

Supposedly pro-labor liberals joined the chorus of anti-labor, racist voices. Major
spokesmen of both major parties agree substantially on the solution to New York
City's problems: forced cutbacks and higher taxes on the workers.
The main difference has been that Ford and his backers were more willing to let New
York City default, thus opening the door to much more catastrophic cutbacks and
deprivations for New York's workers--and the possibility of fairly lengthy delays
in repayment of certain loans to banks and other major bondholders. More minor,
but well-publicized differences involved details: should the federal government
establish a committee to run New York City's financial affairs; should a judge
handle the job; or should the bank-dominated Emergency Financial Control Board
continue to rule New York City? Should the federal government guarantee loans by
the banks to the city of $2.5 billion or $3 billion?
Very few politicians, on any level of government, have taken the side of the working
people of New York City. John Conyers and Bella Abzug have been among the most
responsive, and one or two members of the New York State legislature have spoken
out. Many politicians, who previously had good positions, crumpled under the
pressure. However, it is noteworthy that most New York politicians are quite concerned and worried about how the people will respond to the cutbacks. They sense
the growing anger and willingness to fight and are afraid of getting in the way of
the expected upsurge.
On November 26, 1975 President Ford reversed his opposition to aid for New York City
and endorsed a plan for $2.3 billion a year in short-term Federal loans to ease the
city's cash flow problem through 1978. The loans must be repaid by the end of each
year--at interest rates 1% above those of federal securities. However, the essence
of the financial "solution" is: (a) the bailing out, with liberal interest but
some delay in payment, of the banks and big private investors in city notes; (b)
financing of the city to the tune of billions by cleaning out the reserves of
workers' pension funds--forcing the unions to lend their pension funds to the city
when the banks and other big investors are boycotting city securities as a bad
risk; (c) not an inch of motion to collect unpaid and underassessed taxes from
banks and office buildings, or get a larger share of the $26 billion paid to the
federal government in taxes annually.
It is clear that at the heart of the three-year plan are substantial layoffs, a
wage freeze and cuts in services, with the Emergency Financial Control Board (EFCB)
giving every aid to the employers in dictating terms of labor contracts and thus
fundamentally undermining collective bargaining. The first contract negotiation of
1976 involves 32,400 subway and bus workers in the Transport Workers Union. Their
contract expired March 31, 1976. The Transit Authority is insisting on a wage
freeze among other items, on the grounds that the EFCB forbids any wage increases
as part of its three-year financial plan.
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Mass layoffs are the heart of this financial plan imposed by the EFCB--and Ford's
plan only adds federal pressure to its implementation. For example, Harrison
Goldin, City Controller, said on January 15, 1976 that New York faces a $1 billion
income shortage in the next three fiscal years. His response is more layoffs.
Felix Rohatyn says he believes the shortage is already up to $112billion when
originally $725 million in added budget cuts had been foreseen.
Mayor Beame, in his address on the "State of the City" on January 22, 1976 said:
"I am here to tell you that the road ahead as far as the eye can see is uphill and
rough." He said that the city could not continue to finance the City University.
Deputy Mayor Kenneth Axelrod, speaking about additional layoffs, said: "It looks
like that's where the emphasis will have to be."
Beame, in his speech, deplored
the cuts, and the racist nature of these cuts, and then turned around and said he
would continue making them. He demagogically stated: "I want to make it clear
that at this point in our history, economic development and job and revenue projects must have absolutely top municipal priority." How did he propose to expand
jobs? By cutting them!
The New York Times "News in Review" section of January 25, 1976 commented on Governor Carey's "State of the State Message," saying that he sounded like Ronald Reagan.
Each proposed less government spending for social welfare programs and more tax and
other benefits to big business as the cure for economic ills. Mayor Beame's Message drew much the same "trickle down from the rich to the poor" policy conclusions.
Default was avoided temporarily, but as Controller Goldin indicated could reappear
as an imminent danger at any moment. Standard and Poor's says it will be 10 years
before the city can borrow in the commercial market and others say it will be 20
years. In the meantime cuts in services, layoffs, and wage freezes are to continue,
each year cutting over twice as much off the budget as in the first year of the
plan, now that the budget deficit is discovered to be $1 billion rather than $725
million.
Proposals to Aid the People of New York and Other Cities
To help cities all over the nation avoid fiscal crises and default without putting
new burdens on city workers, several relief measures must be won. First, the
federal government should guarantee whatever loans any city needs. Second, shortterm loans must be converted to long-term loans with a reduction in their interest
rates. This would reduce the immediate financial pressures on the cities and would
hurt only the banks and other bondholders. The long-run solution to New York's, as
well as other cities', financial problems lies in massive federal grants to the
cities. Without such grants, New York's problems will likely reappear with increased intensity when the limited time period of federally guaranteed loans runs out.
The long-run financial problems of New York City and other cities show no signs of
lessening; rather, every indication is they will intensify without outside help.
Long-run solutions must include federal grants to cities, with specific appropriations for housing construction, schools, child care, mass transit, and other needs.
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Priority must be given to the most oppressed communities. This type of program
would create many jots and help balance city budgets by increasing tax revenues and
decreasinc welfare expenditures. Restructuring of the tax burden in New York City
and on all levels of government, so that the ruling class pays more, is absolutely
necessary.
Finally, the largest source of federal funds which could be used to create jobs and
aid the cities is the military budget. The advance of detente allows and demands a
substantial reduction in the military budget. This source of funds must be tapped
for the peoples' benefit.
It must be clearly understood that those who oppose detente also oppose saving the
cities; those who oppose unions also oppose helping t~e cities; those who favor
segregation and discrimination oppose giving aid to the cities. And, it must be
stressed, these positions are not accidental. They are reflections cf Lasic class
positions. Therefore, to win substantial aid for the reople of the cities, this
reactionary coalition and all that it stands for must be fought. As long as this
pro-monopoly coalition rules, it will not willingly spend the billions necessary to
turn the cities into centers of full employment, decent schools, mass transit,
adequate housing, clean air, etc.
To campaign for federal aid to the cities, while evading the absolutely necessary
struggle to reduce the arms budget, will only result in failing to win aid for the
cities. To strive to convince representatives of monopoly to vote for measures to
help the working class--while anti-monopoly forces remain trapped within the twoparty, lesser-evil, two wings of the capitalist class political party framework-will guarantee failure. Only independent action, independent with regard to
political line (and not isolated from the labor, peace, civil rights, women, senior
citizen, etc., movements), offers a path of struggle with a chance for success.
After all, large problems require basic solutions.
The two greatest barriers to success (for the working class) in our nation are
racism and anti-communism. Without a principled battle against both, a successful
battle for the cities cannot be won. Racism divides us along "color lines" and
prevents us from seeing our real enemy: monopoly. Anti-communism isolates those
who have stood steadfast against the ravages of American "free enterprise" ideology
and prevents them from giving much needed leadership in the terribly complex
battles lying ahead.
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THE WARFARE-WELFARE TRADEOFF:

HEALTH, PUBLIC AID AND HOUSING*

by Kathleen Peroff
University of Maryland

It is a truism that resources devoted to defense are unavailable for nondefense purposes.
Investment in defense takes place partly by reducing civilian
spending on consumer and capital goods through tax rates that are higher than they
would otherwise be and partly by reducing government spending on non-defense
programs.
The purpose of this
paper is to test
for the existence and magnitude of
the latter tradeoff over the years 1929-1971 in the United States.
In particular,
the analysis concerns the tradeoff between defense and three social welfare
policies: health, public aid and housing.
In addition, the analysis examines
whether these tradeoffs differ during periods of war and peace.
Theoretical Arguments
One prevailing theory is that no tradeoff occurs between military and welfare
expenditures.
Proponents of this
theory argue that modern society moves toward a
warfare-welfare state in which political
elites
must buy off the populace with
welfare goods. One reason is that welfare policy promotes the growth of GNP by
contributing to better physical and psychological health for the workers which in
turn promotes efficiency and production.
(Baran and Sweezy, 1966; Rimlinger, 1971,
59-60; Helo, 1974, 89-90).
Another argument in favor of this theory is that welfare spending contributes to political order by co-opting the masses and rewards
them for fighting wars.
(Gouldner, 1970).
In a more pragmatic vein, Eckstein concludes:
I think that historical experience has been that governments are
either stingy or they're spenders, and if they're stingy about
defense, they're stingy about everything.
I would say that the
historical record suggests that the association between civilian spending and military spending is positive, not negative.
(1963: 1012)
A related argument suggests that defense spending, even if greater than necessary for national security, is not necessarily a waste, since alternative uses of
economic resources would be equally "frivolous." For instance, the money might be

*The author wishes to thank Gillian Dean and Margaret Podolak-Warren for helpful comments. This research was done with the financial help of the General
Research Board, University of Maryland.

turned back to the taxpayers for personal consumption and not put into other policy
areas. If this is the case, the real price of defense is merely the loss of
1
However, this argument holds only if the
luxuries for middle and upper classes.
income tax is truly progressive. Pechman's (1971) research indicates that effective
tax rates are mildly progressive over most of the range of incomes but exhibit regressivity at high levels of income. Thus, the burden of defense is carried to a
greater extent by lower income groups. The argument that defense merely displaces
frivolous consumption has yet to be empirically supported.
The previous lines of theorizing hold that there is certainly no negative
relationship between defense and other policy sectors and that there may be a
positive relationship. Other theorists, however, take a contrary position and view
defense and welfare policy goals as mutually exclusive. They argue that military
burdens drain political, technical and economic resources from domestic programs.
Wilensky contends that a foreign policy accenting military action without total and
sustained mobilization is inflationary enough to enhance the policy appeal of the
position "cut the domestic frills, balance the budget." (Wilensky, 1975, 79-80)
Similarly, Russett contests the position that military spending is necessary to
maintain overall demand in the modern economy and argues that defense expenditures
are now more likely to force tradeoffs than they were thirty years ago. (1970, 133)
A related argument is that heavy defense investment retards the establishment
of new welfare or health programs. If a country supports a burdensome defense,
other domestic policies or programs may not be introduced or established because
policymakers perceive the cost as insupportable given present and anticipated defense sector outlays. This possibility is legitimately a substitution effect although it cannot be empirically supported by examining current expenditure data.
In another vein, government funded research and development is primarily concentrated in the defense and space industries while non-defense agencies do not have
research and development programs that relate broadly to their entire mission. This
continued imbalance in government research efforts also retards innovations in welfare, housing, and health care programs.
Existing Empirical Research
Empirical findings to date are mixed. The number of studies which indicate
the existence of a tradeoff relationship approximates the number which show that
none exists. A review of this research discussion will center on conceptual and
methodological problems in these studies which account for some of the confusion.
Pryor is the only researcher to apply both cross-sectional and time-series
His cross-sectional study of seven "capitalist"
data analyses to this question.
and seven "socialist" countries reveals no evidence of a substitution effect
between non-military (all non-military expenditures are lumped together) and
military expenditures for two different years: 1956 and 1962. (1968, 121) However, his time-series analysis for the period 1950-1962 uncovers a more varied
pattern. In those countries where defense expenditures are a relatively small
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proportion of the GNP, there exists no statistically significant inverse relationWhen defense expenditures
ship between defense and current public expenditures.
are a relatively more important part of the governmental budget, a significant
but small substitution relationship is evident, but only when transfer payments
are excluded.
When transfer payments are added to current expenditures, there is
no substitution effect. (1968, 298) Similarly, in another time-series analysis
over the period 1950-1970 for Sweden, the United Kingdom, Australia and the United
States, Caputo finds that defense does not undercut welfare expenditures.
(1975,
445-446)
Recent research on Latin American countries also indicates no tradeoff between
these two expenditures. In an analysis of the relationship between defense and
education expenditures, Ames and Goff obtain positive and significant correlations
between changes in defense and education outlays and conclude that these two
policies are not mutually exclusive.
(1975, 181) Examining Brazilian budgetary
outlays, Hayes also finds that when correlating levels of defense expenditures
with what she terms "social development" expenditures, the correlation is positive.
The rapid expansion of both the whole economy and the federal sector in Brazil over
the period of her analysis is used to explain these results.
Correlating spending
ratios (category of expenditures/total federal expenditures), she obtains a negative but insignificant correlation.
In sum, her analysis indicates that military
spending does not have serious negative consequences for economic and social investment in Brazil. (1975, 33)
Lastly,
120 nations
Defense and
correlated.

similar results are found with cross-sectional data on approximately
reported in the World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators.
health expenditures, each as a proportion of GNP are not inversely
(Hudson and Taylor, 1972, 34)

While the results of these studies do not strongly support theoretical arguments which suggest a positive relation between defense and social welfare
spending, neither do they support the substitution hypothesis of an inverse
relationship.
They do suggest that major decisions about the magnitudes of various
public consumption expenditures are made in relative isolation from each other.
Other empirical analyses, however, do find an inverse relationship between these
expenditures.
In an analysis of defense spending in the United States between 1938 and 1969,
Russett concludes that military spending undercut welfare first, then education
and then health. (1970, 151) Looking at the post-World War II experience of
Great Britain, France and Canada, he again gives a qualified "yes" to the question
of substitution effects. (1970, 171-174) Wilensky's findings tend to corroborate
those of Russett. Although his cross-sectional analysis indicates that military
spending is irrelevant to welfare outlays, his "time-series analysis" shows that
in nations with very large military budgets, war and welfare are mutually exclusive
goals. He emphasizes the impact of the Cold War period as having the most obvious
depressing effect on the growth of social welfare expenditures.
In a sample of
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sixteen countries, "great increases in military spending in 1950-1952 (military
spending/GNP 1952 minus military spending/GNP 1950) are associated with small
4
increases in social security spending for the whole period 1950-1966 (r=-. 3)."

(1975, 77-79)
In sum, empirical findings are not very consistent. Those research designs
employing cross-sectional data show little or no support for a tradeoff or substitution effect while time-series studies have revealed more complex patterns.
In the following section, discussion focuses on certain conceptual and methodological problems which characterize these studies and which cause their different
results.
Concerptual and Methodological Issues
One source of variation in findings is whether the analysis is based on crosssectional or time-series data. The argument here is that cross-sectional analysis
is simply an inadequate aprroach to this question. Cross-sectional analysis
reveals whether different countries exhibit budgetary tradeoffs at a single point
in time. This information is simjly not sufficient for rejection or acceptance
of the substitution hypothesis which is better tested by examination of budgetary
patterns of behavior over time. Results based on cross-sectional data may and
have been shown to vary for different but close years for the same group of
countries, causing problems in reaching any definite conclusion. (See Pryor, 1968,
231)
A second problem is that of those studies using time-series data, most have
relied on relatively small time periods for their analysis. Usually this constraint
is due to problems of data availability. However, analysis of very short timeseries prevents strong generalizations and precludes empirical tests of oscillations
in relationships during significant sub-periods.
Third, in research based on time-series analysis, either no or inadequate
attention has been given to certain statistical problems. Especially noteworthy
is the problem of serial correlation in regression and correlation analysis. If
not eliminated, serial correlation leads to inaccurate tests of significance which
are biased towards rejection of the null hypothesis. Thus, there is a high probability of accepting as true relationships which in fact are spurious. (Hibbs,
1974) In this case, researchers may erroneously infer the existence of a tradeoff
when none actually exists.
Fourth, many existing studies have not been especially cautious when defining
and operationalizing the expenditure terms. Specifically, the results of empirical
analysis for tradeoffs or substitution effects are clearly influenced by the assumptions made about the nature of the allocation game. For instance, no substitutive effects may exist between absolute levels (or percapita amounts) of
defense spending and absolute levels (or percapita amounts) of other governmental
spending if the allocation process is an expanding-sum game represented by a
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growing public sector. Negative shifts in the percentage allocation figures do not
necessarily entail negative shifts in the absolute or percapita levels. The example given by Hayes underlines a simple but worthwhile pcint:
Assume, for example, a government with $100 to spend in year 1,
and $200 in year 2. If 15% of the budget is allocated to both
military and welfare in year 1, each sector gets $15.
In year
2, a one-to-one percentage tradeoff occurs and military gets
20% of the total while welfare gets only 10%. Military receives
$40, a substantial increase, but welfare gets $20, still an
increase over the previous year. (1975, 28)
Thus, welfare appears to be cut only in percentage terms since the absolute levels
for both defense and welfare are increasing.
However, a substitution effect is
in fact occurring; the increase in the level amount for welfare is not as large
as it would be if the defense increment was smaller.
Simple correlation analysis
of the level amounts does not reveal this and may lead the researcher to infer
that a substitution effect does not occur. Thus, in the examination of tradeoff
relationships, it is important to examine the ratios rather than the level or
percapita amounts.
A fifth problem in this kind of research is suggested by a study which shows
that tradeoff relations vary over different time periods.
(Hollenhorst and Ault,
1971, 760-763) Estimation of a single tradeoff parameter for a long period of
time may hide oscillation in the tradeoff relationship during sub-periods and hence
bias results.
In this case, the significant sub-periods are periods of war during
which defense expenditures become more dominant and, as a result, lead to larger
substitutions or tradeoffs than during periods of peace.
In sum, these pitfalls suggest the need for new analysis which is based on
time-series data over a longer time period in which potential serial correlation
is examined, the expenditures are measured as ratios and last, tests are done for
changes in the tradeoff relationship in war and non-war years.
ANALYSIS
The following analysis tests the tradeoff hypothesis over the years 1929
through 1971 for the United States. Additionally, the analysis tests the possibility of changes in these tradeoff relationships during 1) World War II (194l-1945),
2) the Korean War (1950-1953) and 3) the Vietnam War (1965-1971) versus non-hotwar periods.
The large number of years in the sample allows for a good test of
variations in tradeoffs during three different types of war as well as a good
number of non-war years.
Annual time-series expenditure data at the federal and total (federal, state
and local) levels have been collected for the three policy areas: health, public
aid and housing.2 The purpose of this study is to analyze tradeoffs between
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defense and domestic policies which are primarily distributive or re-distributive
in nature, so education is not included. Also excluded are social security and
veterans expenditures; in both cases, beneficiaries have "contributed" either
through payroll taxes or military activity. In addition, social security expenditures come from a special fund separate from the normal budget so that the
tradeoff notion is not very meaningful.
Description of the expenditure data
Health:
Public health expenditures cover the following general categories:
hospital and medical care, medical research, maternal and child health programs,
school health, other public health activities and medical facilities construction.
With the exception of school health and state and locally owned hospitals,
federal health spending is funneled into all of the above program areas. While
there is no national health insurance covering the entire population, the federal
government does provide hospital and medical care for specified groups of beneficiaries:
Indians, Alaskan natives, lepers, narcotic addicts, federal prison
inmates and smaller miscellaneous groups. The federal government also provides
hospital and medical care for military personnel and their dependents and veterans.
However, these defense-related expenditures have been excluded from the health
figure, since they are more properly regarded as defense related expenditures
necessitated by previous wars and maintenance of a peacetime army. Therefore,
all defense related health expenditures are included under defense.
Federal, state and local financing covers medical research, medical facilities
construction, programs for maternal and child health care and other public health
of these program
The federal contribution is usually larger in all
activities.
areas. This is especially the case with respect to hospital construction and
medical research. Only county/state owned psychiatric, general or tuberculosis
hospitals are completely financed by these levels of government.
Public aid expenditures refer to those programs that provide
Public Aid:
payments in cash or services to individuals and families. Unlike social insurance
programs which pay benefits as an earned right, public aid programs rely on a
means or income test to determine eligibility. The following programs are included under this expenditure category: Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(ADC, AFDC); Old Age Assistance (OAA); Medical Assistance for the Aged (MAA); Aid
to the Blind (AB); Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled (APTD); Medical
3
(GA).
Assistance (MA); state and locally financed General Assistance Programs
Housing expenditures refer to government sponsored and/or supported
Housing:
programs that specifically aim to assist families in meeting their housing needs.
1) public housing owned
These expenditures cover two broad categories of programs:
and/or operated by a public body and 2) other housing programs which relate primarily to government programs designed to assist private industry in financing
(Department of
subsidized housing for low-income and moderate-income families.

-371-

Health,

Education,

and Welfare,

1968,

163)

Government loans for low-rent public housing or for college housing ..e not
4
Proincluded on the grounds that they will be repaid or privately refinanced.
and mortgage and
for home-financing institutions
grams providing credit facilities
For the most part, they have resulted
loan insurance programs are also excluded.
in no net cost to the government since income from these programs exceeds expenditures. Finally, certain war emergency housing program outlays, primarily
intended for the use of defense and wartime workers, have been subtracted from the
expenditure series.
Estimation Technique
Since the regression equations in this study are estimated from time-series
data, there is a potential problem of serial
correlation.
One of the assumptions
of the classical normal linear regression model is non-autoregression in the residuals which implies that the disturbance occurring at one point of observation
This assumption is often violated
is not correlated with any other disturbance.
in models of time-series data. When it is, the properties of the least squares
estimators are no longer those of the best linear unbiased estimators.
While they
are unbiased and consistent, they are not asymptotically efficient (Kmenta, 1971,
278) Thus, conventional formulae for carrying out tests
of significance or constructing confidence intervals for the regression coefficients may lead to incorrect inferences.
To solve this
potential problem of serial correlation, a variant of Generalized
Least Squares estimation is used.
The Cochrane-Orcutt Method is employed to estimate the p or autocorrelation coefficient. See Cochrane and Orcutt, 1949, 32-61;
Johnston, 1972, 262).
This p is then used to transform the original data in the
following manner and the equation is estimated via Ordinary Least Squares.
Given
the following equation,
Y = B0 + BIX + u
the transformed variables are:
Y* = Yt - Pyt-i
X* = x t

-

Y-t-

i

BE = B U( -p

0

0

u*= u t

- Put-,

This method of estimation will be used only when serial
correlation remains
after OLS estimation.
If the Durbin-Watson test
indicates no significant firstorder serial correlation after OLS estimation, then GLS is not used and OLS
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estimates are presented. In the more likely case of serial correlation, GLS helps
to remove autocorrelation in the residuals and thus allow "safer" conditions for
hypothesis testing.
Two equations are estimated for each of the three categories of expenditures:

l) Y1
and

=

B0

+

BIX

2) Y2 = B0 + BIX

+

B2 D1
+ B2 D 2

+

B3 Z1

+

BZ

+ B 3 Z4

+
2

B5 Z3

+ u

+ BhZ5 + B 5 Z6 + u

where Y1 = federal health or public aid or housing expenditure/total federal
expenditures
Y2 = total health or public aid or housing expenditures/total expenditures
of all levels of government
X

= real GNP percapita (1958 dollars)

D1 = defense expenditures/total federal expenditures
D2 = defense expenditures/total expenditures of all levels of government
Z1 = D in World War II years only,
0 for all other years
Z2 = Dl in Korean War years only,
0 for all other years
Z3 = Dl in Vietnam War years only,
0 for all other years
Z4 = D2 in World War II years only,
0 for all other years
Z5 = D2 in Korean War years only,
0 for all other years
Z6 = D2 in Vietnam War years only,
0 for all other years
B is the estimate of the peacetime relationship between the proportion spent
It should
on defense and the proportion spent on the other expenditure categories.
be negative and significant if the prediction of the tradeoff hypothesis is correct.
The sum of the coefficients B2 and B3 estimates the relationship during the World
War II years. The relationships for the Korean and Vietnam wars are the sums
(B2 + B) and (B2 + B5 ) respectively. The estimate B1 acts as a control for the
relationship between GNP/population and the growth of the three expenditures and
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should be positive.
In cases where the t value(s) for the interaction coefficients (B 3 through
5
B5 ) is/are insignificant (i.e., the tradeoff does not appear to change during
war years), it is possible that multicollinearity is causing depressed t values.
To check out this
possibility, the hypothesis is tested that any two or three of
the war periods jointly have different tradeoff effects from peacetime years. For
example, to test
for the joint impact of the World War II and Korean War experiences
on the relationship, the following test
is constructed:
B3 + B4 = 0
-

/

23+

2 + 2 Cov

3B4

3B

a significant t allows one to infer that the joint change in the tradeoff relationship during the years of World War II and the Korean War is significantly different
from the tradeoff relationship during peacetime years.
Results
Health:
The estimates for both federal and total
health expenditures are
given in Table 1.
Since serial correlation remains after Ordinary Least Squares
estimation, Generalized Least Squares, as previously described, has been used to
estimate these equations.
In both cases, the Durbin-Watson values for the GLS
Equations surpass the upper boundary value of 1.58 required to accept the hypothesis
of no serial correlation at the .01 significance level.
Overall, the model fares poorly. Although the R 2 is biased due to the use of
GIB (Generalized Least Squares), its
low value of .11 and the insignificance of all
of the estimates (including GNP) suggest the model is inadequately specified for
federal health outlays.
The evidence points to no defense-federal health tradeoff
during either peacetime or periods of war.
Nor is there evidence of a joint
tradeoff effect during the combined war years.
A significant tradeoff does take place, however, for total
health expenditures.
With each percentage increase in the defense ratio during years of peace, the health
share of total expenditures declines by about .03%.
The results indicate no significantly different (larger or smaller) tradeoff during the Vietnam War.
However
the tradeoff is greater by .003 during World War II and smaller by .005 during the
Korean War years.
While these changes in the tradeoff are almost significant at
the .05 level, they do not represent strong oscillations.
Public Aid:
GLS estimates are given for the same equations in Table 2 for
federal and total public aid expenditures.
Again, the new Durbin-Watson values
are large enough to reject the presence of first-order
serial
correlation.
A
substantial tradeoff or substitution occurs between public aid and defense for both
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Each percentage increase in the federal defense ratio takes
expenditure measures.
.25% from the public aid share; each percentage increase in the total defense ratio
This
is obtained by taking .15% from the public aid share of total expenditures.
tradeoff does not change in either direction during any of the wars, nor is there
Lastly, the
any evidence to suggest a joint wartime change in the tradeoff.
economic term is not significant, underscoring the lack of a relationship between
the success of welfare in the budget and the state of the economy.
In conclusion, while the model does not explain a large proportion of the
variance in either expenditure share, the significance and size of the defense
term underlines the importance of the tradeoff notion in predicting public aid
outlays in the United States.
Housing: Table 3 presents the results for housing policy. The analysis does
not favor the tradeoff hypothesis either in years of peace or war for the federal
housing ratio. Nor is there any evidence of a combined war tradeoff during World
War II and the Korean War.
During the Vietnam War years, the relationship is
actually positive, contrary to the predictions of the tradeoff hypothesis.
Results from analysis of total housing expenditures are less definitive.
While no tradeoff takes place between the total defense and total housing ratios
in peacetime, the t values for the interaction terms for World War II and the
Korean war years are negative and quite large though not conventionally significant.
A test for their joint significance was computed and the new t is -l.47, significant
at the .10 level.
If significance requirements are relaxed, the analysis suggests
that public housing programs were hurt more during World War II and the Korean War
than during non-war years when they were not hurt at all. Last, while GNP has no
effect on federal public housing policy, it is important to the total housing expenditure share.
Conclusion
The substitution or tradeoff hypothesis is supported to different degrees for
each of the three policy areas considered. Public aid programs are most undermined
by defense.
Since these expenditures constitute over time a much larger proportion
of both the federal and total U.S. budgets than either health or housing combined,
it is not surprising they are more sensitive to defense. In addition, these expenditures are the most explicitly redistributive in nature, and therefore, the
most politically sensitive, so they are more likely to suffer when defense spending
is rising.
A health-defense tradeoff also occurs in the case of health expenditures by
all levels of government. The tradeoff is smaller than that between public aid
and defense but nevertheless significant.
However, while the substitution effect
between actual levels of expenditures on health and defense is smaller than for
public aid, the fact that no national health insurance has been enacted may be in
part due to the defense burden on the budget.
As noted earlier, this is a potential
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substitution effect which analysis of actual expenditure data cannot reveal.
Given the high level of the existing budget, of which defense is a major contributor, and given the costs of establishing some form of national health insurance, one could argue that enactment of the latter has been delayed (although
there are obviously other factors, as well, which have prevented the establishment
of national health insurance).
Housing is least affected by defense spending. For most of the time period,
no substantial tradeoff has transpired, although tentative evidence suggests that
World War II and the Korean War did have limited adverse impacts on public housing
programs. To some extent, the lack of a substantial tradeoff here may be due to
the minimal share of federal or total expenditures devoted to housing needs. The
lower political sensitivity of housing and its small share of the budget may dispose
policy-makers to choose other domestic areas to cut for defense purposes. As suggested earlier, only when a policy sector constitutes a "significant" share of the
budget, does it appear that its allotment is adversely affected by military needs.
Tests for changes in the tradeoff during periods of military mobilization reveal no substantial differences for the most part. During World War II, the
health-defense tradeoff grows by .3% while it declines by .5% during the Korean
War. One explanation for this switch is that World War II was more expensive
and hence a little more costly in terms of health than was the Korean War. Unmet
health needs after World War II stimulated greater health expenditures in the
early 1950's inspite of the Korean War. For instance, expenditures under the 1946
Hill-Burton program which initiated federal grants to assist states in hospital
construction, increased significantly during years of the Korean War. In the
case of total housing expenditures, a very small housing-defense tradeoff takes
place during World War II and the Korean War while none occurs during any of the
other years. Generally, the lack of substantial oscillations in these tradeoffs
is that defense spending did not decline after World War II and Korea due to the
beginning of the Cold War. Prevailing heavy defense investment in non-war years
during the 1950's and early 1960's contributed to tradeoffs equivalent to those
in war years. This suggests that "war" is not a very relevant concept per se in
explaining tradeoffs if defense outlays remain almost as high during years of peace
as they are in periods of war. Another argument for the lack of substantial tradeoff changes is that tax increases during war periods expand the budgetary pie which
allows higher defense outlays without hurting domestic programs more than they are
hurt in non-war years.
In conclusion, this analysis has focused on tradeoffs between three domestic
public policies and defense programs. Future research is needed on the impact of
defense on other public programs. In addition, since the private sector also
provides welfare, housing and health services, it is important to know the impact
of a heavy defense burden on the private sector levels of these services. For
instance, does a heavy defense burden cause a decline in private health consumption
of medical care because of higher tax rates (due in part to defense spending) which
cause lower personal income?
Does defense spending lead to lower levels of private
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hospital or housing construction because the government employs deficit financing
to support its defense burden and thus competes for loanable funds with private
bidders? Answers to these questions would add further information to the extent
of the warfare-welfare tradeoff.
Endnotes
iWhile this is not Russett's argument, he discusses it in What Price Vigilance,
1970, p. 139.
2

Data sources are:

i)

U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
Historical Summary of Government Finances in the
United States, 1902-1957 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Printing Office, 1959).

2) U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare,
Social Security Administration, Office of Research
and Statistics, Social Welfare Expenditures Under
Public Programs in the United States, 1929-1966,
Report No. 25 compiled by Ida C. Merriam and Alfred
M. Skolnik (Washington, D.C., 1972).
3) U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare,
Social Security Administration, Office of Research
and Statistics, Social Welfare Expenditures, 1970-71;
1971-72 compiled by Alfred Skolnik and Sophie R. Dales
(Washington, D.C., 1971 and 1972).
3

Expenditures on the Food Stamp and Commodity Surplus Programs are not included in this series.

4
However, since these loans are made at below-market interest rates, they
could be included in the expenditure series to the extent that a subsidy is being
provided the borrower.
5

Significance is understood to mean the .05 level in this analysis.
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THE WELFARE EFFORT OF THE bRUITED STATES:

KNOU THEN THYSELF

Leonard S. Miller, Associate Professor
Marleen Clark, MSW
School of Social Welfare, University of California, Berkeley

The Argument and the Findings
It seems obvious that the United States is not meeting the welfare needs of
all its citizens in a adequate and equitable manner.
But, it is neither clear
what rearrangement of national priorities would result in more resources for welfare state usage, nor, given the resources at its disposal, is it clear what
priorities and activities
within the welfare state would lead to best reeting the
needs of its users.
Countrymen, what is to be done?
There are two basic strategies that can be followed.
One focuses on securing
larger budgets for the welfare state, the other focuses on -al-in mfore efficient
usage of existing budgets.
The purpose of this article is to core to sore ludgement, albeit tentative, about the probable success of pursuing thie first
strategy,
and to suggest areas of priority relevant to the second strategy.
To facilitate
the raking of these judgements we make three calculations wkiich corprise the body
of this paper and they have some intrinsic
interest of their own.
Let us begin with the strategy cf increased budgets. Twc questions relevant to
this strategy are immediate:
what is the likelihood of anticipating a ralor welfare
state budget change in the near future, ; and what is the likelihood that the military budget would offer a source of funds for such an increase?
Wilensky has argued that welfare states in advanced nations structurally
resemble one another, and that this pattern of similarity increases with the development process.1
Following Wilensky's work one of the authors of this paper showed
that the magnitude of national welfare efforts in 64 jations throughout the world
are similarly determined by supply and demand forces.
There appears to be a structural pattern, an international "social normalcy," or expectation about what constitutes the appropriate size of any national welfare state, given a basic national
description. If, as Wilensky argues, patterns are converging, then one should anticipate that national welfare state
budgets smaller (larger) than expected would be
more (less) likely to increase over time than to decrease (increase) over time.
Our first
calculation determines whether the size of the United States welfare
effort is more or less than expected when the size of her per capita income, the
size of her military effort, the proportion of her aged, and her political system
are considered simultaneously.
Contrary to the rather commonly held opinion we
find that the United States is not a welfare state
laggard, but for 1966 at least,
she spent more than would be predicted, given her description.
From the argument
above it follows that the U.S. is less likely to increase her welfare state size
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than if she actually were a laggard.

The second question relevant to the increased resources strategy is to determine where budget increases might come from and how large they might be. The
single largest competitor to the welfare state for resources is the defense budget.
Consequently, it may appear as a likely source for welfare state funding increases.
David Stockman's most interesting article in the Public Interest argues persuasively, in our opinion, that very little can be expected from this source. We quote:
The basic problem is that strategic weapons and other military hardware
have always constituted the primary targets for cuts, but the share of the
defense budget attributable to these items has dropped from nearly 50 per
cent in 1964 to less than 30 per cent during the current fiscal year (or
in 1975 dollar amounts, from $38 billion in the former year to $23 billion
today). This rather pervasive shift is largely the result of the escalating
costs of manpower under the volunteer army. Since the latter is probably
invulnerable at present, the effect has been 3 to narrow the target for defense budget reductions quite substantially.
In relentless pursuit of even the possibility of a diminished defense budget,
we ask how much of each reduced dollar of defense spending should one expect society to transfer to welfare state purposes? To estimate an answer to this question
we first formulate and estimate a model that describes this historical welfare
effort of the United States. Based on this model we estimate tile welfare-warfare
trade-off, the increase in the welfare state budget that is expected from saving a
dollar of defense expenditures. We find that six cents is the expected welfare
state budget allocation for every dollar saved from the military budget.
The combination of a welfare state level that is above "normal" in size, and
consequently less likely to increase than to decrease, the likelihood that defense
is not subject to severe cuts at this time, and the rather small increases in welfare budgets that would follow a successful effort to demilitarize, suggest that a
strategy to increase the welfare budget, at least through marauding the defense
budget, is likely to be bankrupt. Consequently, our focus shifts and attention is
directed to the welfare state itself.
Using the historical model of the United States welfare effort, developed to
estimate the welfare-warfare tradeoff, which is naturally limited in its considerations of possible welfare state programs, we estimate where future welfare state
problems probably lie and indicate how present research and planning might best
prepare for expected future increases. Our results suggest that problems associated
with aging populations are the number one future priority. This result is in agreement with the recent call for the development of the technology of care, or main4
The discussion that follows indicates in greater
tenance programs, within welfare.
detail the analysis and methodology behind the calculations that led us to the above
judgements.
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Are U.S.

Welfare State Expenditures Greater Than or Less Than Expected?

The United States has been characterized as a welfare state "laggard," a
the failure
description that is beset with negative performance characteristics:
to spend some expected proportion of GNP; a level of spending that is low in comparison to other rich nations; a nation slow to start
social programs, such as workmen's compensation and national health insurance, and one that is grudging in its
5 6
support of programs once they have begun. ,
In short, the laggard view placed the
United States in the company of the reluctant public welfare providers, such as
Australia, Canada, Japan and Switzerland, in contrast to the welfare state leaders,
West Germany, Belgium, Austria, the Netherlands, and France.
How does this view
hold up under analysis?
A decade ago the United States' welfare effort (government expenditures on welfare and health as a proportion of GNP) was 7.9%.
How close is this value to the
value that would be predicted for any country with similar per capita C1P, military
effort (government expenditures on military as a proportion of GNP), political
system, and proportion aged in the population?
A recent international study of the
structural determinants of the welfare effort by one of the authors estimated a
relationship between these descriptive variables and the welfare efforts of 64
7
nations (23 of which were advanced nations).
That model predicts a 1966 U.S. welfare effort of 7.4%, a half of a percentage point less than the actual U.S. performance.
As the United States has the highest GNP per capita it might be suspect of
being an outlier, a nation not appropriately represented by the estimated international model.
While there may be some truth in this point, one's reservations might
be tempered with the knowledge that of the four explanatory variables in the model
only in GNP per capita was the U.S.'s variable values at an extreme.
Moreover, the
implications that follow from excluding the U.S. from the international model's
estimation lead to a comparative portrait of the U.S. showing her even more relatively advanced than that described above.
Because (1) the U.S. welfare expenditures were less than those predicted by the model, and (2) the method of least
squares was used to estimate the model's coefficients, excluding the U.S. from the
estimation sample only results in an international model that predicts less of a
U.S. effort than the model that includes her in its
estimation.
In point of fact,
a model estimated without the U.S. predicts a U.S. effort of only 6.9%, a full
per-

centage point less than her actual performance.

Tests showed no significant diffe-

rences between the estimates of the two models.

Because we will be using two of

these international coefficient estimates in
In Table I.
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the section to follow we present them

Estimates of the
TABLE I:
Structural Determinants of the Welfare Effort

Variables

a

Units

Constant
HG
HM
HM2
LG
HA

$
% GNP
% GNP
$
Proportion
of

Coefficient
Estimates
U.S. Included

Coefficient
Estimates
U.S. Excluded

8.834.lOE-lt
-2.598.lOE-3+
1.696+
-l.606.fOE-l+
5.304.1OE-3+
i.211.lOE2+

8.998.lOE-lt
-2. 793.lOE-3*
1.681+
-1. 612.lOE-l+
5.248.10E-3+
1.245.10E2+

4. 721+
2.239*
6.190.10E-1

4.755+
2.259*
6.188.lOE-l+

population

PI
P2
P3

Nominal
Nominal
Nominal

a) H and L denote high and low income countries: G - GNP per capita,
M - military effort, A = proporation of population aged 65 and over;
PI, P2, and P3 are the political system indicators - totalitarian,
liberal democratic and authoritarian oligarchic states, respectively.
See Wilensky (1975), p. 138 for the classification by nation. The
United States is a liberal democratic state.
*

= significant

at

- - .05

+ = significant at a - .01

t - No standard errors are provided by the algorithm.
Our positive difference between actual and estimated expenditure level contra-

dicts Aaron's finding that estimated U.S. welfare expenditures (again, as a percentage of GNP) exceeded actual expenditures. 8 The goal of his study was also to
discover if there were common determinants of social security expenditures. He
had a sample of twenty-two countries and found the most important determinants to
be per capita income, age of the social security system, and household saving.
His model predicted a U.S. welfare effort for 1956-57 at 6.2%, while the actual
U.S. effort was 4.9% (these figures are based on data somewhat different from ours,
and accordingly only the difference between us is important to this argument).
There seems to be a clear difference between these two results. We are somewhat
comforted by the fact that while Aaron found age of the system to be one of his

three most important explainants it only accounted for an additional one-half of
one percent of the variance in welfare effort in the international model discussed
per capita, proporation aged, military effort, and political system
above after GN2P

-385-

had been included. While there is need for further clarification on the comparison
between predicted and actual welfare state expenditures, we must tentatively reject
the supposition that the Lited States is somehow performing below expectations.
The Potential Welfare-Warfare Tradeoff
If expenditures on welfare and expenditures on warfare were the only social
choices, then every dollar withheld from military expenditures would be available
for welfare expenditures. This is obviously not the case, as the competition for
government monies extends into every sector of social concern.
Including, as one
should, the possibility of not collecting taxes, the competition extends into every
private concern as well. This recognition prompts us to ask how much of each dollar
withheld from military expenditures can one expect to be allocated to welfare expenditures? We call this reallocation the potential welfare-warfare tradeoff.
Estimating the magnitude of this tradeoff is quite straightforward. First,
one needs an explanation for the size of the welfare effort as a function of the
size of the military effort. For illustrative purposes we can use either of the
international models presented in Table I.
We say illustrative because a crosssectional international model is only suggestive of average changes which may
occur in some artifact average nation. It is not an appropriate description for any
particular country.
Second, using this explanation, one can calculate the rate of change in the
welfare effort due to a unit reduction in the military effort.
The derivative of
the welfare effort supply with respect to the military effort, according to Table I
(U.S. included model) and evaluated at the U.S. military effort for 1966 (9.1 per
cent), yields the result that a unit decline in military effort, which in this case
is 1 percentage point, produces a 1.23 unit increase in welfare effort, which in
this case is 1.23 percentage points.
If the dollar increase in welfare spending
arising from the dollar decline in military spending is divided by the dollar decline in military spending we have the welfare-warfare tradeoff-the welfare increase
for each dollar reduction of military expenditures.
Thus the third step is to
determine the dollars associated with the 1 percentage point decline in military
effort and the dollars associated with the 1.23 perCentage points rise in welfare
effort and then to divide the former into the latter.
Let $H measure the dollar reduction in military expenditures and SW measure
the military-induced increase in welfare expenditures.
Given our data, SM is the
product of (1) the military effort, which is the ratio of military expenditures to
the GNP, (2) the GNP per capita, and (3) the population size.
Similarly, SW is the
product of 1.23 times (1) the welfare effort, which is the ratio of welfare expenditures to the GUP, (2) the GNP per capita, and (3) the population size.
Dividing
the former expression into the latter expression yields:
(1) Welfare-W$arfare tradeoff - $
I

(l.23)(Welfare effort) (GUlP/capita) (capita)
e(Military effort)(GP/capita)(capita)
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According to Wilensky's data the
The latter two terms of this expression cancel.
(1.23)(7.9%)
tradeoff is simrplv:
= 1.07.
(9.1%)
Welfare-Warfare tradeoff- =
A welfare-warfare tradeoff of approximately I means that if the international
rcdcl were tile aprrcrriate model, and if one were only interested in welfare expenditures, demilitarization would be a fruitful goal--every dollar saved from military expenditures would result in the increase of a dollar in welfare expenditures.
This result implies that no other private or social interests would capture any of
these savings.
For our purpose, a more accurate calculation of this tradeoff would result
from an analysis of the welfare effort of the United States itself. To fulfill
the task of calculating a reasonable estimate of the welfare-warfare tradeoff for
the U.S. we must first estimate an historic model of the U.S. welfare experience,
The data used tc estimate the
and then apply the methodology just illustrated.
The structure of this
model are U.S. observations for the years from 1935-1973.
model, built on supply and demand forces, will parallel that developed for the
international model. Let us turn to supply considerations first.
The Variables of the U.S. Historical Model
filitary effort, similar to the international model, is measured as the proportion of GNP spent for national defense. Results from the international model
suggest that military efforts of more than 5.5 percent of GNP substitute for welfare efforts. Except for the five years we considered that preceded World liar II,
annual military efforts have exceeded 5.5 percent, with few exceptions. Thus, a
negative, or substitute, relationship between military expenditures and welfare
expenditures is expected.
Russett
This expectation conforms with previous research on the question.
when defense
found significant decreases in health, education, and welfare spending
9
spending increased, with the greatest decrease in welfare programs.
It would seem sufficient to specify the military effort measure in an equation
for welfare effort and anticipate a negative sign on its coefficient. However, to
test for the possibility of a somewhat more complicated curvature in the relationship between welfare effort and military effort we began by including both the
military effort value and the square of the military effort variable in the welfare effort specification.
In the international model we found that increases in per capita GNP in the
rich nations led to diminishing percentage GNP expenditures on welfare. There, per
capita GNP was considered as a supply variable, which was probably a specification
error. Per capita GP actually measures both the availability of resources, which
As a supply
is supply related, and the national income, which is demand related.
measure the availability of resources should be positively related to welfare. The
As a demand
more resources that are available, the more that can go to welfare.
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reasure the opposite prediction is expected.
Positive increments in national income,
over the historic period in question, are usually interpreted to mean that people
Consequently, their welfare needs are lower and they demand less
are better off.
welfare. These arguments imply that the effect of an increase in per capita (24P
on welfare effort is ambiguous.
If the supply forces exceed the demand forces,
the sign of the coefficient on per capita QJP should be positive.
If the demand
forces exceed the supply forces the sign of the coefficient on per capita GJ.P
should be negative.
And if there is a balance between these two forces the estimate of the coefficient on per capita (MP should not differ (statistically) from
zero. We turn now to considerations about less ambiguous demand variables.
While populations at risk are more or less able to voice their needs, society
has collectively determined that certain groups have needs which require public
responses, and has fashioned a welfare system to respond to these needs. The najor
groups so recognized are the aged, children in need, and workcrs whose connections
with the market has teen tempcrarily or permanently disrupted. Lircct and indirect
measures of these populations should provide reasonable denand variables.
The proportion of the porulation aged 65 and older is an obvicus choice-it
was the most important variable in the international model.
There is no reason
to believe that this variable would be any less important in the Urited States.
Ihe
expect a positive relation between the proportion aged and the welfare effort.
There appears to be an increasing propensity for women in disrupted families
to form separate households tian in the past.10 It seems Tlausible to believe that
female-headed families, particularly those with children, are a higher-risk group
(in terms of needing aid from the public sector) than families in general.
The
proportion of primary families which are female-headed becomes the second demand
variable.
As the proportion cf female-headed families rises, w'eexpect the welfare
effort to rise as well.
Unfortunately, accurate and comparable data on both female-headed and primary
families were not available prier to 1950.
Consequently, an indicator variable,
which we denote DF, was also included in the specification for welfare demand.
Between 1935 and 1949 the indicator variable takes on the value 1 and the proportion
female-headed of primary families takes on the value zero.
Eetween 1950 and 1973
the indicator variable takes on the value 0, and the proportion female-headed of
primary families takes on its estimated value.
The annual unemployment rate, an average of tLe monthly rates, also measures
welfare effort demand.
The reasons seem obvious. UnemFployment benefits and welfare
payments to those whose benefits have been exhausted or to those wthc were not ccvered in the first place are part of welfare effort. In addition, in tires of high
unemployment some people, ineligible for Social Security benefits solely because of
earned income, are made eligible by unemployment and collect those Lenefits.
While there may be some methodological argument about the accuracy of government data with regard to unemployment (especially for the earlier period of our
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analysis), we consider the annual rate an adequate approximation of the condition
of the labor market in any one year. As unemployment rises we expect welfare effort
to rise as well.
There is no doubt that other variables could be considered here as well, but
we believe these three to be sufficient to test our specification. We did not use
data strictly comparable to that used in the international model, due to different
sources. Details may be found in the Appendix. One final point: we chose to lag
the annual demand variables by one year as we expected that their full impact would
not be felt until that time.
In summary, and to clarify notation that is to follow, the following variables
are included in the model:
W

S

D
D

W
GNP
MIL
2
MIL
AGED
UN
FHF
DF
C

welfare effort supplied, the proportion of GNP allocated to public
expenditures on health and welfare
welfare effort demanded, which is not measured
gross national product per capita, converted to 1966 prices
military effort, the proportion of GNP spent on national defense
military effort, squared
the proportion of the population which is aged sixty-five and older
the average of monthly unemployment rates
the proportion of primary families which are female-headed
an indicator variable taking on the value of I or 0 as the year is
before 1950 or is 1950-73, respectively
a random variable.

Model Specification
Equations (2) and (3) denote the supply and demand equations, respectively.
(2)

(3)

w =a
+ a1GNP +
t
0
1
t

2MIL

+

1.IL

+ a WD + E

4 t
St
2
t
3
t
Wt = Yo + yIGNPt + Y2 AGEDt-I + Y3 Tt-1 + y4 FIFt-1 + Y5DFt-1 + EDt

Substituting equation (3) into (2) yields the model to be estimated:
(4) W S

+ a4YO ) + (81 + 84 Y 1 )GNPt + a2 MILt + 83 MIL2 + 84 Y2 AGEDt- 1

(0

+ 8 4 Y 3 UNt_ 1 + O4 Y 4 FHFt_ 1 + 84Y5DFtI +
where Tt. CSt

+

4CDt

Table II presents, in summary form, the hypotheses associated with the estiof the variables are displayed
Descriptive statistics
mates of the coefficients.
in Table III.
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TABLE II
Hypotheses on the Estimate of

Variable
Constant

Null

Coefficient
+ 84 Y0

0

Alternate

do-0

=

Nt

d1 = 0

aL

82

=

2
MILt

83

=

AGEDt_
U t-

1

2

63
4
=64

3

E4Y4

=

(

d2

=

d

=0
d4=

£4Y2 64y

FHFt_ 1
DFt-

1

do0

From the discussion of the
hypotheses about GNP we would
expect i > 0, ( 4 > U, and
V < U. Therefore,

4yI = 62

1 +

the Specified Model

0

65

d = 0
d50

66

d6

4Y5 = 67
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#0

d

d2 > 0 if d 3<0
< 0 if d 3 = 0
d3 <0
d 4 >0
d5

>0

0

d6 > 0
d 7 >0

d7= 0

d7> 0

Descriptive Statistics of
Descrit)tive Statistics
Variable

Units

WS

Proportion

TABLE III
the Historic Model's Variables

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Maximum

Minimum

38

0.115

0.019

0.063

0.022

38

4.474

1.508

2.904

0.799

n

of GNP
GNP

$1000

MIL

Proportion
of GNP

38

0.383

0.010

0.101

0.087

AGED

Proportion
of the
Population

38

0.100

0.061

0.084

0.012

Percent of

38

20.100

1.200

6.510

4.930

23

0.115

0.093

0.101

0.006

UN

Labor Force
FHF

Proportion
of Primary
Families

Estimation of the Historic Model

Our first estimate (Model 1, Table IV) indicates that the forces of increased
resource availability and decreased demand are in balance. The coefficient on
the percapita GNP term estimates not statistically different from zero. The model
1 estimates also show that the more complex curvature between military effort and
The coefficient on the square of the military effort
welfare effort is unnecessary.
All other estimates are statisterm is also not statistically different from zero.
tically different from zero in the predicted directions.
Unfortunately, the Durbin-Watson statistic indicates that there it a problem
Conseof autocorrelation, a not uncommon occurrence in time-series analysis.
quently, we have reason to doubt whether these estimates are best linear unbiased.
The Durbin-Watson d statistic has a distribution that depends on sample size and
the number of variables in the specification. For example, the area of uncertainty
for 38 observations and 5 variables lies between 1.12 and 1.70. A d less than the
lower limit of 1.12 indicates autocorrelation; a value above the upper limit of 1.70
indicates the absence of autocorrelation at the 5 percent level of significance. A
Since the d
value lying in the area between the limits is considered inconclusive.
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value for model 1 is

1.17,

the odds heavily

favor the presence of autocorrelation.

The standard method to rectify this problem is to substitute the procedures
of generalized least squares for those of ordinary least squares.12
While the
methodology to do this is straight forward, its
employment requires one to know
(in this case) the intertemporal relationships between the error terms of equation
(4).
After considerable experimentation the test
meaningful intertemporal relationship we could find was a simple correlation between an error and its
4 year
lagged error.
Such an error structure suggests a life
cycle in the office of the
presidency. Relative advances and declines in annual welfare efforts are made
during particular phases of the four year cycle. After transforming Model l's
variables to neutralize its
autocorrelation, model 1 was re-estimated.
These results appear in Table IV as Model 2.
Having verified that the per capita CIP and
2
MIL coefficients were indeed not statistically
different from zero. we eliminated
them from the specification. We then estimated the simplified specification with
ordinary least squares, which is presented as Model 3, used these estimates to
construct the generalized least squares variable transformations, then re-estimated
Model 3 to obtain our final results, which appear in Table IV as Model 4.
Note that the generalized least squares procedure increased the Durbin-Watson
d from a value of 1.06 for the variables in the Model 3 to a value of 1.55 for
Model 4.
While the value of 1.55 does not suggest the absence of autocorrelation
(at the .05 level of significance), it shows considerable improvement over the
ordinary least squares estimates.
Estimating the Welfare-Warfare Tradeoff
As we expected, military spending erodes welfare spending, but not to the
extent that the international model suggested that it would.
A one percentage
point increase (decrease) in military spending is associated with 9/100th of a
percentage point decrease (increase) in welfare spending.
Substituting the U.S.
average military effort, 10.1 percent, and the U.S. average welfare effort, 6.3
percent, and the rate of increase in welfare effort for a decrease in military
effort of 1 percentage point, .09, into equation (1), yields a U.S. historic
welfare-warfare tradeoff of only .056.
Unless there is some major qualitative
change in the historic determinants of welfare, one should expect 6 cents, on the
average, to be shifted over to welfare for every dollar saved from military expenditures.
Interpreting the Demand Variables of Model 4
As in the international model the proportion of persons age sixty-five and
older proves to be a significant determinant of the welfare effort.
An increase of
1 percentage point in the proportion aged leads to an increase of 1.3 percentage
points in the welfare effort. Changes in the proportion aged affect welfare similary in both the international model and the U.S. historic
model.

-

IQ , _

TABLE IV
Estimates of the Historic Determinants of United States Welfare Effort
Variable

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Constant

-.29627+
(.05894)

-.25382+
(.05048)

-.25670+
(.02402)

-.25985+
(.01640)

-.00788

-. 00064

(.00742)

(.00630)

MIL

-.15901*
(.06562)

-.14753+
(.05357)

-.08700+
(.01757)

-.08992+
(.01646)

AIL 2

.21395
(.15254)

.14314
(.12183)

1.48851+
(.52085)

1.29001+
(.43886)

1.12929+
(.39345)

1.29851+
(.32502)

.00104*
(.00049)

.00073
(.00041)

.00128*
(.00048)

.00085*
(.00038)

2.3009+
(.58864)

2.15382+
(.53099)

2.24383
(.39121)

2.13916+
(.31501)

.25867+
(.05512)

.21618+
(.04954)

.22354+
(.03462)

.21661+
(.02737)

AGED

Durbin-Watson
d Statistic
2
R

1.169

1.479

1.062

1.551

.944

.965

.939

.966

(Figures in parentheses are the standard errors of the estimates)
* Significant at a = .05

+ Significant at a - .01
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Changes in unemployment rates are approximately as significant in their effect
as are changes in the military effort.
An increase in unemployment by 1 percentage
point increases the welfare effort again by 9/100ths of a percentage point.
The
model we are estimating is extremely simple and does not really allow us to study
the full nexus of interrelationships between the explainants of welfare effort.
However, as our society is presently constructed, unemployment is probably negatively
related to military spending; demilitarization probably increases unemployment.
Consequently, welfare should doubly rise from demilitarization--first because of the
direct effect of demilitarization, and second, because of the indirect effect of
unemployment.
While no one wants to increase uelfare expenditures through actions
that lead to unemployment, demilitarization, in this piecemeal world we live in,
probably would cause this result.
The proportion of primary families which are female-headed proves to be the
determinant of greatest magnitude in the historic model.
A 1 percentage point
increase in the proportion female-headed primary families leads to a 2.1 percentage
points increase in the welfare effort.
While contemplating the better types of
social restructuring to come, let
us hopefully look forward to a diminishing importance to this estimate.
Over the past two decades this variable has been strongly
associated with increases in welfare effort.
But, if economic discrimination
against women diminishes, and if the birth rate remains low, the proportion femaleheaded families could continue to rise without evoking such an increased demand on
the welfare system.
Discovering Welfare Priorities
Though we have been somewhat speculative in interpreting our results, provided
there are no major changes in social functioning, the overall conclusion must be
that little
is likely to be gained for welfare by pointing a finger at the military.
Let us be more self-reflective.
Our third calculation probes the future with the purpose of determining priorities within the welfare industry itself.
First we make predictions of the welfare effort, for five year intervals, to the year 2001, ignoring the possibility of
major social change, complete economic depression, and total
nuclear war.
Then we
compare the size of each variable's increment to the welfare effort and order these
increments as to their implied priorities.
Predictions
To predict welfare effort we need projections for the independent variables
in the model.
In the case of the proportion aged and proportion of female-headed
fmilies, we were able to use Census Bureau projections.
For female-headed families
projections, the Bureau has provided high and low estimates.
But for the remainder
of the determinants, we were limited only by reason and imagination.
Military effort projections were problematic and highly speculative.
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Under

what conditions will military expenses as a proportion of MNP increase, remain
the same, or decrease? If the military establihment continues to be a strong
demander of the national resources we might expect the level to remain at least
the same, or increase incrementally. If a "backlash" against military expenditures is combined with increasing demand strength in other sectors, we might expect
military effort to remain the same or decrease to some level of minimum mainten13
showed that the level of proportional military expenditures after
ance. Russett
major wars has seldom fallen to its pre-war level, so that, omitting war years as
special cases, expenditures have tended to increase over the years, perhaps as a
result of incremental budgeting or increasing international tensions or both.
To explore the historical relationship between GNP and military effort we
regressed military effort on GNP for the period 1947-73 (to omit the extraordinary
expenses of the World War II years). The coefficient on GNP was not statistically
different from zero. The Durbin-Watson statistic indicated severe positive correlation between first difference errors, which was not significantly diminished
by regressions on first differences in the variable observations.
Mt

t
(.0936 - .00284
(0234) (.00709)eros

R2. .006:

Durbin-Watson - .42: (standard
errors)

Given these results we chose to specify military effort as a constant proportion of GNP. The average U.S. military effort over the period 1947-1973 was 8.44
percent.
Unemployment has been portrayed at two constant rates; 8 percent,
market failure, and 4 percent, indicating market success.

indicating

Table VI lists the independent determinants of welfare effort to the year 2001.
We have included four projections here, but the reader can predict any situExamination of Table VII, which presents the
ation he or she might find plausible.
projections, indicates that most of the differences in projections are caused by
A comparithe differences in the projected proportions of female-headed families.
son of estimate I with estimate 3, or of estimate 2 with estimate 4, shows that
the 4 percent unemployment differential accounts for only a miniscule increment in
welfare effort. The high unemployment and the high projected proportion of femaleA high
headed families predictably produces the highest level of welfare effort.
unemployment scenario would probably be associated with a slow labor market advance
for women. This possibility lends credence to model 4's female-headed families
coefficient estimate and, by implication, to the projected welfare effort percentages. A low unemployment scenario would probably be associated with more rapid
labor market advances for women, a diminishing female-headed families coefficient,
and projected welfare effort percentages that are smaller than those based on model
4's proportion female-headed families coefficient.
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TABLE VI
Projections of Determinants
Supply Variable

Year
1976
1981
1986
1991
1996
2001

Demand

Military effort
projected at
constant rate

Year

1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000

.0844
.0844
.0844
.0844
.0844
.0844

Proportion of
Population
65

Variables

Unempolyment
Low
High
z

.10461
.11008
.11389
.11806
.11909
.11657

*Projections based on previous proportions.
oly through 1990.

Proportion femaleheaded families
Low
High

.10775
.10690
.10519
.10305
.10069*
.09824*

.10926
.10978
.10975
.10980
10977*
.10982*

U.S. Census projections available

TABLE VII
Prediction af Future U.S. Welfare Efforts
Estimate 1

Year
1976
1981
1986
1991
1996
2001

Unemployment-8%
Female-Headed
Families/High
.1072
.1154
.1203
.1258
.1271
.1239

Estimate 2

Estimate 3

Same as 1, but
Female-Headed
Families/Low

Unemployment-4%
Feale-Headed
Families/High

.1040
.1193
.1105
.1114
.1076
.0992
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.1038
.1120
.1169
.1224
.1237
.1205

Estimate 4

Same as 3, but
Female-Headed
Families /Low
.1006
.1059
.1072
.1180
.1043
.0958

While the projected level of welfare effort does not appear to vary much, the
Note that a change
range in predicted welfare effort is between -. 005 and +.017.
from .10 to .11, when considered in absolute dollars, is not an inconsiderable
sum; given a present welfare expenditure of approximately $140 billion annually,
a .01 difference refers to an additional $1.4 billion to be allocated to welfare
needs.
Induced Increments to Welfare Effort
The U.S. historic model, as a predictive tool, can suggest the future influIt is easy and
ences its variables might have on the size of welfare efforts.
obvious to say that the proportion of aged persons is growing, therefore we should
allocate more resources to this group. Without an empirical base, however, we
What
can only guess the relative importance of competing welfare effort demands.
inferences can be drawn from the model to guide resource allocation within the
welfare industry?
An interesting example of relative priority determination arises out of the
comparison between the female-headed family induced effort and the proportion aged
induced effort. Taking the average 1976 female-headed family projection, .10850,
and subtracting this figure from the year 2000 projected female-headed family
proportions, for each series, results in a proportion female-headed family change
Multiplying these changes by the estimate of the
of either -. 01026 or +.00132.
marginal change in welfare effort induced by a unit change in proportion femaleheaded families predicts either a decrease of -. 02 or an increase of .002 in welThe same procedure applied to the profare expenditures as a proportion of GNP.
jected increase of the proportion aged population over the next twenty-five years
results in a predicted increase in welfare effort of .013. Thus, by the year
2000, we estimate that the aged population will induce an additional 1.5 billion
dollars of expenditures over that induced by AFDC and related considerations.
Further extension into the future emphasizes the importance of the aging
Census Bureau quinquennial projections through
population as a welfare concern.
the year 2050 reach a maximum proportion of persons aged 65 and older to total
population of .17 in the year 2030.14 According to our model an increase of .069
in welfare effort is predicted for the period from 2000 to 2030. This roughly
implies an additional 10 billion dollar growth in the welfare industry.
Our models are simple, all other variables are assumed to be held constant,
However, they have clear implications
and our results must be considered crude.
Until better estimates become available it seems likely
for social work policy.
that we should place added emphasis in the curriculum and in the field on those
programs and services directed toward the aging and in deveigping research in the
area of care or maintenance services for this target group.
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Conclusion
In the body of this paper we have offered answers to three questions.
First,
is the United States truly a welfare state laggard? In terms of percentage of CIP
expended on public welfare programs and compared to other rich countries it seems
so. However, we found that the United States actually spent more on w:elfare state
programs than would be predicted for a country with its description, at least for
1966.
We went on to estimate the historic L.S. welfare-warfare tradeoff by specifying and estimating time-series determinants of this effort.
The chosen variables
seem to explain much of the variance in welfare effort produced in the United
States. The coefficient estimates indicate that if relatively small changes are
made in the determinants of social choice, six cents would go into welfare state
spending for every dollar saved from military spending.
Finally, we used the
historic model to predict the expected welfare state effort over the next twentyfive years. Our results suggest that among the areas considered, services for the
aging population have the highest future priority.
As Llysses sailed past the island of the Sirens, bound hand and foot as lie
was to the mast of his ship, truly he must have heard a tempting sueet song, for
the Sirens promised him foreknowledge of all future happenings on earth. Figuratively, we too have offered such a song.
But, rather than lure the reader off
course, by reason and calculation we have pointed him/her in the same direction
Llysses was headed-home.
The task before social work and social welfare lies at
home. It lies in making our welfare institutions into the very best they can be.
Appendix: Data Sources
Welfare Effort: To obtain data for the maximum number of years data on welfare programs were taken from the Historical Statistics of the United States and
various years of Statistical Abstracts.16, 1 7 Although the data are not strictly
comparable, most of the discrepancy seems to fall into education, which along
with public housing, we are omitting from the welfare effort measure.
Public
expenditures for social insurance, public aid, health and medical programs,
veterans programs, and other social welfare were totalled and divided by Gross
National Product.
iRilitary Effort: Federal Government expenditures for national defense
fumctions (Statistical Abstracts, 1962 and 1974), have been divided by Gross
National Product to provide a measure of military effort. Veterans benefits and
services are not included in this measure.
CUP: Gross National Product data have been divided by population and converted to 1966 dollars to indicate CQP per capita in constant dollars. 18 These
figures are not comparable to the international model data as in that case CliP
was computed at factor cost.
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Aged.
The aged variable represents the proportion of the population age 65
and older and was obtained from the Economic Report of the President, 1974, and
Historical Abstracts of the United States, 1960.
The projection of proportion
aged is based on Census Bureau data.19
L1:
The annual unemployment rate, an average of the monthly rates, was citained from the Economic Report of the President, 1974 and Historical Abstracts
of the United States, 1960.
There have been some changes made in the definition
of unemployment, but it is beyond the scope of this paper to attempt to derive
more accurate figures.
1hile some sets of years may not be strictly comparable,
we feel that the rates are adequate approximations for our purposes.
FHF:
The proportion of Frirtarv families headed by females was obtained from
Current Population Reports and Statistical Abstracts, 1955, 1962.20 11is series
is entered only for the years 19,50-73.
The information on both Frimary families
and female-headed families was first collected in 1947 and we felt the most accuracy could Ue eLtained in using 1i5L and later census data. The rrojections of
21
feuale-headed families are from Census Bureau data.
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A COMPARISON OF DEFENSE AND WELFARE SPENDING
IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM, 1946-1976
James L. Clayton
Professor of History
University of Utah

One of the most important and absorbing questions of our time is whether governments should extend or retrench their efforts toward assisting people who do not
seem to be able to make it on their own.
Those who believe that governments should
expand their programs to help the needy argue that a compassionate and affluent
society has both the ability
and the responsibility to do so; those who believe
that governments have already pushed too far and too fast argue that the advance of
the welfare state must be halted.
Closely related to this basic disagreement is
the question whether society must sacrifice in one area in order to build in another, that is whether one government program must come at the expense of another.
Those who argue that governments should do more for their less fortunate people tend
to believe that high levels of defense spending are a hindrance to expanding welfare
programs.
Conversely, those who believe defense needs are under funded generally
feel that welfare expenditures are a limitation on national security.
This essay focuses on this warfare-welfare dichotomy by measuring and comparing warfare and welfare expenditures over an extended period of time in two countries:
The United States and the United Kingdom.
The main object of this essay is
to show the long-term trends of warfare and welfare spending in these two countries
in order to determine 1) whether either or both are rising or falling, 2) whether
welfare expenditures are inversely related to defense expenditures, and 3) whether
the welfare-warfare experience in a foreign country comparable with the United
States can offer important insights into our present predicaments and help us anticipate certain problems we might face in the future. The United Kingdom was chosen
for comparison with the United States because its defense policies and expenditures
have closely paralleled ours for the past 30 years and because American welfare
expenditures have tended, usually with a lag of about 20 years, to follow those of
Great Britain more than any other country.
England is,
moreover, our "Mother Country" in more ways than one, and Americans have readily related to such comparisons
in the past. The base year 1946 was selected because United Kingdom welfare expenditures are available in a complete series only since that date and yet 30 years is a
sufficient time frame to measure both long and short term trends.

I
There are a variety of ways of
America prefer to use the "national
This account includes Department of
tary personnel, military assistance

defining defense expenditures.
Most analysts in
defense" expenditures account in the U.S. budget.
Defense (DoD) outlays, retirement pay for mili- 1
to friendly nations, and atomic energy outlays.
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This method slightly overstates our defense expenditures since some civilian programs of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) are included, as are funds for educating military personnel and their dependents overseas.
It understates defense
costs on the other hand by excluding war-related veterans' benefits, interest on
war loans, and that unknown portion of our space program that is primarily military
in nature.
Since there is no way fiscally to break out AEC civilian programs, military dependent school costs, and war-caused vs. welfare-related veterans' benefits,
efforts to expand on the U.S. budget concept, with one exception, have been largely
unsuccessful and highly controversial. 2 That exception is the method used by the
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (USACDA) in its reports on world military
expenditures.
This agency uses NATO definitions of military spending which generally exclude civilian-type expenditures of the DoD but include military-related
expenditures of other government agencies, military grants of the donor country,
and military equipment credit purchases.
On the average the USACDA defense data
are slightly higher than U.S. budget defense data and are given in calendar rather
than fiscal years. Both of these methods will be used in this essay.
Looking at the period since World War II it seems at first glance that defense
expenditures in the United States have been rising rapidly. Allowing for a reasonable time period for World War II spending to have worked itself out of the budgetary process--say by 1950--it appears that defense spending has risen from $12.4
billion in 1950 to an estimated $101.1 billion for fiscal year 1977.
This represents an increase of 715 percent in 27 years, most of which were years of international tension and fully half of which America was engaged in combat. Using 1950
as a base year considerably overestimates this recent expansion since it was the
last year before the Korean War, but also underestimates this figure historically
since the level of defense spending in 1950 was approximately four times higher than
traditional defense expenditures during peacetime.4
A better way of measuring spending trends is in constant prices.
On this basis
defense spending in constant (1975) dollars rose from $40 billion in 1950 to $84
billion in fiscal 1977, or a little over two rather than seven times. Defense
spending peaked at $133 billion in 1969 and has been falling every year since until
fiscal 1977 when a slight increase occurred. Defense spending has been fairly constant since the Korean War, fluctuating around $100 billion, except for the Vietnam
escalation. Then it went considerably higher, but in recent years defense outlays
have fallen well below the average for the past two decades.
An even more accurate method of measurement is to compare defense expenditures
as a percent of total federal outlays and GNP. In 1950 defense represented 29.1
percent of total federal spending; in 1977 defense had fallen to an estimated 25.6
percent. 5 On this basis defense spending has not only been falling since 1968 but
also has declined even from the pre-Korean War base year of 1950. As a percentage
of total public spending (federal, state, and local) defense expenditures have
fallen to their lowest level since 1940.6 Today (1976) defense represents about 15
percent of total government expenditures. In 1968 that figure was 29 percent and in
1953 it was 45 percent. On the other hand defense spending has risen since 1950 as
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a percentage of GNP. In that year defense required 4.6 percent of our total goods
and services; today defense requires 5.8 percent (See Tables 1 and 2).
Perhaps the most accurate and dispassionate way of measuring defense expenditures is to put these data in constant dollars and on a per capita basis. Both
price and population inflation are rendered neutral in this way. In constant dollars America's defense effort is costing less today than at anytime since 1950, and
with the exceptions of last year has fallen every year since the peak year of the
Vietnam War. 7 But on a per capita basis in constant (1958) dollars, defense spending in 1976 cost $157 for each and every American, the lowest price tag since 1950
when defense cost $11O.
During the Great Depression defense costs on this same basis were far less, about one-seventh what we pay today.
Prior to World Wag I defense cost about one-fifteenth the current rate--even in constant dollars.
From the above analysis it should be clear that in real terms the trends of
defense spending in the United States in recent years is sharply downward, not upward, and currently defense outlays are at the lowest level they have been for the
past 25 years.
A variety of other data also support this conclusion. 9 This conclusion is further born out by the most recent Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
study. According to that agency U.S. military expenditures fell from 9.5 percent
of MP in 1967 to 6.2 in 1974, or from $102 billion to S77.9 billion in constant
dollars. 10 Since it is frequently assumed that defense spending is rising in the
United States, and particularly at the expense of social welfare programs, it may
be useful at this point to flip back to Chart 1 on page
to fix this point visually in mind.
II
How one defines welfare spending in the United States is also a matter of considerable controversy. There are two generally accepted definitions of long standing, however, and both will be used here. The first and more important is the Social Security Administration's (SSA) "social welfare" concept which includes federal, state, and local public spending, and also includes welfare-related spending
for all groups, not just for the very poor or those who are stigmatized in one way
or another. I
"Social welfare" reflects expenditures designed to help those Americans whose income falls below a certain minimum and seeks to establish minimum standards of health, education, and housing for everyone. Specifically, this definition
includes expenditures for social insurance, public aid, publicly financed health and
medical programs, veterans' benefits, public housing and education outlays, and a
few other minor activities. A derivative of the social welfare definition is the
"income support" category which only includes social insurance, veterans' benefits,
and public assistance.
Income support increased from $17 billion in 1950 to $103
billion in 1974 in constant (1974) dollars, or from 3.7 to 7.9 percent of GNP. 1 2
Social welfare expenditures have risen as a percentage of GNP in almost every
decade of this century. Prior to World War I they represented less than three percent of our CNP: during the 1920's they inched up to four percent; in the Great Depression they climbed to more than 10 percent, then fell somewhat during World War
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II only to rise again during the 1950's. Since 1965 social welfare expenditures
3
have risen exponentially and now stand in excess of 20 percent of GNP.1
Social welfare has also steadily increased its share of total public spending
since 1950. In that year social welfare represented 38 percent of all government
outlays; in 1975 that figure had risen to 58 percent. On a per capita basis in
constant dollars social welfare spending had risen about 50-fold since the beginning of this century and about seven-fold since the New Deal. Since 1965 real per
capita social welfare spending has shot up 128 percent, increasing by $47 billion
in fiscal 1975 alone. Despite a spending level in fiscal 1975 of $287 billion
these expenditures continue to grow at an exponential rate (19 percent in 1975) and
show no sign of leveling off.
The second most common definition of welfare is the "income security" category
and its "public assistance" derivative in the U.S. budget. Income security expenditures are designed to help those Americans whose income has been lost or impaired
by retirement, disability, illness, unemployment, poverty, or death. Income security outlays have risen from $30 to nearly $140 billion in the past 10 years and
these, too, are growing exponentially. Part of this category includes "public assistance" expenditures for the aged, disabled, blind, and families with dependent
children. This category alone has risen from 4.1 billion in fiscal 1968 to an estimated 23.6 billion in fiscal 1976, an increase of 476 percent in less than a decade. 14 Finally, federal outlays for the poor are sometimes viewed as comprising
welfare spending in this country. These outlays include cash benefits, food, housing, education, health and manpower training. In constant dollars these federal
antipoverty outlays have steadily increased from less than $10 billion to more than
$30 billion since 1960.15
All of these income security programs are limited to federal spending and, consequently, underrepresent welfare spending by the amount states and local governA better method is to use the "public
ments spend. This difference is substantial.
welfare" method of the Census Bureau. This definition includes all public spending
for those Americans who are blind, disabled or out of work, females with dependent
children, and the poor who are either old or need medical care or both. These data
16
On a per capita basis and in conare available since 1902 for selected years.
stant dollars public welfare expenditures rose from less than two dollars in 1902 to
$75 in 1973, or at about the same rate as social welfare expenditures for the same
period. These data, along with social welfare expenditures, are tabulated as a percentage of GNP since 1965 in Table 2, and as a percentage of total public spending
in Table 3. Table 4 compares defense and social welfare and public welfare spending
in constant dollars per capita since 1965.
The above tables, and especially Table 4, clearly demonstrate that since 1946
and more particularly in recent years warfare spending in the United States has been
trending downward and welfare spending has been increasing markedly. As a percentage of GNP defense spending has fallen generally from its Korean War peak, and has
fallen 57 percent since 1968. An even sharper decline is evident when measured as a
percentage of public spending. On a per capita basis in constant dollars, the drep
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since 1968 is 70 percent. On the other hand, social welfare spending has risen
steadily since 1946 as a percentage of GNP, except for the Korean War years, and
has climbed 46 percent since 1968.
The same pattern holds for public welfare spendlag. On a per capita basis in constant dollars social welfare climbed 123 percent
between 1965 and 1975, and public welfare 188 percent between 1965 and 1973.
Clearly, warfare and welfare spending have been moving in opposite directions during this
generation.
There is no statistically significant correlation between military spending and
either of the two welfare spending categories during the past 25 years, although
there is a demonstrable negative relationship between warfare and welfare spending
during World War 11.17 On the contrary, it seems more likely that a substantial
portion of our welfare revenues since the end of the Korean Conflict have come from
declining defense budgets. Since most of the increases in government spending have
come at the federal level and in the social welfare category, and since tax rates
have not been raised significantly during the past 20 years, it stands to reason
that rising welfare needs have benefitted from declining defense costs. Resistance
to further defense cuts is hardening in the Congress, however, and a continued welfare windfall from further defense cuts seems less likely in the foreseeable future.
The point that declining defense outlays have helped to fund rising welfare programs
has also been arued
by Roger Freeman in his insightful study, The Growth of Ameri1
can Government.

III
The United Kingdom has traditionally spent a larger share of its resources on
defense than has the United States.
This is understandable since England became a
world power two centuries before America did and given England's proximity to potential enemies and greater suffering as a result of war. During peace-time years in
this century Britain has spent between two and three percent of her GNP on defense,
an amount about twice comparable
U.S. expenditures. During World War II Great
Britain expended well over 60 percent of its GNP on that war; the United States less
than 40 percent. World War II loosened the bonds of the British Empire, however,
and recontruction at home and the cost of British occupation troops in Germany
caused a retrenchment in defense commitments. Nevertheless, the U.K. continued to
spend a higher percentage of her GNP on defense than did the U.S. until the outbreak
of the Korean Conflict. From 1952 until the present the U.S. has spent more of her
GNP on defense, with substantially more during the Korean and Vietnam Conflicts.
Today, both nations spend approximately the same percentage of their GNP's for defense. The same pattern holds true for defense spending as a percentage of total
public spending (see Table 3).
Great Britain's steadily declining defense expenditures reflect a gradual erosion in her world position, the dismantling of her empire, basic changes in her defense policy as a result of these two factors, and growing economic limitations.
By avoiding hasty demobilization of her armed forces following World War II she continued to play a major role in world affairs for a time, but her defense budgets

-405-

were a rising burden on her limited economy now committed to an ambitious program
of socialization. As the Cold War diminished in intensity following the death of
Stalin defense commitments were whittled down. As the years rolled by the primacy
of economics and domestic issues became more and more evident. What began with a
strong emphasis on costly nuclear weapons as a deterrent in the early years of the
Cold War by 1956 had become a matter of relying on the United States' nuclear deterrent capabilities and a more limited commitment to NATO. Rising concern over
sluggish growth, rising deficits, and the feared potential limits of the publicprivate mix helped cause this shift in emphasis. As with the United States, the
basic problem of the United Kingdom in recent years has been to maintain her declining international influence with diminished defense budgets, rising domestic
19
problems, and waning public resolve.
In comparing U.S. and U.K. defense expenditures the most significant pattern
seems to be that Britain decided earlier to diminish her role as a world power and
accordingly cut her defense budgets earlier and more deeply than the United States.
Since 1950 the British have halved their defense efforts as measured by total public spending; the United States has merely cut out all of the growth subsequent to
1950. On the other hand America's cuts since 1965 have been much deeper than Britain's, especially on a per capita basis (compare Tables 4 and 5). Still, even
though the sacrifices for defense are roughly equivalent today, because America is
considerably richer her actual defense dollar outlays are more than double those of
the British. The disparity in wealth between the two countries is likely to maintain this inequality in outlays for years to come.
IV
The British social welfare programs are not exactly similar with American efforts, but they are sufficiently alike to be roughly comparable. Part of the difficulty lies in the fact that the English welfare state is much older than the American and has gone further down the road toward "cradle-to-grave" security, a term
coined in the English Beveridge Report of 1942. A further difficulty is that Britain has much greater breadth of welfare coverage for only a slightly larger investment of her resources. Complete health insurance, family income allowances, thousands of voluntary organizations that are partly publicly financed, and a relatively
larger influx of immigrants who need state assistance suggest some of the funding
differences in the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, the British do use the term"social services" and that term includes programs that are essentially like those in
our "social welfare" sector. 2 0 The two systems are therefore fiscally comparable.
To be specific, British "social service" programs include all public (central and
local) spending for: education; the national health services; personal services for
the elderly, handicapped, mentally ill, and child care; school meals; social security benefits; veterans' benefits; and public housing subsidies.
In 1929 United Kingdom social services represented 8 percent of GNP compared
with 3.9 percent of GNP for United States social welfare outlays. 21 By 1950 these
figures had risen to 13.7 and 8.9 percent respectively. In 1975 the United Kingdom
spent h21.8 billion or 23.5 percent of her GNP on social services; the United States
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22
Today America
spent $287 billion or 20 percent of her GNP on social welfare.
spends much more per capita and a larger share of its public funds on education,
veterans' benefits, and social insurance than do the British, but the British ex23
Although the mix is different
pend more on health services and public housing.
the total social welfare effort in both countries is nearly the same.

The British, like the Americans, also define public welfare more narrowly.
24
It includes all
in the national budget.
This is their "welfare services" account
public spending (central as well as local) for the aged, handicapped and homeless,
child care, care of mothers and young children, mental health, and domestic health
care. It also includes the cost of providing school meals at reduced prices to disadvantaged children and expectant mothers.
In 1975 "welfare services" cost the
British El.1 billion or 1.0 percent of their GNP.
Table 2 compares U.S. and U.K. social welfare expenditures as a percent of GNP
for recent decades. Social welfare programs were much more fully developed in Britain during the Great Depression than in the United States, particularly when one
remembers that the depression was much more severe in America than England.
Social
welfare programs have also been growing much more rapidly in the U.S. since the inauguration of President Johnson's Great Society in 1965. Since that date U.S. social welfare expenditures have grown at an annual rate of 8 percent per annum.
If
this rate of increase continues, and there is no evidence that it is slackening off,
the United States will surpass the United Kingdom, assuming their rate of increase
remains constant, in social welfare expenditures as a percentage of N before the
end of this decade.
United Kingdom military, social services, and public welfare expenditures in
constant dollars and on a per capita basis are compared in Table 5.
As was the case
with comparable U.S. data, U.K. social service expenditures since 1965 have been
rising, although not quite so sharply as in America (see Chart 1).
Like defense
outlays, U.S. per capita social welfare expenditures in constant dollars far outstrip U.K. efforts.
V
A number of fairly firm conclusions can be drawn from comparing defense and
welfare spending in the United States and the United Kingdom during the past 30
years.
First, U.S. and U.K. defense spending data are clearly comparable over time,
but welfare spending data are only roughly comparable.
The two most commonly used
welfare spending definitions--social welfare and public welfare--are however approxImately the same for each country. Using these two categories can give fair comparisons of welfare commitments between the two nations.
Second, defense spending trends for the U.S. and the U.K. as a percentage of
CNP closely parallel each other over the past three decades.
Both show a gradual
Secular decline since the Korean War, but the U.K. started higher and has fallen
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somewhat more. Today, each country sacrifices approximately the same amount of
goods and services to defense.
Third, broadly related social welfare programs as measured by expenditure levels, although much more advanced in the U.K. in earlier decades, will be approxi-,
mately equal by the end of this decade. This is largely because the rate of increase of welfare spending in the U.S. is faster than in the U.K.
Fourth, there is no statistically significant correlation between defense
spending and welfare spending over time in either country. Both defense and welfare
have a life of their own and neither grows primarily at the expense of the other.
The cost of each comes essentially from changing the public-private mix to favor
more government and fewer private undertakings, from increasing taxes, and from enlarged public deficits. The first of these three is the most important. More than
any other single factor, social welfare spending is responsible for the growth of
the government sector in both the United States and the United Kingdom since 1946.
In England that sector now represents 60 percent of the total economy; in America
almost 40 percent. In each the size of the government sector has occasioned intense
political debate and possibly a diminished growth rate in recent years. Since much
of this growth has been financed through deficits rather than by tax increases, the
size of each country's deficits has mushroomed. In England especially public sector borrowing requirements measured as a percentage of GNP have almost tripled during the past 10 years. In both interest rates have been climbing, but to date the
problems of governmental finance have been much more acute in the United Kingdom,
partly because its debt burden is substantially higher than it is in the United
States.
Fifth, the limits of declining defense budgets seem to have been reached in the
U.S., but not in the U.K. Neither party in the U.S. is talking of continued defense
cuts of the size of recent years and both are now voting for slight increases. In
England the Labor Party is considering further cuts, however, possibly as much as
twenty percent by the early 1980's.25
Sixth, the limits of social welfare and public welfare spending, although intensely discussed on both sides of the Atlantic, have not yet been fixed. The need
to halt the exponential trends of social welfare spending at some point is clearly
recognized, more especially in Great Britain, but the decision to actually flatten
or to reserve this trend has not been made. The Labor Party has decided in their
most recent White Paper to cut both defense and welfare spending by 1980, but most
observers doubt that the Labor Party will in fact cut their welfare budget in real
terms.
Finally, both England and America are presently gambling that their long-term
cuts in defense spending have not dangerously impaired their national security and
that exponentially rising welfare spending will not overburden their economies.
Whether England and America are right on these propositions will be one of the most
important questions that either country will face in the coming years.

-408-

FOOTNOTES
1.

See The United States Budget in Brief, Fiscal Year 1977, p. 22.
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See James Clayton, "The Fiscal Limits of the Warfare-Welfare State: Defense
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See Clayton, Table 4.
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Other indicators of a falling defense emphasis since 1968 are a massive decline
in military and civilian manpower and substantial percentage declines in employment in defense products industries, declining defense R&D as a percentage
of total R&D, and declining defense purchases as a percentage of GNP.

10.

See footnote 3, p.

11.

See 1975 Statistical Abstract, p. 280. For more recent data see the January
1976 issue of the Social Security Bulletin, p. 3.

12.
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Press:
Cambridge, 1976), p. 35.

13.
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(Washington, D.C., 1976), p. 340.
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15.
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See Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics on Governmental Finances, 1967
Census of Governments (Washington, D.C., 1967), p. 25 for data to 1967. For
subsequent data see the Census Bureau's annual Governmental Finances in 197374 (Washington, D.C., 1975).

17.

This point was made some time ago by Ida Merriam and Alfred Skolnik in their
Social Welfare Expenditures under Public Programs in the United States, 19291966, HEW Research Report No. 25, 1968.

18.

See The Growth of American Government (Hoover Institution Press:
California, 1975), p. 110.

19.

For a survey of British defense policy from World War II to the mid 1960's see
R. N. Rosecrance, Defense of the Realm (New York, 1968). For more current policy debates The Economist is an excellent source.

20.

See the issues of Britain, An Official Handbook (London, published annually).

21.

Cf. The British Economy, Key Statistics, 1900-1970, pp. 4 and 12; with U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics, Colonial Times to 1970 (Washington,
D.C., 1976), p. 340.

22.

Cf. U.K. 1975 Annual Statistical Abstract, p. 54; and U.S. Social Security Bulletin, January, 1976, p. 3.

23.

For other differences on a comparable basis see Charles Taylor and Michael Hudson, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, 2nd ed. (New Haven and
London, 1972).

24.

See U.K. 1975 Annual Statistical Abstract, p. 57.

25.

The Economist, June 5, 1976, p. 18.
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Stanford,

Table 1.

U.S. and U.K. Defense Expenditures as
a Percentage of GNP, 194 6 -1977

U.S.

Sources:

U.K.

21.4
6.5
4.8
5.0

20.1
10.6
7.4
7.0

4.9
7.2
13.1
14.0
12.9
10.6
9.8
9.9
10.1
9.9

7.1
8.7
10.7
10.6
9.8
8.9
8.6
8.0
7.4
7.2

9.3
9.4
9.4
9.1
8.8
7.6
7.9
9.1
9.7
9.0

7.1
7.1
7.2
7.1
6.6
6.7
6.6
6.7
5.4
5.7

8.4
7.7
7.2
6.2
5.8
5.8
5.8
S. 5 est.

4.8
S.0
5.2
4.9
5.2
5.4
5.4
NA

R. N. Rosecrance. Defense of the Realm (New York, 1968)
Appendix, Table 1; USACPA, World Ifilitary Expenditures and Arms
Transfers, 196S-1974 (liashington, D.C., 1975), p. 50; 1975 U.K.
Annual Abstract of Statistics, p. 326; U.S. Budget in Brief.
Fiscal Year 1977, pp. 67 and 69, for U.S. defense and GNP spending
data for FY 1977.
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Table 2.
U.S. and U.K. Welfare Expenditures as
a Percentage of GNP, 1946-1975

Year

U.S. Social Welfare
Spending as
a % of GNP

U.S. Public Welfare
Spending as
a % of GNP

U.K. Social Services
Spending (including
housing subsidies)
as % of GNP

1946
7
8
9

6.1
7.8
7.6
8.1

1.3
NA
.8
NA

NA
NA
NA
NA

1950
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

8.9
7.7
7.6
7.5
8.2
8.6
8.6
9.1
10.3
10.6

1.0
NA
8
.8
.9
.8
.8
.8
.9
.9

13.6
13.1
13.4
13.4
13.1
13.5
13.4
13.5
14.5
14.9

1960
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

10.6
11.5
11.6
11.6
11.7
11.8
12.2
12.9
13.8
14.1

.9
.9
.9
.9
.9
.9
.9
1.2
1.3
1.6

14.9
15.1
15.5
16.2
16.0
17.1
19.7
20.4
21.4
22.1

1970
1
2
3
4
5

15.3
17.0
17.4
17.5
17.7
20.1

1.8
2.0
2.1
2.2
2.3
NA

21.5
21.5
21.5
22.0
22.2
23.5

Sources:

Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics, Colonial Times to
1970 (Washington, D.C., 1976), pp. 340 and 1120; Social Security
Bulletin, January, 1976, p. 3; The British Economy, Key Statistics,
1900-1970 (London, 1971), pp. 4 and 12; 1975 U.K. Annual Abstract
of Statistics (London, 1975), p. 54; and Governmental Finances in
1973-74, p. IS.
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Table 3.

U.S. and U.K. Defense and Welfare Lxpenditires as
a Percentape of All Covcrnnent Expenditures, 1946-197S

Year

Defense
S3.4

U.S.
Social
Welfare

16.1

U.V.
Public
Welfare

Defense

1.3

43.6

2.9

21.3

2.9

27.5

3.0

21.6

Social
Services
NA

8
9
1960

27.3

4
5
6
7
8
9
1970
1
2
3
4
S est.

Sources:

Bureau of the Census, IHistorical Statistics, Colonial Times to 1970
(Washington, D.C., 1976) pp. 340 and 1120; Social Security Bulletin,
January 1976, p. 10; 197S Statistical Abstract, pp. 250 and 314;
1975 Annual Abstract of Statistics, pp. 54 and 326. The British
Economy, Key Statistics, 1900-1970, p. 12; R. N. Rosccrance,
Defense of the Realm (N.Y., 1968), Appendix, Table 1.
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Table 4.

U.S. Military, Social Welfare, and Public Welfare
Expenditures in Constant (1973) Dollars Per Capita. 1965-1976

Year

Notes:

MILEX
Per
Capita

SWEX
Per
Capita

PWEX
Per
Capita

1965
6
7
8
9

372
437
498
506
483

509
535
614
675
721

26
28
36
40
54

1970
I
2
3
4
5
6

434
395
392
374
367
363
352

779
870
938
1,007
1,028
1,134
NA

56
60
68
75
NA
NA
NA

MILEX - Military Expenditures
SWEX = Social Welfare Expenditures
PWEX - Public Welfare Expenditures
1975-76 MILEX figures based on the percentage decline for defense
spending in U.S. Budget in Brief, Fiscal Year 1977, p. 67.
[Conversion rates are based on consumer price index;]and 1974
Statistical Abstract, p. 275.]

Sources:

U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1965-1974 (Washington, D. C., 1976),
p. 50; James Clayton, "The Fiscal Limits of the Warfare-Welfare
State...," Western Political Quarterly, forthcoming, Table 8.
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Table 5.

U.K. Military, Social Services, and Public Welfare
Expenditures in Constant Dollars Per Capita, 1965-1975

Year

Notes:

SSEX
Per

PWEX
Per

Capita

Capita

Capita

1965
6
7
8
9

151
148
151
148
138

430
462
423
449
467

7
8
8
10
10

1970
1
2
3
4
1975

136
143
154
154
163
141

475
542
539
578
588
615

15
19
19
26
38
53

MILEX
SSEX
PWEX

Sources:

MILEX
Per

Military Expenditures
- Social Services Expenditures
= Public Welfare Expenditures
-

U.K. 1975 Annual Abstract of Statistics (London, 1975), pp.
54, 57 and 326; International Financial Statistics, January,
1976, p. 390; and USACDA, World Military Expenditures and
Arms Transfers, 1965-1974 (Washington, D. C., 1975), p. 50.
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in constant dolars per capita, 1965-1975

-418-

SOCIAL

The

POLICY

AND
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American writers on social policy usually treat war as a
diversion or interruption of progress towards a welfare state.
The
progressive era was cut off by World War I, the New Deal was liquidated as a hostile Congress and indifferent President turned tFeir
attention to World War I I , and the War on rove-ty gave way to the
war on Vietnam.
"War," Max Lerner said in 1940, ''generally puts
an end to any period of social refo'rm." '1 British writers, however,
see it differently.
Most have agreed with Bruce thit
The decisive event in the evolution of the Welfare
State was the Second World War ...
The years of
active thought and planning were those fron 1941 2
to 1948: these mark an epoch in British history.
The difference should suggest both the distinct histories of the
two countries, and the need for an analytic framework in which
to examine more generally the relationship between war, the statc,
and social policy.
The importance of war in the formation of social
is perhaps most strongly stated by Richard Titmuss, in
"War and Social Policy":

policy
his essay,

The aims and content of social policy, both in peace
and In war, are thus determined - at least to a
substantial extent - by how far the co-operation of
the masies is essential to the successful prosecution
of war.
How does he come to this conclusion, .nd is it correct?
After
raising some questions about Titmuss's argument (the most informed and stimulating contribution to the question by a major
social policy analyst) I will propose a different approach, and
suggest how it might be applied to a comparison of social policy
in the United States and Britain in World War II.
My primary
concern will be with the relation of war to social policy, the
state's organized efforts to affect the health and well-being
of the populace, rather than with war's impact on social or
political change in general.
I will argue that social policy
is pressed out between the needs of capital on the one hand
and the struggles of labor (and/or specially oppressed groups
such as blacks or women) on the other; and that the impact of
war on social policy depends upon the demands it makes on the
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state, and upon the balance of class forces.
What I offer is
a framework for analysis, not a history of social
policy in
4
Britain and the United States in World War 1I.
Titmuss argues that war has become more total.
It once
was a game played between rulers, risking a few subjects as
pawns while most social life was undisturbed.
Now it involves
the whole society.
Industry, agriculture, even family life
are affected.
All are shaped and organized as part of a war
effort, the consequences of which are felt long before and
after any actual fighting. 5
In this progression from limited
to total war, Titmuss traces through four stages the state's
increasing concern with the quantity and quality of the
population:
(I)
(ii)
(iil)

(iv)

with the quantity of troops, leading to
census operations:
with the quality, or fitness for service,
of recruits;
with the physical health of the whole
population, especially of children, the
next generation of recruits;
with civilian morale.

These concerns, Induced by wars of increasing scale and intensity, have, Titmuss argues, prompted many if not most
social policy developments in 8rItai.
Thus the shocking
state of health of working class troops revealed in the Boer
War led to the establishment in 1906 of the school medical
service, meals for elementary school children, and other
services.
In World War II the state's survival depended upon
the mobilization and support of almost the whole population.
The Education Act of 1944, the Beveridge Report, the National
Insurance, Family Allowances, and the National Health Service
Acts were all "in part an expression of the needs of war-time
strategy to fuse and unify the conditions of life of
civilians and non-civilians alike."
The universalism of the
postwar "welfare state" reflected the extent to which the
"co-operation of the masses" was essential to military success.
Titmuss bases his conclusions mainly on his and his
colleagues' studies of British social policy in World War II
and on Stanislav Andreski's theoretical work, Military Organization and Society. 6
He sees World War II as a typical "modern
war", the culmination of a historical development from limi'ted to
total warfare.
Andreski himself assumes no such progression.
His key variable is the "military participation ratio' (MPR),
defined as the proportion of militarily utilized individuals in
the total population.
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When the MPR

is high,

the

ruling group

must win the mas-,cs over

to support the war, convincing them that they are fighting for
themselves.
Social inequalities will narrow, while the rulers
will also need ticht control over the population,
Such a war
will foster both egalitarian and totalitarian tendencies.
Wnen
th. MPR is low, the masses can be left alone, but a privilegqd
military elite will develop and social incqualities will widen.
He does not assume a historical progression fro.i low to high
MPR.
He shows how MPR may rise or dccline with inventions such
as the stirrup, the long bow, or gunpowder, which require different
kinds of military organization.
Andreski pcints out, however,
that, with the exception of post-revolutionary France, the major
European powers only adopted universal conscription after severe
military defeats.
The fact that technico-military factors had
already rade mass armies more effective than professional ones
was not enough to lead to adoption of the former.
The pressure
of military competition was also neccssary. (Thc Rus-ian Revolution showed, inter alia, that ruling classes had good cause
to resist mass conscript armies for as long es possible) 7
Andreski's indicators of MPR include extent of conscription
or national service, proportion of GNP going to the military
and to war production, and actual or anticipated civilian injuries.
World War II certainly involved a high MPR, and it
strengthened statist and egalitarian tendencies, especially in
Britain where the MPR was substantially higher than in the U.S.
In both countries, military success required the participation
in the war effort of the working class and specially oppressed
social groups (women and, in the US, blacks).
In both
countries these groups made substantial gains in terms of
employment, income distribution
etc. which were not completely
reversed in the postwar period. °
The concept of the military
participation ratio, however, must be seen as only one element
in a larger explanatory framework.
It does not explain why, if
the Boer War led to a school meals program in Britain, the US
Congress was able to cut heavily a school meals program in
World War II despite the evidence of malnutrition revealed by
the Selective Service examinations.
Moreover, World War II
was not typical of later wars, such as Korea or Vietnam.
More
typical of the present period are inter-imperialist wars fought
by proxy (which avoid direct confrontation between major powers)
or wars of national liberation (which do not threaten the
"mother country").
Korea was arguably a case of the first kind,
Vietnam of the second.
Be that as it may, the Vietnam war
certainly involved a high MPR for the Vietnamese (and produced
egalitarian and totalitarian tendencies within that society),
but for the US It involved a low MPR, a small proportion of
GNP (or even of the total military budget) and low rates of
conscription and civilian injury.
It was also a regressive
war in terms of its effects on social inequalities and the real
living standards of workers. 9
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There has been a tendency on the part of both Fabian-type
social democrats in Britain and some New Deal liberals In the
United States to welcome those aspects of war which strengthen
the state.
For them, a strong "positive" state is essential
to the pursuit of social justice and the modification of blind
Such considerations led Fabians
and ruthless market forces.
into wholehearted support of British imperialism before and
during World War I and encouraged New Dealers in the subordination of their domestic goals (includin 9 civil liberties)
to the US's military effort in World War 11. 0
These "socialimperialist" impulses are more than ever misguided in a nuclear
age.
Not only are contemporary limited wars likely to be socially
regressive, but a "total war" in the future would presumably
be a nuclear war, and therefore one which would not involve
mass mobilization and conscript armies.
Indeed, given the
present centrality of nuclear weapons in the "defense" of the
great powers, it is probable that World War II was atypical
in involving a high MPR in those countries.
Titmuss's generalizations about war and social policy are
thus based too narrowly on Britain and World War II. They
also fail to see war itself as a member of a larger class,
namely social crisis.
American historians of social policy
point to the Great Depression much as the British do to World
War II.
It too broke down resistance to social and economic
planning, strengthened the role of the state, flattened the
social pyramid somewhat, and produced the basic legislation
of the "welfare state." No one would claim that the social
policy of the New Deal is usefully explained as the state's
response to an impending major war.
It is necessary to
distinguish the specific impact of war, and of different kinds
of war, from the impact that any kind of crisis might have on
a given social structure.
Titmuss's claims for war as the
major determinant of social policy are too large.
A major
crisis, whether war or depression, is likely to lead to a new
level of state intervention, which then has independent effects
in the economy and society which prevent a return to the
status quo ante. 11
An Important element in the explanation of social policy
neglected by Titmuss (except in terms of wartime morale), is
the response of the state and ruling groups to pressures from
below.
The reforms of the last Liberal government in Britain
are not adequately explained as belated reactions to the Boer
War, or as preparations for World War I. They also reflect
the attempt to hold and incorporate the rising labor movement
within the two capitalist-party system.
The Liberals failed
in this attempt in Britain, whereas Roosevelt succeeded in
holding labor in the Democratic Party and Johnson had similar
12
success with regard to the black movement in the 1960s.
The "cooperation of

the masses"

may become problematic
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in

circumstances other than war.
Capitalism is a highly dynamic,
competitive system (war being only the most intense and deadly
form of this competition).
It generates social costs, dislocations and oppositional movements which force the capitalist
class (or sections of it), however reluctantly, to look to the
state and its social policy (and/or forces of repression) for
so lutions.
None of these qualifications of Titmuss's arguments should
obscure its implicit point, that ruling groups in a class
society will take steps which benefit the health and welfare of
the population (i.e. of subordinate classes and strata) when
they face a situation in which the needs or demands of that
population can no longer be ignored.
The needs themselves,
however pressing, do not guarantee social provision.
Henry Sigerist, the medical historian, pointed out that in
ancient Rome war led to the establishment of extensive and
sometimes elaborate institutions for the medical care of
soldiers when "it was in the interest of the army to restore
the wounded as quickly and as thoroughly as possible."13
On the other hand, he observes, the lack of war led to the
establishment of vedical facilities for slaves, since in
peacetime there were no prisoners of war to replenish the
supply of slaves and "it became profitable tO spend money
for the restoration of the slaves' health." 1
In either case,
the needs of the ruling class, not those of the potential
patients, were the determining factor.
Unfortunately Titmuss
himself obscures this point as a result of his socialdemocratic conception of the state.
The state, in this view,
represents the collective interest of society, not merely of the
ruling class or group in society.
While it may be unduly Influenced, or even controlled by dominant groups, the state is
essentially above class conflicts.
The state intervenes to
redress inequalities, to impose "social discipline" and assure
a measure of economic security for all. 1 5
The "social discipline" imposed by war and enforced by the state is seen as
being a restraint on individual greed in the interests of the
collectivity, rather than, for example, as the price which
capital has to pay for the preservation of a system based
upon inequality and exploitation.
Titmuss certainly conceives
of class differences, but he sees classes as groups based
upon and defined by gradations
of wealth, income, occupation,
and so on.
By contrast the view implicit In this paper sees
the two main classes of capitalist society, the capitalist
and working classes, as defined by their antagonistic relationship to each ofter and their specific relationship to the means
of production.
For Titmuss, classes are not necessarily in
conflict with each other:
together they constitute "societys,
which can function effectively and humanely in its "search for
equity" (a recurrent phrase) given sensible and informed
legislation.
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The state, in this conception, ideally represents the mutual
collective interests of all classes, of society as a whole.
Thus,
when talking of the state's response to war he easily slips into
the first person plural:
he talks of "our concern for communal
fitness" and how it has followed closely upon "our military
fortunes."
Talking of civilian morale In World War ii he emphasizes that "millions of ordinary people" had to be convinced
that "we had something better to offer than had our enemies.,,17
How are "we" going to convince "them"?
Titmuss cites the
famous post-Dunkirk editorial in The Times, a call for social
justice which reveals the consciousness, unevenly shared in the
British ruling class circles to whom the newspaper is addressed,
that if "we" are to convince "them" to continue the fighting
and the sacrifice, "we" are going to have to make substantial
concessions.
The significance of Dunkirk for the timing of this
editorial is not that this near-disaster led to a great upsurge
of cross-class national solidarity but that, on the contrary,
morale among both civilians and troops was then in a quite precarious state. 1 8
As Arthur Marwick observes with regard to the
blitz:
The expressions of exultation and of social
solidarity are to be found almost exclusively
in the diaries and comments of middle- and
upper-class people... The expressions of
hostility to an established system which had
failed to provide adequate protection and
post-raid services, are to be found among
the working class, and also among the more
socially conscious of their betters. 19
World War I had ended, in many countries, in strikes, demonstrations,
and revolution.
This fact was not lost on Britain's rulers in
World War II.
As Quintin Hogg put it in the parliamentary debate
on the Beveridge Report (17 February, 1943):
"If you do not give
the people reform, they are going to give you social revolution.
Let anyone consider the possibility of a series of dangerous
industrial strikes, following the present hostilities, and the
effect it would have on our industrial recovery..." 2 0
Wars
often begin by masking the contradictions of a class society with
widespread patriotic fervor and solidarity; but if they are at
all long or difficult
they are bound to expose and sharpen those
contradictions.
In the course of this discussion of Titmuss's essay, several
points have emerged:
the demands or needs of the subordinate
classes, and the extent to which rulers are forced by war (or
other circumstances) to respond to them, the need of rulers for
a healthy military and workforce to support them, the relationship of the state to different classes.
The problem now is to
relate these elements in an analytic framework which will make it
-424-

possible to understan6 more clearly the differential impact of
World War II on social policy in the United States and Britain,
as well as being of more qcneral application.
Since, like Titmuss,
I am using "social polic"
to refer to certain activities of the
state, such a
fraj:ework must also define a conception of the
state.
How then, is the relationship of social policy to different
social classes and to the state, to be conceptualized?
Social
policy in a modern, capitalist society reflects the needs of
capital for a workforce with an adequate level of health,
education, and economic and social security. 2 1
Labor costs
and the indirect expenses of production have been increasingly
socialized, that is paid as taxes and delivered in the form of
state-provided benefits or services, rather than being ret
entirely through the paycheck or provided by individual employers.
At the same time, workers have organized to demand not only
higher wages, but also higher social benefits.
Their demands
do not necessarily stop at what would be from a capitalist
perspective the optimum point, the minimum level at which no
loss of efficiency occurs.
Social policy, as well as repression,
may also aim at social order, conditions which allow the accumulation of capital to proceed in a relatively haroonious
and predictable environment.
Thus, it may be directed not only
at workers and their families, and those temporarily out of work,
but at those on the margins of the workforce or outside it altogether.
Just as workers' pressure for higher wages compels capital
to rationalize production and raise productivity, so workers'
pressure (exerted through their class organizations - unions and
parties - and through strikes, demonstrations and other actions)
for decent health, education, housing, and economic security
compels capital to rationalize the provision of these, through
the state if necessary.
Indeed the processes are not merely
analogous but interrelated.
Wage pressure induces technological
innovation to maintain competitiveness, and these new conditions
in turn require a more reliable, healthy, educated workforce,
and measures to deal with the social dislocations carried in
the wake of rapid technological change.
From this perspective,
an analytic framework may be developed which sees social policy
as being pressed out between the needs of capitalism (in particular the need for a regulated supply of efficient labor-power,
and for social stability and order), and the struggles of the
working class for adequate income, health, education, housing,
social security, etc.
What results may be see as an "unstable
equilibrium of compromises". 2 2 The nature and content of those
compromises depend - as does the question of whether they involve real sacrifices or concessions on the part of capital,
or merely capitalist rationalization - on the balance of class
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Such an
forces at a particular conjuncture.
way implies equivalence of power, still less
in the actual policy-making process.

equilibrium in 'no
equal participation

The locus of thisequilibrium is the state, and it is in the
The
state's social policy that the compromises are crystallized.
capitalist state is the institution whose primary function is to
maintain order and harmony in the relations of production.
Carrying out this function is by no means a simple or obvious
task.
It is not always clear what policy will further this
system-maintenance function, nor, if it were, would it necessarily be possible to carry it through against resistances, even
The state is far from monolithic, even
within the state itself.
under fascism, reflecting divisions and conflicts of interest
and ideology within the capitalist class as well as the differentially "felt" pressures of subordinate classes and strata.
The state may thus appear as a battleground of "warring principalities", as Moynihan describes the departments of the federal
2 3
(Howard Dratch paints
government debating the War on Poverty.
a comparable picture of the disputes within the expcutive branch
But the state
World War II.)
over federally funded child care in
is also distinct from the capitalist class or any section of it,
and is unable to function adequately to the extent that it is
directly subjected to control by particular capitalist interests.
It is a capitalist state in the sense that it is structurally
bound (its strength and survival depend upon capital, if only
for the source of its revenues) to the function of aiding,
organizing, co-ordinating, the accumulation of capital and
ensuring the social conditions in which that accumulation can
take place, even at the expense of short-term or sectional
The state's social policy, then, may
capitalist interests.
involve the enforcing of concession or sacrifice (or rationalization) upon part or all of the capitalist class, in spite of
its hostility, in the general interests of maintaining the system.
Moynihan is also correct in this sense when he talks (within a
different theoretical framework, of course) of the state's ability
to "assume an innovative and responsible role in the resolution
25
of social conflict and inequity".
The more threatened the capitalist class, in general, the
less able it is to solve its problems by "voluntary" means, and
Major wars and
the stronger the role the state has to play.
depressions are crises in which the state is forced to assert
its authority against the prerogatives of individual capitals,
and the capitalist class is forced to submit, or both may perish.
Such crises impose new needs on capital and the state, and at
the same time render them more susceptible to pressure from
This does not imply that state organs are independent
below.
of and above specific interests and pressures in times of crisis.
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On the contrary, there is likely to be an accelerated corporatist
trend, a partial integration of employers
and trade union
bureaucrats into parts of the state machinery.
This constitutes
a partial negation of the separation of the political and the
economic which, in principle, characterizes capitalism (a negation
which nevertheless takes places on the basis of that separation,
just as "monopoly" develops on the basis of competition and only
partially negates it),
With the aid of this framework (which draws upon an extensive recent Marxist literature on the theory of the state)2 6 ,
it is possible to see World War II as a crisis which, like the
Depression, threatened (or made vulnerable) the national capitalist
classes and necessitated the emergence of a "strong state" capable of encroaching on the prerogatives individual capitalists
and overcoming their suspicion and hostility towards it.
The
"threat", or vulnerability, in the case of World War II, ray be
seen as in part internal, taking the form of a heavy dependence
on the active support of, and participation in the war effort
by subordinate cltsscs and strata.
This vulnerability to pressure from below (pressure which although partially offset by
suppression of d~ssent and tight control over the population, is
not fully relieved even by very high levels of repression) is
present in any war where there is a high MPR. 2 7
In the case of
World War II, however, "military participation" must be understood in a broader sense, for it represents the culmination of
a two-century trend towards the integration of the productive
forces and the armed forces. 2 8
The technico-military demands
of the war imposed on the state the need to subordinate the
entire economic life of the country to the war effort, the
need to determine what would be produced, by whom, and often
for whom.
Planning and controls over many aspects of economic
and social life were raised to new levels.
What were the results for social policy?
Perhaps the
earliest and most urgent area of need to be identified by the
state In both Britain and the US was that of health.
As war
has become more technological, so armies have raised the standards
of health for their soldiers.
Health standards have been significantly higher for the military than for industrial production,
as draft rejection rates have dramatically revealed.
In wartime, however, the health of workers (especially those with skills
needed for essential production) becomes much more important
than at other times (including, of course, a depression) due
to the shortage of labor - and the situation is exacerbated by
measures taken to meet the health needs of the military.
Of the first 2 million men examined for military service
in the United States, half were rejected as unfit for service,
a result which caused considerable alarm, especially in view
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of the low minimum requirements, the Army's expectation of only
a 20 percent rejection rate, and the fact that those examined
presumably constituted the healthiest part of the population. 2 9
The Selective Service examinations revealed, among other things,
serious problems of malnutrition, as the National Nutrition
Conference for Defense noted as early as May, 1941.
Attention
was also focused, both in social policy and business journals,
on the tremendous loss to industrial production (running at about
30
400 million "man days" annually) due to illness.
The war, then, exposed these and other health
problems or,
more accurately, made them a problem for the state.
It also
aggravated the situation.
The shortages and maldistribution of
health care professionals and services were exacerbated as
physicians and nurses entered the armed forces.
By 1943, there
was only one physician for every 100 servicemen,
but one for
every 3,500 civilians.
The poorer rural areas of the country
with greatest shortages often overfilled their quotas for the
military while more urban and prosperous areas failed to meet
theirs, so increasing the maidistribution.
The physicians who
continued to tend civilians were likely to be older or sicker
than those In the army.
The situation was especially bad in the
war-boom towns, where thousands lived and worked in dangerous,
crowded, and unsanitary conditions. 3 1
In spite of these problems, the war produced a substantial
improvement in health status and health care in almost all fields,
whether measured by public and private expenditures, hospital
beds, number of physicians and other health personnel, life expectancy, infant mortality, or Incidence of most diseases. 3 2
Much of this improvement was, of course, an unintended side
effect of the war, derived from the general improvement in the
living standards of the population as labor scarcity (gradually
and unevenly) replaced mass unemployment.
People could afford
to eat better and to spend more on health care - and they did
both.
In part, however, it reflects the conscious recognition,
within the state and among business leaders, that the national
health had become too important a matter to be left to the succession of reports and conferences which, with the exception of
a few relatively minor New Deal programs (food stamps and grants
-in-aid for maternal and child health programs), had characterized
the previous decade.
The concern of employers with the health of their workforce
was expressed in many ways, from the handing out of vitamin pills,
to provision of physical examinations, hot meals, improved health
and safety conditions (especially where women were employed), and
most significantly for the long term, involvement in various forms
Perhaps the most conscious industrialist
of health insurance.
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in this field was Henry J. Kaiser, who not only saw the importance
to production of a healthy workforce and supported prepaid medical
care for all, but instituted his own prepaid group medical care
scheme (with the assurance of federally guaranteed profits from
33
war contracts) in the face of intense AMA opposition.
The state's response to the health problem also took many
forms.
Some sixteen million servicemen and their dependents
were provided with a program of socialized medicine, albeit
a short-term one.
Many pre-existing conditions were treated
(especially defects of teeth and eyesight) and about 2 million
men were salvaged for military service as a result of induction
examinations.
Many servicemen received good medical treatment
and a balanced, adequate diet for the first time in their lives.
In the war boom towns the federal government financed the construction of hospitals and clinics, and in naiy cases the US
Public Health 'ervice provided more and better services than
had existed before the war.3
A lono-teri effect of the war was
a substantially increased government role in health care financing, especially in the fields of hospital construction,
research, education, and mental health.
In Britain a similar pattern emerged:
1) serious problems
of health, and of halth care organization and financing, 2)
exigencies of war which rendered these problems visible and
immediate while at the same time aggravating them, and 3) a
response by the state and employers (in this case, primarily
the state) which, in conjunction with other factors, led to
improved health, a rationalization of the health care system,
and a substantial increase in the state's role. 3 5
There are,
of course, important differences.
These have to be explained
within the framework of the differential impact and nature of
the war and the different society
(i.e. the distinct conjuncture
of economic, political, ideological, and social conditions)
upon which the war impacted.
As Titmuss documents in his Problems of Social Policy, the
Emergency Medical Service had very early to recognize that wartime planning must include provision for civilians.
A much
higher casualty rate for civilians was expected than actually
occurred, but civilians still suffered a higher number of
casualties than the armed forces until the third year of the
war.
The special treatment and privileges which soldiers and
veterans receive In wars with a low MPR had to be extended to
the whole population, culminating in this case in the provision
of a universalist National Health Service.
Again, as Titmuss
shows, the dependence of the war effort on the support and
sacrifice of the working class undermined or made intolerable
many of the class distinctions and privileges of pre-war Britain,
and made possible a degree of universalism in social policy in
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the 1940's from which successive governments of both
steadily pulled back. 36

parties have

In the United States the state was less seriously threatened
from outside than Britain (the only major European country not
It was therefore less
to be defeated in the course of the war).
dependent upon the enthusiastic support and sacrifice of the whole
population.
Concessions and benefits, consequently, were directed
more selectively at the pressure points, particularly toward the
military and skilled and/or organized labor.
The military/civilian
distinction remained intact (despite heavier casualties in war
industries than in the armed forces), and the substantial gains
made by soldiers and veterans, in health, education, and welfare
provision were not extended to the population as a whole.
Veterans'
benefits were, as Wilensky puts it, a back do35 that did not in
this case open to the rest of the population.
As a result of these
social policies, World War II veterans became a rgatively previleged part of the population.3 8 This selectivity
of provision
was, of course, facilitated by a politically weak labor movement
which, despite the trade union gains of the 1930's, had failed to
organize an independent labor party.
In Britain, on the other
hand, the social-democratic ideology of theLabor Party lent itself
admirably to the carrying out of a substantial program of capitalist
rationalization by the state which included some real benefits
for the working class, under the guise of an advance
towards
40
socialism, or at least towards social justice.
The relative weakness of the threats from outside and below
in the US made it possible for the professional monopoly of the
American Medical Associatron to withstand the pressure of organized labor for adequate health care, or rather to divert it into
private and localized channels.
The conjuncture of AMA opposition,
the needs of capital, the pressures of labor, and the interventions
of a state at war are interestingly reflected by Somers and Somers
in this conclusion to their chapter on the growth of the "Ubiquitous
third party":
It was entirely fortuitious that the American
Medical profession's successful campaign against
public health insurance during the lat thirties
and forties coincided with the vast expansion
of organized labor and collective bargaining.
But the implcations of this fact were great.
From the end of World War II, the growth of
private health insurance and of industrial
"health and welfare" plans were inextricably
interrelated.
Enlightened management's increasing concern for "human relations" in
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industry, the wartime wage stabilization
program .,ith its encouragement of "fringe
benefits", and the effect of National
Labor Relations Board and the United States
Supreme Court decisions in making such
benefits a routine matter for collective
bargaining all helped to accelerate the
"shotgun" marriage of medical care
and
4 1
industrial relations.
Health was only one, if a major, social policy concern of
American and British covernments in World War II.
The demands
of the draft, war production, and labor scarcity produced tremendous physical nobility in both countries.
Existing family
arrangements were put under severe strain by the dispersal of
family heads and, especially, by the absorption of women into
the armed forces, auxiliary services, and civilian employment.
The need for women in production conflicted with doriestic
functions normally performed by women and sometimes depending
upon neighborhood networks - functions of the "social economy"
which are urinaid, arid, in term, of their importance for the
economy as a whole, usually unrecognized.
Consequently, as
Ferguson and Fitzgerald put it in their volume in the U.K. Civil
Series of the offical History of the Second Wo-ld War, families
became less self-reliant in war-time and "'Twhat family and
neighborhood could now no longer do for themselves, the State
had to help them do". 4 2
The state "had to" make some provision
because

of the

nature and

demands

of

the

war.

In this area of social policy we find a pattern similar to
that discussed with regard to health.
The war exposed the
weakness of existing arrangements, aggravated them, and elicited
a response from the state which amounted to an unprecedented
level of state intervention in economic and social life.
In
comparing Britain and the United States, again we find a similar
pattern:
a more severe "war threat" (producing a higher MPR
despite the same military technology) and more thoroughgoing
state Intervention with more lasting results in Britain.
In
the United States, the controversy over federally funded group
child care, explored in detail by Dratch, shows a decentralized
and divided state, one that could afford to be so because of the
strength of the capitalist class and the weakness of internal
and external threats to it.
The U.S. Children's Bureau, with
Its traditional child welfare ideology, led the opposition
to the Federal Works Administration, which was more concerned
about employment and production than about keeping children with
their own mothers or in individual foster arrangements during
the working day.
Federal funding was provided for group child
care, but as an emergency measure, under the 1940 Lanham Act
4 4
4
so thatitsdlscontinuance at the end of the war was assured. 3,
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In view of the considerable disparity in the effect of
World War II on national social policy, it is not surprising
that British and American writers have viewed the relationship
of war and social policy so differently.
While these differences in part reflect the serious neglect of the importance
of World War II for American social policy developments, they
also reflect real variations of historical experience.
I have
attempted to develop a framework within which both
national
experiences can be understood.
The framework takes account both
of the nature of the war and the demands it makes upon the state
(in particular, the MPR), and also the nature of the society
(that is, the balance of class forces at a particular historical
conjuncture) upon which the war impacts.
The Boer War, as Titmuss says, led to the provision of
school meals in Britain, because the health of the next generation of recruits was a matter of concern to the State.
In
the United States, however, the evidence of widespread malnutrition revealed by the Selective Service examinations did
not prevent Congress from cutting the subsidies for the school
lunch program almost to nothing.
The connection between the
Boer War and school meals program in Britain depends upon the
interaction of the needs of the state for a healty military
(although the MPR alone is obviously insufficient as an explanation), the need of capital for a healty workforce, and
the pressure exerted by a working class with a measure (at the
time growing) of ideological and organizational independence.
The reaction of the US Congress to school lunches has to be
explained within the context not only of a state engaged in a
major war involving a high MPR, but also of a capitalist class
which resists the incursions of the state unless its need for
them is inescapable, and of a labor movement which, despite
tremendous gains in adverse conditions, had failed to establish
an independent political party, even a bureaucratic one like
the British Labor Party, which accepted the exigencies of
capitalism as setting the limits of reform. 4 5

-432-

NOTES

1.

Max Lerner , "The State in War Time," in Willard Waller, ed., War
Dryden Press, 1940, 414.
in the Twentieth Century, N.Y.:

2.

Maurice Bruce, The Coming of the Welfare State
Batsford. 1968, 326.

3.

Richard M. Titmuss, "War and Social Policy," ch. 4 of Essays on
Allen and Unwin, 1958, 8 . Emp i'The Welfare State,' Londun:
sis added.

4.

Such a comparative history would have to deal with many contingencies essential to the understanding of specific events in
But that, though related, is another task.
their full complexity.
Nor do I deal with the long-term political-economic outcomes of
wars themselves - re-ults (with major social policy implications)
such as the break-up of feudalism or of Japanese isolation, or
the establishment of US hegemony, or the spread of the Stalinist
Although the balance of class forces
social system. for example.
is discussed as a determinant of war's impact on social policy, I
The question of
do not discuss war's impact on class struggles.
how reforms are w',n (granted from above or grasped in struggle)
is of central importance here, but it goes beyond the scope of
this paper.

5.

Titmuss shows, i-r example, that many draft rejectees become
clients of the social services, and that many premature retirees
of the early 1950s were casualties of World War I. Titmuss, loc.
cit.

6.

HMSO and
Richard M. Titmuss, Problems of Social Policy, London:
Longmans, Green, 1950; Sheila Ferguson and Hilde Fitzgerald,
HMSO and Longmans, Green,
Studies in the Social Services, London:
195. T Both these works are part of the History of the Second World
United Kingdom Civil Series, edited by Sir Keith Hancock.
War:
Stanislav Andreski, Military Organization and Society (2nd edn.),
Univ. of California Press, 196 .
Berkeley and L.A.:

7.

Andreski,

8.

In
For white ma:e w rkers, however, the gains are less obvious.
absolute terms. i.iras were substantial, not only in fringe beneEconomic
in real wage rates (despite wage controls).
Iits but al
Govt. Printing Office,
Report of the President, Washington, D.C.:

op. cit.,

(4th edn.), London:

68-70.

-433-

1971, Table C-31, p. 233.
gains were largely offset
9.

Relative to capital, however, these
by sharp rises in productivity.

A. Dale Tussing, "Social and Economic Results of the (Vietnam)
War." in Max Casper, ed., The War and Social Welfare, Syracuse,
The Korean
Central New York Chapter of N.A.S.W., 1971.
N.Y.:
War, which took a considerably larger proportion of the GNP,
also involved substantially greater gains in real disposable
Economic
weekly earnings for private non-agricultural workers.
Govt. Printing
Report of the President, Washington, D.C.:
Office, 197T.

10.

Studies in the
On the Fabians, v. E.J. Hobsbawm, Laboring Men:
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964"-,-ch-14,
History of Labor, London:
On New Deal Liberals and the war, cf.
"The Fabians Reconsidered."
Alonzo L. Hamby, "Sixty Million Jobs and the People's Revolution:
The Liberals, the New Deal and World War I1," Historian, 30, 4
The
(August 1968), 578-598; Richard Polenberg, War and Society:
Lippincott,
United States 1941-1945, Philadelphia, N.Y., Toronto:
For a contemporary
1972, ch. 3, "The Waning of the New Deal."
critique, v. Norman Thomas, "Totalitarian Liberals," Commonwealth,
37 (1943), 342-44.

11.

cf. Gunnar Myrdal,
Univ. Press, 1960,

12.

cf. Leon Trotsky, On the Labor Party in the United States, N.Y.:
On the Great Society and the black moveMerit Publishers, 1969.
ment, cf. Frances Fox Piven and Richird A. Cloward, Regulating
Random House,
The Function of Public Welfare, N.Y.:
the Poor:
1971, ch. 9.

13.

Henry E. Sigerist, "War and Medicine," in Milton I. Roemer, ed.,
M.D.
Henry E. Sigerist on the Sociology of Medicine, N.Y.:
Publications, 19O,34O.

14.

ibid.,

15.

Where Andreski talks of the totalitarian tendencies stimulated
by a high MPR, Titmuss talks of "social discipline" which he
treats as a virtue.

16.

On these different conceptions of class, cf. Isaac Balbus,
"Ruling Elite Theory vs. Marxist Class Analysis," Monthly
Review (May 1971), 36-46; also his "The Negation of the
Theory
Theory of Capitalism Within an Historical
Negation:
ociety, 3, 1 (Fall, 1972), 44-63
n
of Social Change," Politic

Beyond
21-23.

the Welfare State,

New Haven:

Yale

341.

-434-

17.

Titmuss, "War and Social

Policy,"

81,

82.

18.

William Rankin, "What Dunkirk Spirit?"
New Society (15 November
1973), 396-98; Angus Calder, The People's War:
Britain 19391945, N.Y.:
Pantheon, 1969, 1-36-139.

19.

Arthur Marwick, War and Social Change in the Twentieth Century,
N.Y.:
St. Martin's Press,
974
---

20.

Cited by Nigel Harris, "The Decline of Welfare,"
Socialism, 7 (1961), 5.

21.

Gaston V. Rimlinger, Welfare Policy and Industrialization in
Europe, America, and Russia, N.Y.:
Wiley, 1971.
cf. Karl
Marx, Capital
19-6-T-edn. , N.Y.:
International Publishers,
1967, vol. I, ch. 10, "The Working Day."

22.

The phrase is that of Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and
Social Classes (Eng. edn.), London:
NLB and Sheed and Ward-,
1973, 192.
My use of it does not imply a shared theoretical
framework or "problematic."
Although his influence will be
obvious in these Laragraphs, I have some basic differences
both over what I take to be his structural idealism and over
his specific (but perfunctory) comments about social policy
and the welfare state.

23.

Daniel
N.Y.:

24.

Howard Dratch, "The Politics of Child Care in the 1940's,"
Science and Society, 38, 2 (Summer, 1974), 167-204.

25.

Daniel P. Moynihan, The Politics of
Random House, 1973,

26.

The contributors to this discussion include Nicos Poulantzas,
Ralph Miliband, Claus Offe, James O'Connor.
Their work is to
be found in seieral books published since 1968 in France,
Britain, U.S.A., West Germany and in articles in New Left
Review, Kapitalistate, and Politics and Society.

27.

Andreski, op. cit., 36, argues that the "suppression facility"
i.e. the ease with which a population can be kept down, "accentuates the effects of the low M.PR. and counteracts the effects
of the high."

International

P. Moynihan, Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding
Free Press, 1970, lvii.

31J.

-435-

a Guaranteed

(2nd edn.),

Income,

N.Y.:

28.

To this extent Titmuss is correct in seeing World War II as the
furthest point in a historical progression.
It was not, however,
the end of history (although World War III may be).
On the integration of the productive and armed forces, cf. Hans Speier,
"Class Structure and Total War," American Sociological Review,
4. 3 (June 1939), 372-80, and "The Effect of War on the Social
Order," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science, 2IT7 November 1941), 87T-96.
-

29.

U.S. Senate, 78th Congress.
Wartime Health and Education
Hearings before a Subcommittee o
the Committee on Educatton
and Labor, Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Senate, 1944.
Draft rejection rates were alluded to in very many contemporary discussions of the nation's health.

30.

Frank G. Boudreau, M.D., "Food for a Vital America," Survey
Graphic, 31, 3 (March 1942), 128-129, 156-157.
This article
forms part of a special issue of Survey Graphic on health in
wartime, "Fitness for Freedom."
For evidence of business
concern, see "Death on the Working Front." A Supplement to
Fortune, 26, 1 (July 1942).

31.

Office of War Information, Doctor Shortage and Civilian Health
in Wartime.
O.W.l. no. 2398 (S-eptember 6, 19--93), Washington,
D.C.:
mimeographed; Elin L. Anderson, "Organizing the Community
for Health Protection in Wartime," Public Welfare, 1, 9 (September
1945), 262-67.

32.

U.S. President's Commission on the Health Needs of the Nation,
Building America's Health, Washington, D.C.:
cf. Monroe Lerner,
Odin W. Anderson, Health Progress in the United States 19001960, Chicago and London:
Univ. of Chicago Press .. 9T3.
Geoffrey Perrett, Days of Sadness, Years of Triumph:
The
American People 1939-1945, Baltimore, Md.:
Penguin Books,
1974, ch. 2.
Perrett, however, paints altogether too rosy
a picture of health improvements in World War II by ignoring
the extent to which they were continuations of trends apparent
in the thirties, and by taking as typical of the war years an
exceptional figure for one year:
the number graduated from
medical schools in 1944 was extraordinarily large because of
a special program but no other year shows such a jump.

33.

Paul

de Kruif,

Kaiser Wakes the Doctors,

N.Y.:

Harcourt Brace,

1943.
34.

Robert J. Havighurst and H. Gerthon Morgan, The Social History
of a War-Boom Community, N.Y.:
Longmans, Green, 1951.

35.

Harry
ture,

195U.

Eckstein, The English Health
and Achievements, Cambridge,

Service:
Its Origin, StrucMass.:
Harvard Univ. Press,

36.

cf. Angus Calder, op. cit., 61 et passim.
On the decline of the
British "welfare state,'' v. J.C. Kincaid, Poverty and Equality
in Britain, Harmondsworth, Eng.:
Penguin, 1973, and Jim Kincaid,
"The Decline of the Welfare State," in Nigel Harris and John
Palmer, eds., World Crisis, London:
Hutchinson, 1971.

37.

Harold L. Wilensky, The Welfare State and
L.A., London:
Univ. of California Press,

38.

Davis R.B. Ross.
During World War

39.

"Selectivity" here refers
groups of the population,
test within those groups.

40.

Anthony Giddens, The
London:
Hutchinson,
Preface.

Equality, Berkeley,
1975, 41-42.

Preparing for Ulysses:
Politics and
II, N.Y. and London:
Columbia Univ.

to the
rather

Class

1973,

focusing of benefits
than the application

Veterans
Press,

on
of

special
a means

Structure of the Advanced Societies,
T4,
-and
H rry Eckstein, op. cit.,

41.

Herman Miles Somers and Anne Ramsay Somers, Doctors, Patients,
and Health Insurance:
The Organization and Financing of Medical
Care, Washington, D.C.:
The Brookings Institution, 19 1, 226-27.
I do not endorse their "corporate rationalizing" perspective (as
Robert Alford called it in Health Care Politics, Chicago and
Nor do I wish to
Univ. of California Press, 1975).
London:
imply that the struggles of the stronger unions for whatever
economic gains they can make, even on a fragmented and localized
basis, is anything but progressive.

42.

On the U.S., v. J.E. Trey,
Ferguson and Fitzgerald, op. cit., 7.
"Women in the War Economy - World War II," Review of Radical
Political Economics (special issue on "The Political Economy
Concern about the war's
o f Women") ,4 ,2 _Ttmmer 1972), 40-57.
effect ,n family instability, delinquency, etc. is expressed in
many contemporary articles and is reflected in the Senate
Hearings on Wartine Health and Education, op. cit.

43.

As Dratch says, federal funding for
doward Dratch, op. cit.
group child care also took the form of war contracts to Henry
Kaiser, who develcped a program for his employees.

-437-

44.

In Nazi Germany, of course, the conflict between sexist ideology
and demands of a tight labor market was much sharper:
German
capital and the state were much more "at risk," the labor shortage
was much more severe, and at the same time the Kinder, Kirche,
Kiche ideology was more central to Nazi propaganda.

45.

On the British Labor Party, v. Ralph Miliband, Parliamentary
Socialism:
A Study in the Politics of Labour (2nd edn.),
Londcn:
Merlin Press, 1973, and Paul Foot, The Politics of
Harold Wilson. Harmondsworth, Eng.:
Penguin, 1968, ch. 11,
"The Futility of Pragmatism."

-438-

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SOCIAL WELFARE: A PERSPECTIVE
Christopher Rhoades Dykema,
Student, Hunter College School
of Social Work

Part I, Introductory
The social services are in trouble. After decades of expansion, we face retrenchment, fiscal pressures that threaten vital
services, and unemployment among social service workers. The human
services' traditional political champions offer only a timid and
unconvinced resistance to the assaults from reactionary quarters.
This threatening environment is certainly disconcerting and
doubly so because it follows a period when the steady growth which
began with the progressive movement seemed to suddenly burgeon.
Money was abundant, agencies proliferated, and there seemed to be
a widespread public recognition of the need for an ever-increasing
program of services.
But now the mood of optimism has vanished. Workers and consumers are scrambling to save some services from the fiscal wreckage. The mass media report a supposed reversal of public opinion
-- a new feeling that the social services have "failed," that they
are a senseless drain on the public treasury.
Clearly we are entering new and very trying times. But the
problems the social services are committed to addressing still exist and in some ways are getting worse. What has changed? It is
not enough to point to the new unpopularity of services. Everybody
knows social welfare has a public relations problem and besides,
this knowledge alone does not suggest any very new and more effective ways to fight for services or mount a counterattack against our
antagonists. Traditionally the proponents of social services have
lobbied for them on the basis that they were a rational way of
addressing certain social problems. Suddenly, despite the persistence of the problems, the arguments seem inadequate. Examining
some aspects of the history of social welfare, this article will
show that social welfare's function has changed fundamentally in
ways that have altered,and (temporarily, we hope) reduced its base
of actual political support.
But what is social welfare's function?
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This is a matter of

long-standing dispute. The definition offered here is an attempt
at concreteness and clarity. Hopefully its usefulness will become
apparent in the course of the paper.
Social welfare in the modern United States is an aspect of
the legitimation and accumulation functions of government. It is
legitimative in that it works to ameliorate the economy's disastrous human consequences.
It fulfills the accumulation function by
maintaining and enhancing conditions for the profitable conduct of
commerce. 1 These two basic functions can obviously be discharged
in various ways and the social service worker's traditional commitment has co-existed with greater and lesser degrees of contentment
with the nature of the existing society. Conscientious workers
have always recognized that their role -- as mediators between individuals and organized society -- necessarily involves ambiguities.
Certain "radical" writers of recent years have revealed a primitive
political understanding by identifying social services entirely
with the more repressive aspects of the legitimation function,
particularly in the area of relief. As we shall see, the matter is
not as simple as their diatribes would imply, but they have recognized an important issue. Relief has traditionally been the crucial social welfare service, to which all others are politically
(and, often, administratively) allied. In recent decades, the political economy of American social welfare has eveolved in close conjunction with the development of relief and has largely reflected
changes in the nature of poverty itself. This analysis must, therefore, begin with a look at the economic and political forces that
have formed the basis of the existing American social welfare system.
Part II, Traditional Social Welfare in Maturity
Social welfare assumed its modern form in the thirties when
the Depression had disrupted most aspects of American life and many
elements in society jockeyed for position and influence. The most
significant contenders eventually arrived at a set of mutually acceptable compromises. One of these arrangements, important to several
key groups, was the development of the social welfare system.
Some of the history of these events appears in Frances Fox
Piven and Richard Cloward's Regulating the Poor, The Functions of
Public Welfare.2 Although they refer in passing to the Speenhamland
system and other earlier experiences their conclusions are mainly
based on a study of relief in the United States since the advent of
the Depression, during the historical epoch of modern American public
assistance. From this analysis they construct a general theory of
the function of welfare. Briefly, they argue that relief serves to
assure the availability of a large pool of cheap labor (the accumulation function), that relief is given in a manner calculated to
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enforce passivity in the workforce (the legitimation function), and
that relief administrators, historically, have vacilated between a
hard and a soft approach according to the manpower needs of the
ruling social strata.
Their analysis is largely valid as far as it goes, and discussions of social welfare cannot safely fail to use it as a point
of departure. However, Piven and Cloward, concentrating on the
labor force, ignore the evolution of the broader political economy,
a process which forms the basis of all major developments in social
welfare.
The Depression, for instance, was more than just a disruption --

even though a gigantic one --

in

the progress

of the labor

force.
In fact it marked a profound change in the American political economy.
Up until then the economy had been able, albeit with
mounting difficulty, to generate enough demand to absorb what industry produced.
In the past there had been recurrent failures of
this absorption process but these downturns in the business cycle,
"panics" as our grandparents quaintly called them, had a serious
but still
only limited effect.
The mass layoffs they occasioned
would increase competition for jobs and would lower wage levels.
At a certain point wage costs would have declined enough for business to see an advantage in expanding operations once again and
hiring the jobless. A recovery would begin. Prosperity would
bloom, unemployment would fall and the resulting competition among
employers for the now-scarce workers would gradually raise wages to
the point of cutting into profitability.
Then there would be another
panic and the cycle would repeat itself.
This abstract schema is a
general paradigm for the movements of the American economy in the
period separating the Civil War and the Depression.
This simple pattern, however, was complicated by businessmen's constant effort to improve their profitability by replacing
workers with an increasingly sophisticated technolocy. Their
scrambling for an edge in competition made for an accelerating tenThe unprecedented
dency towards chronic technological unemployment.
severity of the cyclical downturn which began in the fall of 1929,
occurred mainly because the economy had finally reached a point where
It
fewer and fewer workers could produce more and more commodities.
was no longer realistic to assume that the recovery would naturally
happen all by itself. By 1933 this fact was so strikingly obvious
that the Roosevelt administration was forced by circumstances to
By the Federal
intervene actively in most aspects of the economy.
Emergency Relief Act of May 12, 1933, the labor force was included
in this intervention.

-441-

As the Depression deepened, relief continued in a variety of
forms, including both the dole and several explicit and implicit
types of work relief. Nearly every social element was for it in
one form or another. Businessmen supported it, 4 although they came
to think work relief less debilitating to the work ethic than the
dole. The hordes of jobless were certainly in favor. In fact,
their efforts were a significant element in the general insurgency
of the period. Organized under leftist leadership into the Workers'
Alliance of America, an early example of Popular Front cooperation,
they fought for adequate relief and, to an extentwere successful.5
The disruptions caused by the Workers' Alliance, however,
would have been politically insignificant without the concurrent
strike wave among the employed. The number of man-days lost to
strikes rose from a low of 3,320,000 in 1930 to 19,600,000 in 1934.6
Such serious disruptions of business activity could only be avoided
with cooperation from the employees, and the reforms advanced by
the New Deal were part of an effort to secure the acquiescence of
a crucial part of the working class in forming a renovated capitalist social order.
This renovated social order, as one of its
architects writes,
. . began to assume its present form as a result of the crisis
of 1933.
Under stress of the Great Depression . . . the federal
government assumed responsibility for the functioning of the economic system"7 In the past, laisser faire theory had held that
government should discharge the legitimation function in a small
way (providing police forces and armies when necessary) and that
market mechanisms would pretty much take care of the problems of
accumulation.
But the Depression was solid evidence that the market
could no longer be trusted to do any such thing. It was just this
failure that made renovation of the social order so necessary and
also showed that the key to the renovation lay in finding a way to
create enough demand to support a reasonable level of production.
The Roosevelt administration initiated various mechanisms
of economic stimulation which were not very successful -- full employment was only achieved with the beginning of war production.
But the New Deal reforms were not simply irrelevant. However
limited their success in generating economic recovery, they did
succeed in establishing a social order which is only now beginning
to disintegrate. The social welfare system was an important element in this new arrangement. Its establishment reflected the
political dynamics of the time, a relationship of political forces
which we must examine.
In the thirties, as in the present, American society was
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dominated by its business elite.
But the American business community
falls into two parts:
the monopoly sector and the competitive sector.8 The former comprises the largest corporations, including most
basic manufacturing and mining; the latter
comprises all other commercial enterprises.
However, petty entrepreneurs like small shopkeepers, newsdealers, etc., are nearly powerless at a national level.
In practice the competitive sector may, therefore, be taken to include
only those secondary industries and smaller enterprises whose ownership is so dispersed and the scope of whose operations so local that
they relate to each other and the consumer on the basis of the traditional mechanism of price competition.
The monopolistic corporation, by contrast, dominates its market either alone or in cooperation with a limited number of similar
corporations.9
It is not subject to price competition because the
major corporations set their prices on the basis of formal or informal mutual collusion.
Relations between the sectors have never been static and, in
fact, the conflict between them has often been bitter.
It arose a
century ago with the advent of the first
corporations, giants seeking to become monopolies.
Since the competitive mechanism progressively eliminates the weaker firms (except in special cases), there
is a natural tendency for the ownership of industry to become more
concentrated.10 The eventual outcome of the conflict between large
and small capital could then hardly be in doubt.
The Depression,
however, accelerated the process, profoundly weakening competitive
capital.
The New Deal consolidated the monopoly sector's hegemony.
The competitive sector retains some constantly shrinking areas of
power --

Congress is

perhaps the most significant

--

but the mono-

poly sector has maintained effective control of the national administration since 1933.11 Congress had had only marginal influence
over the budgetary process since 1920,12 and so the federal intervention in the economy inaugurated by the New Deal must thus be
seen as a fairly exclusive project of the newly ascendant monopoly
sector.
It is true, of course, that public relief and the other
New Deal reforms are often imagined to have been enacted over the
This is a simplistic and incorrect
furious opposition of business.
view. To be sure, many businessmen did oppose the reforms, and
their opinions were widely disseminated by organizations like the
National Association of Manufacturers and the Chamber of Commerce.
However, these are the very groups which most clearly ".

.

. reflect

conservative elements within the power elite and represent their
short run interests in specific geographical areas."13 This is
competitive capital at work. By contrast, the monopolistic
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. . . corporation has a longer time horizon
and it is a more
rational calculator.
Both differences are related to the incomparably larger scale of the corporation's operations."14 This broader
perspective is also more liberal -- the monopolistic corporation,
until recently, could afford to make concessions to labor and generally meet the needs of the underlying population, allowing greater
attention to government's legitimation function.
The competitive
businessman, struggling to survive from day to day or at least from
year to year, tends to believe that the government should guarantee
accumulation and do no more.
Not surprisingly, the leaders of the monopoly sector worked
for the reformist social legislation which began in the Progressive
Era and culminated in the New Deal.
The overt pressure for the reforms generally came from labor and other popular forces but the
powerful influence of big capital was constantly present in such
organizations as the National Civic Federation, a group of major
business leaders and conservative trade unionists, and the American
Association for Labor Legislation, a prototypical think tank of
liberal intellectuals financed by corporate leaders. The National
Association of Manufacturers on the other hand, was an organization
which, according to the NCF's President and founder, Ralph Easley,
.. . . 'included none of the great employers representing the basic
industries, such as coal, iron and steel, building trades and
railroads.'"15 The dissension on social questions between these
two industrial strata had taken on a developed form as early as
1905 when leaders of the NCF intervened on the side of the Metal
Polishers Union and the American Federation of Labor in the Buck's
Stove and Range Case, an anti-labor court action brought by Jazes
W. Van Cleave, a leader of the National Association of Manufacturers.
In this case, Andrew Carnegie surreptitiously subsidized the legal
defense of the MPU and AFL which was conducted by Alton B. Parker,
a Wall Street lawyer, Presidential candidate in 1904 and future NCF
President.16
This political technique -- covert support by the monopolistic
corporate elite for measures advanced by mass reform movements -persisted into the thirties and still exists. It was employed, with
conspicuous success, in the fight for the social reforms of the New
Deal, particularly the two crucial enactments, the Wagner National
Labor Relations Act and the Social Security Act. The Wagner Act
established an assured, though subordinate position for the organized working class in the renovated capitalist polity. The explicit
purpose of the Act was ". . . to diminish the causes of labor disputes burdening or obstructing . . . commerce. . . ." But it was
not enough to give labor a voice. It was also necessary to address
some real grievances of the working population. Hence, the Social
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Security Act of 1935 established unemployment compensation, social insurance, and public assistance.
It was an obvious and direct response
to the mass unemployment of the Depression, an implicit recognition
that the market mechanism and private social agencies could no longer
deal with the problems of chronic joblessness.
It was also the culmination of years of lobbying and agitation by popular groups like
the Townsend Movement and the labor movement and also by elite groups
like the American Association for Labor Legislation.
Both the Wagner Act and the Social Security Act are cornerstones of the existing social order.
They grew out of political
struggle and reflected the balance of forces at the time of their
passage -- the leaders of the monopoly sector were consolidating
their newly-won ascendancy in the midst of economic collapse.
To do
this they needed a measure of social tranquility at a time when the
working class had reached an unprecedented level of organization
and militancy and could only be repressed by armed violence.
Intelligent leaders of the monopoly sector did not imagine, however, that
the labor struggles constituted a revolutionary situation.
After
all, the better-informed among them probably knew that the Communist
Party, the most significant radical organization of the period, had
found little
success in the uncompromisingly revolutionary policy
it followed from 1928 to 1934.18 The two acts were passed not to
head off revolution but to acknowledge that a tranquil environment
for the conduct of business and the renovation of the social order
was impossible without some attention to the needs of the workforce.
The social order formed by the renovation of the thirties
still
exists and has come to be called the liberal corporate state.
It is liberal by contrast with laisser faire, which had prevailed
earlier.19 It is corporate in t-at the giant corporation is its
dominant economic unit.
And within this social order the government has assumed a broad range of economic responsibilities.
In
fact, the Federal Government has become, in large part, an administrative device which uses a repertoire of techniques to guarantee,
as much as possible, the smooth functioning of the economy.
This,
in effect, means that government must maintain conditions which
guarantee the profitability of the major corporations.
Preeminently,
the government creates demand by actually buying vast quantities
of industrial products.
It acts to secure overseas markets and
generally tries to assure an open field for corporate activity
abroad. It pays for necessary research and development. It advances
capital to prevent disruptive bankruptcies.
And, as we shall see,
it regulates the workforce.
Under laisser faire, of course, all these functions were
almost entirely private responsibilities since it was believed
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that the market would take care of the economy without intentional
human direction.
The Depression showed the inadequacy of laisser faire and
the need for conscious use of human intelligence in--Udressing the
problems not only of the economy per se but also of society in general. Consequently corporate liberal-sm has a greater regard for
expertise than the laisser faire approach, which valued knowledge
and thought primarily when it was directly applicable to making
money. Corporate liberalism believes that economic and social problems have solutions which technical experts can formulate as policies. Not surprisingly, social work started to flourish with the
beginning of corporate liberal hegemony. As Walter Trattner says,
it ". . . assumed a new prestige and importance in American life as
a result of the Depression and the New Deal."20 Social workers had
important administrative positions in the Roosevelt administration
and in both public and private agencies their numbers doubled durIt was one among
ing the thirties2l despite mass unemployment.
many forms of expertise that the emerging corporate liberal order
pressed into service in its effort to find technical solutions to
social problems.22
One of the first major projects of social workers in the
liberal corporate state was in designing the public assistance provisions which formed an integral part of the Social Security Act.
And just as the hegemony of corporate liberalism was built on an
accommodation between various layers of society, so too the Social
Security Act was a product of compromise. The working class got
unemployment insurance, a basic national pension in OASI, a floor
under wages in the newly organized public relief system, and some
rudimentary social services. The corporate elite of the monopoly
sector got a systematized disciplinary mechanism in the relief system which it could use in regulating the workforce. Some theorists
expected, however, that public assistance would be a residual program, withering away as soon as OASI became thoroughly established.
War did bring temporary decline, but after
This was a vain hope.
"Once an economic convulsion sub1945 relief expanded once more.
sides and civil order is restored, relief systems are not ordinarily abandoned."23 Although war production continued after 1945,
it was held at a level sufficient to maintain wartime employment
Relief was institutionalized and ". . . made an important
levels.
contribution toward overcoming these persistent weaknesses in the
capacity of the market to direct and control men. "24 This was its
traditional discliplinary function, a function it has fulfilled,
using a very limited repertoire of techniques, since the decline of
feudalism. But an historic change was in the making.
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Part III, Traditional Social Welfare in Decline
In recent years the corporate liberal alliance for social
welfare has weakened and partially broken down.
A fundamental
presupposition of the alliance was the availability of enough
wealth to fund social welfare services.
A basic premise was social
welfare's regulatory function.
Both of these necessary conditions
have been seriously undermined -- the one, by certain broad economic trends, the other by profound demographic changes.
These two
new factors have come to act in concert in recent years, since the
economic trends became apparent.
The demographic changes emerged
somewhat less recently.
Partly understood, they began to arouse
official concern in the early sixties.
Piven and Cloward25 offer a partially valid analysis of the
developments and their main point is correct: mechanization of
southern agriculture forced great numbers of blacks off the land.
(They ignore an analogous process which took place in Puerto Rico
with greater intentional viciousness and similar results.)
Productivity in cotton-growing increased 304% between 1950 and 1965, 26
transforming what had previously been a very labor-intensive industry. An enormous unemployment rate developed in southern agricultural labor.27 Millions of displaced farm workers left
the countryside and flocked into urban areas.
The southern relief system, which
Piven and Cloward show to have exercised its
traditional regulatory
function with exceptional harshness, continued as before.28 Great
numbers, therefore, came north and settled in a relatively small
number of cities.
In these areas the welfare systems were less restrictive than
in the South and the rolls began an inexorable expansion.
By 1957
the Aid to Dependent Children category overtook Old Age Assistance
and became, permanently, the largest.29
By December, 1963 the costs,
in constant dollars, of public assistance had tripled over the level
of December, 1936. 30 Clearly, a significant proportion of these
migrants were not finding jobs and settling into the traditional
pattern of working class existence.
Something had gone unprecedentedly wrong.
Rural populations have been leaving the land and coming to
cities for centuries, of course.
This urbanization process has always involved massive dislocations and, frequently, great suffering,
but sooner or later, in times of prosperity, these populations were
absorbed into the labor force.
During recessionary periods, of
course, they were often the first
to suffer layoffs, but even so,
they did have at least some organic relation to the workforce. As
a result, most writers on the subject, and most politicians, see the
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question of relief as one of regulating labor, getting people to
work. Piven and Cloward only differ from the others in their more
systematic analysis and greater humanitarian concern for the clients.
But all these theorists, including Piven and Cloward, fail to grasp
that a new epoch has begun.
Most welfare recipients are not simply unemployed workers.
They are, in actuality, a kind of subproletariat3l whose exclusion
from the workforce does not significantly change with fluctuations
The most basic reason for this change is the
in the business cycle.
increasingly technologicaland capital-intensive character of American industry.
Traditionally, urbanized rural people have gotten jobs requiring little skill. This process has now broken down. The breakdown is a fairly recent phenomenon, corresponding, historically, to
the expansion of public assistance.32
This point may be empirically demonstrated. In the period
1950-1965, to use Piven and Cloward's periodization, the number of
non-farm laborers (a category to which displaced farm workers are
naturally recruited), only increased by an average of .6334% per
annum,33 far slower than the general labor force (1.28%)34 and the
U.S. population (1.84%).35
These figures do not depict a situation in which an unskilled
migrant from the Mississippi Delta could readily find a job, but
they assume an even greater importance if compared with equivalent
figures from the earlier period 1890-1950 when the labor force increased significantly faster (3.42% per annum) 36 than the population
(2.34% per annum).37
In other words the economy now has a decreasing capacity to absorb the natural increase of the whole population
Its ability to absorb the unskilled has become
into the workforce.
negligible. They have truly become a superfluous population, rather
than a necessary surplus population.
The rise of the subproletariat has had profound consequences.
The presence of masses of black voters in northern cities created
a powerful interest group pressing the Democratic Party to secure
black rights in the South. This tended to detach the white South
from its traditional Democratic allegiance,39 and thus increased the
importance of urban voters, especially since many blacks came to be
concentrated in cities that are strategic in national elections.
In addition, not all the black and Latin migrants were voters.
Many congregated in the cities, alienated from the established electoral political process. The political machines of these cities,
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dominated by the regional business elites of the competitive sector,
were not interested in organizing and politically integrating the new
ghetto population which was unlikely to support them reliably and,
if organized, might have worked against some of their local interests:
e.g., the urban renewal schemes of competitive business interests.
This, then, was the situation in 1961 which confronted John F.
Kennedy, a representative par excellence of the liberal corporate
elite of the monopoly sector. His party had largely lost its secure
political base in the South, and the narrowness of his victory in
1960 showed that the potential base among urban northern blacks was
not yet fully realized.
And the local Democratic organizations would
not do much to remedy the situation.
In addition, as the next few
years would show, the presence of such numbers of impoverished and
anomic people in northern cities was a potential source of serious
disruption.
Kennedy, Johnson and their entourage were, therefore,
presented with a complicated set of problems.
The situation was not
so grave as the crisis of the thirties -- it was not an economic
and social cataclysm requiring a full-scale renovation of the social
order -- but it was serious nonetheless and could not be addressed by
standard procedures.
The Democratic regime followed two distinct but related
approaches to the dilemma presented by the newly urbanized ghetto
population.
The first,
embodied in the 1962 Amendments to the
Social Security Act, was an attempt to get people off welfare by
providing rehabilitative services.
The second, involving several
pieces of legislation, found its clearest expression in the Economic
Opportunity Act of 1964.
The Economic Opportunity Act was a conscious attempt to confront the dilemma that the growth of the subproletariat posed for the
political and corporate leadership of the monopoly sector.
This
point is beautifully demonstrated by the writings of Daniel P.
Moynihan,40 a participant in the preparations for the poverty program. Moynihan describes the concerns of the program's architects
with some clarity.
As an early poverty warrior he was ".
involved with

.

.

. the situation

of those persons in

the population

whose life circumstances do not appear to respond, at least very
quickly, to the large movements in the economy." (i.e.,
the business
cycle) .41
The problem was becoming so serious that it could not be
overlooked.

The economy ".

.

. seemed to be acquiring patterns

sharply inhospitable to the poor, notably the Negro poor fleeing the
depressed countryside."42

However,

".

.

. the poverty

cycle was,

at

this point, still
seen almost solely in terms of the individual,"43
whose unemployability was thought to be a result of many cultural,
environmental and motivational factors acting in concert to produce
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a kind of vicious circle.
largely unnoticed.)

(The economic side of the issue went

The War on Poverty was, therefore, conceived as a massive
exercise in environmental modification, ". . . 'a coordinated attack'

to break the cycle through preventive, rehabilitative and ameliorative interventions."44
It included a large number of programs in
job-training, education, legal services, day-care, etc., and also
provided federal money for local groups to fund programs of their
own. To ".
. ensure that persons excluded from the political process in the South and elsewhere would nonetheless participate in
the benefits of the community action programs . . ."45 it required
that they be "'developed and conducted with the maximum feasible participation of residents of the areas and members of the groups
served

.

.

.'"46

This was a clear attempt to bypass the local

elites of the competitive sector, political forces which, of course,
had already failed to integrate the ghettoized subproletariat into
the established political process. The anticipation of a refractory
attitude on their part is an obvious echo of the controversy around
the Wagner and Social Security Acts.47 In fact, the Economic Opportunity Act, like its predecessors, was an example of enlightened
social legislation developed by liberal experts (of the Ford,
Russell Sage, and Kaplan Foundations)48 and supported on a federal
level by the political representatives of the monopoly sector. In
this sense it was a part of the traditional corporate strategy
traced earlier.
The War on Poverty, however, became a sad example of the
futility of mechanically applying a familiar response to a changed
set of circumstances. The crisis of the thirties, although very
serious, had been resolved by a combination of political compromise
and (eventually) massive and permanent military spending, policies
quite acceptable to the elites of the monopoly sector. The organized working class had thus been integrated through certain specific
concessions. Its loyalty in practice was assured. No such specific
measures suggested themselves in the sixties when it was clear that
something had to be done to integrate the subproletariat.
The existence of the subproletariat obviously demanded a
thorough re-ordering of the economy to create great numbers of jobs.
Such a reform, although indispensable, would have been much more farreaching than the concessions of 1935. It was, and is still, antithetical to the corporate elite's interests and hence unacceptable
to them.
Unable to really address the problem, the poverty warriors
could only offer vital but inadequate services, illusory "participation" and a surfeit of rhetoric.
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However, the Economic Opportunity Act was more than a mere
assemblage of noble thoughts. In fact, it raised vast hopes and
galvanized thousands of people into action, people who were organiUsing a fairly small amount
zed with funds the Act had appropriated.
of money (relative to the total federal budget), the poverty program
This constituency had a paid staff recruited
built a constituency.
pay did
The staff's
from the natural leadership of the communities.
and its accountnot, of course, come from the constituency itself
ability was therefore rather ambiguous.49 Even so, an internal political structure had been brought into being, a structure with many
characteristics of a big-city machine of the type that had traditionally integrated the urban working class into the American polity.
Some of the community action agencies' activities were disruptive but they were more of a nuisance to local politicians and
public assistance agencies than to the monopolistic elites. As
Moynihan shows,50 moreover, even local politicians learned to live
with community action which turned out to be less of a menace than
they had expected.
All this activity failed, of course, to achieve the ostensible purpose of the War on Poverty. This ostensible purpose, however, was not a mere trivial obfuscation without social significance.
It presupposed that certain services would change poor populations
A similar theory,
in ways that would move them toward self-support.
on an individual level, informed the 1962 Amendments to the Social
The one approach' was based on the rehabilitation of
Security Act.
Although poor people
whole populations, the other of individuals.
do need many services, both as communities and as individuals, in
their struggle for survival, it is also clear that success must
forever elude any rehabilitative effort which aims "To move people
off relief by renewing their spirit and creating economic and social
opportunities for them, "51 when the entire emphasis is on the "spirit"
and there is no serious effort to create anything like a sufficient
number of jobs.
This extravagant rhetoric and vacuous content smacks clearly
In the case of the 1962 service amendments,
of a hidden purpose.
however, the political ulterior motive is not as obvious as it was
in the case of the war on poverty. Part of the reason probably is
that the service program was designed by competent social workers in
the Ad Hoc Committee on Public Welfare who certainly understood
client needs.52 Unfortunately they also felt obliged to promise that
services would materially reduce the welfare rolls by rehabilitating
the clients. This promise was used to justify creating the beginnings of a comprehensive social service network, somethincr Americans
desperately need. Unfortunately, it depended on borrowed political
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capital that could not be repaid. Since the rehabilitative effort
could not possibly show any very satisfactory results in employment,
there began to be political criticisms.53
As the sixties continued, the welfare system came to be seen
as an increasingly serious failure. Recipients and their sympathizers
damned it as a dehumanizing quagmire which provided grossly inadequate benefits. Much "public opinion" and its representative politicians bewailed the mounting expense. Both had a strong factual
basis for their discontent.
All the agitation of the War on Poverty
had not created substantially higher grant levels. It had, however,
played a role in the dramatic expansion of the rolls which grew,
nationally, by 107% from 1960 to 1969. 54 A large part of the increase
came even after the industrial boom of the Vietnam War began in 1965,
further evidence for the existence of a mass subproletariat.
Piven and Cloward, who were deeply involved in the welfare
rights movement, see the explosion of the welfare rolls as the result of three factors:
the rise of community action agencies offering advocacy services, the setting up of legal services agencies
which fought for recipients' legal rights, and the mobilizing of
people in poor areas by community organization.55 They demonstrate
that all these elements were the result of federal action and that
although there was no particular popular demand for them before
their establishment56 they very quickly generated an enthusiastic
response from the impoverished populations which received the services. The response, as we have seen, was quite in keeping with the
interests of the monopoly sector and the Democratic Party on a
national level -- the subproletariat began to be integrated into
the established political process. However, it was not enough to
organize this group and given it a voice. Even in the paternalistic context of the poverty program, certain expectations were raised,
expectations which had to be met in some way.
The simplest and most readily available palliative was welfare,
which expanded at a furious rate. The great majority of new applicants had been eligible for some time.57 What had changed was the
ease with which their cases were accepted. Any person who worked in
a public assistance agency in the later sixties was aware of the
loosening eligibility standards, typified by the fact that a certain
acceptance code was used in those years by the New York City Department of Welfare to designate cases which had become eligible through
liberalization of agency policy.58 Significantly, no code existed
to fit a hypothetical opposite circumstance.
The expansion of welfare, however, could not fail to call
forth a reaction. In some localities the local share of public
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assistance was beginning to be a fiscal burden, resulting in rising
taxes, a source of discontent among the working population whose declining living standard did not increase their receptivity to rising
welfare outlays.59
But the core of opposition to welfare was the local competitive sector business elites, who had always disapproved of relief and
now had a certain mass following for their campaign against the
"welfare mess. "
Welfare's legislative defenders were in a dilemma. In 1962
they had enacted the service amendments. A few years later they had
set up the poverty program.
But poverty continued to exist and public assistance seemed to grow with no end in sight.
None of this is entirely surprising. The subproletariat
could only have been employed with a major and very expensive
effort at job creation and retraining. This would have required
redistribution of wealth or a significant reduction in military
spending or both.
These solutions were politically tabu and so the
legislative response followed the tradition of imposing work requirements on the recipient, setting up the "Vork Incentive Program" (WIN)
60. Since this did not address the problem of job availability any
more than earlier efforts, it must be viewed as a self-indulgent act
of legislative petulance.
Attempts to enforce the work ethic on the subproletariat are
essentially ideological exercises. But not all politicians are a
prey to such illusions. After all, as we have seen, the declining
ability of the labor market to absorb the potentially employable
can be demonstrated with non-esoteric figures from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics. Not surprisingly, some changes in public policy
seem to signal the beginning of a new approach to relief.
Perhaps the most important of these changes is the administrative separation of social services from financial assistance, a
clear break with the 1962 service amendments which had assumed that
each recipient was employable unless proved otherwise.
Separation
implies an opposite assumption, relegating non-financial services to
a relatively limited role and introducing the concent of "income
maintenance" with its connotations of permanent dependency.
To be
sure, some authorities have envisioned separation as enhancing services (i.e., the accumulation function).
"Why not," wrote Gordon
Hamilton in an early statement of this theme, "take the albatross
of 'relief' from the neck of social service?"61 This kind of thinking
was current in many circles during the sixties. Why, it was asked,
does one need a social worker just because one happend to be poor?
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The abstract logic of these ideas is impeccable. Unfortunately,
they have served, in practice, to give a propagandistic cover to the
crippling of services.
Separation, under federal mandate, prevailed in most of the
country by the early seventies. Its practical meaning quickly became apparent. One of its first victims was the insurgency of relief recipients that had seemed so powerful in the sixties. The kind
of bureaucratic flexibility that the National Welfare Rights Organization had exploited (by demanding clothing and other discretionary
special grants) is gone now and NWRO declined to the point that it
was destroyed in 1973 by the National Caucus of Labor Committees.62
The public assistance rolls remain high, however, and it seems impossible to reduce them to anything like the levels prevailing before
1960 or 1965.
The welfare system, in practice, seems now to be moving towards
being a custodial operation. It sustains life, minimally, to avoid
the kind of mass starvation prevalent in underdeveloped countries.
And it gives relief in a way that induces atomization and passivity.
The custodial concept is not publicly acknowledged, of course, and
indeed it is anathema to all politicians and much of the electorate.
They do not realize yet that an epochal change has taken place, that
for the first time since the decline of feudalism, there is a large
and permanent subproletariat with no realistic prospect of absorption into the workforce. The custodial concept tacitly recognizes
this historic fact.
But since the concept has not yet been elaborated coherently by any of the theoreticians of public policy, one can
only guess about the eventual mature form they will give it.
The development of the subproletariat and, derivatively, of
the custodial principle, imply, most significantly, that the traditional function of relief as the disciplinarian of the workforce,
has been eliminated, at least potentially. After all, the disciplinary function presupposes that the recipients, or at least the ablebodied among them, are members of the workforce who happen, momentarily, to be jobless. But events of the sixties clearly show that
relief can expand even in boom times, irrespective of cyclical fluctuations in employment.
Hence it is clear that most public assistance clients, not belonging to the workforce, can hardly be subject
to its discipline. To this extent, then, it may be said that Piven
and Cloward, the chroniclers of the disciplinary function, are
obsolete.
There is, however, yet another development which confuses
this whole issue. Just at the point when the development of the
economy had created a permanent subproletariat, apart from the
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labor force, it also entered a period of chronic stagnation and high
unemployment, factors which tend to blur the distinction between the
subproletariat and the more or less steadily employed workforce whose
recurrent joblessness is still the result of cyclical changes. This
working-class stratum has often belonged to the mass following of the
anti-welfare demogogy of recent years. Now such people frequently
find themselves receiving public assistance or, even more often, food
stamps and unemployment insurance. This experience probably tends to
alter their view of relief, but just as important, their obviously
involuntary unemployment vitiates the argument that welfare clients
are really shiftless loafers. How long this situation will continue
is uncertain. The immediate result partly depends on the vicissitudes
of party politics. However, the economic recovery now in progress
has shown itself to be compatible with a level of officially reported
unemployment so high that President Ford's spokesmen have resorted to
vilification of his own Bureau of Labor Statistics.63 Unemployment
in the workforce is likely to be high for the foreseeable future.
The persistence of this joblessness, although a human tragedy,
does at least have the potential merit of uniting in suffering the
somewhat more regularly employed portion of the population with the
subproletariat.
An alliance of these two elements is the only possible basis for political resistance to the attack on the American
living standard, a resistance which becomes more and more crucial
all the time as the corporate liberal polity deteriorates.
The liberal corporate state, as we have seen, was founded on
a number of compromises among social groups.
The initial
arrangements were the key legislative enactments of the mid-thirties. World
War II brought national unity and prosperity, perpetuated in the later
forties by the permanent war economy and political/economic domination of the rest of the world.
This was a key accommodation.
In
effect, the corporate elite guaranteed the working population a rising living standard which formed the basis for integration of every
social element into the corporate liberal social order.
In the fifties social scientists celebrated the "end of ideology" and proclaimed that the material basis for social conflict had vanished in the
United States, a nation in which nearly everybody was "middle class."
This conception of American reality was wildly exaggerated,
of course, but it was true that the general living standard improved
steadily enough that most Americans came to see continued improvement
as an inalienable right of citizenship.
In fact, this "right" existed only as long as the corporate elite could afford it. To be
sure, they could afford it for two decades, but they cannot afford
it any more. Hence, they have taken steps to protect their own financial position at the expense of almost everyone else. The Vietnam
War stimulated business activity and as a result the living standard
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declined only gradually for awhile.59 The war is over now, however,
and in recent years the American living standard has come under heavy
attack from the business community.
In the social services we are painfully familiar with this corporate assault, which has taken the form of budgetary restrictions
in the name of fiscal responsibility. Although there is a wide variety of ideological justifications for the attack on social welfare,
most of them are rationalizations of fiscal pressures imposed by the
centers of corporate and financial power.
In some cases this power
has been used quite openly, as in New York City, where an ultimatum
from a well-organized group of banks forced the local government to
yield control of the city administration to a board of financiers and
corporate executives.
Nationally the corporate pressures have been more casual and
covert. Still, the business press grows steadily more frenzied in
proclaiming a "crisis in capital formation." Business Week,64 for
example, recently published a special issue with the banner headline:
"Capital Crisis: The $4.5 trillion America Needs to Grow." Other
publications have sounded the same theme in recent months. The gist
of their argument is that:
The jaws that threaten the nation's well-being are not
those on the giant fish that loom up in front of moviegoers, but those on the yawning capital gap that faces
the U.S. this year and as far ahead as anyone can see.65
The shortage of investment capital, they believe, is so serious as
to preclude further expansion of Ametican industry. Their solutions
include: reductions in government spending to release capital for
corporate use,

changes in

the tax structure ".

. . so that the cash

flow to business increases,"66 and other changes in public policy
to benefit corporate interests. They acknowledge that "there is a
problem in that any tax break for businesses comes on as a business
welfare program while businessmen are not perceived by the general
public as among the deserving poor."67 Unpopular though it may be,
however, a diminished living standard for most Americans is, they
believe, the only solution. Business, which used to exhort us to
increasing consumption, has been taken with an almost Calvinistic
austerity and believes us to be ". . . a society that is too profligate in consuming rather than saving. . ..
"68

Social service workers, long used to working with insufficient
resources among the desperately poor, may not recognize "profligacy"
as a universal characteristic of American society. They may even
imagine that the "crisis in capital formation" is dnly a propagandistic

deception. There is indeed a large measure of press agentry in
Business Week's florid language. Unfortunately, there is also enough
reality to constitute a serious strategic problem for those who wish
to preserve and extend the social services. It is the reality of the
American political economy's essential irrationality, a system which
can only avoid collapse by institutionalizing waste, war, and pointless destruction. Recognizing this fact, however, does not diminish
the problem although we are not constrained by any inherent logic to
accept Business Week's solutions.
It is true that money capital is relatively scarce, interest
rates are high, and that great numbers of businesses are so deeply
in debt that they constantly borrow to pay off their obligations.
This is the reason for the calls of corporate spokesmen for government retrenchment, calls which find political echoes in the Baptist
and Buddhist rhetoric of Jimmy Carter and Governor Brown.
The shortage of liquid capital would seem to be a purely economic problem, far removed from our concerns, and yet it is the basis
for social welfare's most menacing political opposition. It is vital,
therefore, to understand its origins in order to develop a strategy
for social welfare.
The shortage developed slowly, reachina serious proportions
only recently. Its roots, however, are in the corporate liberal response to the Depression, a crisis which, as shown earlier, arose out
of the market's inability to absorb the products of industry. In the
forties the government became the "consumer of last resort," buying
war materiel to keep the economy going at a high level of prosperity.
Although parts of Asia and Europe slipped from its grasp, the United
States had emerged from the war as the dominant world power. Its
military, despite a partial demobilization, was maintained tc assure,
among other things, that the "Free World" would be a secure market
for American industry. Militarism, therefore, developed two important economic functions: in itself it consumed vast quantities of
industrial products, and it enforced their consumption by people in
other countries.
Military spending could not be financed entirely out of taxes.
As a result, the Federal budget has been in deficit almost every year
since the beginning of World War II. Economists at first believed
that deficits were a healthy economic stimulus. More recently, however, deficits have become a source of concern, seen as inflationary.
And the economists are right after all. When Washington spends more
money than it receives in taxes it makes up the difference by selling
bonds, notes and similar instruments. Banks and corporations buy
most of this paper which can then be used in their transactions just
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like ordinary currency. The total supply of dollars in circulation
increases and is far greater than the gold reserves which supposedly
back it.
Inflation is in fact just that -- a situation in which growth
of the money supply outruns the grow-l of commodities (gold is only
a specialized commodity, after all).
Deficit spending at home and economic expansion abroad became
a fairly consistent Federal policy. For years they seemed to have
"solved" those problems of American capitalism that seemed so disastrous in the thirties.
In reality, the solution was only a palliative.
Under the tranquil surface of prosperity the fundamental dilemmas persisted and in the end proved to have created new problems
in addition to the old.69
The policy of economic expansion embodied contradictory tendencies:
a tendency to absorb American products by creating markets
and a tendency to arouse opposition overseas which caused, derivatively, other political and economic problems at home and abroad.
In Vietnam, the second tendency came decisively to the fore.
The military establishment is not simply an exercise in job
creation after all.
American economic dominance could never have
been maintained by purely "peaceful" means like subsidies to conservative foreign politicians (as in Italy) or sponsorship of military
coups (Guatemala, Iran, Chile, etc.).
As a result, for more than a
generation, the United States has maintained garrisons around the
world. This vast military presence has been fairly successful. On
the other hand, the victory in Vietnam showed that the Washington
government and the corporate elite
cannot afford many failures.
The Vietnam War was a logical consequence of a long-standing
policy:
1) no part of the world would be abandoned which was open
to domination by American commercial interests, and, 2) almost any
area could be a potential market for American corporations.
In fact,
foreign sales grew more rapidly from 1950 to 1965 than sales in the
more easily saturated domestic market.70 The policy did not, of
course, necessarily correspond to the particular needs of specific
corporations, in each instance, but it did (and still
does) reflect
the general interests of the monopoly sector. The war increased
military expenses, but its unpopularity meant that the Johnson regime
dared not defray them with heavy taxes and austerity (as in World
War II).
Instead the Federal deficit grew from $1.6 billion in 1965
to $25.2 billion in 1968. 71 War production reduced unemployment to
3.5% in 1969, 72 greatly increasing labor's bargaining power. Following the lead of the unionized, workers in general raised their incomes
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almost fast enough to keep up with inflation. American products, at
inflated prices, could not compete well with those of other countries
and in 1971, for the first time in the century, the United States imported more than it exported.73 This decline in American economic
hegemony and the loss of foreign markets threatened the whole policy
of economic expansion which had helped "end" the crisis of the thirties. From 1965 to 1970 corporate profits (i.e., money capital) had
declined by 10.6%.74 From the corporate standpoint this situation
was a disaster. It was the basis of the crisis in capital formation
of today.
The American economy, a vast structure erected on shaky foundations, continues to confound its managers. Presidents Nixon and Ford
saw inflation as the crucial enemy. They devalued the dollar to make
the United States more competitive internationally, cut labor costs
with a wage freeze and did little to relieve the most serious recession in forty years. Banks and corporations, with help from politicians of both parties, have used the New York City fiscal crisis to
scare the citizens into accepting reduced levels of government services and permitting wealth to flow to the major commercial and financial centers. The elite is especially persistent in pursuit of this
capital because nearly all large corporations are deeply in debt and
most banks have abandoned sound business principles and ordinary
common sense in makina loans. They have built a precarious network
of obligations in which a failure of any one participant coulO, at
least in theory, preciritate a general collapse with bank failures,
corporate bankruptcies, and other horrors.75
There is a traditional myth which holds that businessmen, conthe stern realities of the world, are necessarily hardwith
cerned
headed and practical. without much thinking about it, many of us
still tend to assume that if these pragmatists think there is a capiIf they and
tal shortage then there must be a capital shortage.
their economic experts say it exists because of our "profligacy" and
must be relieved at our exnense, we feel unset but do not oresume to
question their expertise.
As we have seen, there really is a shortage of money capital
(not of other kinds though -- inventories are quite high at rresent)
but it exists as an unintended consequence of policies designed to
save business from the irresistible need of an unplanned, profitoriented economy to produce more goods than the neople can buy.
Business is in a serious dilemma and the corporate pragmatists want
the majority of Americans to sacrifice in order to get them out of
trouble. It would be possible, of course, to resolve the crisis at
their expense and not at the expense of the poor and working people.
Various solutions are possible. The choice between them is a
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political question.
The capital crisis and the development of the subproletariat,
pose a serious threat to social welfare. Unable to regulate the subproletariat as it has traditionally disciplined the labor force, social
welfare is correspondingly less useful to both the corporate elites.
The leaders of the monopoly sector increasingly employ the hackneyed
anti-relief rhetoric of the competitive sector elites. The capital
crisis gives an urgency to their denunciations.
The American political economy has evolved, in recent decades,
in a way that has destroyed the necessary conditions for existence of
the corporate liberal alliance for social welfare. Social welfare's
partisans must develop a completely new approach, based on the concrete realities of today, in their fight to preserve and extend services.
Part IV, Towards A Renewal of Social Welfare
The struggle for social welfare will have to be consciously
political, and in unprecedented ways. Social welfare partisans must
learn to recognize enemies as well as friends and to see political
issues as questions of power. Since the traditional supporters in
the business elite are unreliably friendly at best, social welfare
must have a mass base of support in other areas of the population,
among that great majority of Americans whose interests are fundamentally opposed to those of the elite. This means, of course, that
social welfare must abandon the stance of the "expert" who is above
politics, a relic from the heyday of corporate liberalism. In reality, social welfare's work has always had political implications and
it was only the nearly total hegemony of the monopoly sector corporate elite which made it possible for that stratum's chosen policies
to appear as the only conceivable products of science and intellect.
Nowadays social welfare can only advance if it makes a clear
political commitment and follows a general strategic plan as part
of a popular anti-corporate movement.
This proposition can only seem abstract at present. The
majority of working people are fragmented and discouraged, divided
very frequently around issues of social welfare itself, with relief
the supposed object of mass hostility. It is entirely possible,
however, that the opposition which many public opinion polls purport
to demonstrate is an opposition to the cost of services rather than
to the services themselves. In view of the staggering burden of prevailing taxation, this attitude is perfectly comprehensible. In the
absence of any credible political force pushing for a thoroughgoing
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reform of state finance and a redistribution of wealth, the average
voter has little choice but to accept the fiscal stringency on which
most of the significant centers of power in the U.S. seem to have
agreed. Insofar as working people do oppose social welfare, it is
probably because they see it as a set of programs for the subproletariat, a stratum they often resent as parasitic. Their feelings have
a certain basis in reality -- the subproletarian poor do live off
wealth produced by others, and the social services they use do tend
to be separate from those used by the working class. Of course, it is
not their fault that they have been excluded from the workforce and
live off public assistance rather than wages, salaries, or unemployment insurance benefits. The fact remains, though, that the organization of social welfare reflects the division between these two
social strata.
Working people need social services too, of course, and have
fought hard for some of them, especially daycare and some ancillary
services in medical and educational settings. These struggles have
been difficult in recent years as the pressure of the capital crisis
has intensified.
The difficulties are increased by social welfare's
subproletarian stigma.
On the other hand, there are programs which are entirely
respectable because they are clearly established to help less fortunate members of the workforce.
Social security and unemployment
insurance are examples.
This fragmentation of both the social services and their
political base is a serious source of divisiveness and weakness. The
first task for partisans of social welfare is to overcome this disunity.
It is possible that the blurring mentioned earlier of the
distinction between subproletarians and unemployed workers may play
a salutary role.
In addition the partisans must propose policy
changes to break down the distinction between the two types of programs.
Some examples are the funding of Old Age and Survivors Disability and Health Insurance out of general revenue, the retention of
the food stamp program for a wide stratum of workinq people, and a
broad range of non-financial services under Title XX of the Social
Security Act for both relief recipients and those who are better off.
The Social Security tax is regressive and a burden. In addition it seems insufficient to guarantee the program's long-range solvency.76 Funding OASDHI out of general revenue raised by a supposedly
progressive income tax would be an improvement in principle. More
importantly, it would mean an abandonment of the insurance concept and
convert OASDHI into a relief program, a relief program, however, with
enormous popular support.
Such a transformation of social security
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would begin to undermine the pariah status of public assistance.
The unifying character of the broad food stamp and Title xx
programs is obvious. It might be argued, of course, that a more
narrowly focused effort would result in a better service for those
most in need. As an abstract argument, this is true enough but
in practice we must recognize that a narrowly focused program has
a correspondingly narrow basis of popular support and is thus more
subject to scapegoating and funding cutbacks. To demonstrate this
one need only compare the relative popularities of public assistance
and OASDHI.
The possible changes in policy begin to address the question of how a new mass base for social welfare can be formed. They
do not, however, speak to the question of funding and the crisis of
capital formation.
How can funding for social welfare be increased?
A partial answer lies in a thorough revision of governmental
spending priorities, a turning away from militarism. It is not
enough, however, to propose, for example, that the Pentagon forego
two Bl bombers so that social service funding may be augmented by
equivalent billions.
What is needed instead is a thorough plan for
demilitarization of the entire economy.
Discontent with militarism is a constant undercurrent in
American political consciousness, although no established political
tendency articulates it forcefully. Still, the Cold War could only
be instituted after a systematic effort to delude and terrorize the
American populace 77 who, even so, voted for what claimed to be
peace candidates in 1952, 1964, 1968, and 1972. Opposition to
militarism arouses the fury of red-baiting conservatives and the
occasional support of certain liberals, who timidly propose marginal
reductions in military procurement. The liberals have a long history
of losing such arguments, mostly because their position is based on
nothing more than a series of quibbles about the relative strength
of Soviet vis-a-vis American military might.
They do not challenge
the purposes of militarism. Obviously, liberal anti-militarism,
having conceded basic premises to the right, can only be feeble and
tentative.
A genuine anti-militarism, by contrast, must forthrightly
attack militarism's premises. The Vietnamese fiasco has substantially discredited the idea of the United States-as world-policeman.
And the view of military spending as a creator of jobs is rapidly
losing its basis in reality.
Military spending tends to create jobs. Its defenders always
emphasize this fact.
But they ignore another, paradoxical reality:
that it also tends to eliminate jobs.
In earlier years the first
tendency prevailed, but recently the second has become increasingly
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dominant. The constant effort to maintain military superiority
over the USSR requires ever more technologically sophisticated armaments. More sophisticated weaponry implies more technologically
advanced industries to build it, industries requiring a more skilled
and less numerous workforce. Military spendina thus fosters technological unemployment and compounds the problem created by sluggish
growth in the number of low-skill jobs. The harm military spending
does to the job market has recently been documented in a study which
shows the differences in the number of jobs resulting from $1 billion
of federal expenditure in the military as opposed to several other
areas.78
In addition, military production, by failing to either meet
consumers' needs, or produce equipment other manufacturers could use
to meet them, does not generate as many jobs as civilian production.
In fact, military production's products are either used up (i.e.,
destroyed), or become obsolete and get scrapped without ever being
employed. Either way they are wasted without producing economic
wealth that human beings could use.
Opponents of militarism are clearly in a position to make strong
appeals to the self-interest of most Americans. Although the Vietnamese victory removed the immediate impetus for public debate on
militarism, it is probable that a vague comprehension of these facts
lies at the root of the considerable (though partly latent) distrust
of the military which persists despite the jingoism of many politicians and the mass media.79 There are grounds for cautious optimism,
at least, in thinking that a coherent plan for conversion of the
economy away from militarism could win many adherents. Certainly,
it would have a more beneficial effect on inflation and unemployment
than anything anyone else has suggested.
And since militarism is
mainly a mechanism for the care and feeding of corporations, a political effort against militarism is necessarily part of the growing
anti-corporate movement.
Supporters of social welfare must attach themselves to the
broad progressive coalition which is gradually evolving in opposition to the corporate attack on the American people. Some workers
will disagree, arguing that they should continue in their traditional
role as "dispassionate experts" trying to solve the problems of society. That role was somewhat relevant in the earlier years of the
liberal corporate state. Unfortunately, that role was based on the
willingness of the corporate elite of the monopoly sector to sponsor
efforts at social amelioration -- the nicer side of regulating the
workforce, legitimation. With the advent of the subproletariat,
the custodial function, and the capital crisis, the elite is less
friendly. The social welfare expert has less to offer them than
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before.

The corporate liberal order is crumbling.

If social welfare is to survive it must become part of a new
force, the independent movement of the American people toward peace
and prosperity.
Social welfare need not go as a supplicant -- it has
much to offer in training, experience, and program -- but it is a
truism that social welfare needs friends and this is the only possibility.80
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THE CONSERVATIVE PROGRAM FOR THE WELFARE-WARFARE STATE:
KOREAN, ALGERIAN, AND VIETNAMESE WARS

THE RESPONSE TO THE

Clarence Y.H. Lo, Department of Sociology, University of California, Berkeley

introduction
Limited wars after World War II have produced a right rather than a left turn
in the politics of the industrially advanced countries. During the Korean War, the
Republican party articulated the Popular discontent about the war and captured the
Presidency in 1952.
Perhaps it is no surprise that the Korean War, accompanied by
McCarthyism and MacArthur's demands for escalation, should lead to eight years of
Eisenhower conservatism. Vietnam, however, created a strong left wing mobilization
against the war; it is less obvious why Nixon was elected immzdiately afterwards.
De Gaulle, another conservative, followed the French involvement in Algeria, which
produced protests from both left and extreme right that brought France to the brink
of a military coup and civil war.
This paper explains why the leaders of conservative political parties were so
successful in the aftermith of limited wars. Conservative parties are those parties
whose constituency is large and small business, managers, upper income professionals,
and some white collar workers and farmers, exemplified by the Republican Party in
the United States, the Gaullist Party in France, the Christian Democrats in Germany
and Italy, and the Conservative Party in England. Conservative political leaders
rose to power because they addressed the problems intensified by limited wars-budget deficits, political stalemate, and inter-imperialist rivalries-- and, to
some extent, enacted short term solutions--budget cuts, leadership above politics,
and increasing national power.
The first section of the paper describes how budget deficits grew in limited
wars because of increases in military spending, heightened opposition to taxes,
and, in the case of the Vietnam War, increasing social spending to keep domestic
order. Conservatives appealed to the mounting popular concern with inflation and
proposed budget cuts.
Part two argues that limited war also worsened the problem
of political stalemate, the inability of any group or coalition to mobilize sufficient pDpular support to implement a coherent program. During the Korean War, the
conflict bdtween the Democrats' limited war aims and the Republicans' victory strategy intensified the already bitter conflict between the new deal and anti new deal
coalitions. The Algerian War made the political stalemate of the Fourth French
Republic a complete breakdown. The conservative response to political stalemate
was the national hero-Generals Eisenhower and de Gaulle--who offered to govern the
country without the deadlock of conflicting popular demands and ineffective politicians. Defeat in a limited war gave conservatives the opportunity to claim that
they would increase national power. Eisenhower promised an affirmative policy of
liberating the communist nations instead of merely trying to contain them, and
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threatened massive retaliation at times and places thatbe would choose, rather than
responding to
communist initiatives. Nixon continued to use the rhetoric of
increasing national power, but at t] e same time, sought to increase the U.S. standing in the world economy. Afte, the Algerian War, de Gaulle also made French power
a theme, through the rhetoric of grandeur, challenges to the U.S. position in the
international monetary system, and increases in the French military budget.
The specific policies of budget cuts, leadership above politics, and national
power reflect values which have been long associated with conservative politics.
The conservative suspicion of state action and reform is reiterated in the program
of budget cuts following limited wars; the conservative acceptance of inequality
finds new life in the demands for reductions in government programs for the poor
and disadvantaged. The calls Icr leadership above politics echo elitist suspicions about letting popular pressures determine government actions. National power,
too, has been a long standing theme of conseriatives. Despite the connections betwcen the policies after limited wars and conservative traditions, it would be a
mistake to portray the policies as the logical outcome of a consistent conservative
theory.
Conservatism has undergone dramatic changes throughout history. Most recently, as we shall see, the conservatives de Gaulle and Nixon vastly expanded the
powers of the high levels of the executive branch of the national government, and
used that power to accomplish major changes in policy. This "executive conservatism," is at odds with a major conservative tradition--the distrust of active
government, and new policy departures, in favor of an equilibrium in government
1
based on checks and balances.
The flexibility of conservative doctrine is nothing new. Throughout history,
while conservative principles have remained, specific positions on broad issues
such as industrialization, democracy, and the state have often completely reversed.
The constituencies supporting conservative views have also dramatically changed.
In the early stages of industrial capitalism, the social base of conservatism
was landed and commercial wealth, which was seeking to resist the demands of the
newly emerging industrial capitalists, workers, farmers, and artisans for equality
and participation in absolutist governments.
The conservatives of this period,
who can be termed "traditional conservatives," not only were skeptical of maintaining order by concessions to the mob; they also doubted the industrial capitalists' claim that markets would control the labor force and insure popular com2
Traditional conservapliance the face of continuing inequality and privilege.
tism favored the maintenance of social order by strengthening forms of community
that had stabilized feudal society:
the church, the family, the military, the
small village, and other groups where hierarchies were maintained by customary
deference and obligation. Traditional conservatism survives in the recent work of
Nisbet (1976).
By the end of the nineteenth century in the United States, a particular variant of conservatism arose as industrial capitalists became the major constituency
articulating the conservative principles of preserving property, privilege, and
tradition. Laissez faire, rather than feudal notions of community, became conser-
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vatism's major theme. American conservatism borrowed the liberal tradition of
markets, rationalism, and individualism. Conservatives also made use of democratic
rhetoric, although they continued to bitterly resist all popular attempts at reform and participation. (Rossiter, 1962: 128-62)
Thus, the inconsistencies and
flexibility of the conservative doctrine have allowed it to survive through vastly
different historical periods. After the Korean, Algerian and Vietnam wars, conservative policies not only managed merely to survive. Conservatism was highly relevant in the crisis situation of the limited war and provided short run solutions
that prevented intensification of the crisis.
Our view that conservatives can effectively respond to crisis, generate a
consensus among elite factions, and gain popular assent for the policies, is a
needed supplement to the prevailing view among new left historians. These writers
have stressed the ability of the "corporate liberals" to accomplish new policy
departures. While conservatives see popular movements as a threat to stability
and order and hence are unwilling to make any concessions to them, corporate liberals become involved in the issues raised by popular movements and are more
tolerant of reforms.
Despite the corporate liberals' rhetorical acceptance of the
goals of popular reform movements, the actual aim of the corporate liberals, according to new left historians, is to stabilize the capitalist system. For example,
Kolko (1963: 255-78) contends that the "Progressive" Era reforms such as regulation of corporations and the establishment of the Federal Trade Commission increased
the growth of large firms at the expense of smaller ones. 3
Corporate liberals in
the National Civic Federation favored the recognition of moderate labor unions
which would institutionalize class conflict without threatening the capitalist system. (Weinstein, 1968: 3-39) Bernstein (1967: 263-82) argues that the New Deal
expansion of
social spending prevented the intensification of popular discontent and provided business with expanded markets and a safeguard against deep recessions. Corporate liberal support helped blacks to reduce political and legal
inequality. Thus, the civil rights movement was conciliated, and also, from the
point of view of capital, the U.S. gained a more favorable image through the third
world, where communist propaganda had effectively criticized the condition of U.S.
blacks. Since new left historians see corporate liberalism as the long run interest of the capitalist class, conservatives, who opposed government regulation of
corporations, the recognition of trade unions, and the welfare state, therefore
also oppose capitalists' class interests, even though, ironically, the conservative
position was the majority view of the business community at that time.
Although in the Progressive Era and the Great Depression, conservative opposition to reform was dysfunctional for capitalism, after limited wars, conservative
remedies became more relevant.
This interpretation differs from the "power shift"
theory (Sale, 1973, 1975; Oglesby, 1973) which also attempts to explain the recent
conservatism of politicians, government policies, intellectuals, and public opinion.
According to the power shift theory, the owners and managers of the multinational
corporations headquartered in the East continue to be corporate liberal.
However,
they are no longer dominant economically; they have been out-shined by the fast
growing industries of the South and Southwest, which support conservative politics.
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The sun belt's rising economic power is matched by rising political power of the
conservatives.
However, our analysis contends that the conservative revival does
not result from a power shift from the eastern to the southern factions of the
capitalist class. Multinational eastern business is still the dominant faction
of the business community.
On many issues, they are shifting from a corporate
liberal to an executive conservative position because the interest of the capitalist class as a whole has shifted to the right.
Our methodology is to first consider the general outlines of the crisis of
late capitalism:
the fiscal crisis of the state, political stalemate, and shifting inter-imperialist rivalries. These three problems have been intensified by
limited wars. Right wing politicians have taken the lead in identifying the problems, but have often presented a distorted analysis, calling for budget cuts, leadership above politics, and increasing national power. Despite the inaccuracies
of their analysis, conservative politicians have succeeded in using these issues
to win sweeping electoral victories near the end of each limited war.
Shifting attention from political campaigning, we next study how the Eisenhower, de Gaulle, and Nixon administrations dealt with the three problems. De Gaulle
and Nixon, unlike Eisenhower, handled the problems by greatly strengthening the
executive branch of the national government.
The specific details of conservative response will vary from nation to nation, depending on past history of the country, its place in the world economy,
and its culture; no one case will exemplify all of the features of the conservative ideal type.
Thus, the 1968 Nixon campaign placed relatively little emphasis
on breaking a political stalemate. Reductions in government spending, the major
campaign theme of the two Republicans, was not an important reason for de Gaulle's
popularity.
Nevertheless, in the long run, no administration could ignore the
issues of budget cuts, stalemate, and national power.
In focusing on the conservative alternative to the crisis of late capitalism,
we are not implicitly arguing that this alternative is in any way inevitable. Conservatism is not a long-run solution to the problems of capitalism. The fiscal
crisis, political stalemate, and the destabilizing effect of inter-imperialist
rivalries can be attacked through a wide variety of solutions, social democratic
and fascist as well as conservative. The conclusion examines the potentialities
and weaknesses of the other alternatives, and discusses the options available to
the left.
We first consider how developments in late capitalism strengthened the conservative positions on budget cuts and leadership above politics. After briefly
indicating some of the general causes of crisis in late capitalism, we will describe the intensification of crisis by limited wars and the response of conservative politicians.
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Budget Cuts and Leadership Above Politics
O'Connor (1973a) has argued that the development of monopoly capitalism depends on growing state budgets, which has resulted in inflation and the fiscal crisis of the state. During the Korean and Vietnam Wars, high military spending and
the demands of interest groups intensified the problems of inflation and fiscal
4
crisis, which became successful campaign themes for both Eisenhower and Nixon.
In the beginning of the Korean War, the fiscal crisis was latent. The initial
popularity of the war produced an almost universal consensus for raising taxes; in
the war's first year the federal budget had earned a 16.4 billion dollar surplus.
However, military spending continued to soar, mainly propelled not by the fighting
in Korea but by an ambitious program to rearm Western Europe and other U.S. allies
against the Soviet Union. As the war entered its second stalemated year, popular
opposition to taxes increased (Lo, 1976).
Although compared to World War II, military spending in the Korean War was less, a higher percentage of it was paid
through taxes instead of public sales of savings bonds. Tax rates approached
World War II levels, and in the case of single individuals, were higher than in World
5
War
II.
A reluctant Congress would approve only self expiring, rather than
permanent tax increases. President Truman's proposed budget for fiscal 1953 showed
6
a deficit of $10.4 billion.
Pressures from labor unions, farmers, and business
succeeded in weakening the government's wage, price, and credit controls, threatening a new round of inflation, which heightened the need for budget cuts.
During the Vietnam War as well, the concessions to interest groups combined
with the costs of war to produce intense inflationary pressures. Black Americans
insistently made new demands on the state; the possibility that the black movement
would form an alliance with the anti-war movement was an added reason for concessions (O'Connor, -1973b).
The expansion of government social spending in the 1960's
benefitted countless other interest groups as well. For example, urban renewal
programs mainly gave benefits to non-black interest groups--building contractors,
central city land owners, savings and loan associations, and state workers. High
social and military spending produced budget deficits; opposition of conservatives
to social spending and leftists to military spending led to opposition to taxes
which worstened deficits and inflation (Lo, 1976).
One possible remedy for inflation was to reduce government spending. Sheer
numbers, combined with conservative priorities, pointed to emphasizing cuts in
military spending after the Korean War, and cuts in social spending after the Vietnam War. Social spending had risen more (and military spending had risen less) in
the Vietnam War compared to the Korean War. During the Korean War (between fiscal
year 1950 and 1953) social and economic spending rose by $1.2 billion (to $10.5
billion).
(National Defense spending rose by $37.4 billion to $50.4 billion.)
During the Vietnam War, (fiscal 1964 to 1968), social and economic spending rose by
.$14.7 billion (to $32.8 billion).
(National defense spending rose by $26.6 billion
to $80.4 billion.)
(Department of Defense, 1972: 192.)
Military spending could be
cut after the Korean War because the war had successfully kept half of Korea in the
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U.S. oriented bloc.
Cutting social spending was a winning issue for Nixon, as was cutting military
and social spending for Eisenhower. Capitalizing on the backlash against black
riots of the late 1960's, Nixon criticized the Democratic partyts policy of social
spending, counterposing his own law and order approach. Boyd (1971) compared the
ability of different issues to account for Democratic party identifiers who did
not vote for Humphrey in 1968. The second largest defections occurred among people
feeling that riots should be met by "all available force to maintain
law and order,"
7
instead of correcting "the problems of poverty and unemployment."
Edged on by Republican fiscal conservatives and neo-isolationists like Taft
and Hoover, Eisenhower promised to reduce government spending to $60 billion by
8
fiscal 1955, making possible tax reductions.
The most decisive issue in the 1952
campaign was Eisenhower's promise that ending the long and expensive Korean War
would be the first priority of his administration.
The Republican Party was in a position to benefit from the issues of inflation
and budget cuts because of their past campaigning. The debate over the continuatio
of the New Deal in the immediate postwar period identified the Republican party as
the representative of popular discontent about high taxes, the mounting national
debt, and the large size of government budgets. During the Korean War, the right,
rather than the left, was able to make high military spending a campaign issue because of the previous Republican criticism of costly international commitments.
Their stands against the Democratic policies of preparedness for World Wars I and
II and excessive economic aid for Europe made the Republicans seem the group
most
9
likely to reduce government spending for foreign affairs and the military.
Another source of conservatism is political stalemate. A political stalemate
is the inability of any group or coalition to mobilize sufficient popular support
behind a program to deal with a particular problem of capitalism. The simplest
form of political stalemate occurs when one political party proposes a solution to
a problem, and that solution is blocked by other political parties or popular groups
so that the state takes no action, or only ineffective action. This, we argue, was
the situation of the first Nixon administration, where the strategy of domestic
budget cuts was stalemated. Another version of political stalemate occurs when two
parties propose different solutions to a particular problem of capitalism. Each
political group has just enough strength to block the proposal of the other political group, but neither has enough power to successfully implement its own proposal.
This second type of stalemate was exemplified by the politics of the Korean War,
where the Republican option of air and sea war with China stalemated the Democratic
option of continued, limited, land war in Korea and a negotiated settlement. The
most extreme form of political stalemate is a deadlock on all major issues. Political parties fragment; no group is able to govern the country for more than a
short period. The Fourth French Republic is the best example of such an extreme
stalemate.
Political stalemate is most dangerous if it is combined with an economic or
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international crisis which compels a certain response which the political system
is unable to deliver. Then, political failings intensify crisis. This conjunction
between political stalemate and crisis occurred in each limited war.
Political stalemate, while primarily a problem from the point of view of the
capitalist class because it blocks needed policies, is also a problem for the population at large. The intensification of a crisis usually has detrimental consequences for the people (such as inflation or a prolongation of casualities in a
war), which leads to popular resentment against politicians and the political system. The conservative solution to political stalemate is to seek solutions to problems without gaining consent from the political parties. One means of achieving
this is the ascendency of a national hero, often a victorious general, who claims
to stand above the existing deadlocked politicians. The classic cases of such
heroes are Napoleon and Louis Bonaparte. Karl Marx (1869) analyzed the deadlock
of the French political parties in the 1840's and argued that their inability to
govern the country paved the way for the regime of Louis Bonaparte. Bonaparte
took advantage of the paralysis of government to make demagogic claims that he
would sweep the incompetent politicians aside, restore order to France, and embark
on a series of foreign adventures.
The national hero solution is conservative because it involves subordinating
the confusion of popular demands, interests, and competing political parties to a
president who can deal with the problems of capitalism. Occasionally, the national
heroes themselves explicitly argue the traditional elitist doctrine that the best
government is one in which the rulers are autonomous from popular pressures, and
are thus free to pursue the national interest instead of selfish group interests
or the petty whims of politicians. At the same time, conservative writers sound
the same theme, claiming that the ills of the society result from excessive popuIn the United States, this view, once argued by
lar demands on the government.
Schumpeter (1930), is again being emphasized in the report of the Trilateral ComThe Public Interest (1975).
mission (1975) and in the journal
All three limited wars intensified the already present tendencies toward political stalemates. De Gaulle, Eisenhower, and Nixon made political stalemate a theme
in their campaigns, promising leadership above politics.
The Algerian War turned the stalemate of the Fourth French Republic into a
The socialists, the radicals, and the MAP, the moderate parcomplete paralysis.
ties which had formed coalition governments during the Fourth Republic, were unable
to make any moves toward solving the pressing Algerian problem. The army and the
French settlers' political groups in Algeria would simply refuse to obey any meaIn the Algerian War, popular perceptions
sures leading to an independent Algeria.
of stalemate stemned not only from domestic French politics but also from the long,
indecisive nature of the conflict.
De Gaulle was chosen president during the Algerian crisis because he seemed
to offer an alternative to the political stalemate of the Fourth Republic. De Gaulle
was a national hero, symbolic to many Frenchof the resistance to Germany during
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World War II.
Voters hoped his widespread popularity would produce effective action. One of de Gaulle's favorite campaign tactics was to place two alternatives
before the voters--either a continuation of his rule or total chaos, which no other
individual or party could handle.
In the U.S. the underlying tendency toward political stalemate has been the
breakup of the New Deal Coalition. According to Burnham (1970) and Lubell (1956),
political stability in America depends upon a coalition, which is first formed in
a "critical" or "realigning" election such as the election of 1932. The development of late capitalism has produced inflation and the fiscal crisis, which has
weakened the New Deal Coalition. Limits to deficit spending and the expansion of
state budgets meant that government benefits to any group in the coalition could
For example, welfare programs could
only be made at the expense of other groups.
only be supported through taxation of the middle strata--the prosperous ethnic
groups, the suburbanized working class, and white collar workers. Thes groups,
once solidly affiliated with the Democrats, and still remembering the welcome relief that the New Deal provided in the thirties, now also had an interest in the
anti-New Deal coalition, which promised to ease high taxes and inflation by reducing
social spending. As a result, the middle strata erratically shifted their support
between Democrats and Republicans. These shifts, combined with defections in the
South and the Midwest, weakened the New Deal Coalition and produced a stalemate.
the parties; often, opposing parties
The Presidency passed back and forth between
10
controlled the White House and Congress.
The Korean War intensified and made more serious the deadlock between the two
political parties. Each political party vetoed the alternative of the other party.
The Democratic Party solution was to continue the ground war and negotiate a settleRepublicans remembered the political points they had scored by criticizing
ment.
the Yalta negotiations and the World War I peace settlement, and denounced the administration for making excessive concessions to the treacherous communist negotiators. According to the Republicans, the Democrats had not only failed to win a
If Truman settled the Korean War on the
war; they were losing the peace as well.
same terms that Eisenhower eventually settled for, Republicans would have denounced
it as treason.
(Ellsberg, 1972; Waltz, 1967).
The alternative of the right-wing Republicans was General MacArthur's plan for
a total military victory in Korea, by striking China with an invasion of Chiang
Kai-shek's army, a naval blockade, and U.S. air power, including nuclear weapons.
Although Truman administration spokesmen discredited most of Mac Arthur's proposals
during the Congressional hearings of spring and summer, 1951, the intense partisan
debate continued. Senator Jenner exclained, "this Government of ours [has been
turned] into a military dictatorship, run by Communist-appeasing, Communist-protect11
Extremist rhetoric
ing betrayer of America, Secretary of State Dean Acheson."
led a horrified group of intellectuals to sound dire warnings about the danger of
the "radical right" in America (Bell, 1964).
Through his nonpartisan appeal, Eisenhower seemed to offer voters a relief from
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the partisan stalemate. Like de Gaulle, Eisenhower was a World War II hero standing above politics; some prominent Democrats sought to have Eisenhower as their
party's nominee for president.12
In the 1972 campaign, Nixon also stressed that he was president of all the
people, and was above politics. He gave the impression that he considered political campaigning to be a distraction from the affairs of state. Nixon's attempt at
leadership above politics resulted from the need to reduce social spending. Nixon's
budget-cuts during his first administration generated opposition from the Democratic Party, government bureaucracies, and special interest lobbies. Nixon had won
the Republican nomination in 1968 by gaining delegates through patiently conciliating and bargaining with special interests.
In 1972, however, in order to reduce
domestic spending, Nixon needed a base of support that would not require pluralistic concessions.
Nixon's re-election campaign was run outside the normal channels
of the Republican Party. Nixon sought a sweeping electoral victory from a constituency, the silent majority, which would not make many political demands on his
administration.
Nixon's actions, intended to overcome a political stalemate, actually increased
it.
The Watergate scandal and other relevations increased distrust of government
and politicians, and weakened political parties, thus making them even less able to
organize assent for policies needed by capitalism.
Earlier in the seventies, voter
distrust seemed to be a left wing issue. Many of the injustices about domestic intelligence were first exposed by the radical left; the hostility against Nixon's
law and order advisors, and the stress of civil liberties in the Watergate investigation seemed to point to an increased influence of the left. However, distrust
of government is also feeding the conservative sentiment for budget cuts in social
services as well as the leftist critique of American foreign policy and the military.
National Power
All political ideologies have called for national power, but to different degrees. The most vehement proponents were once conservatives; the lead shifted to
the corporate liberals by World War I but now is reverting back to the conservatives.
Around the turn of the century, conservatives were the leading advocates of overseas economic expansion and military power (Williams, 1962, 1969).
Free market
ideology led conservatives to call for enlarging that market throughout the world;
military spending was small enough so that a hefty increase would not offend
laissez-faire sensibilities. But as gunboat diplomacy against minor powers was
replaced by total warfare among all the industrially advanced powers, the laissezfaire conservatives in the U.S. became less enthusiastic about high military spending and governm'nt control over the economy that imperialism required.
Industrial
capitalists, who had generally supported the Spanish American War and Open Door
diplomacy, were reluctant to rally behind the preparedness campaign before World
War II, because of their investments in Germany and their dislike of state regulation, especially since it was led by President Roosevelt (Kolko, 1962; Bernstein,
1966).
Before the Korean War, mainstream business sentiment called for reductions
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in the Marshall Plan and strict limits to the rise in military spending (Lo, 1975b):
In the United Stat(s, the primary support for the overseas expansion of U.S. economic and military power came from the corporate liberals.
Roosevelt, Truman, Kennedy
and Johnson pushed for corporate liberal reform at home and forged a centralized
state to further U.S. interests abroad.
Beginning with the Nixon Administration, however, conservatives began to abandon their hardened stand against all state intervention and supported an active
state in foreign affairs. This change in conservative ideology resulted from the
underlying shifts in great power alignments, which were further disrupted by limited wars.
During the Korean War, the change in the world balance of power stemmed from
tbc rising strength of the Sovict Union, China, and the left. Western Europe, the
major barrier to Soviet afluence before WKrid War IT, had been dcstroyed by the
war.
In addition, United States power had been undermined by the rise of communist
governments in China, North Korca, and Eastern Europe, which made neutralism a more
attractive altcrnative to a military and economic alliance with the United States.
Although the Truman Administration spent huge amounts for a military buildup and
foreign aid, still, communist governments came to power.
The Korean War not only became the'symbol of foreign policy frustrations; it
also contributed to the weakening of U.S. power. Western Europe and the non-aligned
nations of Asia were critical of U.S. policy in Korea because of the excessive drain
on resources and the U.S. neglect of other problems; U.S. allies feared irresponsible military actions. Hence, each year of the Korean War brought further tensions
in the system of U.S. centered alliances.
The conservatives Eisenhower and Dulles responded to the challenges to the
U.S. position by promising to reassert American power through a new policy of
"liberating" communist dominatedEastern Europe'and China. The Truman Administration's policy of containment,or restricting further Soviet gains, they claimed was
"defeatist" and "negative."
However, the policies of the Eisenhower Administration
were more negative and defensive than Truman's, mainly because of Eisenhower's
other campaign promise in 1952--to reduce government spending.
Eisenhower reduced
national defcnsc spending from 447.7 billion in fiscal 1953 to 138.4 billion in
fiscal 1956 (Department of Defense, 1972: 192).
As the communist challenge to U.S. power persisted, conservatives continued to
call for increased national power, but unlike Eisenhower, made tenative moves toward
supporting higher military spending.
In 1968 Nixon continued the political rhetoric
about increasing national power, criticized the Democrats for squandering the American advantages in the Vietnam War, and claimed that the seizure of the Pueblo by a
"third rate military power" showed that U.S. power needed to be restored by the Republicans.
In the 1972 campaign, Nixon appeared to increase U.S. power by creating
the symbolic issue of safely returning the prisoners held by North Vietnam, and
then securing their release through bombing North Vietnam. In the 1972 elections,
Nixon defended high military spending from the attacks of George Mc Govern. The
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policies of President Ford complete the transition of conservatism into a position
that supports high military spending and remains opposed to state intervention to
regulate business, clean the environment, or increase social welfare. Ford proposed a 4101 billion military budget for fiscal 1977 and planned to increase real
expenditures by 4% a year, reaching a level of $111 billion in fiscal 1981.13
Defending high military spending is easier for conservatives now that it involves not the ambitious expansion of U.S. commitments, but rather a maintenance of
international privileges (such as low raw material prices and the use of the dollar
as the standard reserve currency) which have already proven to be a boom for capital.
Defending high defense spending also fits into the conservative principle of
resisting popular demands, since the left of the Democratic Party, and a plurality
of the nation supports lower military budgets. According to the Gallup Poll, the
percentage of people thinking that the U.S. was spending too much for defense varied
from 49%, (315 favoring the same level, March 1971), slipped to 371 (40% favoring
the same, August, 1972), and rose to 46- (30% favoring the same, September, 1973).
Thus, conservatives reacted to the communist challenge by making inflated
patriotic demands to increase national power, and in addition, began to support
the substance of national power--high military spending. Another major change in
the world balance of power was the decline of the economic power of the United
States compared to Western Europe, exemplified by the decreasing competitiveness
of U.S. industries and an increase in the U.S. balance of payments deficit. Later,
we will discuss the U.S. response to this shift. Although American conservative
politicians did not try to make this decline into a campaign theme, de Gaulle made
it a winning political issue in France.
The same factors which necessitated a reassertion of U.S. power--a deadlock
between the Soviet Union and the United States and the U.S. balance of payments
deficit--gave France an opportunity to better her international standing. The
nuclear balance of terror between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. and the stabilization
of relations between East and W st Europe meant that France could rely less on the
United States for her military defense and could instead play an independent role
in world affairs.
The increasing U.S. balance of payments deficit gave France the opportunity to
press for changes in the international monetary system which would strengthen France
and attack the privileged position of the U.S. Most countries had to devalue their
currency and induce recession if they ran a balance of payment deficit.
However,
the U.S. deficit was tolerated because it supplied a flow of dollars abroad, needed
for international exchanges and reserves.
De Gaulle criticized the U.S. deficit,
not only because the exemption from induced recession gave the U.S. an unfair advantage, but also because it caused inflation in Europe. France in the 1960's
sought to force the U.S. to end its deficit and to change the international reserve
currency from the dollar to either gold or a Composite Reserve Unit which would be
based in gold.14

The var in Algeria gave de Gaulle added reason to raise the issue of national
powcr. The Algerian War was the last in a series of long and violent struggles for
independence by France's colonies in Asia and Africa.
Since France had to play a
less active rcl
in the third world, the French military needed a new task in Europe;
otherwise, discontent in the Army would continue to lead to army interference in
15
French domestic politics.
De Gaulle made the restoration of French power a major theme in his political
campaigns. He enhanced his popularity through his resistance of American hegemony
in NATO and in the international monetary system, his veto of the English application to the Common Market, his boycott of Common Market political activities in
1965-66, and other actions taken in the spirit of grandeur and independence. But
in addition to inflated rhetoric and symbolic political stands, de Gaulle embarked
on a major buildup of the French military. At first attempting to increase French
power in the structure of NATO, de Gaulle then withdrew from the organization when
it became clear that his proposals would be blocked by the United States. De Gaulle
announced an ambitious plan for making France an independent military power, which
called first for the d-velopmey
of atomic weapons and strategic bombers, and then
the hydrogen bomb and missles.
Thus, amid the common conservative cry of increasing national power, Nixon,
Ford, and de Gaulle have been abandoning the laissez-faire conservative suspicion
about high military spending. National power stems not only from a military might
and diplomatic tenacity, but also from economic strength--rapid technological advance, high productivity of industry, price stability, and balance of payment surpluses.
The dedicated pursuit of the conservative goals of increasing national
economic power has led some conservatives to a drastic abandonment of laissez-faire
in favor of centralized executive power--the forte of yesterday's corporate liberals.
Executive Conservatism
In late capitalism, conservatives have been usually favored a very weak form
of centralization--effective administration within a government bureau. For example,
the Hoover Commission Report and other conservative proposals to reform the U.S.
military establishment stressed using standard business practices, increasing financial accountability to a central authority, coordinating procurement, eliminating
duplication, and lowering administrative overhead. Conservatives favor these proposals as a means of reducing government spending (Hammond, 1961: 242, 312).
This
weak form of centralization differs greatly from executive conservatism, which seeks
to impose a centrally planned, comprehensive policy on a number of different government jurisdictions including executive bureaus and the legislature.
De Gaulle and Nixon, unlike Eisenhower, were executive conservatives. The Constitution of the Fifth Republic, largely of Gaullist inspiration, increased the
powers of the President and the Prime Minister, particularly over the state budget.
Nixon also increased presidential power, through the erosion of the war-making and
budget-making powers of Congress, through the creation of the Domestic Council to
parallel the National Security Council, and by using hatchet men and personal ad-
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visors to control federal agencies (San Francisco Kapitalistate Group, 1975). Eisenhower, on the other hand, was not particularly interested in centralizing power.
The differences in centralizing can be traced to variations in two factors which
produced conservative politics--budget cuts and national power.
We first consider how differences in the need to restore national power can
explain differences in the Eisenhower and Nixon Administrations. By the time of
the Vietnam War, the U.S. position in the world had greatly deteriorated from the
Korean War period; a whole series of measures were needed to restore hegemony,
which necessitated executive centralization in the Nixon Administration.
During the Korean War, the economic position of the U.S. was quite favorable
compared to its competitors, communist or capitalist.
Eisenhower merely had a negative task--ending the Korean War and high military budgets, which, if continued,
threatened to produce many of the same economic dislocations of the Vietnam War.
Between fiscal years 1950 and 1953, the U.S. spent around fifteen percent of gross
national product on the military, which included not only the costs of the Korean
War but also a world-wide rearmament program. But, beginning in 1952, policymakers
saw that many of the goals of the rearmament program could be postponed without adversely affecting the world balance of power. And, once a certain level of military
strength had been achieved, it took less resources to maintain and modernize the
forces. Eisenhower's task was relatively uncomplicated; it was merely to cut back
military spending, thus allowing the consumer goods boom to continue.
Since the
cut was accomplished through existing presidential powers, no executive centralization was needed.
After Korea, the international economic position of the United States steadily
deteriorated. Although reducing the U.S. effort in Vietnam helped to lessen the
deficit, further measures were needed to restore United States hegemony. The Nixon
Administration devalued the dollar, temporarily taxed imports, instituted wage and
price controls, subsidized investments, launched a campaign to increase exports,
and sought to increase East-West trade. Politically, the defeat of the United
States in Southeast Asia led to the policy of trying to maintain U.S. power in the
third world by using U.S. food supplies as a bargaining weapon and allowing relatively stable, developed, and pro-American regimes such as Brazil and Taiwan to
play a more active military and economic role in the third world. Thus, the task
of restoring U.S. hegemony in the post-Vietnam period required a planned series of
economic policies, delicate negotiations with the Soviet Union, China, and the
other Western powers, and quick reactions to meet international crises. The accomplishment and coordination of these policies required the growth of executive power.
In addition, many of the policies needed to restore hegemony involved increasing
costs to workers and consumers. Reducing the cost of U.S. exports involved wage restraints; exports of grains to reduce the U.S. balance of payment deficit increased
food prices. The accomplishment of these policies required a strengthening of executive power to prevent interference from domestic political pressures.
In the de Gaulle regime,

increasing national power, specifically, raising the
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military budget at the expense of consumption and social services, led to the growth
of executive power. Meanwhile, higher demands for social services, particularly
education and social security, actually produced a decline in the percentage of the
18
state budget dcvoted to military spending in the Fourth Republic.
De Gaulle used the Fifth Republic's new budget-making powers to resist increased social spending and to insure that the resources would be optimally used
within the military.
The Constitution of the Fifth Republic reduced the power of
the Parliament over budgets. Amendments to the budget could only be made by the
Finance Committee rather than from the floor of the Parliament. The finance minister could refusc to allow votes on separate clauses of the budget bill; Parliament
was given at a time deadline to decide on the budget. A five-year plan for military spending reduced the ability of Parliament to interfere with the expenditures
for any specific year.19
The final reason for the development of executive power in the aftermath of
the Vietnamese and Algerian Wars, but not the Korean War, is the seriousness of the
threats to the political order. Extremist political groups during the Vietnamese
and Algerian Wars challenged basic premises of foreign and domestic policy and rejected established channels of influence in favor of violent or otherwise illegal
Government repression necessitated the growth of centralized
means of protest.
executive power.
During the Vietnamese War, fairly large sectors of the anti-war movement and
the black movement were willing to resort to non-established channels of protest
such as mass demonstrations, and illegal actions such as sit-ins. A small but
prominent tendency in the movement disobeyed draft laws, resorted to violence, and
questioned the basic premises of U.S. foreign policy--anti-communism, and dependent
relations between third world nations and the United States. The Algerian War produced threats from both the extreme right and the extreme left. The extreme right,
favoring a continuation of a French Algeria, refused to cooperate with plans for
independence, instigated several insurrections of the army in Algeria which threatened to spread to France, eventually resorted to a campaign of bombings and assassinations. The communist party and other left groups critiqued France's colonial policy
and sponsored many demonstrations. A group of prominent communist-leaning intellectuals signed the "Manifesto of the 121" encouraging soldiers to refuse to serve in
Algeria.
The challenge from the extreme left and the extreme right was met by executive
power, applied directly to the dissidents and more generally to a new foreign policy.
i Gaulle sought out and jailed dissenters from both extremes; he used executive
power to reorganize the army, giving honorific but powerless positions to his political enemies.
There were also discrete but comprehensive purgings and postings
in the armed forces--so comprehensive, indeed, that it was said
that to know what was going on, one ought to follow the postings
of generals rather than the maneuvers of the parliamentary groups.
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.... "They no longer say 'so and so
is going to abstain,'"
20
'Trinquier has been sent south.'"

but

Many American social scientists have claimed that Mc Carthyism and other rightwing tendencies during the Korean War were extremist movements, challenging the
basic policies of the Eastern elites and relying on new patterns of mobilization
Although the rhetoric of the right wing was extreme,
and new channels of influence.
the right posed a far lesser threat to the political order than either left or
Howright in Vietnam or Algeria. MacArthur did disobey commands from Washington.
ever, the problem of civilian control of the army was never as severe as in the
Algerian War, and ceased to be a serious problem after MacArthur was replaced.
Practically all of the right-wing discontent about the Korean War and Truman's
economic policies was channeled through existing legal forms of political action-lobbying of interest groups, the 1952 campaign of Taft and Eisenhower for the Presidency, and Congressional actions to halt further tax increases and investigate the
In fact, as Michael Rogin (1967) points out, the
dismissal of General MacArthur.
ability to form new channels of prostrength of the right did not derive from its
test but rather from its connections to established centers of power. The left,
silenced by McCarthyism, was unable to critique U.S. policy; the right, while op.posing Truman's specific policies, still agreed with the necessity of military confrontation of the U.S.S.R., China, and the left.
Thus, the need to reassert national power, austerity, and threats from the extreme right and the extreme left, produce executive centralization. But the need
for budget cuts that makes executive power necessary tends to limit it at the same
time. Limits on government spending prevent concessions to interest groups and
bureaucracies which are necessary compensations for the loss of their power to the
president. Centralization of executive power has usually been accompanied by an
increase in government spending. In the United States, higher spending and presidential power characterized the New Deal, World Wars I and II, and the Truman and
Kennedy-Johnson Administrations. During the Vietnam War, presidential control over
bombing targets and the general conduct of war could only be obtained if the military services were promised expanding budgets in return (Schurmann, 1974: 180-1).
There are few examples of executive centralization in a period of budgetary restraint rather than budget expansioi, the usual case. After World War II, plans
for the unification of the United States An;, Navy, and Air Force under a single
Department of Defense were justified to the public as a moans of reducing duplicaBut intense bureaucratic conflict betion and hence lowering military speanding.
tween the services over budget shares and strategic programs limited th:ir willingness to cooperate in unification schemes. Nixon also attempted to increase executive power over domestic policy while at the same time restraining the increase of
government social spending. The opposition to both these policies, particularly
among liberal Democrats, found an outlet during the Watergate scandal.

Conclusion:

The Fascist and Social Democratic Alternatives

We have seen how conservatives attempt to formulate plausible programs to deal
with the three major problems of late capitalism.
Seeking popular acclaim without
conceding to public demands, conservatives reiterate some of their traditional solutions--cutting social spending and providing leadership above politics. But the
problem of dealing with inter-imperialist rivalries has led conservatives to abandon strict laissez-faire and call for higher military spending and executive centralization to increase national power.
Although conservatives have gained popular favor by identifying and seeking to
remedy the problems of late capitalism, the conservative program is nothing more
than a short term remedy to the fiscal crisis, political stalemate, and inter-imperialist rivalry. Budget cuts are at best a temporary solution to fiscal crisis,
since there are limits to how much the budget can be cut. As OtConnor (1973a) points
out, much government spending is essential for the expansion of capitalism. The
state budget subsidizes the cost of capital and the consumption of the working
class, thus lowering costs for business. "Social expenses" are necessary to contain
dissent.
In addition, specific capitalist interests oppose budget cuts in expenditures that benefit themselves.
The conservative call for leadership above politics is also a fictitious solution. As the case of Richard Nixon shows, the campaign rhetoric of the national interest often hides corruption, the use of the state for partisan advantage, and
deals with special interest groups.
Leadership above politics assumes that there
is a consensus for a national goal. We have seen however, that the conservatives
do not represnt the interest of society but support the interest of capitalism
(Kolko, 1968: 64-98; San Francisco Kapitalistate Group, 1974).
The conservative rhetoric about national power is the most specious of all.
The Gaullist and Eisenhower-Dulles promises to increases national power were wildly
exaggerated. Eisenhower and Dulles pledged to increase national power not through
material means but by acting "tougher" with the communists.21
But actually, the
declining position of the U.S. resulted not from the softness of the previous administration but from long term changes. Standing up to the communists cannot increase national power. Only increases in military spending, improving productivity,
and controlling inflation might have a real impact, but an uncertain impact at best,
depending on the reactions of other states. But each of these actions requires
high taxes, cuts in the non-military budget, lower
sacrifices by the working class:
wages. The conservative alternative would have a much lower popularity among the
working class if it were made clear who would pay for the conservative's chauvanism.
Although conservatism has developed short term responses to crises, it has
never found a method of establishing a more permanent social order in times of crisis. Conservatism claims that order results from the natural processes of society-the hierarchial communities of aristocratic conservatism, and the self-regulating
market of laissez-faire conservatism. Conservatism works best in a period of social stability, when the social order needs not reconstruction, but only praise.
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However conservatism is most needed in a period of popular challenge against the
state.
But its program for social stability--community and market--is bankrupt
because both have been undermined by the capitalist development that conservatism
supports as well.
Conservatism's only program for order is the resistance to popular demands, which has incited revolution as often as it has created submission
(Kissinger, 1954).
Political ideologies other than conservatism have also attempted to develop
programs relevant to the problems of late capitalism. The same factors which produce conservatism--austerity, stalemate, and national power--when intensified, can
also produce fascism. Restoring Germany to a position of world power after the
defeat of World War I was a major theme in Nazi propaganda.
Karl Polanyi (1957)
tracts the rise of fascism to the political stalemate between labor and capital,
and to the restrictions on pDpular opposition that accompanied austerity programs
to defend the gold standard in the 1920's.
Fascism, however, differs from conservatism because it is the active mobilization for the creation of a new order, whereas conservatism is the passive support
for the maintenance of the existing order. Thus, while fascism required a high
level of popular commitment to new policies, the politicization behind Eisenhower,
Nixon, and de Geulle was obviously less intense. Nixon's political base was an
otherwise inactive constituency--the silent majority. Those who voted for risenhower were in no mood for a new order--the 1950's were to be an era of normalacy
and consumption.
Another alternative to conservatism is social-democracy, which is based in
the working class and seeks the improvement of popular conditions in a way compatible
with the continuation of capitalism. The non-communist leadership of the U.S. and
European labor movements and the U.S. civil rights movement were social democratic.
One possible response of social democracy to the crisis of limited war is a mimicry
of the conservative stands of budget cuts, leadership above politics, and national
power. Examples abound of social democrats following the lead of the conservatives
in the name of the national interest. The social democratic parties of Europe supported budget cuts and austerity to defend the gold standard and voted war credits
on the eve of World War I.
Presently, the English Labour Party is trimming the
welfare state that it struggled for decades to create (Guttman, 1976); the stands
of other social-democratic political parties throughout the world became less distinguishable from the conservatives.
Just as Democrats and Republicans in the
1950's competed iver which party was more anti-communist, politicians today compete
over who can more effectively lower social spending.
In this competition over
means, social democrats have an advantage because they are mire likely than conservatives to obtain the support of the labor movement and ither popular groups. However, since social democrats arc more subject to popular pressures, they will be
less able to mike the large cuts that capitalism might require in the future.
The second major reaction of social democrats is to continue tocall for the
lim - honored program of expanding government social spmnding and job creation.
This strategy, howevvr, c-)mits a major sin of omission.
By failing to advocate
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adequate government controls over business such as effective price controls, allocation of investment, and regulation of multinational corporations, the strategy
causes some sections of the working class to pay for the benefits of other secIn the current economic crisis, social welfare without
tions (Andersen, 1976).
government controls merely produces inflation, slow investment, and high taxes for
Conservatives will continue to stress these problems and will
the working class.
blame them on the social-democrats' policies, resulting in less popular support
for the original goals of social spending and full employment.
Thus, the first alternative is to abandon social-democratic goals; the second
rests on the false belief that the goals can be achieved without controlling corporate power. The third alternative is to recognize that in a period of capitalist crisis and decline, popular demands and capitalism are becoming increasingly
incompatible, and that the fulfillment of popular demands requires the abandonment
of capitalism.
FOOTNOTES:
1.

The American forerunner of executive conservatism is Alexander Hamilton.
Cf. the arguments of Wolin, 1976, who considers the Hamiltonian notion of a
strong state to be integral to the conservative tradition. Our treatment of
Hamiltonian conservatism follows Rossiter, 1962: 108-10.

2.

Polanyi, 1957, reminds us that the conservatives rightly saw that it was a
uptopian experiment to trust self regulating markets to produce social order.
For a similar argument that capitalists are unable to provide social, political, and ideological order see Schumpeter, 1950: 121-163.

3.

According to the typology developed here, Kolko's The Triumphof Conservatism
actually describes the triumph of corporate liberalism.

4.

We differ from O Connor's (1973a) view that the "social industrial complex",
an ambitious program of government spending to employ the surplus population
and make monopoly capital more productive, is a viable solution to the fiscal
crisis of the state. O'Connor and Offe point out that it is difficult to
organize state activity to make capital more productive, because there are
no clear criteria in the state sector which would be equivalent to the profitability criteria in the private sector. Thus, it is likely that the expansion of social spending would be a further drain on revenues instead of
increasing them in the long run.

5.

U.S. News and World Report, January 4, 1952, pp. 52-53, April 25, 1952, p. 77.

6.

For a concerned corporate liberal response, see Comittee for Economic
Development, 1952. The actual deficit was $6.5 billion.

7.

During Nixon's presidency, between fiscal years 1968 and 1974, non-military
spending as a parcent of GNP rose slower than during the Johnson administra-

t
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tion (fiscal 1965-1968).
Statistical Abstract of the U.S., 1975, p. 225.
Military spending declined as a percentage of GNP in the Nixon years.
8.

Patterson, 1972: 574.

9.

Westerfield, 1935. See Converse, 1934 for data on popular perceptions of the
differences in the two parties.

10.

Lubell, 1956a, 1956b.

11.

Acheson, 1969:

12.

During the 1952 campaign, Eisenhower criticized both the Democrats' limited
war policy and the demands of right wing Republicans for escalation of the
Korean War. However, once in office, Eisenhower adopted some of the policies
Eisenhower announced that the U.S.
suggested by the right wing Republicans.
Seventh Fleet would no longer prevent Chiang kai-shek from invading mainland
China. Eisenhower threatened new forms of retaliation if the peace was not
satisfactorily negotiated. Caridi, 1968.

13.

The New York Times, May 23, 1976,

14.

See Block, 1975 for an extended discussion of the international political
issues involved in managing the U.S. deficit.

15.

Furniss, 1964 and Kolodziej, 1974:

16.

See Kolodziej, 1972 for international economic policy and Aron, 1965 and
Kolodziej, 1974: 96-112 for rearmament.

17.

Flash, 1965:

18.

Morse, 1973.

19.

Williams and Harrison,

20.

The general use of executive power to accomplish a new foreign policy helped
to solve the problem of order in France. The French Communist Party approved
de Gaulle's policy of detente with the Soviet Union and his opposition to
European political integration, NATO, and U.S. economic hegemony. The PCF
was thus unwilling to actively work to form a coalition to replace de Gaulle.

21.

In the struggle against communism, Dulles and Eisenhower stressed the use of
moral weapons, the most tangible of which was propaganda. In a strange twist
of cold war logic, reliance on material weapons such as military spending and
foreign aid was denounced as succumbing to a materialist theory of human behavior characteristic of the communists.

365.

section 3, p. 1.

164.

90-5 and Snyder, 1962: 383-524.

1971:

173-235 and Pickels, 1960:
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112-144.
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THE WELFARE STATE WITHIN THE MILITARY
Charles Maynard and Ann Blalock

Much has been written concerning the extent to which contemporary industri- alized societies meet the accepted criteria of a "welfare state". 1 By contrast,
the literature on the welfare aspects of the military as an institution within
societies is comparatively sparse. Yet internally, military establishments often
exhibit many welfare state attributes. Within the military's organizational
territory and authority, members are provided with a wide spectrum of comprehensive
universal entitlements--social, economic, occupational, educational, and medical.
The formal parameters of the U.S. military establishment's welfare entitlements
give the undeniable appearance of a bonafide welfare state whose provision is
significantly more benevolent and equitable than that provided to the nonmilitary.
As with all welfare systems, however, the unique welfare state within the military
has developed more in response to its own perceived organizational needs and requirements than to a rational assessment
of the "real" needs of those it serves-2
military personnel and their families.
In this sense, the military welfare state reflects the organizational imperatives, constraints, and ambiguities common to diverse forms of welfare provision, which are inevitably generated by the contradiction between the genuine
social welfare needs of recipients and the survival requirements of the provider.
Therefore, an analysis of military social welfare in the context of the military
environment should provide insights not only into the nature of social provision
in the military, but into welfare structures generally. This brief investigation
may also illuminate an aspect of the welfare/warfare problem only infrequently
addressed.
The military welfare state, however, is an unusual case, because of the nature
of the military establishment's primary manifest function in the society, and
therefore of its organizational goals. The military is mandated to provide an
adequate and acceptable response to the society's definition of what constitutes
major threats to its security in the external environment. Even more narrowly,
its responsibility is to afford protection in an international environment which
has historically been characterized by the threat of physical force, as compared
with the dangers inherent in international economic and political competition.
Therefore, the goals of the military establishment are highly specialized:
the development of superior defensive, offensive, and deterrent capability. In
pursuing these goals, the military has been vulnerable to all the organizational
requisites characteristic of social systems generally, as well as to their
special elaboration in large scale bureaucratic systems. Most significant among
them are the maintenance of internal order and morale, and the securing of the
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organization's safety in the external environment--in this case, the civilian
sector.3 The way in which these requisites are viewed by those in authority determine the military's needs and requirements. Social welfare entitlements to
individuals and families are considered part of such requirements. Factors such
as the increasing demands of members' changing societal conditions, alterations in
the bureaucratic structure, changing definitions of national security, and technological breakthroughs, have modified the definition of survival imperatives in the
direction of expanding the military welfare state.
Our
ports to
military
ficantly
arily of

thesis is that this welfare state is not in actual practice what it purbe. There are serious inequities and constrictions which have eroded
social provision, largely because the organizational goals which signishape this system are clearly servants first of warfare, and only secondreal welfare.

The General Dimensions of the Military Welfare State
Although most of the data on military social services are primarily descriptive
of the U.S. Army, formalized social provision to all branches of the armed services
has comprehensive features. Walter Friedlander's article describes the many universal entitlements which apply both during and beyond the period of service, involving
literally cradle to grave benefits.4 These are: income maintenance, job provision,
housing provision, recreational benefits (both social and rehabilitative), medicaldental care (for service personnel and their families), social work services for
individuals and families, psychiatric diagnosis and treatment, on-the-job training,
vocational training, readjustment allowances for veterans formerly employed or selfemployed, educational and training subsidies (GI Bill) and education for dependents
overseas, disability benefits (economic compensation, medical care, pensions, subsistence allowances, special aid for the blind, deaf, and amputees, after-care in
halfway houses, nursing homes, and outpatient clinics), business and home loans,
life insurance, retirement pay, death pensions, educational benefits for veterans'
survivors, and burial services for indigent veterans. These welfare benefits and
services, representing an enormous national expenditure, are theoretically provided to all members of the military for whom they are ;elevant, within the restrictions of the hierarchical military ranking system.
In this sense, the welfare state within the military establishment is an
intriguing paradox. It seems more beneficent at all levels than its civilian
parallel, while functioning within a caste-like stratification system which is
structurally much less flexible and socially mobile than its nurturing society.
It is at the same time more collectively equitable and more individually constraining. In the non-military sector, governmental responsibility has traditionally
involved "residual" definitions of welfare, in contrast to the military application
of "institutional" definitions. The former view suggests that "social welfare
institutions should come into play only when the normal structures of supply, the
family, and the market break down," whereas the latter holds that social services
are "normal, first line functions of a modern industrial society." 6 Despite the
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broader definition characteristic of the military, welfare is accompanied by immense physical jeopardy in wartime, and considerably more in peacetime than in most
parts of civilian society. And it is an interesting case of uneven formal governmental definitions of human needs within different sectors of the society.
The formal distinction between residual and institutional definitions, however,
ismoot. The existence of the military welfare state is indirectly dependent on an
expropriation from the civilian welfare system, in the sense that national priorities have in recent history essentially involved a transfer of scarce goods from
domestic programs to defense. It is important to note that certain important categories of needs created but unmet by the military also inevitably deplete the resources of civilian social and health services.
Within this context, our purpose is to concentrate on two general categories
of entitlements within the military welfare state: occupational benefits and income
maintenance; and social services to individuals and families. In each case, it will
be our objective to examine some of the explicit purposes and implicit effects of
military social provision.
The Military Welfare State:

Occupational Benefits and Income Maintenance

Government job creation and guaranteed annual income have been goals of
liberal reformers in responding to the problems of stimulating the economy, reducing inflation, lowering unemployment, and dealing with poverty. However, the
military is rarely thought of as an authentic government job or income maintenance
system. For many, it has been the employer of last resort, but for low-income
minorities it has often been viewed as the employer of maximum opportunity. 7 And
for a significant number it has provided civilian jobs directly underwritten by the
military budget. 8 There is no question but what the military subsidizes a substantial portion of the potentially unemployed, and provides unskilled, semiskilled, technical, supervisory, and managerial jobs for many members of the
society. Furthermore, income and fringe benefits are competitive with the demands
of organized labor in the private civilian sector. 9 Job security is assured within a different set of limits from the civilian employment system, but the limits
are similarly dictated by what kind of behaviors are considered destructive of the
goals of the employer. The military formally offers more extensive occupational
benefits than many civilian employers, in terms of job training, vocational training, special educational programs, and after-service educational and training
grants for skill upgrading. Retirement benefits allow the serviceperson the
possibility of civilian employment in middle age, supplemented by a guaranteed
income (even though highly related in amount to the military ranking system).
Early retirement, combined with reserve status, would seem to provide both more
economic and occupational flexibility in one's lifetime than the civilian labor
market.
The important question is whether the military is providing, in actuality,
occupational and economic welfare. The following selected examples reveal

_496-

discrepancies and inequities in these entitlements within the military welfare
state.
Minority and Low-income Military Personnel
In the early years of the Vietnam War, black leaders actively encouraged recruitment from the ghetto into the armed services, in the interest of increased
occupational and economic mobility in the society. This was premised on findings
which indicated that WWII veterans were enjoying economic superiority in civilian
career competition vis-a-vis their nonveteran cohort. 1 0 It was also recognized
that racial integration in the U.S. military had in some ways progressed further
77
than the parallel process in civilian life, both chronologically and in degree.
Badillo and Curry explain this phenomenon in terms of the Armed Forces' reliance
on "meritocratic" criteria in the assignment process, which reflected "thy preoccupation of military elites with rational and bureaucratic efficiency." '2
However, though these criteria were equitable, many of the occupational and income
outcomes for ethnic minorities within the military were not.
By the late 1960s nearly 20% of Vietnam combat units were black. More significantly, blacks and other minorities, and low income whites, were markedly
over-represented in combat casualty rates.13 Differential casualty figures were
reinforced by the disprQ ortionately high battle death rates for volunteers as
compared with draftees.R That the major variable was socioeconomic status more
than ethnic identity was supported by several studies which concluded that the
assignment process was highly contingent on socioeconomic background and tended to
lower-class backgrounds into positions more susceptible
channel individuals from
15
to combat casualties.
However, the same factors that diminished the importance of race as a criterion
for decisions about assignment, worked to increase the significance of those attributes of the socialization process which correlated (economically and educationally)
with ethnic status. The military's use of essentially culturally-biased achievement variables to assess potential competency, which employed the occupational,
educational, and income levels of parents as indicators, was discriminatory in outcome. Ethnic minorities and low income whites have been most likely to score low
on all three. There is generally an unbalanced competition between the skilled
and unskilled for noncombatant tasks, and this is exaggerated in so far as those
military specialities which involve the greatest exposure to danger are also those
requiring the lowest level of preservice training and ability. Through the occupational stratification of personnel, these factors have resulted in inequities
in the application of the military welfare state's formalized occupational entitlements. The stratification process has tended to reward those who have been
advantaged in civilian society, and has resulted in disproportionate injury and
loss of life for certain groups of personnel in wartime.
Upward mobility in the civilian occupational structure by way of the military
not only depends on the acquisition of increased job skills, to which combat skills
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have traditionally provided little or no contribution, but also on leadership
opportunities not equally available in the civilian labor market. The more desirable leadership positions have been difficult for minorities and low-income
personnel to obtain. The proportion of black officers, for example, remained
statically low even after civil rights gains became evident in the civilian occupational structure. As late as 1974,
although 14.4% of the armed forces were blacks,
16
only 3% of blacks were officers.
Even the range of noncombat skills acquired in the armed services have had
little transfer value (real marketability) in the civilian labor market, and for
the previously disadvantaged this has been especially so. 17 Although successful
re-entry to the civilian manpower system from the military has been complex to
analyze and interpret, it is significant that in 1972 the average unemployment rate
for Vietnam-era veterans was 6.7%, while the total average rate for men 16 and over
was 4.9%; and still in 1974 it was 11.3% for Vietnam-era veterans and 9.1% for the
total male civilian labor force. The average unemployment
rate for minority and low
18
income veterans in each case was significantly higher.
The incomes of ex-military personnel reflect the same discrepancy. A study
analyzing a large random sample of veterans and nonveterans found that by 1970
there was a persistent differential in earnings between Vietnam-era veterans and
non-veterans, a differential which increased with the size of the income category.
For example, though 26% of nonveterans were earning at least $10,000 only 14% of
veterans were doing so, and while 10% of nonveterans were earning at least $13,000,
only 4% of veterans were doing so. Only 6% of nonwhite veterans were earning at
least $10,000 and only 1.9% were earning at least $13,000.19 Although it is plausible that the differences in incomes reflected the differential return of veterans
to the educational system--i.e. those not returning to college, graduate school, or
training programs having less ability to earn--this is not an adequate explanation.
The military welfare state's theory of educational readjustment has had a
strong relationship to the institutional commitment to occupational and income maintenance. The purpose of the GI Bill was explicitly to subsidize the education of
the veteran to compensate him for time lost during military service. The assumption
was that education was clearly related to occupational mobility and increased income. However, veterans' educational benefits for Vietnam-era veterans have till
very recently been considerably less in absolute value than those for WWII veterans.
Only 20% of these veterans (compared with 50% after WWII) were using the GI Bill in
1969. Thus those who needed the entitlement most--minority and low income veterans-were effectively prevented from using it. As the political struggle to increase
these benefits began to have an impact, the utilization rate had increased to 46%
by 1973, still with a lower rate for disadvantaged veterans. The consistent opposition of the Veterans Administration to increasing educational benefits, and
providing veterans services on campuses, illustrates the subservience of the
military welfare state to the organizational priorities of the larger military
establishment.
A huge, heavily financed bureaucracy, whose budget is one of the largest of
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any federal agency, the VA is officially committed to the delivery of the military
welfare state's social benefits to a substantial segment of the ex-military population, yet its lack of responsiveness to Vietnam-era veterans--in particular minorities--indicates the relative unimportance of service delivery once personnel are no
longer necessary to the functioning of the military. This disinterest of the VA in
the special educational readjustment problems on campuses basically hostile to war
participants, and non-nurturing toward the coping problems of minority veterans
little prepared for the culture shock of movement into the higher
educational sys20
tem, has increased the problems of this group of GI Bill users.
Therefore, although income and occupational maintenance benefits appear nominally superior to those of civilian society, and even extend beyond the time of
service, for minority and low income military personnel there are obvious contradictions in their application. Certain efforts have been made to redress this
inequity. Project Transition, a six-month predischarge training program initiated
in 1967 to ease re-entry, though an excellent concept, failed to provide the services promised. The Department of Labor's manpower training programs, which utilized
veterans' preference and minority preference guidelines, tended to involve veterans
in dead-end low-skilled jobs. State employment systems yielded little help for the
sizeable number of combat veterans with few technical skills, those who had been in
a holding operation in low-skilled military jobs, and for disabled veterans. The
National Alliance of Businessmen's job program, specifically for veterans, provided
longer-term jobs with greater opportunities for upgrading, but placed only a small
proportion of those veterans unemployed. 21
The major difficulty could not easily be resolved: the specialized occupational needs of the military are responsive first to running an effective war machine,
not to enhancing industrial growth or achieving full employment in the civilian
sector. Though supporting defense-related industrial growth is of vital concern to
the military, and a significant portion of the gross national product is consumed
by the military establishment, industrialization concerns and labor market conditions are not considered within the military's area of responsibility. Consequently,
easing the transfer of ex-military personnel to civilian industry, or increasing the
utility of their skills to civilian industry and business is not an instrumental
goal.
Military Retirees and Civilian Occupational Re-entry
Though a universal entitlement, the opportunity for occupational retirement
considerably earlier than in civilian life is in actuality a meaningless benefit
for non-career personnel, a sizeable group in wartime. For career military, however,
it theoretically allows a shift to the civilian labor market cushioned by the
military retirement pay subsidy. As "real" welfare, it is a mixed blessing. Even
when the individual's military-acquired skills are considered useful by businesses
and industries, these personnel have been in strong competition with better established, more organizationally senior, and more union-integrated rivals for
scarce jobs. Bureaucratic management styles and procedures differ, and new
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behavioral expectations are hard to identify and learn. Dumas emphasizes the
of technical scientific and engineering skills for
difficulties in the conversion
peacetime industrial use. 2 2 In addition, the very protectiveness of the military
welfare state has increased the vulnerability of retirees to culture shock in
re-entry to civilian life.
Also, military retirement typically occurs at a stage of the family life cycle
which demands complex adjustments for multiple family members. No adequate preparation is provided systematically within the military for confronting the new resocialization process which is required by this group. The lack of response by the
military to what becomes of personnel after retirement is somewhat similar to the
civilian sector, but the latter occurs to the retiree at a much later chronological
age and stage of the family life cycle, and therefore is within a very different
cultural context.
Many retirees--both officers and enlisted men--have experienced periods of
unemployment and have often needed to take jobs which were not equivalent to the
skill level and prestige of their former military positions. Many have returned to
academic programs for retraining in fields in which they may not have extensive
prior knowledge or experience, and in which they are in competition with much
younger students with more current backgrounds. These transition experiences have
been genuine life crises for many ex-military personnel and their families.
The paternalism inherent in the military welfare system is evident in the
sense of isolation from the rest of the society felt by many of these newlyreturned retirees. The residues of public anti-military attitudes complicate this
sense of separation. As a group, these personnel and their families have unmet
needs which eventually involve the use of civilian welfare resources and which constitute a hidden defense-related cost which effectively reduces the national social
services allocation to other groups of recipients.
On the other hand, for those retirees at the top of the military hierarchy,
the retirement subsidy represents a sizeable income. Moreover, the prestige of
their former positions has tended to be retained in civilian life. Since contacts
made while in the military, with government and corporation bureaucracies, have been
substantial--and since their specializations have been more translatable and more
in demand--these personnel have not only enjoyed disproportionate benefits within
the military welfare state, but have in many instances displaced civilian personnel
from important positions.
Women in the Military, and Occupational Entitlements
Women have constituted less than the 2% quota for female military personnel
since it was authorized at the close of World War II, and have always been a volunteer army. However, it should be mentioned that women have to a significant extent
made the mounting of modern mass-mobilization wars possible through occupying the
work force positions of men absorbed into the military, positions which were
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critical to the production of weapons and war supplies and to domestic survival.
By 1975, with the gradual shift to an explicitly all-volunteer force, women
constityted 4.5% of all military personnel on active duty, including academic
cadets. z J Historically, women in the military have been excluded from direct combat
roles and significant administrative jobs, and have typically been relegated to
nursing, and routine supervisory and clerical jobs. They have experienced much
stronger occupational segregation than in the civilian labor market. As Goldman
24
comments, "the military is the epitome of a male-dominated establishment."
25
Charles Moskos terms it "a vestige of male sanctity."
Nevertheless, the military made strong promises to upgrade and increase female
career options in the 70s--that Is, to improve the occupational benefits of the
military welfare state where women were concerned. This represented more than an
appreciation of the changing role of women in civilian society. It reflected,
Goldman says, a new perception of women personnel as a necessary technical labor
resource. 2 6 It also, she contends, symbolized an appreciation of the necessity of
broadening sex roles because of the increased emphasis on administration, logistics,
communication, and deterrence. Organizational, professional, and recruitment
changes were needed by the military.
But there has been little real movement on the part of the military to systematically incorporate women into military operations and other key military assignments. The military still does not perceive as an organizational imperative the
adoption of a value system which would permit substantial movement toward real
occupational equality for women personnel. Goldman comments that the context of
military practices, and the nature of the military system, "presents [for women]
a case of the search for equality without the opportunity of similarity of specialization or task with their male counterparts." 27
Women are therefore likely to continue to experience significant organizational
resistances and role strains. Goldman claims these cross pressures mirror many
forces: formal allocation limits on the overall number of women in the armed
forces, the sex typing of professional and occupational roles, civil service requirements which emphasize equity-producing promotion criteria, powerful elaborate
standards for promotion which tend to penalize the most gifted and creative of both
sexes, the existence of sex-segregated occupational associations within the military,
the marginal access of women officers to military social life, the trend toward
managerial authority side by side with the crisis-prone organizational reality which
centralizes control and hampers the extension of women into authority positions, the
increasing emphasis on specialization but the persistence of rewards for being a
generalist, and the ranking system which tends to separate the position from the
person. The net outcome for women is the disparate promotion of women officers.
Apart from this inequity in the application of occupational and income benefits,
women are likely also to continue to have difficulty with what Goldman terms the
"sexual symbolism" which permeates the military because of the communal nature of
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the military environment, a setting in which work and residential roles overlap.
Such symbolism has an obvious impact on occupational life. In this respect also,
job provision and income maintenance have fallen short of real welfare. And Goldman
concludes that women are destined to continue to have problems in an institution
whose major function is the management of violence.
The military provides jobs and income maintenance for personnel in order to
produce an efficient, effective deterrent and offensive capability in the interest
of national security. Adequate occupational and income maintenance, tied to other
benefits which would be very costly to individuals outside the military, provides
a necessary incentive to perform the tasks required by the military organization,
to reduce potential unrest within that system, and to compensate for the dangers
in military service and for the high level of regulation of the behavior, attitudes,
and life styles of military personnel. Therefore, military welfare is at once
protective and controlling. And within these occupational and economic entitlements there are significant inequities in pay, occupational status, the sophistication of tasks, the technological level of skills, and the rewards and risks involved
in membership in the military welfare state.
Military Social Services to Individuals
The United Nation's definition of social services as "organizational activities
social
whose purpose is to further a mutual adjustment of individuals and their
28
That social
environment" has special meaning within the military establishment.
environment is quite circumscribed, not only in wartime but in peacetime, and the
mutual adjustment process is skewed: individual personnel and military families
are required to do the major part of the accommodation. To illustrate this latent
aspect of social service provision, we will narrow our analysis to psychiatric and
social work services to individuals and families, and to particular examples within
these.
Mental Health Services During and Following War
Symptoms of maladjustment to military life represent a major organizational
problem for the military both in peacetime and most critically in combat situations
during war, just as the incidence of mental illness constitutes a serious social
problem for civilian society. Both sectors of the society associate considerable
costs with inadequate individual adjustment, both in organizational efficiency and
in the capacity to implement primary goals. However, different limits of tolerance
and distinctive definitions of deviant behavior have been characteristic of the
more restrictive and demanding military environment. Individual adjustment has
duty." 29
been viewed within "the institutional and situational demands of [military]
The main indices of successful adaptation have been an absence of disciplinary
problems in peacetime, and a low breakdown rate in war, rather than more objective
measures of psychological health. Therefore, the prediction and prevention of this
form of maladjustment gradually became the major function of military psychiatry.
This is not inconsistent with the military's continued acknowledgement of the impact
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of combat stress on the fighting capability of personnel.
The history of professional services to individuals has therefore responded to
the military's changing perceptions of its needs in producing an effective fighting
force. The origin of professional counseling was in 1l8 when the Red Cross provided
social workers to aid in the diagnosis, treatment, and after care of soldiers with
"functional neuroses.",30 Early in World War II, the emphasis was on psychiatric
screening of draftees and enlistees to determine unfitness for combat prior to
absorption into the military, the purpose being to select only those capable of
high performance within current military requirements. 3 1 As the war increasingly
demanded greater militarization of the population, and the loss of potential
personnel through screening was sizeable, a shift occurred in the direction of
retaining within the military not only those defined as most able but also those
with psychiatric disorders who were "capable of performance at any reasonable
level.",
To sustain this broader definition of military capability during heavy mobilization, psychiatric and social work services turned toward a 'social psychiatric'
concept of combat disorders "involving mental hygiene services, consultation to
command, and preventive psyciatry."33 The nature of prevention and treatment became tied to the proper use of combat personnel by the command structure. Considered most important in prevention were the duration of exposure to a given combat
situation, the nature of the prior training, and the length of the tour of combat
duty. 4 These were seen as variables manipulatable by command personnel in reducing the incidence of combat-related mental disorders. The main elements of the
treatment approach became immediacy--the necessity of implementing treatment as
early and as close to the lines as possible; expectation--treatment carried out
with the anticipation that the soldier would return to combat; simplicity-treatment focused on the combat circumstances producing the condition rather than
on predisposing factors in the past; and centrality--the availability of a psychiatric staff where psychological casualties were evacuated. 35 These concepts were used
to some extent in WW II, but largely due to the different nature of the wars, they
were the exclusive guiding principles in Korea and Vietnam. The central purpose
was to maintain all personnel in a combat-ready frame of mind.
This reshaping of military psychiatry around changing organizational imperatives produced a substantial expansion in the military welfare state through new
interventions. Psychotropic drug medication was only one example. The extension
of social services was credited by many with the significantly lower breakdown
rate reported in the Vietnam War.6 However, this apparent increased responsiveness to the coping problems of individual military personnel, particularly in
combat, must be examined in a larger context.
Breakdown rates have always suffered from diverse definition and interpretation, and considerable measurement error. They reveal, usually to an unknown
extent, as Borus suggests, the soldier's "past history of coping, the flexibility
and variety of the coping repertoire he has established in adjusting to past

-503-

transitions [crises]. "'37 Borus views coping within a remarkably military-type
model as "a process of struggle, as in warfare, when the individual must mobilize
his resources and allocate them to offensive, defensive, and systems-management
operations to ameliorate significant stress."
What is also revealed in breakdown rates, however, is the relative successfulness of military socialization. Basic combat training, for example, is designed to
place the soldier under selected physical and psychological stress, and strongly
emphasizes the acceptability of overt expressions of hostility and violence under
combat circumstances. Many of the tenets of Maslowian "self-actualization" are
deliberately eroded. 3 8 Conformance to military requirements takes precedence over
the development of personal values independent of the organization. Personal pacifist tendencies and attitudes supporting cultural relativism, for example, are negatively sanctioned. The degree of psychological stress experienced by different
personnel is therefore related not only to combat conditions per se, but to the
whole milieu in which both the majority of one's peers and the helping professionals
have been socialized to support the "healthiness" of certain personal attributes
over others.
In addition, other factors were felt to have made a strong contribution to the
low breakdown rate: the degree of cohesiveness felt by the combat group and its
sense of identity as a unit, the way in which the unit perceived the adequacy of
its leadership, the episodic nature of the fighting, the absence of psychological
rewards for evacuation to rear areas, the widespread use of drugs, and perhaps most
significantly the rotation system. 39 Some quarreled with these interpretations.
Savage and Gabriel, for instance, proposed that cohesion, discipline and professional leadership in Vietnam exhibited several major indicators of disintegration: the
replacement of traditional officer stereotypes with managerial noncombat role images,
the troubling intermingling of combat and noncombat personnel, and the destruction
of primary military groups due to the rotation system. 40 But differing explanations
of the low breakdown rate ignore a more basic question: to what extent did the
social services within the military welfare state, which contributed to reducing
mental breakdown, actually increase the mental health of members of the military in
wartime?
It is deceptive to view the psychological health of combat personnel in any
other context than an environment which generates far greater fears, anxiety, anJ
guilt--and much more psychological brutalization--than most civilian life situations. Though a minority of personnel gain self-identity and personal integration
through combat roles, this form of wholeness has questionable connotations. Some
of the behavior expected of personnel by the military in wartime is clearly illnessproducing, by civilian psychiatric standards. And among military personnel these
expectations are differentially illness-producing, inasmuch as a higher proportion
of low income and ethnic minorities experience combat. Therefore a reduction in
certain symptoms of clinical illness under severe stress must be analyzed in terms
of the life quality of military personnel.
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It is important in this respect to discuss briefly the unexpected rate of
"civilian readjustment breakdown" which occurred among a significant number of
Vietnam veterans. 4 1 The complicated matrix of delayed symptoms was titled "the
post-Vietnam syndrome" by civilian psychiatrists. Shatan and Lifton identified
its basic themes as a strong tendency to experience episodes of terror and disorientation, threat-avoiding mechanisms appropriate to combat carried over to
civilian relationships, a distrust of establishment pyschiatric and social work
services, guilt and undischarged grief over those killed and injured, and a pervasive feeling of victimization b military and government agencies and by hostile
public attitudes toward the war.4 z The military took little interest in this phenomenon, treating these problems as "non-service-connected disabilities," thus
making services within the military system and the Veteran's Administration unavailable to this group. The civilian welfare system was poorly prepared to treat
men with unique post-combat and civilian transition problems, and coped deficiently
with this group of clients. Meanwhile the difficulties involved in the veteran's
occupational and educational integration increased the severity of the
syndrome.
The military welfare state was far more capable, potentially, of
developing a meaningful pre-discharge and post-discharge counseling program around
this problem. But the military bureaucracy, which needed to resocialize civilians
to lower their normal control over violent impulses in combat, did not feel an
equally strong obligation to deal with the inevitable personal consequences of such
training and experience. In returning to a society which had been undergoing considerable social change in the direction of increasing alienation toward such personal warfare credentials, veterans found that both the military and civilian welfare
systems treated readjustment problems with benign neglect.
Drug Abuse Services
The use of drugs during the Vietnam War posed a sufficient threat to combat
effectiveness and the maintenance of morale and order in the armed forces to stimulate the introduction of new preventive and rehabilitative services. Though Jones
and Johnson claim that "drug abuse became an evacuation syndrome paralleling in
scale the loss of manpower due to 'war neurosis' in the early stages of World War
II," others hypothesized that there was a marked relationship between the low breakdown rate and the enhancement of coping abilities through non-addictive drug use,
particularly marijuana. 4 3
Bourne discussed the physiological effects of drugs in alleviating stress
symptoms. 4 4 Bey and Zecchinelli took the position that marijuana had indeed served
as a coping device in Vietnam.4 5 Roffman suggested that "it is within the realm of
possibility.. .that moderate marijuana use for some soldiers--perhaps for most
soldiers (in Vietnam]--reduces the likelihood of mental illness [and] personality
disorganization." 6 He proposed that marijuana use may have assisted some servicemen with "healthy efforts at coping with a hostile environment." Saunders felt
illicit drug use, rather than arising from character disorders,
was for some a
47
rational means of dealing with military life in Vietnam.
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The military's labeling of the level of drug use as seriously disruptive, and
its
institutionalization of treatment services, was therefore largely a reactive
response to fears of reduced combat performance, rather than an interest in determining the extent of the problem or its consequences for individuals. That this
was the case seems borne out by the paucity of military research on drug use, and
the secrecy with which Defense Department data were handled. Consequently much of
the research has been retrospective, methodologically poor, and the results contradictory. The better data suggest that drug use was quite extensive, though far less
than some reports had indicated. And it was estimated that only approximately five
48
percent of servicemen in Vietnam were physically addicted.
The data unequivocally suggest that the majority of drug users were first introduced to drugs in Vietnam. Marijuana use was most extensive, the higher incidence
rates being among younger servicemen, those of lower rank, single persons, personnel
with urban backgrounds, and ethnic minorities. There was higher use in the field
than in base camp areas, and somewhat more use in combat areas than rear areas.
Serious adverse reactions attributed to marijuana use occurred in only a very small
proportion of chronic heavy users. There was a surprisingly high rate of remission
of drug use upon return to civilian life.
A close relationship existed, then, between the conditions of war and the
fluorescence of a social problem, particularly in a war where drugs were readily
available and where certain personnel at relatively high levels of the military
hierarchy were actually involved in illegal purchase and distribution. Those in
authority in the military, however, viewed the problem mainly in terms of social
control, and largely for this reason drug treatment services were generally inappropriate and ineffective. More seriously, the application and utilization of
these benefits were uneven, and the consequences for individuals seeking or assigned
to them revealed the ambivalence with which the military power structure defined the
role abuse played in strengthening or weakening combat units.
Chemical dependency was responded to within changing and arbitrary sets of
criteria. The identification of those "needing" services was often dependent on
the command personnel's perception of the value of a particular unit in meeting
immediate troop requirements in combat, irrespective of the level of drug abuse
within it. If behavior within a unit appeared to involve disciplinary problems,
and the unit was not essential to military operations, individuals were often more
likely to be channeled to services. This sorting of drug abusers into social
services frequently resulted in less-than-honorable discharges. Because the extent
of the abuse reported within units varied considerably among commanding officers,
discharges were sometimes based on idiosyncratic evaluations of the amount and
chronicity of drug use.
Even under the drug abuse amnesty program, publicized by the military as an
important additional social service, many self-confessed addicted personnel were
stigmatized with such discharges. The special treatment programs under the amnesty
program were, in actual practice, not made available to many who needed them. The
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data on discharges suggested that the disproportionate number of minority veterans
who received less-than-honorable discharges based on drug abuse, was in all probability related to the high proportion of black personnel in combat units. The discharge review process, formally available for reinstating veterans benefits, was
implemented successfully in less than 1% of the cases where review was requested,
49
and applications piled up for months and sometimes years prior to a hearing.
As a result, insurmountable difficulties were created for many veterans in
gaining civilian employers' trust and in dealing with the double-bind in civilian
society: labeling both as a participant in an unpopular war, and as a potentially
problematic reject from military service. The evidence strongly supported the claim
that some drug-connected less-than-honorable discharges were related more to black
militancy than to chronic drug abuse. Because the overwhelming majority of discharges were administrative rather than given through the court martial procedure,
only minimum due process protection was available. In addition, "general" discharges, which fell within the honorable category and therefore did not involve a
loss of benefits, nevertheless officially stigmatized the returning veteran in
civilian society, and reduced his employability. The defining of the individual as
"unsuitable" for military performance had broad connotations to civilian employers,
far beyond the ability to adjust to military combat. Furthermore, those veterans
re-entering civilian life with a genuine drug abuse or alcoholism problem, developed
in Vietnam, were denied by their discharges the treatment specifically developed to
respond to their needs. Moreover, they were deprived of the educational and training benefits which could have provided healthy support for re-entry.
Taussig suggests five basic criteria for evaluating the entitlements of welfare
systems: the adequacy of benefits, cost-effectiveness, horizontal equity, preservation of incentives, and absence of stigma. 5 0 Drug abuse entitlements proved to be
inadequate, relatively ineffective, inequitable, alienating, and stigmatizing. This
was so mainly because they were provided within the organizational limits of the
military environment and were not the servant of real welfare.
Social Services in Peacetime
In peacetime, and away from combat zones in wartime, the pattern of utilization
of psychiatric and social work services within the military also discloses inequities in the military welfare state, which correlate with the structural characteristics of the military establishment. For example, differential "acceptability" has
been traditionally attached to different types of individual problems. In practice
this has meant that those with drug and alcohol problems have had the least access
to social services, those with medical problems the highest, personal problems have
fallen in between, and problem involving protest behavior have been completely exThe discrepancies in the value judgements associcluded from the welfare state. 1
ated with different clusters of behavioral "symptoms" have been discriminatory in
outcome, favoring those traits which are in conformance with desirable organizational outcomes. As mentioned previously, the withdrawal of certain social service
entitlements are likewise linked with "unacceptable behavior" by these standards.
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The decision not to make full use of needed entitlements is also constrained
by the rigid stratification system which helps define the criteria for upward mcbility. Janowitz has documented the highly competitive promotion path of the career
officer, emphasizing the intensity of that competition particularly at the mid-level
and higher level ranks. He points out that serious jeopardy is involved in the promotion board's notice of possible blemishes to the individual's suitability for
shouldering responsibility. 2 One such blemish can be the implication that the
individual has sought or needs to obtain help with personal problems. These problems, by contrast with physical symptoms, are considered controllable, and controllability is related to promotional adequacy in a traditional, male-oriented system.
This pressure effectively limits the use of counseling and treatment benefits by
officers: it is occupationally safer to seek help from non-military personnel or
from military personnel on an unofficial basis. In some cases, this has led to
black market services which benefit only one category of military personnel and
undermine services to others. Because of strict occupational stratification, enlisted men do not frequenly work through the ranks to officer status, and tend not
to be (by self-selection) as career oriented. Consequently they have not been as
constrained by military norms to avoid the use of these entitlements. Nevertheless,
these values
also create strains for enlisted personnel.
More insidious is the tendency of the military to view lack of conformity to
the proper definition of behavior in superior-subordinate relationships, and to the
performance of appropriate combat roles, as an index of military unsuitability. An
example of the command structure's concern about the latter is the existence of the
Air Force Human Reliability Program. This program attempts to identify and remove
individuals considered "unreliable" from critical assignments. Such individuals may
or may not need help, yet the negative consequences of seeking help may inhibit the
individual from securing much needed assistance and support.
Definitions of appropriate sex role behavior also play a part in the access to
and use of psychiatric and social work services. As in civilian life, the presence
of symptoms is much more an acceptable rationale for women seeking help than for
men, as the dependency inherent in asking for help is more consistent with traditional sex role definitions. However, this inequity is exaggerated in the military
welfare state by the much stronger emphasis on the virility and personal ego
strength of male personnel, which has been a persistent machismo norm within military systems long before Sparta. This context also affects the utilization of
services, as they are provided predominantly by male military professionals whose
values tend to be compatible with traditional sex role expectations. The special
strains which women experience in the military are often not recognized as legitimate problems for which healthy coping repertoires are needed, and the emphasis is
placed on the adjustment of the woman to the generally male-dominated requirements
of the organization.
The point we wish to illustrate is that the norms and values of the military
"culture," and the social structure of the military "society," create serious inequities in how responsive military social provision has actually been to the needs
of individuals functioning within it and making transitions from it. The purpose
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of military social services is more clearly related to the suitable performance of
military tasks and to internal order--within the primary goal of maintaining an
efficient, effective war machine--than to the usual definitions of mental health and
illness followed in non-military settings.
Social Service Entitlements to Military Families
The armed services have only gradually become a familistic institution, in the
sense of giving attention to the families of military personnel. This change has
been in response to developments in the larger society, among which have been the
general increase in the percentage of persons living in family units and the growth
in medical and contraceptive technology. Trends within the military have also been
operative: a consistently lower divorce rate than in the outer society, and a reduction in the average age of active-duty personnel. The particular position of the,
military in an advanced industrialized democracy has meant that career
personnel
53
have increasingly demanded a similar family life style to civilians.
However, the main objective of social services to families has been to prevent
family disruption, based on the assumption that the family is a critical support
system for military personnel. This notice of the military function of the family
has in large part been a response to the realities of the civilian divorce and separation rates, new sexual values and sex role definitions, and new family configurations. Janowitz has commented that there has been a growing recognition that a
breakdown in family relationships is a threat to military performance, and asserts
that the military has come to believe that
"the solution of family problems is
54
essential for professional solidarity."
Until recently the average number of children in military families has steadily
increased. Military families have been characterized by younger wives, younger
children, and fewer wives employed outside the home, than their parallels in nonmilitary society. This too has increased the demand for additional services and
has supported a modification of the military's view of its priorities. At the same
time there has been less stigma attached to acknowledging family problems, as they
are not interpreted as being as controllable by military personnel as individual
personal problems, chemical dependency, or incorrigibility.
Though an increase in benefits followed from changing evaluations of the
family's importance, there has been a scarcity of policy development and research
within the military on the actual needs of military families. Janowitz and Little
have identified some of the major areas of stress as residential mobility, changes
in women's roles, loosened ties with conjugal families and communities, a decrease
in family allegiance to the military, and retirement transition. 5 5 Little comments
that "the esoteric occupational culture" of the military, and its forced family
ties with the father's occupation and associated organizational activities, is a
distinctive feature of the military family which has had positive, but in net
effect negative effects. 56

-509-

The family separations which are related to military mobility patterns are to
some extent unique, and personnel must sometimes make a choice between rank and
family. A sizeable percentage of married personnel do not live with their families,
and for a majority of military families this means separation from relatively young
children and reduced participation in their early socialization. Spouses attached
to tactical or combat-ready units have difficulty establishing regular family interaction patterns. This tends to impose a double-parent role on the remaining parent
and has often led the family to redefine itself in the matriarchal direction.
Stanton points out that there are also outcomes in loss of ties with the more
supportive elements in the military community, excessive dependence on relatives,
infidelity, and efforts to seek help outside military social services. "The military," he says, "shares the dubious honor with a few other occupational groups and
institutions of being a pioneer
in the trend toward parental absence that has
'57
emerged in U.S. society.
Frequent and often unexpected family relocations are conditions of life rather
than chance occurrences in the military, and are the source of potential family
problems. There is evidence that family members often try to reduce the painfulness
of relocation by avoiding deeply-felt extended kinship attachments, or by engaging
in non-intense short-lived personal relationships. Residential instability also
interrupts long-term medical care and children's schooling. From a mental health
standpoint, evidence has suggested that those wives most alienated from the military
find mobility most stressful. Though some studies suggest that family relocation
has had little significant adverse effect on the mental health of younger children,
emotional deprivation has indeed been an outcome in individual cases. In particular,
the effect on adolescents is problematical. Mobility separates them from important
peer supports for their own identity, and increases their dependence on parents at
a time when independence is a cultural requirement of the maturation process. Foreign assignments, though often economically desirable, usually carry with them inevitable cultural shock for all family members, yet little counseling or prior
orientation to the new environment--or services around the anticipation of family
problems likely to occur in another society--are provided.
The dramatic change in job and environment discussed earlier for career
military facing retirement, has important family implications. Given the comparative youthfulness of military families, retirement tends to occur for many career
personnel at just that family cycle point which involves large adolescent adjustments. 58 In addition, at a time when most civilians are reaching the height of
their earning period and productivity, 50,000 military retirees per year are entering the mainstream of the civilian occupational structure. The difficulties experienced by the inevitable transfer of the husband's anxieties and pressures onto
the family, and the strains the family feels directly in accommodating military and
civilian values, have affected change in military policies toward the family.
These policies have been translated into specific services. The recognition
of family relocation problems led to the Army Community Service, a comprehensive
program "to develop an organized system for bringing together all available military
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and civilian resources for the relief of personal and family problems.' 59 Wiest
and Devis have described it as "a spectrum of humanitarian and mental health approaches which are designed to meet the human needs of a highly technical, highly
mobile, multimission military population in cultural transition crises." 60 The
Air Force instituted the Family Service and Dependent Assistance Program to aid
families in resettling while husbands were on active duty. Another Air Force
program, titled Children Have a Potential, responds to handicapped children and
their parents.
The Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services, publicized
as a national health insurance plan for the military, involves a significant array
of family services, as well as medical care and individual counseling. The recent
extension of this program subsidizes outpatient psychiatric treatment and social
work services for military personnel and their families in civilian mental health
agencies and facilities. It is a unique case in which military territoriality and
control have been sacrificed in order to secure another goal, that of preserving
the family as a supportive milieu.
But CHAMPUS is a cogent example of some of the deficiencies in militarysponsored social services to families. It was developed in the context of a
continuing shortage of military psychiatric and mental health professionals. It
has been criticized by Congress beginning in 1970 for program mismanagement, only
a few of the thirty-one recommendations made by Congress having been implemented
in the five years of its operation. 6
Military families have felt little precedence for trust in the confidentiality of records, and those at the higher ranks
have still avoided practitioners in any way related to the military. Personnel on
isolated posts and families on foreign assignment have not had access to the services. The values within which military families have typically been socialized,
and their formal loyalty to a specialized occupational route to success, have
mediated against moving out to nonmilitary professionals who likely share a
public hostility to military service. Yet in seeking help within the military,
they have been hampered by the primary expectations of professionals for
preserving the family as an integrated group.
One of the major difficulties is that many of the family problems, to which
this part of the expansion of the military welfare state has reacted, are actually
generated by the nature of the organizational objectives of the military. These
strongly affect the environment in which families must function. The development
of services has therefore been both a military requirement and a protective response to the changing norms for family life over which the military has little
control. In many cases, the net effect has been insufficient to compensate for
the superimposing on family life of a structure geared to warfare.
The Military Environment and Social Welfare Professionals.
Within the framework of the narrow view of personal adjustment in the military, it is important to identify the roles played by military psychiatrists and

-511-

social workers. The Army has over 80% of all active duty social workers within its
ranks. Wiest and Devis claim that Army social work has constituted nearly all of
military social work services since World War 11.62 However, in 1969 this involved
63
only approximately 300 professionally trained social workers on active Army duty.
Though military psychiatry developed rapidly in World War II, a substantial
expansion did not follow. The traditional psychiatric model was not entirely compatible with the military environment. Some writers have felt that social work
actually flourished in the military setting, largely because of its emphasis or
the inter-relationship of the individual and the environment. Social workers
tended to expand the scope of services beyond the individual to the family and
community, and increased the diversity of professional roles. They became involved
in integrating social work services into a total medical care program.6 4 The significant point is that social workers had skills which the military increasingly
needed. Nevertheless, an inescapable tension existed between the professional
training, ethics, and objectives of professionals, and the organizational requirements of the military.
Daniels, in a series of articles which examine the role of the psychiatrist
in a military setting, concludes that psychiatrists have tended to be"agents of
the military bureaucracy" and therefore unable to serve their clients in the same
fashion as their civilian counterparts. "When problems of conflicting interests
arise," says Daniels, "the psychiatrist may be placed in a quandry. What is best
for the patient may be the opposite of what is best for the system. Such problems
arise most dramatically in times of combat.' 6 5 She claims also that the psychiatrist is directed by military goals to maintain an individual's fighting capability.
His professional code directs him to support his client's efforts to become a
healthier, more self-actualized person. The professional's choice between these
conflicting pressures has crucial consequences for individuals.
On the one hand, the professional--psychiatrist or social worker--is a gatekeeper who must prevent the individual's exit from combat in wartime--due to
neurosis, psychosis, character disorder, drug addiction, dissenting behavior,
alienation. In peacetime, the professional is to perform a social control function in reducing potential disruption which could interfere with the achievement
of military goals. As General Westmoreland so revealingly stated' the helping
professional plays "a personnel management consultant type role.' 6
On the other hand, the military psychiatrist, psychologist, and social worker
are to be advocates for the individual's own integrity and wholeness. The professional codes of these professions are committed to the health and continuing
growth of the individual, somewhat in isolation from the cultural demands placed
upon him. This role, however, is often sacrificed within the military environment.
Robert Lifton feels, for example, that during the Vietnam period military psychiatrists, social workers, and chaplains--in their role as "ultimate authorities of
the mind and spirit"--rationalized and justified the ordqring of combat personnel
into a situation that was both unnecessary and immoral. 6 7 "Helping" the soldier
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remain in combat, and sometimes to participate in war crimes, psychiatrists sometimes served to erode the soldier's capacity for moral revulsion and guilt. Therefore he says that chaplains and psychiatrists "formed an unholy alliance not only
with the military command but also with the more corruptible elements in the soldier's psyche." Lifton feels this produces a "counterfeit universe in which pervasive, spiritually-reinforced inner corruption becomes the price of survival."
In such a universe in Vietnam, he insists, conscientious professionals become
equally entrapped
in an organizational commitment to war, and were profoundly
compromised. 6 8
Professionalism itself may be partly to blame. The image of professionalism
gradually shifted as the society changed, first from a personal commitment, to the
development of general principles, and finally to specialized kinds of knowledge
and skills. Lifton suggests that the latter contained risks: "hierarchical distancing, medical mystification, and psychological reductionism" that tended to
undermine ethical responsibility. This is perhaps vastly overstated, but what
Lifton fears is critical--that the process of professionalism has involved a move
in the direction of "technique devoid of advocacy," away from a process of "advocacy based on faith." The advocacy he has in mind is moral choice in support of
humane principles of psychological health and growth, in which professionals are
engaged in considering the nature and consequences of their real objectives.
The main problem for the professional in the military--which is not so for
civilian professionals--is the strong pressure to mold individuals into an effective fighting force, both bureaucratically and tactically. The professional is
no more immune to the rewards and sanctions involved in pursuing these objectives
than other military personnel. There is perhaps an even stronger tendency on
their part to rationalize the objectives of the system, because to remain within
the military requires some prompt resolution of the conflict between individual
growth goals and military goals. Through such a process, the military welfare
state tends to become a servant of the military establishment.
Conclusion
In this article, we have analyzed a comparatively specialized issue--the
impressive system of institutionalized universal and comprehensive entitlements
which form what we have termed a welfare state within the military. We have
built our case on the premise that in all social systems--of whatever size or
complexity--action tends to become organized around critical requisites for the
system's continuity and survival.
In being selective in illustrating our main ideas, certain important aspects
of the existing military welfare state have not been covered. We have not discussed many of the continuous and emerging needs of military personnel which
have not been met by existing benefits and services. We have not anticipated
the welfare problems and possibilities in the all-volunteer force.
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Another limitation is implicit in our approach, which judges the military welfare state against three criteria: the extent to which it is in practice what it
formally purports to be, the way in which it compares with the nature of civilian
social provision, and the degree to which it provides optimum life quality for its
members. The latter is admittedly perfectionistic, but a criterion to which all
welfare systems should ultimately be made accountable. In this judicial process,
however, we have focused on the abundant weaknesses in military welfare, rather
than on its strengths.
Our major thesis has been that the military welfare state tends to become
shaped in the service of the dominant survival goals of the military establishment:
the maintenance of an adequate level of deterrent capability and of internal order.
Inthis context, military social provision has provided both incentives to perform
necessary organizational tasks, and sanctions to control behavior in the interests
of adequate performance. This has involved serious contradictions and inequities
which interfered with individuals' real welfare.
The military establishment, like other bureaucratic structures in modern history, is characterized by what Coleman has termed relatively autonomous "corporate
actors." For such corporate actors, he says, "the wants and interests of persons
constitute only constraints on a path of which the goal is corporate survival
...
and growth." This, he contends, biases the direction such organizations take.
Organizational decisions about the development and use of resources are "more
and more removed from the multiplicity of dampening and modifying interests of
of narrow
which a real person is composed.. .and more and more the resultant
69
intense interests of which corporate actors are composed."
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Footnotes
1. Welfare state is here defined as Wilensky has developed that concept, the
essence of which is "protected minimum standards of income, nutrition, health,
housing, and education, assured to every citizen as a political right." Evidenj
suggests, says Wilensky, that many welfare states are financed by somewhat regressive contributory and tax schemes "but do produce substantial income redistribution and on the whole are likely to be egalitarian in net effect." He clail
that the welfare state represents the convergence of urban-industrial societies
toward some common "post-industrial condition," despite the diversity of its
forms. However, he carefully distinguishes between the welfare state and the
"real welfare" of people in societies, and suggests a set of indicators for
measuring the impact of the welfare state on real welfare and equality.
See Wilensky (1975, preface).
2. It should be clarified that by "real welfare" we mean satisfaction of the highel
order needs of people for social esteem, recognition, and self-actualization.
This is additional to the usual concept of "well-being" as the satisfaction of
the basic essentials of life--adequate food, housing, and other material goods.
Real welfare emphasizes less tangible values; for example, a sense of achievement in one's work, a sense of fulfillment of one's potential. Though welfare
has come to be defined in terms of the material resources an individual can command, we are suggesting that it also be measured in terms of life quality. For
a well-done and provocative study which attempts to measure dimensions of life
quality in American society, see Campbell et al. (1976).
3. For a classic discussion of system requisites, see Parsons (1937).
4. See Friedlander's article in this journal.
5. In fiscal 1975, veterans' benefits and services were estimated to be $15.5
billion, which is just under 5% of the entire federal budget, and does not include the very substantial budget for retirement and disability payments to
career military personnel. Only the national defense budget, civilian public
welfare, medical care, and interest on the national debt account for larter
portions of the federal outlay. See The U.S. Budget in Brief (1976).
6. See Wilensky and Lebeaux (1965, p. 13B).
7. In 1975, approximately 15% of the non-white civilian labor force was unemployed,
a much higher proportion than for whites. This differential prevailed during
the Vietnam War as well. It is not unrelated that the proportion of blacks in
the armed services increased from 8.2% in 1965 to 14.4% in 1974. This reflected
differential deferment for education between whites and nonwhites, as well as
enlistments. Those unemployed but not able to seek education or training were
most vulnerable to the draft as well as to the pressure for enlistment. The
result was military employment of a sizeable portion of the unemployed. See
Statistical Abstracts of the U.S. (1975).
8. For example, in 1974, out of the total U.S. employment force (including the
military) approximately 3% were persons employed within the armed forces, another 3% were civilian personnel working for the armed forces, approximately 1%
were civilians working for federal defense-related agencies, and approximately
4% were civilians working in defense-oriented industries. See U.S. Bureau of
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9.

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

15.
16.

17.
18.

19.
20.

21.
22.
23.

Labor Statistics, U.S. Civil Service Commission Report on Employment and Earnings (1975); and U.S. Census of Manufacturers, Current Industrial Reports, U.S.
Bureau of the Census (1975).
In 1975, the average salary of enlisted men was $8,000 and officers $18,000,
apart from the array of other life-style-supporting services available to military personnel. See Department of Defense, Average Annual Military Pay Rates
(1960-1975).
It was understood that the selective process in WWII involved personnel of
higher prior educational background and socio-economic status, however.
See Moskos (1970).
See Badillo and Curry (1976).
This has been amply documented in various sources. See also Zietlin et al.
(1973).
Out of the 46,173 battle deaths in Vietnam between 1961-1973, 30,760 were
volunteers as opposed to 15,403 draftees. Blacks represented a much larger
proportion of enlistees than of draftees. See U.S. Department of Defense,
Selected Manpower Statistics (1974).
Badillo and Curry, op.cit.
In 1965, 9.5% of the total armed forces were black but only 2% were officers.
By 1972, 11.9% were black but still only 2.4% were officers. Less than a 1%
increase occurred between 1972 and 1974, despite a 2.5% increase in blacks in
the service. See U.S. Department of Defense, Office of Equal Opportunity,
The Negro in the Armed Forces (1962-1974).
Some investigators have pointed out that over 80% of enlisted personnel's positions in the military were in occupations which accounted for only about 11% of
the civilian male labor force.
See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Average Unemployment Rate of Men Sixteen
and Over in the Male Civilian Labor Force" (1975), and the hearings before the
Subcommittee on Readjustment, Education and Employment of the Committee on
Veterans' Affairs, U.S. Senate (1972, pp. 500-524).
See Villemez and Kasarda (1976, p. 407-419).
For a specific discussion of this situation, see the testimony of Joseph Garcia
before the Subcommittee on Readjustment, Education, and Employment, U.S. Senate
(1972, pp. 517-524). As an example, in the state of Washington, Employment
Security was placing only approximately 3% of all job applicants in 1971 in
jobs lasting more than three months. Emergency Employment Assistance jobs and
NABS jobs provided slightly more marketable skills and more continuous jobs,
but the percentage placed was again very low, particularly for minority group
members.
Ibid.
See Dumas' article in this journal.
Between 1960 and 1972, the peak year for the Army was 1972--women constituted
1.9% of total army personnel on active duty. For the Navy, the proportion
peaked at 1.5% in 1972. For the Air Force, 1972 revealed a substantial increase to 2.2%. In the Marines, the highest proportion, 1.2%, was in 1972.
By 1975, however, 4.5% of all military personnel on active duty were women.
It is significant that these figures include academic cadets. Statistical
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24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Abstracts of the U.S., Department of Defense, Military Personnel on Active
Duty (1950--1975).
Goldman (1973, p. 892).
Moskos, op.cit.
Goldman, op.cit., pp. 893-900.
Ibid., pp. 892-910.
S-e-United Nations report, The Development of National Service Programmes
(New York, United Nations Social Commission), 1959, p. 6.
Nelson (1976, p. 81).
O'Keefe (1966, pp. 605-630).
Wiest and Devis (1971, p. 327).
Ibid.
Ibid.
Caldwell (1967, pp. 1605-1612).
Jones and Johnson (1975, pp. 49-66).
For example, during the most intense Tet offensive fighting between 1965 and
1966, only 12 patients were hospitalized or excused from duty out of every
1000 soldiers. The highest rates in Vietnam were approximately 1/10 of the
highest rates in WWII, less than 1/3 those of the Korean War. See Blalock
(1973, p. 9). Eric Gunderson (1976, pp. 68-69) states that during the Vietnam
War the psychiatric incidence rate for Navy enlisted men remained stable at
1000 per 100,000 strength per year, and varied widely by rank (higher for enlisted men than officers), by sex (higher for female enlisted personnel than
male), by age (higher for age 17-18 than for 21-35 enlisted personnel), and
technical specialty (higher for those in nontechnical jobs, higher for those
among hospital ship crews and medical staffs than combat ship crews). The
rate for the Marine Corps enlisted personnel more than doubled between 1966
and 1969 from 1000 per 100,000 per year, to 2,100 per 100,000, during the
peak of intense and sustained fighting with heavy casualities. These rates,
Gunderson says, are still considerably lower than WWII and Korea.
Borus (1976, pp. 28-29).
Maslow (1968).
Blalock,
* cit.
Savage and Gabriel (1976, p. 344).
Blalock, op.cit.
Shatan (1973) and Lifton (1973).
Jones and Johnson, op.cit.
Bourne (1969, 1970).
Bey and Zecchinelli (1970, pp. 448-450).
Roffman (1970, pp. 6438-6440).
Saunders (1973, p. 65).
Department of Defense figures and those of the Special Action Office on Drug
Abuse Prevention (1970) were both significantly lower than many other estimates,
though DOD data were slow to be released. Ladinsky, in reviewing conclusions
from Lee Robbins' The Vietnam Drug User Returns (the report of a retrospective
study undertaken by the SA ODAP in May, 1974) reports that 27% of those who
served in Vietnam were regular narcotics users while in Vietnam. Fourteen
percent of these regular narcotics users had been introduced to opiates first
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49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

69.

in Vietnam. Approximately 10% of the regular narcotics users reported continued use after return to civilian life. In terms of acutal drug addiction,
however, the study indicated that approximately 20% of narcotics users were
likely addicted in Vietnam, but over 90% apparently stopped using narcotics
after return. Approximately 60% of these regular users did continue to use
other drugs, particularly marijuana. Among men introduced to marijuana in
Vietnam, over 80% did not continue to use it on return. Ladinsky suggests
that drug use reflected not only the availability of drugs, and peer pressure
to use them, but served a psychological function in the context of an unusual
war environment. See Ladinsky (1976, p. 450).
See the Congressional testimony of Joe Garcia (Garcia, 1973, pp. 522-523).
Taussig (1974).
See Connally's article in this volume.
Janowitz (1960).
This information on family patterns within the military is based on Goldman's
excellent article in The Social Psychology of Military Service (1976, pp. 119132).
Janowitz, op.cit.
Janowitz and Little (1965).
Little (1971).
Stanton (1976, p. 142). The discussion of family mobility and separation
contributed heavily to this section.
Little comments that for this reason "the socialization process of the child
in the military community is relatively incomplete." (1971)
Bevilacqua and Morgan (1971, pp. 851-855).
Wiest and Devis (1971, pp. 319-345).
The Advocate (March, 1976).
Wiest and Devis, op.cit.
The Air Force had only forty-two, and the Navy tended to depend heavily on
chaplains. See Bevilacqua and Morgan, op.cit.
See Bevilacqua and Morgan and Wiest and Devis, op. cit.
See Daniels (1972, p. 155).
Westmoreland, U.S. Army article.
Lifton (1976, pp. 45-64). This article provided many of the ideas articulated
in this section.
Lifton feels the psychiatric principles of immediacy, proximity, and expectancy,
which were to facilitate combat personnel's successful integration into the
group life of their units effectively undermined personal integrity in judging
one's own ethical behavior in the combat situation. (1976).
Coleman (1974, pp. 46-50).
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Class, Poverty,

THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT AND SOCIAL WELFARE:
PAST, PRESENT (AND FUTURE?)
George W. Ayers, DSW
Graduate School of Social Work
University of Texas at Arlington
Arlington, Texas 76019

As we move toward the decade of the eighties we are becoming increasingly
aware of the difficulties and realities of economics on a national level. More
and more we, as a people, are faced with difficult choices concerning the
services that we either demand of our government or which government deems
it necessary to provide.
Although it is an oversimplication, our Constitution mandates that
government always follow to some degree a "guns and (not or) butter" philosophy
in its preamble provisions dealing with "common defense" and "general welfare."
We have though paid dearly, in economic terms, for attempting to follow such
a fatal "guns and butter" philosophy during the Vietnam conflict. Faced
with the untenability of the above non-choice planners, elected officials,
and others must take a hard look at current and future allocation of resources
in order to maintain some semblance of "living within our means."
It is the purpose of this article to exmine one area in which there
could be a re-distribution of financial resources and to advance suggestions
concerning the implementation of programs.
It has been my observation that during the last 15 years the Department
of Defense has introduced a variety of programs which may be viewed purely
as ventures in social welfare.
My thesis is that these programs are (a)
unnecessary, (b) disproportionate in terms of resources expended vs. benefit
received and (c) are not philosophically in keeping with either social welfare
values or the values of the military establishment.
I intend to confine my remarks to three programs:
Project 100,000,
Project Transition, and the Medically Remedial Enlistment Program. While
it is true that two of these programs have been phased out (Projects 100,000
and Transition) the precedent for their use has been set and programs of a
similar nature could be initiated at any time.
Let us first examine the basic premise which underscored two of the
programs (100,000 and Medical Remedial).
That premise was a need for additional manpower during the initial stages of the Vietnam involvement.
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Project 100,000 was initially instituted in October 1966 in two phases.
The first phase was designed to bring into all branches of the armed forces
individuals who would otherwise not be qualified for enlistment because of
unsatisfactory scores on the Armed Forces Qualification Test. The second
phase which began in February 1967 was the Medical Remedial Program which
was designej to enlist those individuals with single correctable medical
conditions.I
What both programs basically offered was an opportunity for individuals
who could not otherwise qualify for military service to enlist. However,
these programs, while aimed at meeting manpower needs during a critical time,
were also social welfare programs. One of the components of Project 100,000
was described as preparation training. This was basically remedial education
for the enlistees under this program and was estimated by the GAO to cost
8 million dollars in Fy 70. Additionally, the cost of remedial education
in other types of training after basic training for the Project 100,000
personnel in Fy 70 was estimated to cost 3.5 million. 2 In other words, in
one Fy the Department of Defense spent 11.5 million dollars in extra training
cost for individuals who did not meet the military's own standards.
The social planner might speculate that this money might have been more
effectively utilized in some type of vocational education program, for over
34%3 of the Project 100,000 enlistees ended up in combat arms branches which
offered no readily transferable civilian job skills. In other words, the
DoD was offering very expensive remedial education in order to prepare an
individual to be a combat soldier. We can only speculate as to whether these
individuals would have enlisted if alternative training had been available
out of the military. This speculation leads us therefore to the "harder"
question of whether a social welfare service should be offered as an enticement for military service if it is not available outside of the military
alternative. I think not.
Let us pause in our examination of the first category of Project 100,000
to view the second category, the Medical Remedial Program. Although Project
100,000 (category 1) has been phased out, category 2 is still with us.
Basically this program allows individuals with relatively minor medical
problems, most of which require surgical correction, to enlist in the military,
have their problem corrected at a Basic Training Center and then enter a
Basic Training cycle. Applicants must be mentally qualified.
One again we are faced with the situation of offering a social welfare
service (health care) as an incentive for enlistment. This is an unequitable
situation. Many of the medical problems which this program addresses are
the type of problems which affect the nature of the work that an individual
might perform and I can find no reason why military service should be a
contingency for obtaining the service. The Medical Remedial Program is still
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with us and will become more expensive to operate as all costs continue to
spiral.
Both Project 100,000 and the Medical Remedial Program were initiated
during an era of military conscription. While they were not eminently
successful, they did provide a pool of manpower. For example, by July
1968, less than two years after initiation, Project 100,000 had enlisted
125,152 men 4 in all branches of the military and 87,700 in the Army alone.
If this type of program had to be offered during a period of active conscription I would conclude that the potential for it, or a prototype, being
resurrected during a period of non-conscription and poor recruiting is high.
What would its resurrection mean? First, it would indicate that the
Defense Department was embarking upon a program of social rehabilitation,
an area in which it has no mandate. Second, it would indicate that "X"
amount of national resources were being channelled into this program. Third,
I would contend that programs such as Project 100,000 and Medical Remedial
are representative of a type of double jeopardy in that individuals who
are basically unequipped with key coping skills are thrust into a highly
competitive environment in which they will be even less able to cope.
Let us examine each of these contraindications in turn. I would define
"a program of social rehabilitation" as any program which is designed to
provide individuals with remedial skills or capabilities which they would
not be able to obtain without the benefit of the program. In turn these
skills or capabilities would enable the individual to achieve or attain
something that would not be possible had not the remedial action been taken.
Paradoxically the job of the military establishment in this country is to
defend the country from all enemies, foreign and domestic. There is no
requirement in the constitutional provisions, which establish the maintenance
of a standing Army, that this Army also provide its members with benefits
concerning remedying of deficiencies which would have prevented them from
serving in the Army in the first place. Many years ago the military in
this country was literally highly over-worked and grossly underpaid. The
professional soldier was viewed by the average citizen as a mercenary,
a ne'er-do-well, and generally as an individual who could "not make it on
the outside." Therefore it was acceptable since the government was in
essence doing the man a favor by permitting him to serve, to pay him less
than a living wage and to provide him with a certain amount of in-kind
benefits to supplement that wage.
Since 1964 military pay has been on the up-swing and is now tied closely
with pay within the industrial sector of the economy and in many respects
exceeds pay in those vocations not subject to the federal minimum wage. I
therefore maintain that there is no need to offer a variety of expensive
and elaborate social welfare type incentives in order for a man to serve
his country or to simply choose the military as an occupation.
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The military will argue that the elimination of the draft has made
recruiting extremely difficult and that were it not for the elaborate system
or fringe benefits some of which are admittedly of a social welfare nature,
there would be no real incentive for a man to serve in the military since
he could obtain the same monetary rewards in the civilian economy and not
suffer the potential hardships and dangers associated with military service.
However the military, to put it quite simply, has no mandate either constitutionally or statutorily to offer social welfare incentives for military
service. The second contraindication concerns the amount of money which
is channelled into these programs. During Fy 68, 69 and 70, the Army either
spent or proposed to spend some 29.2 million dollars on Project 100,000
alone. 5 This is an enormous sum when we consider the fact that there is no
data to validate that the individuals enlisted under these programs were
any better or worse off in the long run than if they had not enlisted. I
would contend that this money could have been more effectively utilized if
added to Manpower Training, Vocational Rehabilitation or some other existing
program, rather than used in a fragmented fashion by the Department of
Defense. Based on the rate of inflation and on the 68 through 70 figures,
we might reasonably conclude that should the Department of Defense choose
to embark on another course similar to Project 100,000, it would entail
costs probably double that previously cited. In addition to the actual and
projected cost associated with Project 100,000, the cost associated with the
Medical Remedial Program could be channelled into already established programs
on health care delivery such as family planning, pre- and postnatal care, and
early childhood screening and probably attain a much greater cost benefit
factor than that associated with simply correcting physical deficiencies in
order to make individuals acceptable for military service.
Concerning the idea of double jeopardy, one Department of Defense publication indicates that Project 100,000 permitted the military services to
utilize "adequate personnel -- not the optimum or the best -- and assume
the additional cost in order to obtain the benefit of upgrading these individuals."'6 The publication further goes on to state that the individuals
who participate in this program will be not only "better soldiers but more
useful, productive and self-assured citizens. '7 That is rhetoric. Let us
look at facts. Of the initial study group in Project 100,000, 15.6% were
still in the first two ranks of the military hierarchy compared to 7.4%
of individuals not taken in under Project 100,000 during the same period. 8
This figure alone indicates that Project 100,000 individuals were not competing at a level equal to those individuals who entered the military through
the normal channels. Additionally a quote from a recent article concerning
the performance of individuals who enter a high stress environment such as
the military with a proven record of inability to cope in the civilian
environment underscores my point. (A resigning company grade officer states:)
"So much time and manpower is virtually wasted trying to help people who
actually do not want help. This includes criminals present and past and
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juvenile delinquents. As an officer I am expected to redeem these people,
to erase 17 to 20 years of ingrained dishonesty and apathy often at the
9
expense of worthwhile men."
We know empirically that 24% of the Project 100,000 personnel ended
up in the infantry. Another quote from a resigning company grade officer
"The present practice of
indicates the result of that type of assignment.
assigning to the infantry only those recruits who have uniformly low intelliContrarily recruits with high verbal abilities should
gence (must stop).
be assigned to the infantry, since they will be the most qualified to under10
stand and give orders, and most confident when speaking to a group of men.'
The military establishment is perhaps the only form of work in which
an individual can be severaly punished for the commission of offenses which
in a non-military job would result, at worst, in the loss of the job. There
is no argument with the necessity of discipline, particularly among troops
whose exposure to combat is imminent. However, I would contend that individuals who have demonstrated significant difficulty with authority and
structure in the past, i.e., high school dropouts, etc., are going to continue
to demonstrate those patterns in military service and no effort oriented
toward upgrading large numbers of these individuals on a mass scale can
expect to be effective in changing the behavior patterns of significant
numbers of them. We therefore find that the individual who has exhibited
a marginal adjustment to life stress when placed in the military is literally
subjected to double jeopardy. The stress situations have not lessened,
if anything they will have increased and the individual will demonstrate
a parallel correlation in his ability to cope with them.
Before we begin to look more closely at the philosophical issues involved
in the military's venture into social welfare, let us examine briefly the
final program, Project Transition. Project Transition was established in
April of 1967. "The primary purpose of Project Transition (was) to provide
educational, vocational and job counseling for enlisted personnel prior to
11
release from active duty."
The GAO report to Congress concerning management deficiencies in this area indicated that the program was showing too
much emphasis on educational upgrading and not enough in accomplishing the
original purpose of the program which was to simply smooth the transition
from military to civilian life. Granted there is a fine line concerning
mandate when it is obvious that transition from military to civilian life
is going to be hampered by lack of education, however, the purpose of this
program was not to provide remedial education but to assist the individual
in developing or repackaging his marketable skills. The hooker in this arrangement is that the training took place while the individual was on active duty
and continued to receive his full pay, allowances, and benefits while being
taught some usable skill. This is nothing more than a camouflaged form of
Public assistance. If in fact the purpose of the rilitary is to provide
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job training, then substantive changes must be made within the statutes that
govern the military. Project Transition was expensive. It was programmed
for 16 million in Fy 69 and 19 million in Fy 70. 12 These are actual training
costs; this does not include the pay, allowances and supporting funds for
those individuals whose services for all practical purposes were lost to the
military.
It would seem that once again we find certain social welfare benefits
being offered as a contingency for having military service, not on the basis
of need. I would contend that if the cost for Project Transition could have
been channelled into other programs and the men released early, the same
benefits could have been obtained at less cost to the taxpayer.
I have attempted in the previous discussion to demonstrate that the
military has increasingly utilized soft social welfare incentives in an
effort to entice individuals to serve. I have not touched upon the idea of
the combat arms bonus, the G.I. Bill education benefits, or the active duty
tuition assistance and high level education opportunities offered to those
who remain on active duty. The basic issue in all of this is whether or not
military service is so repugnant that we as a nation must attach to it an
entire series of elaborate and attractive buffers in order to make it a
viable elternative for our young. The entire concept of the draft has been
and continues to be a volatile political issue and there are sound arguments
both for and against its abolishment and re-instatement. Military conscription
is in itself obviously not the answer. However, there have been a number of
viable arguments advanced for mandatory national service. 1 3 Such a national
service could probably be financed at least in part from the abolishment
of expensive incentives as a reward for military service. It would strike
at a time when many young people are "turned off" to the idea of further
higher education and would offer them a viable alternative to initial competition in an overcrowded job market. Military service would be one alternative of national service. Such a program would offer the opportunity for
health care services to be provided, for educational remedial work to occur
and for young people to solidify those values which will be necessary for a
productive adulthood. It is obvious to me that the current course of heaping
benefit upon benefit for military service is reckless and will eventually
peak out from the sheer force of economics alone. There is no indication
that we are receiving better soldiers for more money. The American people
are faced or will be faced with hard choices and the type of army that they
want will be one of these choices. We have strong empirical validation that
massive ventures into social welfare such as Project 100,000, Project Transition and the Medical Remedial Program are, to say the least, not eminently
successful in meeting our military needs. Rather, they have channelled off
large sums of money and extensive amounts of effort to operate them.
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Some critics would argue that these programs are not inordinately
expensive when compared to the sums spent on social welfare in general. In
a sense that argument is valid but it is not germane. The issue is not
money per se, but who should receive and disburse the money. My thesis is
that the military has no business in social welfare. If the Pentagon cannot
meet its manpower needs on the basis of its Intrinsic attractiveness including
early retirement, pay, tax-free allowances, etc., then it should go before
the Congress and acknowledge its difficulties.
The military's need to pursue social remedial programs as a manpower
source speaks to another area of problems which is beyond the scope of this
paper but which has major implications for social planners.
Those problems
14
were clearly documented in Eli Ginzberg's works
in 1959 and indicate that
we have come precious little closer to bringing a large segment of the population to a level of health and literacy that they are capable of serving
the nation. This failure of all of our institutions to "provide for the
general welfare" underscores the futility of the military's foray into the
social welfare arena.
In the future there must be firm provisions to prevent
the military from offering remedial or transitional services.
There are
existing agencies a plenty to provide these services.
There is nothing dishonorable about military service per se.
What has
tended to dishonor it are inconsistencies ranging from draft deferments to
cover-ups; and social welfare ventures only lead to further tarnishing of an
already battered image.
The competition for scarce resources will grow in intensity as our
national priorities shift.
This competition is, to an extent, necessary
given the nature of our politico/economic system. However, the competition
can be made more equitable if those of us who are advocates of effective
social welfare programs will constantly remain on the alert and speak out
loudly against institutional infringement in our area of expertise.
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SOCIAL WOLK IN RELIEF AND REHABILITATION AFTER WARS,

AT HOME AID ABROAD

Walter A. Friedlander, Professor Emeritus, University of California, Berkeley

In the United States after the wars of the 19th. century, particularly after the
Civil War, no professional social workers existed who could have cared for the wounded
soldiers and civilians or for the disabled veterans.
But in Europe, during the war
of France and Italy against Austria, in 1859, the foundation of some services for
the wounded soldiers of the three involved nations were laid by a Swiss banker,
Henry Dunant of Geneva who arrived by accident on the evening of the bloody battle
in Solferino (Italy) and started to help bandaging some of the bleeding victims of
this fight.
When he recognized that he and his valet were not able to provide aid
even to a small number of the many wounded, he went to the surrounding villages and
persuaded a number of peasants to help him and his servant to bandaging other injured
soldiers.
He also continued his journey and asked the commanding general of the
Italian and French armies to send soldiers and physicians to help the injured.
As
a consequence of this experience, Dunant published the story of this
fact "Un
Souvenir de Solferino" which was sent to several European monarchs, including the
wife of Emperor Bonaparte in France and Queen Louise of Prussia and stirred
public
opinion in several countries to the recognition that aid for war-wounded persons was
necessary.
These actions led to the foundation of the "International Red Cross" in
Geneva in 1864, which afterwards employed social workers, Ryrses and physicians who
assisted injured persons in wars and natural catastrophes.
Although the International Committee of the Red Cross invited the United States
to join the International Red Cross organization, Congress refused in 1864 to do so.
Only in 1882, the foundress of the American National Red Cross, Mrs. Clara Barton,
was able to persuade the Congress to join the International Red Cross. The international agency, in the meantime, had engaged social workers, nurses and physicians
of the partjcipating nations and had helped the victims of wars and natural disasters
in Europe.
However during the First World War (1914-18) American social workers
and volunteers, in addition to British, French and Swiss workers were actively
engaged in services to war-wounded persons and to prisoners of war, helping people
of both warrying nations. The most spectacular relief actions were conducted in
France, Belgium, Italy and Greece, and institutions for the treatment of wounded and
sick persons in Switzerland as a neutral country were widely used.
Not only workers
of the American Red Cross were helping in this period, but also American and British
nmbers of the Friend Service Committees (Quakers), of the American Relief Administration organized by the Government under the direction of the later President
Herbert Hoover, the Near Eastern Foundation, the Save-the-Children Fund, the American
Je-wish Joint Distribution Committee, the World Young Women's Christian Association
and Young Zlq's Christian Association and other philanthropic and religious
charities.
After the first world war, in 1921 the International Migration Service in Geneva
(Switzerland) was founded especially to help refugees and families of prisoners-of-war
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who did not return to their native homes to join their husbands and fathers.

This

agency, now renamed "International Social Service" with headquarters in Switzerland
(Geneva) and New York and cooperating with local travelers-aid services employs
trained professioaal social workers and helps also in adoption procedures for
children of American citizens and foreign women, particularly after the war in
Vietnam. The "Unitarian Service Committee" (Boston) gave medical aid and training
of social workers in European and African countries who were badly needed after the
numerous wars in Africa and in Europe after the second world war in 1945. Under the
auspices of the League of Nations and more recently of the United Nations and their
affiliated organization, UNICEF, World Health Organization, Food and Agricultural
Organization and others, social workers have been assigned to various relief
actions after wars and natural catastrophes. Numerous social workers have been
helping in the rehabilitation and health services in East Asia after the end of the
wars between Japan and China and the occupation of most Asian and Pacific countries
by Japan. Finally in Japan itself, social workers have assisted in the repatriation
of prisoners of war and wounded soldiers as wellgs in the development of modern
social services and training of social workers.
Among the social service programs directly related to wars, the War-Veterans
Services are the most prominent. In earlier periods of history those services were
extremely limited. For instance in England, France and Germany the resources were
so meagre that veterans roved the countries as gangs, robbing and killing peasants
who refused to give them alms. Consequently, the Elizabethian poor law of 1601
for the first time in England included veterans among those groups which should
receive relief from the parish where they had resided before their disablement in
war service unless their families were able to assist them. Similar provisions in
other European nations were the rule until the later part of the 19th. century. In
the United States, the Continental Congress maintained after the declaration of
independence the measures for veterans of the preceeding colonial period, providing
land grants for building a homestead, a small pension for disabled veterans, and
institutional care for those seriously disabled that they felt unable to live in the
community or with their families. Similar conditions continued until World War II.
During this war the universal draft had for the first time in the United States
transformed millions of civilians into veterans and the mass of them gave them
sufficient political power to request new legisl~ion which gave them new essential
priviliges compared to the civilian population.
War Veterans are entitled to receive as monetary benefits "disability pensions"
for all service-connected disabilities leading to permanent, total invalidity; and
"disability compensation" caused by any service-connected disability; "retirement
pay" after leaving military service; also temporary benefits for veterans discharged
before able to find full employment, called "readjustment allowance" for unemployed
and for formerly self-employed veterans; "death awards" for widows and minor orphans
of veterans and special "death pension awards" under circumstances to survivors of
veterans whose death was not service-connected. Educational benefits for veterans
included "subsidies" for further education, studies and training, providing tuition,
books, equipment and needed expenses, such as board, rent, lodging and travel.
"Vocational training aids the veteran in finding employment and the disabled veteran
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in addition to his disability allowance by a special "subsistence allowance".
Veterans Benefits are administered by the Veterans Administration with its central
office in Washington, D.C. , and 13 regional branch offices.
Medical benefits to veterans are free hospitalization in veterans' and other
public and private hospitals, medical and dental care, in emergencies immediate
hospitalization, prosthetic and other needed appliances, and recreational facilities
to help in rehabilitation. Blind veterans are entitled to seeing-eye dogs and
electronic equipment; legless veterans to a special automobile; deaf veterans to
vocational training in rehabilitation centers, vaterans suffering from nervous
illness to psychiatric therapy, and all disabled veterans to after-care after
hospitalization in halfway-houses, foster homes and nursing homes, and in out-patient
clinics. In most states additional medical and rehabilitation services for veterans
are available which allow for treatment by private physicians and psychiatrists. Old
veterans in financial need are entitled to unlimited hospitalization.
Social services by trained social workers and volunteers for veterans are counseling in personal, family, and economic questions, and advice for adjustment and on
medical treatment ordered by the medical staff.
The service includes rehabilitation
and vocational training, information on preferences in civil
service employment,
tax and license fees, burial services for indigent veterans. Several states in USA
also grant guarantees for the purchase of a business, a homestead and land, and
educational supplements for children of veterans.
The Charter of the United Nations states in Article 1 that the purpose of this
organization is the prevention and the removal of threat of war and to achieve international cooperation with respect for human rights and fundamental freedom for all
human beings. Unfortunately they have not realized these purposes so far so that
we have still to consider which social work functions are necessary after warfare
and demilitarization. Within the framework of the international organizations
discussed above the "High Commissioner for Refugees" is particularly concerned with
aid for victims of war, displaced persons, widows and orphans of military personnel
and civilians.
These services were instituted
after
the special "Inqgrnational
Refugee Organization" of the United Nations was liquidated in 1951.
In addition
to the High Commissioner's office in Geneva, the United Nations established after
the 1947 Near East war still two additional agencies: "The Relief Fund for Palestinian
Refugees" and the "United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees"
(UNWA). These organizations unfortunately have not been able to solve the problems
of those refugees in settling them among the Arab nations nor to achieve their
rehabilitation as far as the masses are concerned.
The other organizations of the United Nations are still trying to help war victims
and orphans in many respects, by health care services, emigration counseling and
assistance, children's aid, and social and economic community developments in the
poorer nations. Social workers interested in international services are encouraged
in most industrial nations such as Great Britain, France, Switzerland, Canada, and
the United States by conferences and seninars under the auspices of the "International
Council on Social Welfare", the "International Association of Schools of Social
Work", the "International Federation of Social Workers" and the national professional
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social work organizations of these countries, and of Australia and New Zealand.
Regional conferences and seminars of those organizations are helping to increase
the interest and the participation of social workers and volunteers in social
services for victims of wars.
*1 Martin Gumpert, Dunant, the Story of the
Red Cross (New York, Oxford University
Press, 1938); and John Maloney, Let There Be Ifercy (New York: Doubleday, 1944).
*2 Ernest P. Bicknell, With the Red Cross in Europe (Washington, D.C.: American
National Red Cross, 1938); Walter Friedlander, International Social Welfare
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall, 1945), p. 1-3.
*3 Friedlander, op. cit., p. 3-5.
*4 Dorothy Dessau, Social Work in Japan (Tokyo: Social Workers International Club of
Japan, 2nd. ed. 19680).
*5 Delwin M. Anderson, "Veterans Services", Encyclopedia of Social Work 1971, pp.
1513-18; Eveline Burns, The American Social Security System (Boston: HoughtonMifflin, 1949), pp. 265-292; Walter Friedlander & Robert Apte, Introduction to
Social Welfare (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall, 1974), pp. 99-100, 464-471;
Social Security Bulletin 38 (April 1975), Jables Ml, M2, M3, pp. 45-47.
*6 Ralph Townley, The United Nations (New York: Scribners, 1968), p. 298; Walter
Friedlander, International Social Welfare, pp. 41-43;" Bertram Pickard, The
Greater United Nations (New York: Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 1950).

-533-

ALIENATION OF YOUTH AS AN UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCE OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN AFRICA
Illustrations from the Ethiopian Experience
Quentin F. Schenk, Professor I
School of Social Welfare
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53201

The development of global competition between Russia and the United States
led to a dramatic diversion of the resources of the United States to military and
quasi-military programs. Some of the objectives of the competition were to maintain United States influence and power over its empire in the Middle East and
Africa:
to monitor the Red Sea; to have a presence near Egypt, especially in
view of the development of the Aswan Dam by the Russians; to have proximity to
its Asian colony, Israel; to keep watch over its oil in Saudi Arabia; to establish
and man satellite tracking stations which were necessary to compete with Russia
in space; and to maintain a presence in Africa in order to safeguard its interests throughout the continent.
Ethiopia is geographically strategically located to enable the United States
to accomplish the objectives stated above. Additionally, until recently its head
of state, Emperor Haile Sellassie, held tremendous prestige, and was quite prowestern in his allegiances. Ethiopia was also the African headquarters of the
Economic Commission for Africa, and the headquarters city for the Organization
for African Unity. A military presence, therefore, was mandatory in Ethiopia if
the United States was to stand up to the Russian challenge in that part of the
world. This presence developed from its inception in the middle 1950's to the
point that in 1970, the assistance to the military alone equaled the dollar
amount of all other types of assistance to all the other nations of Africa.
This did not include the support of the official United States military activities
in Ethiopia.
So, it can be seen that the United States invested heavily in
military programs in that country.
One of the interesting items to note is that investment and assistance funds
from all sources to a country usually follow rather than preceed the political
decision to invest militarily in a country. Foundation money, developmental
assistance money such as AID grants; even assistance from other countries and the
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United Nations followed upon the decision to invest in military assistance in
Ethiopia, when it became clear that it was necessary to safeguard our interests
in that part of the world.
Nothing much had happened in Ethiopia since the Italian occupation of the
1930's to encourage it to depart from its traditional modes of organization and
behavior, until the decision of the 1950's by the United States to invest militarily in Ethiopia. Following upon the heels of that, the National University was
established; Ethiopian Airlines came into being; public education was pushed for
development from kindergarten through the twelfth grade; efforts were begun to
establish an economic infrastructure; agricultural modernization was pushed; health
programs utilizing western methods were organized; and so on. Even though there
was much reservation about all this change among the elders, nobility, clergy and
politicians, the push toward modernization went on apace anyway. It is the thesis
of this paper that the decision of the United States to develop and strengthen
its military presence in Ethiopia for the reasons cited was the single most
important factor in accounting for the eventual alienation of youth in Ethiopia,
which in turn became the dominant factor for the current revolution taking place
in that country. As to whether this form of destabilization and its consequences
is more functional than dysfunctional is a matter this writer cannot answer. Only
time can tell. But the point of the paper is that the U.S. military are the
modern missionaries without their either knowing or admitting same; for they in
their presence in a country like Ethiopia to implant and reform military programs
inevitably trigger changes that fundamentally alter the characteristics of all
aspects of the social order. Let us then turn to a brief description of the process
which took place in Ethiopia in the alienation of its youth, a major precursor of
the current revolution there.
Ginsberg states that there are between 22 and 23 million persons living in
Ethiopia. One-third of the population falls in the range of ages 15 and 59. The
number of persons with a tenth grade education or more number 25,000. This select
group of 25,000 are located almost without exception in the cities, where the
scarce educational, welfare, employment, opportunities are found. Ginsberg estimates overall literacy at 5.7%. Fifty-two percent of the urban males are literate;
16% of the urban females are literate. Seven percent of the rural males are
literate, Rut the rate is declining. The literacy rate of rural families is almost nil.
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48.

These figures show that Ethiopia is a nation of young persons, which is a
3
The figures
situation similar to other developing nations of sub-Saharan Africa.
also show that only a very small group from those under 21 years of age are at
The creation of a
present able to move into the ranks of the educated elite.
coterie of educated elite is a key requisite for development, and the ability of
a modernizing nation to produce and utilize this coterie is one of the important
indicators of that nation's ability to initiate and sustain the modernization
process. Ethiopia has difficulty in this regard, for Ginsberg states that with a
population increase of about 2% per year, Ethiopia is becoming a nation of an ever
increasing proportion of young persons, without much change in the near future in
the ratio of the skilled manpower to the total age group. It can be said, then,
that up to this time, only a very few of the young people in Ethiopia have been
touched by the forces of modernization in any real sense. Most of them still
live as they have been doing for centuries past.
This highlights the importance
of this small group of the educated elite, for it is from here that the individuals come who carry the responsibilities and leadership for the current and
future efforts toward modernization. Alienation of this group, therefore, will
have a deleterious effect out of proportion to its size on any effort toward
modernization.
In the pre-industrial society, where age is a positive value, children are
subservient to their elders.
They are an economic asset to the extended family.
Most aspects of the pre-industrial societal structure are congruent with this
value, and minimal disruption results. Young persons are dispersed throughout
the population, for they remain in their homes and villages, and cannot act with
any social force, as they can when they are collected in the cities in organizations such as schools, and in collectivities such as gangs and teams.
But with the advent of the U.S. military programs, complete with hardware,
personnel, and most importantly, the western ideology, new ideas and technologies
were available for inspection, discussion, learning, and adopting.
The U.S.
military personnel are particularly vocal, moreover, about the blessings of the
western technology, and usually equally contemptuous of the non-industrial state
of affairs in countries like Ethiopia where they may be stationed. Military
personnel are also predominantly young. Their sumptuous level of existence is
not lost upon the local population, especially the young, who then contrast this
existence with the prospect of their own, should their situation continue the
same. In fact, the military in Ethiopia lived much better than any other of the
U.S. citizens that lived and worked there. They had their own commissary, which
had all the foods available in the U.S. supermarkets, they brought in their own
cars, which in themselves created great excitement among the populace; they had

3At this point in time, Africa has the highest birth rate of any of the
major
land areas of the world. See Molnos, Angela.
Development in Africa - Planning and
Implementation. Ford Foundation Circular #3, April 1970. Part II, p. 20.
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housing allowances which enabled them to live in some of the best houses in the
city, and they were able to employ a large number of servants. All this largesse was available from the highest ranking to the lowest ranking member of the
U.S. military, and when observed by the local populace, made a profound impression
upon them.
The ideology of the high standard of living is possibly the most powerful
that has yet been developed, and when combined with the missionary zeal for its
dissemination by U.S. military personnel, and the eagerness of the young people
of the developing country to accept it, something must change. The important
point here is that military personnel from the United States, even though they are
ostensibly in the foreign land only to care for the mission there, do carry out
a missionary function by spreading their ideas about the appropriate way of life
to the local population, especially, as has been stated above, the youth.
The western rational, scientific ideology which the military espouse states
that man can know his world, that this world is orderly, that if man studies his
world, he can manage it and exploit its resources to his own ends. By contrast,
most adult Ethiopians believe that the world, including man and his society, is
created by God, maintained by God. Man's task is to ascertain God's plan for the
world, and then follow it. Young persons have no right to question these assumptions, but should believe what they are told by their parents, priests and rulers.
The western ideology is activistic, rebellious, individualistic. In contrast,
that of the majority of adult Ethiopians is passive, collectivistic, conformistic.
When young persons learned of these ideas new to them, this created a certain
amount of conflict in them. Furthermore, if they attempted to behave in accordance
with these new ideas, they found themselves in conflict with the major organizational units of the society, such as the church, the family, the economic system,
government; those structures that existed in large measure to maintain the strength
of the then current ideological, stratification, and power systems of the social
order. When young persons stated that these institutions were not performing to
support the new ideas they espoused, or their proposed techniques for utilizing
more effectively the resources of the country, these young persons raised inevitable
fears among those who strove to keep things as they were, and who resisted the
implications of change for all the sectors of the social order. Therefore, since
the voices of the young persons were not heard, they either withdrew into their
own subcultures, or became strident in their criticism, and radical in the changes
which they advocated. Seldom did they retreat into the beliefs and behavior to
which their elders subscribed.
Of course, the situation becomes further complicated because it was by no
means lost upon the rulers of Ethiopia that the United States has tremendous
power because of its advanced technological system. They longed to remain as powerful as they could, and were not without threats both from internal as well as
external sources to the maintenance of that power. So, the rulers were eager also
to adapt the western technology to their own ends. One of the first things they
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were told, especially the Ethiopian military personnel, was that for a man to be
technologically proficient, he must have education. In fact, the men who now rule
Ethiopia were among the earliest to be educated by the U.S. military in the late
1950's and the early 1960's. They were sent to military training schocls in the
United States during this period, and then came back to modernize the Ethiopian
army. They also came back with ideas about how their countrymen should live, how
rulers should behave, how industrial capacity should be developed, how resources
should be distributed. This, it turned out, was knowledge dangerous to the
status quo.
The ruling class was not slow to grasp that for their power to be enhanced,
they must modernize. But to modernize, they must teach the populace how they
should live for this to be accomplished.
So, a massive public education program
was begun from grade one through the university, to create a manpower pool of technically proficient members of the society to carry out this task of modernization.
Since it is difficult to change the ways of the adults, because they have a stake
in things as they are, and are not amenable to the control that needs to be
exerted in educational activities, the programs concentrated on the young.
Elementary schools up to grade six were initiated in most local communities,
and young persons lived at home while attending these schools.
But following
grade six, those who persisted in their education had to live in the nearest city
where the more advanced facilities were located. This meant that they had to
leave home, live with their peers in some kind of dormitory arrangement, and be
freed from the influence of their family, and the local elders.
It is the cities that have always been the spawning grounds of social change,
and the situation in Ethiopia was no different.
It is the urban youth in Ethiopia
that were the concern of the authorities. It is the urban youth that rebelled
and experimented with western strategies; not the rural youth that form the bulk
of the population.
It is in the city where the young people could escape the
tyranny of the extended family, could congregate in schools where they are the
majority in a cultural as well as in a social psychological sense.
It is because
of this loosening of the hold of the traditional social institutions on young
people that they were able to identify with their kind, develop their own class
and subculture, and look at the world in their own terms. Thus, they were able
to take positions in relation to themselves and their world because of antecedent
changes that operated to make this possible.
In turn, this situation set up considerable incongruencies, from which arose the challenges of youth to the status
quo.
Certainly, educational efforts of the modernizing African states were not
set up to result in the disaffection of those to be educated.
These efforts were
initiated to further the cause of modernization, to build a manpower pool by
which modernization could he accomplished. When one of the most visible immediate results of this immense committment of resources was the rebellion and radicalization of youth, the leaders of these nations became somewhat disillusioned
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with results of these efforts. Both the indigenous and foreign advocates of
change failed to understand that change, when it did come, was not even, was not
readily more functional than previous modes of social behavior, occurred in some
sectors of the society before occurring in others, and above all, was resisted
by the current forms of social organizations as long as these forms had any effec4
tive hold upon the individuals of the society.
Culturing borrowing, and imposition, when done, is seldom even attempted to
be tailor made to the requirements of the borrower, either by the borrower, or by
the exporting faction. The educational system in Ethiopia is a case in point
,
6
(including that portion of it concerned with the training of social workers.)t
In the first place, since it is a direct transplant from the United States, its
objectives are not clear as they relate to Ethiopia.
Does the elementary level
of educational development aim at universal education?
If so, to what end?
Does the secondary level aim to be somewhat selective, and build a base of the
technical manpower pool?
If so, with whom, and for what technologies? And just
what are the aims of the university? To develop a status organization that can
compete with foreign organizations, copy foreign patterns; or to turn its attention to the building of a manpower pool that will be committed and prepared to do
the job of modernization of the nation? What planning between education and the
other sectors of the society - such as welfare functions - is going on to give
cues as to what tasks must be accomplished, how resources can be allocated to
accomplish priority tasks, and just how manpower can be trained, in sufficient
numbers to carry out these tasks?
The inability of men to control the course of change in modernizing societies
leads to problems such as the one under discussion in this paper. Educational
programs are seldom introduced to be relevant to the requirements of the modernizing society. Western medicine is seldom introduced accompanied by population
control measures. Economic planning seldom coordinates the development of the
agricultural and the industrial sector. Welfare programs seldom take into account
the mass rather than the individual nature of social problems of development.

4At the same time that Emperor Haile Sellassie I, then the Chancellor of the
Ethiopian national university, made his commencement speech to the graduating
seniors in July, 1969, reciting the challenges to them for development, 500 students, 10% of the student body, were languishing in jail, a postscript to the
riots then occurring at the university.
5

Schenk, Q. F.
"The Welfare Function in Ethiopia".
Proceedings, Seminar on
the Reassessment of Social Welfare and Related Manpower Needs in Ethiopia Haile
Sellassie I University Press, 1969.
6

Schenk, Q. F. Final Report, Committee for the Study of the College of
Social Sciences and Development Administration Haile Sellassie I University Press,
1970.
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Military programs seldom take into account domestic implications. Young people
are usually the first to realize the irrelevance of their education, the frustration of being overwhelmed with too many of their own age group, the inattention to
problems of rural areas as modernization is attempted, and the preoccupation with
problems of the individual sick, crippled, poor, to the neglect of the attack on
the factors in the society giving rise to these problems. If young people see
few attempts to rectify these inequities which affect them as much at first hand
as any group in the social order, they will fail to understand the value of modernization, and the relevance of individual enterprise in their lives, inhibiting
them from investing themselves in the efforts to modernize as they are exhorted
to do by those holding power at the time.
Alienation of youth is a universal phenomenon in states in sub-Saharan
Africa, all of whom are attempting to modernize their production and distribution
This alienation is a novel situation with which the national leadership
systems.
of these states must deal. Their reactions to this alienation often provoke
measures that exacerbate and prolong the condition, leading to extreme measures
on both sides. The challenge of the appearance of the subculture of youth to
these nations is not to eliminate it, which is impossible, but to use it to
further progress, and as preparation for leadership for development.
Any prolongation of the age at which young persons are readmitted into the
adult mainstream of the social order will aggravate their feelings of marginality,
and thus further the development of a separate subculture.
Since this subculture
is set up to defend against the adult society, its characteristics will be negative
in reference to the adult world. Thus, the sooner the adult society can absorb
these young persons into their own structures, the less will be the degree of
alienation of this portion of the society, and the less the disruption and
tension that will result. However, this can only be accomplished if the economy
can absorb those qualified to enter it; if the educational system is organized
to prepare appropriate numbers for appropriate tasks; if the family and the
religious institutions instill values in the young that will commit them to the
modernization of the society; and if the political and welfare systems can oversee
the planning, the coordination; and develop quickly enough the administrative
efficiency to integrate all the disparate social elements required for development.
In most cases this cannot be accomplished, for change in developing countries
does not proceed evenly any more than it does in the industrialized countries of
the world.
It is often easier to introduce new activities in a country than it is
to modify existing ones, and this important fact often is the basis of the alienation which this paper addresses.
Education in the organized sense did not exist
before extensive western incursions into Ethiopia, so it was relatively easy to
develop. But religious, political, and distributive systems did exist, with all
their supporters among the leaders and the powerful who retained their power and
leadership by maintenance of things as they were.
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When the rulers realized what kind of monster they had created in their midst,
one which threatened their very existence, they naturally became disenchanted with
the results of the efforts to modernize, especially as it was reflected in the
school system.
It was here that the struggle localized itself. The focus became
the political rulers, the clergy, and the elders of local communities against the
students. Riots became common at the university at Addis Ababa, in the large
high schools in headquarter cities in the outlying regions. Force was used on
both sides, schools were closed, and students were killed, injured and incarcerated.
Alienation was engendered and intensified on both sides, and something had to give.
The retreat of the old ruling class from its former enthusiasm for modernization meant also that it had some misgivings about further modernization of the
armed forces. When this occurred, both Ethiopian as well as U.S. military personnel became alarmed, for it meant a lessening of their power and influence, as well
as the standard of living of the local military. For the U.S. military it could
mean the lessening of control of the defense of the country, which in turn could
mean the lessening of control of power in the area to further its aims as an arm
of U.S. foreign policy.
With these two very powerful forces also alienated from
the old ruling class in addition to the youth, the days of the political status
quo were numbered. The only question was not whether a revolution would happen,
but when it would take place, and in what form.
It is now apparent that the United States educated Ethiopian military personnel have seized the political power, but their important preoccupation is still to
develop the means to control the alienated youth. In order to do this, as stated
above, they must find the means to integrate the youth into the main stream of the
culture. In a modernizing society this is a herculean task, for there are not
the automatic forms of control yet developed that exist in our own society to
coopt the dissidents and make them work for the major values of the society. But,
if the current regime cannot accomplish this task, then it too is doomed to be
replaced, for the youth of Ethiopia are too numerous, too well organized, and
presently still enough alienated to be ignored. Youth of Ethiopia, then, constitute a major problem in maintenance of societal stability when that society is in
the process of technological development.
During the years that the author lived in Ethiopia, he was haunted by the
ethics of exportation of the ideology of technological development, especially
as it took place in such uncritical, ethnocentric, and aggressive form, princiIt is the contention of the
pally by the U.S. military personnel residing there.
author that the military as an important arm of the United States is responsible
It was a major factor in exfor initiating what is going on in Ethiopia today.
porting the ideology, the knowledge, the artifacts, of technology that led up to
the instability that ensued and that still exists.
Is this by-product of our foreign policy and our committment to military
strength functional or dysfunctional to the parties to the process, both in the
Could more positive results have been achieved with other
long and the short run?

initiatives such as tailor making programs which the Ethiopians could apply themselves; letting them develop their own technology in reference to other industrial
nations rather than to our own; or, permitting them to live as they had been doing
for centuries, if this is what they wished.
The core of the issue that disturbs the writer is that there did not seem to
be self determination of the Ethiopian people in relation to modernization. If
left alone to make their own decision, perhaps they would have decided to modernize, but then the writer is certain they would have done so at a much slower pace,
with less instability, and possibly with technological assistance from other
developing countries that had recently been through the problems which Ethiopia
now faces.
The writer would like to have seen what direction and form technological
development would have taken had the United States been oriented toward welfare
rather than warfare in reference to its assistance to Ethiopia.
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HUMAN SECURITY OR NATIONAL DEFENSE: THE QUESTION OF CONVERSION
by Bruce Birchard
Philadelphia Yearly Meeting Friends Peace Committee

How can we convert the enormous human, financial and technological resources
currently committed to military illusions of "national security" to programs and
institutions which provide real human security? That is the central question of
this paper.
Our military spending is excessive. The amount of money required for the military defense of the United States is a controversial matter, but many experts
have estimated that less than half of our current military budget would suffice.
In 1972, George McGovern proposed paring the military budget to $55 billion by
1976. In 1971, The National Urban Coalition, in its book, Counterbudoet: A Blueprint for ChanQing National Priorities (Benson and Wolman, 1971), argued that a
military budget of $50 billion would be adequate in 1976. If we eliminated all
forces designed to project American power abroad and prepared solely for the military defense of the territorial United States, military expenditures could be
lowered still further. Shifting to a nonviolent defense strategy would probably
lower the cost even more (cf. Boserup and Mack, 1974).
When the war in Southeast Asia ended, most Americans expected quite reasonably
that the military budget would decline. In 1967, Charles L. Schultze, then Director of the United States Office of the Budget, estimated that the fiscal dividend
accruing to the United States after the termination of the Southeast Asian war
"should lie in the range of $35 to $40 billion," and that this fiscal dividend
should be used to help solve the problems of poverty, provide full employment, an
expanded health care and social security program, and perhaps reduce or redistribute taxes (Schultze, in Gordon, 1968: 16, 19). In actuality, the government
posted a deficit in budget receipts over outlays of $3.5 billion in 1974. The
deficit is expected to rise to $51.9 billion in Fiscal Year 1976, according to
government estimates. Each year since 1968 the national budget has increased with
ever larger appropriations for the military. President Ford asked for $107.4
billion for the defense budget in 1976. This is over $15 billion more then in
fiscal 1975, the largest peacetime increase in the history of the nation. For
fiscal 1978, according to the New York Times of September 15, 1976, the Pentagon
imseeking a military budget of about $130 billion.
Although companies such as Rockwell International, one of the big ten in the
military contracting business, claim that military spending has decreased from 58
percent of federal tax revenues in 1955 to 29 percent in 1975 (Rockwell Interne-
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tional, 1975), the truth is somewhat different, as Table 1 shows.
Table 1: Breakdown of the Proposed FY 1976 Federal Budget, Excluding Trust Funds,
by Spending Category (Source: Friends Committee on National Legislation Newsletter, March, 1976).
Percentage
of Total

Category of Spending

Amount

Military Spending: includes 75 percent of the interest
on the national debt and veterans' benefits.

$132 billion

Human Resources: includes education, training, employment, social services and health programs.

51 billion

19%

Other Non-Military: includes environment, energy,
natural resources, housing, community development,
25% of the interest on the national debt, science,
space, international affairs, law enforcement and
justice, government, revenue sharing, commerce and
transport.

61 billion

23%

Income Security Programs: includes food stamps, unemployment and disability insurance, old age retirement
and several small programs (e.g. black lung benefits).

24 billion

Total

$268 billion

100%

There has been a slight decrease in the percentage of the federal budget committed
to the military, mainly because of the growth of income security and human resource
programs since 1955. The portion of the controllable federal budget, however, is
far higher than the 29 percent claimed by Rockwell International.
Rockwell and other Pentagon supporters are able to claim that the proportion o
the federal budget spent on the military has decreased dramatically only because
the federal government began including federal trust funds (notably Social SecurtK
Highway, and Railroad Retirement Trust Funds) in the federal budget totals in 1968.
Trust funds should not be lumped together with other, controllable federal budget
expenditures since trust funds are made up of our money, collected through special
taxes and held in trust for us by the government. If we remove these funds from
the figures for the federal budget, as has been done in Table 1, military spending
still consumes 49 percent of the administratively controlled federal budget.
In the pages that follow, I shall explore several fundamental questions about
conversion and human security. These questions fall
into four areas: 1) the
benefits of converting the military-industrial complex to production and services
meeting human needs; 2) examples of successful economic conversion, which demonstrate its technical feasibility; 3) an assessment of the obstacles to conversion
from "liberal" and "radical" perspectives; and 4) consideration of strategies for
change. In the latter context,I shall report on some tactics adopted by the
national campaign to stop the B-1 bomber.
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The Domestic Benefits of Conversion
In addition to possible international benefits resulting from conversion
(decelerated arms race, decreased national reliance on violence to solve international conflicts), at least three domestic benefits are likely to accrue to the
American people from a major conversion program: 1) more money, production and
services for meeting human needs; 2) increased employment opportunities; and 3)
a reduced rate of inflation. I shall examine each of these benfits in turn.
More money for meeting human needs
Much federal money could be converted from the military to the human services
portions of the federal, state and community budgets. For example, The National
Urban Coalition's Counterbudoet details the programs that could be supported in
health care, housing, mass transit, rural development, agriculture, environmental
control, education, law enforcement and criminal justice.(Benson and Wolman, 1971).
Seymour Melman, in The Permanent War Economy (1974), gives the costs of dozens of
questionable military projects and describes city, state and federal human needs
programs of equivalent expense that have had to be terminated or were never started
due to lack of funds.
The average thirty-year cost of the $92 billion 8-1 bomber system alone to each
congressional district in the United States would be $210 million. A study by the
Peace Conversion Task Force at LaSalle College in Philadelphia indicated that, if
the 8-1 program were terminated, any of the following needs could be met with the
$210 million saved by each congressional district.
Table 2: Socially Useful Expenditures Equal to the Average Thirty-Year Cost of the
B-1 Bomber System to Each Congressional District (Source: Peace Conversion Task
Force at LaSalle College, 1976).
Socially Useful Program or Service
Provide fifty percent of the costs of child care for 9,300
children for thirty years.

Approximate Cost
5210 million

Pay the operating expenses of a new high school level skills
center providing vocational training for 800 students per
year for forty years.

210 million

Operate twelve 600-pupil middle schools for thirty-five years.

210 million

Finance the construction of 11,000 new low-cost family homes.

210 million

Operate seventy neighborhood paramedic units for thirty years.

210 million

Purchase 300 new subway cars.

210 million

The elimination of this one costly weapon could help many communities meet the
needs of their citizens more adequately.
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One area of the federal budget bears particularly close scrutiny with regard to
the military/civilian spending balance. This is the federal investment in research
and development. Such spending amounts to only 15 percent of federal expenditures,
yet its importance should not be underestimated since it directly affects future
investment and production.
In 1976, $23.5 billion was budgeted for the Federal Research and Development
Program. Only one fourth of this amount was for programs strictly oriented to
meeting human needs. Of the 1976 total, $10.6 billion (45 percent) was for the
military, $3.5 billion (15 percent) for space, $4.3 billion (18 percent) for the
Energy Research and Development Adminstration (E.R.D.A.), and $5.1 billion (22 percent) for all other agencies (Priorities, March, 1976).
Some of NASA's space work and E.R.D.A.'s energy research either directly or
indirectly help meet human needs. The space effort, for example, may yield important "spin-offs" in the fields of medicine and solar power. E.R.D.A. is conducting
research on various energy technologies. Nevertheless, the largest item in the
E.R.D.A. programmatic budget for 1976 was $873.5 million (20 percent of the total
E.R.D.A. budget) for producing new nuclear weapons (Priorities, March, 1976).
Seymour Melman estimates that one half to two thirds of all American research
scientists and engineers are working on military-oriented technology (Melman, 1972).
Conversion should include shifting research and development funds into areas in
serious need of technological development such as mass transit, solar power, lowcost housing, environmental protection and health care.
The devotion of such an inordiate share of our resources to the military has
led to the stagnation end depletion of many of our once-strong civilian industries.
According to Melman, many U.S. civilian industries (e.g. electronics, machine tool,
railroad, textiles and consumer products such as sewing machines, cameras and typewriters) are not only failing to compete abroad but also losing the domestic market
to foreign competition (cf. Melman 1970 and 1974). Until the 1960's, these industides remained competitive, despite higher American wage scales, because of higqh;i
productivity due to continued technological innovations. Conversion would bring
the necessary funds, brains and skills to these industries, helping us to meet
many of our people's needs for better products at lower prices.
Changes in the economic relationships advocated in radical conversion plans alsC
are aimed at meelinghuman needs more fully. New forms of ownership and management
involving worker and/or community control might encourage a stronger orientation tc
meeting the needs of surrounding communities. Conversion to a socialist system,
which emphasizes planning to meet the needs of its citizens rather than making the
highest possible profits, would both lessen the pressures for military spending
and increase spending on human security, according to radicals. (See the section
on "Obstacles to Conversion: The Radical Critiqu' in this paper,)

Increased employment opportunities
Another benefit of conversion would be the generation of hundreds of thousands
of jobs for the people of the United States.
This contradicts widely-held assumptions that military spending is good for the economy and for employment in particular--an assumption which is buttressed by corporate and Pentagon propaganda but not
supported by the facts.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics of the United States Department of Labor (BLS)
provides the most comprehensive information available on the U. S. economy. The
BLS finds that one billion dollars spent on military sectors of the economy creates
33 percent fewer jobs than would be created by increased personal consumption
resulting from a tax cut. Specifically, one billion dollars invested in the military
generates 75,710 direct and indirect jobs, whereas a one billion dollar tax cut
would generate 112,363 jobs (BLS, as quoted in Priorities, June, 1976).
After analyzing the relationships between 132 different industrial sectors of
the U.S. economy, the Bureau of Labor Statistics was able to demonstrate what
demands would be made upon each sector of the economy by spending in a particular
area. Analysts know how many jobs are generated per dollar spent in each sector;
therefore, they are able to predict how many jobs would be generated by expenditures in various industries and services. Table 3 summarizes their findings.
Table 3: Direct and Indirect Jobs Generated by One Billion Dollars in Final Demand
in Various Economic Sectors (Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, as cited in
Priorities, June, 1976).
Mean Number of Jobs
Generated per Billion
Economic Sector
Dollars of Final Demand
Military: includes aircraft, electronics, ordnance,
missiles, petroleum products, shipbuilding and repairs.

76,000 jobs

machinery: includes farm, metal-working and general
industrial machinery.

86,000 jobs

Government: includes state, local and federal.

87,000 jobs

Transportation: includes railroad, local and intercity transit and transportation equipment.

92,000 jobs

Construction: includes new residential, non-residential,
public utility and highway construction as well as
maintenance and repairs.

100,000 jobs

Personal Consumption: resulting from a $1 billion tax
cut and including retail and wholesile trade, food
products, motor vehicles, clothing, petroleum products,
communications and personal service sectors.

112,000 jobs

Health: includes services, hospitals and instruments.

139,000 jobs

Education: includes educational services.

187,000 jobs
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According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, a $10 billion shift in government
spending from military to other areas of the federal budget would result in "a net
increase of 245,420 job opportunities" (BLS, 1975: 110).
A similar conclusion was reached by the Public Interest Research Group in
Michigan (PIRCIM). Their findings are reported in detail in the article by Marion
Anderson appearing elsewhere in this issue. PIRCIM calculated that the $80 billion
military budgets during the 1968-1972 period cost Americans 840,000 jobs each year.
Simply returning that $80 billion to taxpayers via a tax cut would have ennabled
them to spend more on such items as clothing, food, homes, services, education and
their state and local governments. This would have generated 840,000 more jobs
per year than would have been lost due to the complete termination of the military
(PIRCIM, 1975).
Another investigation, by the Center for the Continuing Study of the California
Economy, indicated that conversion would not be as drastic a blow to the California
employment picture as generally believed. Their report states that California-which receives 15 to 20 percent of all Department of Defense contracts and gains
more jobs from military spending than any other state except Texas--would suffer
a mere one percent increase in unemployment if military spending were cut by 50
percent over a ten-year period, even if no compensatory programs were initiated:
(Priorities, June, 1976).
Finally, a study by Chase Econometric Associates, a Chase Manhattan Bank subsidiary commissioned by Rockwell International to analyze the economic impact of
producing the B-i bomber, found that alternative government expenditures or a tax
cut would generate more jobs than the B-1 program. The Chase study indicated that
an equivalent government expenditure on housing would generate 57,000 more jobs
than B-i production, a public works program 40,000 more jobs, and a tax cut 19,000
more jobs than 8-1 production (Adams, 1976).
Why is military spending so unproductive in generating jobs? Most military
work is very capital-intensive. The cost of materials is high, as exotic metals
are needed for alloys and tremendously sophistocated technology for production.
Salaries in military-oriented companies are high. According to a 1962 Department
of Labor study, 59 percent of the employees in military-oriented electronics
firms were highly paid engineers and executives, while only 30 percent of the
employees in civilian market-oriented electronics firms held these positions
(as reported in Reich and Finkelhor, 1972: 185).
Most contracts for military goods are let on a cost-plus basis, and relatively
few are decided solely on the basis of competitive bids. In a cost-plus contract,
the government guarantees the corporation a profit on the item produced equal to
a certain percentage of the costs of producing that item. If a corporation makes
every effort to cut costs and increase productivity, it may be able to produce,
say, tanks for $500,000 each. If the government guarantees a 10 percent profit
on costs, the company will make $50,000 on each tank. On the other hand, if it
builds new laboratories, adds elaborate equipment, pays higher salaries to its

managers and encourages inefficient production practices, its costs may rise to
$750,000 per tank, and the company will make $75,000 profit on each one. This
encourages higher costs, of course, for the greater the costs, the higher the
profits. Such high costs and profits decrease the amount of money going for jobs
under military contracts.
Thus, by its capital-intensive, inefficient nature, military spending swells the
unemployment rolls rather than generating jobs that are needed by millions of our
citizens.
Overcoming inflation
The third benefit of conversion for the domestic economy would be the amelioration of the high rate of inflation, many economists have argued that military
spending is a prime cause of inflation. melman, for instance, stresses that
military spending buys products which immediately leave the marketplace. They have
no "use value"; they can neither be consumed nor used in the production of other
goods. The machinery, materials and power that are used in military production
come from other segments of the economy which, however, receive nothing productive
in exchange. This puts an upward stress on the prices of all goods (Melman, 1972:
315-316).
Another economist, Edward S. Herman, finds that military spending contributes
to inflation in several ways:
1. Deficit financing: In order to hide the high cost of military weapon systems
and wars from the public, Congress, under pressure from the military-oriented
corporations and the Pentagon, often approves the expenditure of billions of dollars
on the military which are not covered by tax revenues. As a result, the federal
deficit rises and inflation increases.
2. Reduced social output: For every billion dollars spent on the military, there
is a billion dollars less for meeting the demands of citizens for better housing,
parks, environmental protection, schools, and services. Says Herman:
In recent years, governments have not had enough revenue via politically
feasible tax collections to expand (or even maintain) social services to meet
the needs of a growing population, so that they have had to borrow (i.e. run
deficits) ....And workers have not had a satisfactory growth of income given the
direct tax drain to finance a part of the war, plus the indirect inflation tax,
so we have had pressures for many wage increases in excess of productivity,
with further inflationary consequences. In brief, the drain into military
boondoggles has reduced the output available for constructive social expenditures and real wage increases, and thereby indirectly contributing to increased
deficits and more rapidly increasing money wages, both accelerating price
increases (1975: 12).
3. The technology drain: As noted earlier, the heavy drain of scientific and
engineering talent into military research and development has made U.S. civilian
industries less productive, and this contributes further to the "reduced social
output effect" on inflation.

4. The corruption drain: The military-industrial complex includes corporate
executives and presidents, Pentagon brass and key politicians who work together to
meet each others' needs (exchanging personnel, making campaign contributions,
awarding cost-plus contracts, locating bases and weapons contracts in key Congressional districts). High rates of guaranteed profits, cost overroms and high prices
for the materials required and the items produced all contribute to inflation.
Conversion from military production to production and services meeting human
needs, particularly if a "social-industrial complex" is not created in the process,
should therefore decrease the inflationary pressures in our economy.
The benefits of conversion should thus include an increase in the funds available
for meeting human needs, an increase in the number of jobs for Americans seeking
employment and a reduction in the rate of inflation.
The Technical Feasibility of Economic Conversion
If the benefits would be so substantial, we should consider whether or not
conversion is technically feasible.
One of the early conversion success stories comes from Alabama in 1933. The
Muscle Shoals Nitrate Plant had been an important source of munitions for World
War I. In 1933 it was turned over to the Tennessee Valley Authority and developed
into a center for research on and development of fertilizers.
On a larger scale, much of American industry converted to weapons production
at the outbreak of World War II, then re-converted to civilian production at the
end of the war. Over 75 percent of the automobile industry, for instance, switched
to the production of tanks and armored vehicles in 1940, then returned to making
automobiles in 1945.
This re-conversion was facilitated by long and careful planning on the part of
government and industry alike, for re-conversion was accepted by those in power
an urgent national priority. Pent-up consumer demand and the long experience of
the converting firms in the civilian market also contributed to the success of the
effort.
Can careful planning lead to successful conversion today? Ironically, the most
substantial contemporary program of conversion is guided by the Department of
Defense. Since the Department of Defense is frequently obliged to close federal
military bases, and since they wish to minimize the impact this has on the surrounding communities (partly for obvious public relations reasons), an Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) was opened in 1961 to help communities whose economies were
adversely affected by the closing of federal military installations. In 1975, I
visited the OEA office at the Pentagon and talked extensively with one of their
regional directors.

-550-

The Office of Economic Adjustment is the staff arm of the President's InterAgency Economic Adjustment Committee. It is comprised of some twenty multi-disciplinary professionals plus supporting staff. Upon notification that the Pentagon
intends to close or significantly reduce work at any of its installations, the OEA
notifies appropriate officials in the affected community of the assistance they can
give. If the community requests their help, the OEA works with community leaders
to initiate a study of the impacted area and create a community task force. This
group, with some advice from the OEA, then develops a comprehensive plan for the
conversion of surplus Defense Department property to civilian usage and/or the
development of other economic potential. Such a plan may provide for: 1) needed
community facilities, such as a vocational-technical institute, college, hospital,
sewage treatment plant, airport or recreation center; 2) a more diverse industrial
base by developing a new industrial park, making surplus military buildings available for industry, providing the requisite servisec for new industries (e.g. increased water supply, improved access to highways), advertising pre-existing inducements to industry or developing them when necessary (e.g. a tool-making plant);
3) job training to upgrade or enhance the skills of local workers; 4) assistance
to small business people; and 5) the development of tourism or recreation potential.
The Office of Economic Adjustment is especially concerned with generating employment to compensate for the loss of civilian jobs due to the closing of a Department of Defense installation. According to the "Summary of Completed Major
Adjustment Projects, 1961-1973," the OEA has reviewed its assistance efforts in
nearly one hundred and thirty communities since 1961. The impact of realignment
and closures in these communities ranged from the loss of fifteen to twelve thousand civilian jobs. The loss of military personnel and income added to the
economic dislocation in many areas. Taken as a whole, in the sixty-one communities
in which the OEA had terminated its assistance by 1973, 82,000 civilian jobs were
lost due to Department of Defense cutbacks. In executing their conversion plans,
however, these communities have generated 162,000 new jobs. This is a 2 to 1
ratio of jobs generated to jobs lost. Only seven of the sixty-one communities
affected lost more civilian jobs than they gained.
One of the communities hit most suddenly by the closing of a military installation was Salina, Kansas. In November, 1964, the Pentagon announced that the Schilling Air Force Base near Salina would be closed seven months later. A total of
4,700 military and 327 civilian jobs would be lost. Quick action by the community
involved planning civilian uses for the base and acquiring the federal property
and 11 million of equipment at substantial discounts. Within one month of the
base closing, a new vocational school and the Kansas State Patrol Academy opened
in former base buildings.
Much of the acreage was developed for industry. The
OEA report states:
Seventy-three businesses and other non-defense related activities on the
former base property now employ 3,050 people--almost ten times the number
of civilians employed by the Air Force there. Within just one year after
closing, private sector employment had replaced all jobs lost (The Defense
Office of Economic Adjustment, 1975: 34-35).
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By 1966, Salina was able to renovate a portion of the old Air Force facilities and
begin operating them as a municipal airport, covering the costs with receipts from
the industrial property on the former base.
The OEA's "Summary of Completed Major Adjustment Projects" concludes by stressing
that the communities with which they have worked have succeeded in achieving "a
more diversified and growing local economy, new business and industrial firms within the communities, a significant stimulus to the local tax base, and an opportOnity
to secure new public facilities and improved public services. With few exceptions,
the communities have continued their local growth and development long after the
immediate adjustment period itself."
Many industries would be affected by widespread conversion. Substantial proportions of them could convert to civilian production with little technical difficulty.
Shipyards, which get approximately 70 percent of their work from the Navy, could
design and build modern vessels for the outmoded American fishing fleet. Their
ability to build large metal structures could be used in fabricating steel mills,
oil refineries, desalination plants, pre-fabricated housing, barges, sea-mining
equipment and hydrofoils (Shearer, 1973: 6-7).
Airframe manufacturers depend upon the government for at least half of their
business. They have skills and machinery needed for the development and production
of rail and rapid transit vehicles, low-cost housing modules and small bridges.
Aircraft engine production facilities could produce engines for mass transit
vehicles, electrical generating plants, gas pipelines and refineries. The electronics industry, also heavily dependent upon the Department of Defense and NASA
for contracts, could be doing more work on road, rail and air traffic control
devices, medical diagnostic and monitoring equipment and educational aids
(Shearer, 1973: 6-8).
One recent example of conversion within the private sector is the Boeing Vertol
plant. Located south of Philadelphia, it converted much of its plant from the
production of helicopters for use in the Vietnam war to the production of trolley
cars as the war wound down. Boeing Vertol is the only company in the country producing trolley cars, or "light rail vehicles," and they have received orders from
many cities. Unfortunately, conversion was not planned far enough in advance to
avoid firing much of the Boeing Vertol workforce, despite the efforts of the
United Auto Workers Local 1069 to interest the Boeing management in converting to
the production of low-cost modular housing units. "Think how many housing units
we would have to build to make as much money as we do on one helicopter," a Boeing
executive was repdrted to have told John Taylor, then president of the United
Auto Workers Local 1069 (Philadelphia Bulletin, 2/9/71: 3).
Since consumer demand today is not what it was in the post-war period, military
industries cannot expect to find substantial untapped markets in consomer goods
as they did in the late 1940's. Melman, in his study of alternatives to military
markets for converted military-oriented industries, found that the promising new
markets were primarily in the areas of largely neglected public responsibility,
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including mass transit, housing, water supply, refuse disposal and recycling,
environmental protection and health care (Melman, 1965).
These markets require considerable production of goods such as mass transit
vehicles, modular housing, water purification and delivery systems, recycling
machinery, and medical prosthetics and monitoring devices. Meeting these needs
would also generate demand for personnel in the service sectors of the economy.
Since some highly specialized industries and portions of some less-specialized
firms could not find sufficient markets for non-military goods to keep all their
employees working, however, conversion plans must provide for substantial retraining and relocation of employees of military-contracting firms and members of.the
armed forces.
In 1970, Lloyd Dumas published a study entitled "Re-Education and Re-Employmert
of Engineering and Scientific Personnel" which found that approximately 500,000
scientists and engineers would lose their jobs if military-oriented companies
converted to civilian production. According to Dumas, "Almost all of these men
and women could, within a re-education period of one and a half years or less,
qualify for and find employment in six major areas: high school teaching, construction, pollution, transportation and public utilities, food and related products,
and various agencies of the federal government" (as quoted in Melman, 1970).
The most comprehensive conversion plan to reach Congress was offered by Walter
Reuther, then President of the United Auto Workers, in 1959. Entitled Swords
Into Plowshares, this plan called for a 25 percent tax on military profits, the
proceeds from which would be held in a trust fund by a government conversion
commission. Any worker who was laid off, down-graded, given a shorter work week
or forced to relocate due to cutbacks in military contracts would be compensated
with money from the trust fund. His or her income and all benefits would be maintained at a level equal to his/her average for the previous two years.
Money in the trust fund would also be available to corporations which wanted
to convert from military to civilian production. To secure funds, a company wour
have to gain approval from the conversion commission for a detailed conversion
plan. The fund would then help the company finance the conversion process. The
beauty of the plan is that money for conversion would come from corporate profits,
not workers' pockets, in such a way that corporations would have an incentive to
convert. Only through converting could a military-oriented company draw upon
money in the fund and stop paying the 25 percent tax.
Certain flaws in this plan are obvious. Reuther did not specify how military
profits were to be calculated, and corporate members of the military-industrial
complex have many ways of calculating profits to make them look small. Equally
significant, without a clear process for putting working people and representatives
of citizens' groups on the conversion commission, the commission would be dominated
by corporate and government power-holders who know all too well how to protect
their own interests.
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In sum, the study of past conversion efforts--the Muscle Shoals Nitrate Plant,
the post-World War II experience, the Office of Edonomic Adjustment projects, the
Boeing Vertol facility--indicate that economic conversion is technically feasible.
This does not mean that a widespread conversion program in the United States would
not be disruptive, for these efforts either involved single plants and communities
or, in the case of industry-wide re-conversion following World War II, took place
under special circumstances (high consumer demand and the extensive experience of
the converting industries in the civilian market). However, the studies and the
plans developed by Seymour Melman, Lloyd Dumas and the United Auto Workers strongly
indicate that, with careful planning, a major national conversion program could
be implemented without traumatic disruptions and dislocations.
Obstacles to Conversion: The Liberal View
If conversion is technically feasible and so many benefits would accrue, why
has it not been implemented?
Liberals hold that Pentagon militarists, in collusion with large military contractors and key Congressional figures, have prevented the United States from
embarking on the path of economic conversion and reaping its benefits.
Melman describes the military-industrial complex as one large organization with
a "state management" located in the Pentagon. This management was rationalized by
former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara. During the early 1960's, McNamara organized a number of offices and thousands of people within the Department of Defense
to centralize the management of military industry through the allocation of con-,
tracts and the policing of ongoing work. According to Melman, the Assistant and
Deputy Secretaries of Defense comprise the "board of directors," the Secretary
of Defense is the "president," and the President of the United States is its
"cheipman of the board." This state management effectively controls all significant
decisions about obtaining capital, what and how much to produce, the price and
distribution of the product and how production shall be organized (Melman, 1972:
313-314).
In melman's view, the Pentagon controls the military-industrial complex.
Therefore, an enlightened citizenry and Congress only need to break the Pentagon's
grip upon this large sector of the economy in order to begin the conversion process.:
With Congressional guidance and careful planning, conversion could then be accomplished with no changes in the system of American capitalism. In fact, Melman
sees the system of "Pentagon capitalism" as an aberration in an otherwise sound
free-enterprise system.
This is not to say that liberals see no political obstacles to conversion. They
stress that the Pentagon-oriented military-industrial complex has developed its
own style of operating--a style which will not work in the civilian market.
Military-oriented corporations have none of the marketing organization or experience which is essential in the more competitive civilian market. Their sales

-554-

effort is designed to deal with one customer--the Pentagon. One well-known aspect
of this effort is the employment of former military officers and Pentagon personnel
by military-oriented firms. Extensive lobbying of the Congress and Pentagon,
outings and vacations for important Washingtonians at corporate expense and other
features of the military-oriented corporate sales pitch are well-known.
Conversion from military production to civilian production would thus require
a fundamental change in marketing strategies and structures. This change is sure
to be resisted by the companies involved. The failure of some conversion efforts
stems at least in part from this difficulty, and these failures in turn have
strengthened the determination of many corporations to lobby against the change.
Many liberals also recognize the role which military spending has played as a
government-controlled Keynesian "balance wheel" in the domestic economy. They
argue, however, that other forms of government spending would prove equally effective in regulating demand. Paul Samuelson states simply:
If there is a political will, our mixed economy can rather easily keep C +
I + G LConsumption + Investment + Covernmenj/ spending up to the level needed
for full employment without armament *2pending.
There is nothing special about C LGovernmeng spending on jet bombers, intercontinental missiles, and moon rockets that leads to a larger multiplier
support of the economy than would other kinds of C expenditures (as on pollution
control, poverty relief and urban blight) (as quoted in Edwards, Reich and
Weisskopf, 1972: 179).
Samuelson notes that there may be a political obstacle to such conversion, and he
locates it in "an economically illiterate electorate" which "may less reluctantly
use the tools of the new economics for war rather than peace."
Likewise, the National Urban Coalition states:
High levels of defense spending are not needed to prop up our economy.
The huge backlog of other needs is more than adequate to fill any gap in
aggregate demand--after appropriate conversion and retraining measures-left by reductions in defense spending (1971: 253).
This and Samuelson's statement indicate a recognition by liberals of an economic
obstacle to conversion, namely, the role which military spending plays in generating demand and creating employment. However, they do not see the need for anything
more nor less than the political will of the electorate and its representatives to
re-allocate government monies to new priorities and help affected industries make
the required technological, structural and marketing changes.
Obstacles to Conversion: The Radical Critique
Radicals present a different analysis of the structure of the economic and
political system and the distribution of power within the United States.
Most
insist that the capitalist system requires militarism and high military spending.
They argue that capitalism cannot accomodate economic conversion from military to
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civilian industries without changes in its most significant features.
Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy, in their classic Monopoly Capital, present the basic
argument. (The analysis of the monopoly capitalist system on this and the next
page is drawn almost exclusively from Monopoly Capital, pages 27-215). They begin
with evidence that, in the present-day American capitalist system, most industries
are dominated by a few giant corporations which are much more able to maximize
their profits than individual entrepreneurs and smaller companies ever were. Quoting
from an earlier paper by James Early, Baran and Sweezy examine the goals of modern
corporations:
The major goals of modern large-scale business are high managerial incomes,
good profits, a strong competitive position and growth. Modern management does
not view these goals as seriously inconsistent, but rather, indeed, as necessary,
one to the other, Competitive strength and even survival, management believes,
require large innovations and substantial growth expenditures in the rapidly
changing technical and market conditions of the present day ....For well recog'
nized reasons, management wishes to minimize outside financing, so the funds
for most of these expenditures must be internally generated. This requires high
and growing profits above dividend levels. So, too, do high managerial rewards.
High and rising profits are hence an instrument as well as a direct goal of great
importance (1966: 37-38).
The pursuit of profits is certainly not a new feature of American capitalism. However, the enormous corporations and conglomerates that dominate our present-day
economy differ in at least two important ways from individual capitalists and smaller companies: they can operate within a longer time frame, and they are able to
calculate more rationally. These factors enable the giants to avoid dangerous
risks and adopt a "live and let live" approach to their corporate competitors,
particularly within the old, established industries.
Such corporate power and policies have led to a situation in which corporate
giants in any one field have an interest in seeing that the profits of the industry
as a whole are as large as possible. This restricts price competition. Though
direct collusion in fixing prices is rare, "price leadership," often by the most
powerful firm, is common. Thus, when U.S. Steel initiates an increase in the price
of steel, other companies either follow suit, or U.S. Steel drops its increase.
It is highly unusual, on the other hand, for a company in an established industry
to lower its prices since, once its competitors followed suit, the result would
be lower profits for~all.
Rather than competing over prices, say Baran and Sweezy, corporate giants compete in their efforts to cut costs through technological innovations, the control
of cheap sources of raw materials (often abroad), and relocating in less developed
countries where they can exploit cheap labor pools. They also compete, through
advertising and sales efforts, to capture a larger share of the existing or growing
market. Little of this competition, however, results in lower prices for consumers.
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The result of these policies is the strong and persistent tendency of the economic surplus (profits) to rise. Some of this surplus can be absorbed by thR personal
consumption of capitalists. However, the historical trend, according to 8 ran and
Sweezy, is for dividends to rise more slowly than profit margins, so consumption
takes a steadily lower proportion of corporate profits over time.
Economic surplus can also be invested. However, since corporations will not make
investments that lower their profit margins, larger investments generally lead to
larger surpluses. This tendency is exacerbated by depreciation allowances which
are often sufficient to finance a large part of necessary investments, and by the
bias against introducing radicalyy new technologies which would require extensive
campital and disrupt established production processes. Thus, accelerating growth
eventually outstrips profitable investment opportunities, investment declines, and
so do income and employment. A recession or depression begins.
One other avenue of surplus absorption is still open, however: government taxation and spending. This brings us to the question of whether or not spending on
human services and civilian industries can serve as well as military spending to
generate demand and absorb the economic surplus.
Radicals insist that, within the present-day capitalist economy of the United
States, only military spending can sufficiently stimulate the economy. They cite
at least three important reaons for this claim. First, only through military
spending can government pump massive sums of money into the economy without competing with the private sector. Though spending on human and community needs could
absorb tremendous amounts of money and generate jobs and income, powerful interests
oppose this. A program to provide low-cost housing to poor Americans would threaten
landlords and the construction industry.
Rapid transit systems compete with automobiles and hence are opposed by the powerful oil, automobile and associated industries. A government role in providing health care to those who need it is fought
tooth and nail by the profit-oriented medical establishment. Examples could be
multiplied. The raising of armies and deployment of weapons is unique in that it
threatens no private enterprise.
Secondly, the government provision of adequate human services and the maintenance of employment opportunities for all people threatens the business elite. In
such a society, business would find it difficult to get workers for low-paying,
unpleasant jobs. This would add to their costs and decrease their profits.
Finally, it is only through military spending that government can waste enormous
sums of money and yet avoid public criticism. When the Pentagon quietly dismantled
its once-controversial Anti-Ballistic Missile system in 1976 after spending $6
billion on it, scarcely a word was heard. Weapons and armies are unique among taxfunded programs in that they can be scrapped as obsolete after ten or twenty years
of service. It is hard to imagine investing billions of tax dollars in a mass transit system, then quietly declaring it useless six years later and dismantling it.
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The public accepts such waste for at least three reasons: 1) fears about communism have been constantly stimulated and can be easily manipulated; 2) few people
can compare the functions of a bomber or tank to something which they use, and,
therefore, few can comprehend the absurdity of its high cost; and 3) no one feels
that she or he is supporting the needs of someone else at her/his own expense,
since the military ostensibly exists to protect (serve) everyone, not just the
poor, or the farmers, or welfare mothers.
There is plenty of evidence in recent history for the radical view that military
spending alone can adequately fill the need for additional demand in the capitalist
economy, given the political constraints inherent in the capitalist system. President Roosevelt's efforts to pull the country out of the Depression during the New
Deal only partially succeeded, for even in"this desperate situation, capitalist
restraints on competitive government spending were too strong to allow for a level
of ppending sufficient to restore the economy to full capacity. Only the massive
spending engendered by World War II could accomplish this.
Radicals also argue that the ability of the United States to project power
abroad through a large, heavily armed military is important to many owners and
managers of big business. Most corporations oppose foreign governments which favor
rapid democratizing economic and social changes (e.g. nationalization of industry,
land reform). The corporate elites generally favor more authoritarian governments
which guarantee "stability," a "safe investment climate," and freedom from "interference " from labor unions. These governments (e.g. South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia,
Iran, South Africa, Brazil, Chile) are supported by American arms, technicians and
advisors.
Since the experience of Vietnam, the United States and its corporate leaders
rely less on actual armed intervention (though that threat still exists, as the
Angola revolution demonstrated). Rather, say the radicals (and even some members
of Congress), the United States is arming client governments to carry out the
violent repression of revolutionary forces whose policies would threaten United
States investments. The arms industries and counter-insurgency expertise develupwo
by the American military-industrial complex are both necessary to this effort.
The fact that most American military spending serves to project U.S. power abroad
is no accident. Extensive conversion would threaten this capability.
Domestically, the military-industrial complex brings additional benefits to the
business elites who contributed so much to its growth. Hundreds of our largest
corporations get a tremendous amount of business and profits from military contracts. Estimates of the profitability of these contracts range from a 1971
Government Accounting Office figure of 56 percent on a sample of 146 completed
projects (as reported in DuBoff, 1972: 11) to a figure of 17.5 percent derived
by former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Murray Weidenbaum from a sample of
large military contracts let between 1962 and 1965. In contrast, the average rate
of return on investment in civilian industry is 10.6 percent (Reich and Finkelhor,
1972: 187).
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There are several reasons why profits are so high in military work. For one
thing, many military industries are dominated by a few giant corporations which
exercise near-monopolistic control over the field (e.g. aircraft, shipbuilding).
For another, contracts are seldom let solely on the basis of the lowet bid. A
third reason is the practice of contracting on a cost-plus basis, as explained
in the first section of the paper.
One reason for high profits in military work deserves special attention. Many
military contractors use government-owned plants and equipment in their work. As
of July, 1970, over 514 billion worth of industrial production equipment and
plants were used by private military contractors. In 1967, General Electric and
North American Rockwell (now Rockwell International) held more than $100 million
worth of publicly-owned capital goods, according to a General Accounting Office
report. The use of these facilities, of course, cuts costs and raises profit
margins (Shearer, 1973: 2). Many military companies now calculate their profits
as a percentage of sales rather than a percentage of their investment for this
reason. Such a procedure makes their profits appear smaller. This violates
normal accounting procedures as well as the traditional capitalist view that
profits are a return on investment, warranted by the risk involved in the
enterprise.
The government subsidizes the military corporations in other ways as
When Lockheed faced bankruptcy several years ago, the government bailed
with a guarantee of a $250 million loan. In 1972, the Navy bought $1.7
worth of stock in the Gap Instrument Company when cost overruns on Navy
threatened it (Shearer, 1973: 2).
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A final boon to the upper class brought by military business is the generation
of more high status, lucrative jobs than civilian business. The proportion of
scientists and engineers employed per value of product is oneper $150,000 in the
military sector, one per $750,000 in civilian electronics industries, and one per
52,000,000 in the automobile industry. Twenty-one percent more of every dollar
in military contracts goes to salaries and wages than in civilian-oriented production, and yet, as we have seen, military spending generates fewer jobs (DuBoff,
1972: 14). Military spending thus contributes proportionately more to the wealth
of the upper classes than does civilian spending.
To summarize the differences between the liberal and radical analyses of the
obstacles to conversion, liberals see the military-industrial complex as a distorted
enclave in a potentially sound capitalist economy. They believe that control of
this enclave resides in the Pentagon. They argue that spending on human needs in
civilian sectors of the economy could generate needed demand just as effectively
as military spending and that this could be done with no fundamental change in the
Many hold that the blame for not converting lies with
overall economic system.
the electorate since, after all, ultimate power in our democracy lies with the
voting public.
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Radicals believe that the military sector of the United States economy is not
an isolated enclave. On the contrary, they insist, it reaches deeply into and
operates on the same principles and with the same goals as other sectors of the
economy. As a result, it is strongly supported by most members of the business
and financial elite. The military-oriented sector is not a distortion of the
capitalist system, since the capitalist's primary goal is to maximize profits and
emlarge the power of their class--a goal which is all too admirably met by military
spending.
The radicals also reason that the long-term trend of steadily growing economic
surplus resulting from the basic capitalist drive for increasing profits makes some
form of government spending necessary. Because the capitalist system rules out
substantial government spending which would compete with private interests, only
military spending can "fit the bill" in such a large way.
Finally, radicals do not believe that power is distributed in such a way that
the public can simply be educated to vote for conversion. Rather, they argue, the
upper class of. business and government leaders has tremendous power to influence
the votes of Congresspeople and the opinions of the American people. No fundamental
change, such as economic conversion, can be carried out without re-distributing
power more equitably among the people of the United States.
Radicals conclude that significant conversion from military spending to industries and services which meet serious human and, community needs is impossible without converting in the process to some form of socialist economic system. A system
based on maximizing profits rather than meeting people's needs is structurally and
politically incapable of widespread conversion.
Strategies for Change
One's strategies for conversion depend upon whether one accepts the liberal or
the radical analysis of militarism and military spending.
Liberal strategies stress the development of conversion plans by government,
industry and labor analysts on the one hand and education of the electorate, Congress, unions and industry on the other. Seymour Melman's extensive studies into
the conversion process and new markets for military-oriented firms (cf. Melman,
1965, 1970 and 1974) are a good example of this. The work on retraining displaced
defense workers reported by Melman's colleague, Lloyd Dumas (in Melman, 1971) is
another example.
Most liberals recognize the enormity of the task. Conversion would have to be
made a national goal with the full energies of political, business, labor and professional leaders behind it to succeed. The effort would cost much money and create
considerable dislocation and difficulty in industries which are accustomed to
serving a single customer (the Pentagon) with extensive subsidization and high
profit guarantees.
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Melman has taken the liberal conversion message to Washington, to industry and
to the public. In 1969, for example, he testified on the subject of "Postwar
Economic Conversion" before the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. He
stressed the importance of advance planning "not only in private firms, but among
trade unions and professional associations of the relevant industries, and in city,
He urged Congress to begin by passing
state and federal governments" (1969: 9).
a bill proposed by Senator McGovern which would have established a federal conversion trust fund. The bill was modeled after the Reuther proposal described earlier
in this paper. It called for a federal conversion commission to administer the
fund and, in doing so, encourage and facilitate the conversion process.
The radicals' strategy differs from that of the liberals in at least two important respects: 1) Radicals believe that a successful conversion strategy must include
the development of publicly-owned and controlled service and production industries
and a transition to a socialist economic system. 2) Radicals insist that we must
organize a mass base for conversion in order to counter the power of the ruling
elite, whom radicals see as united in their support for military spending.
Derek Shearer, writing in Working Papers (Summer, 1973), stressed the need for
planning that includes "government spending to serve as a Keynesian balance wheel
in the economy."
"I propose," he continues, "that these plans and programs should
be based on the notions of community controlled economic development and publiclyowned production authorities at the state, regional and national level (1973: 2).
Strategically, this may sound like a retreat from radical calls for total revolution. It stems, however, from a realistic appraisal of the current situation in
the western world. During the past decade, some radicals expected the capitalist
system to topple from the weight of Vietnam, inflation, unemployment and unmet
human needs, Today, most radicals conclude that, whether or not the system finally
collapses from its internal contradictions, the Left must struggle for significant
change in the meantime.
In Strategy for Labor, Andre Corz argues that radicals can work for their yE,
of a new society through a step-by-step process of "radical structural reforms."
Reforms can be revolutionary, he stresses, if they involve a shift in power.
Specifically, a revolutionary reform should meet the following criteria (this
interpretation of Corz is based on remarks in an unpublished paper by Paula Ciese
written in 1973): 1) the reform improves the lot of the working class (or some
segment of it) at the expense of the ruling class; 2) the struggle for the reform
gets people organized on a mass basis to demand change rather than allowing representatives of the elites to bargain for lesser improvements; 3) the reform is
implemented and administered by those whom it benefits; 4) the effort involved in
winning the reform brings people together into structures of communication and
democratic decision-making; and 5) the struggle raises class consciousness. A
strategy for organizing around a series of such reforms would be a truly radical
strategy, argues Gorz.
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To return to Shearer, he sees the creation of community-controlled, publiclyowned service and production industries as an important revolutionary reform for
the United States. Such a program would enlarge the power of non-capitalist groups
and institutions in our society. Since hundreds of millions of dollars worth of
government-owned plant and equipment are already used by military contractors, why
not start there? (Shearer, 1973).
A good example of such a demand is the proposal by the Stop the B-1 Bomber/
National Peace Conversion Campaign to convert the El Segundo plant used by Rockwell
International to develop the 8-1 bomber. The El Segundo facility is owned by the
government. It is located near Los Angeles, which suffers from the lack of a
rapid transit system. As indicated earlier, the human and technological resources
of an airframe assembly plant are readily convertible to the design and production
of mass transit systems.
The Stop the 8-1/ Peace Conversion Campaign has proposed that the publiclyowned El Segundo plant be converted from the manufacture of 8-1 bombers to work
on a mass transit system for Los Angeles. This work should be done under the direction of a new, publicly owned "Southern California Transit Authority." Capital
for the enterprise could come initially through a federal grant representing a small
portion of the money saved by terminating the 8-1 program. Control should be exercised by a board selected by the people of the region or their elected representatives.
United States experience with the Tennessee Valley Authority and publicly-owned
utilities can provide Americans with valuable insights into structuring such
public control. The experience of many European countries, both western and
eastern, can tell us a lot about the advantages and problems of different forms
of public control. On a smaller scale, the experiments with community-development
corporations and workers' cooperatives should be instructive.
The next step in a radical strategy for conversion could be public acquisitic
of any private firm (or military sector of a large, diversified firm such as
General Electric or RCA) doing 75 percent of its business with the government.
Another possible candidate for takeover and conversion is the runaway shop.
As
many multinational corporations leave their workers and communities in the lurch
by shifting production to foreign facilities, their domestic plants could be
appropriated by the state or local government.
Many radicals are interested in the concept of worker-controlled industries.
Part of their conversion strategy is to develop worker-controlled boards which
would oversee the management of the factories or workplaces. Many experiments
in worker and union participation in management are urgently needed.
Radical strategies for conversion often incorporate other demands which meet
some or all of the Corzian criteria for radical reforms. Many demand that corporations "open the books." Corporate accounts are among the world's best kept secrets,
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as became clear when Congressional committees tried to investigate alleged profit
Although all corporations must release reports on
excesses in the oil industry.
their financial activities, the complexity of their operations and the absence of
any clear, standard accounting procedures allows them considerable room to maneuver.
Barnet and Muller state that many multinational corporations keep separate books
for different purposes. They also claim that government regulators are years behind in understanding complex corporate accounting procedures (Barnet and Muller,
1974).
George Lakey suggests that a conversion campaign draft legislation requiring
that every corporation doing more than five percent of its business with the PentaSuch a demand should be coupled
gon open its accounts to the public (1975: 16-17).
with the establishment of standard accounting procedures by the Government Accounting Office. If implemented, a small measure of corporate power would be broken,
and the public would be better able to exercise meaningful control.*
The Reuther proposal for a conversion trust fund overseen by a federal convermion
commission has also been suggested as an element in a radical conversion strategy.
In testimony before the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare in 1969,
Walter Reuther, then President of the United Auto Workers, said in part:
What the outline proposes, in essence, is that a proportion of each contractor's profits from defense production be required to be set aside as a
conversion reserve to be held in a government trust fund.
Monies deposited in the trust fund would be released to carry out a conversion plan filed with the government by the contractor and to pay certain
types of benefits to the contractor's workers to minimize hardships they
might suffer during the transition to civilian production (1970: 17).
In commenting on this proposal, Paula Giese suggests confiscating 100 percent
of a corporation's profits on military production, as calculated by standard Government Accounting Office auditing procedures. She also would insist that the
conversion commission include working people from affected plants, paid for their
time out of the trust fund. In addition to considering the technical and econoniiL
feasibility of proposed conversion plans, she believes that the commission should
examine the usefulness and desirability of the products to the general public,
the "humanizing" of the production processes and the environmental effects of both
the new industrial activity and the goods produced (Giese, 1973).
All radical proposals for conversion strategies, like the liberal strategies,
begin with the need for education and consciousness raising. The radical process
must include an analysis of the present system of monopoly capital and the militaryindustrial complex, a vision of a more just and democratic society, and ideas
about how to get from here to there. Many radicals stress the value of structuring
*ror those Interested in pursuing this approach, Open the Books: How to Research a
Corporation is an excellent manual on how to research your local corporation,
corporate subsidiary, bank or real estate company. It is available from Urban
Planning Aid, Inc., 639 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA, 02139.
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empowering experiences into the educational process itself (e.g. by making this
process a thoroughly democratic one).
As a reflection of its concern for economic and social justice, a radical conversion campaign could enter coalitions with the thousands of neighborhood, citywide, state and national organizations struggling to meet human needs, establish
economic justice, end sexual and racial exploitation and initiate socialism. Such
coalitions could struggle within the arena of legislation and electoral politics,
through the development of alternative institutions and through nonviolent direct
actions.
One campaign which has tried to organize around the issue of conversion is the
Stop the 6-1 Bomber/ National Peace Conversion Campaign. The American Friends
Service Committee and Clergy and Laity Concerned initiated this effort in 1973.
It has involved hundreds of organizers in an effort to stop the 8-1 bomber (mainly
through public pressure on Congress), expose and challenge the military-industrial
complex and promote peace conversion. Many of those associated with the campaign
held the radical view of militarism and conversion, others a more liberal one.
While enlisting the support of tens of thousands of liberal Americans, many organizers tried to introduce a more radical analysis, and sometimes strategy, to the
struggle.
In addition to trying to stop the 8-1 bomber from going into production, the
Stop the B-1/ Peace Conversion Campaign tried to use the B-1 bomber as a means
of approaching the conversion issue. Since the B-1 is so costly and ineffective,
even in conventional military terms, it has led people to question the system
which proposed and wants to produce it. The B-1 program includes many classic
features of military contracting:
low job generating potential, the drain of
billions of dollars ($92 billion) in tax money from pressing human needs, the
use of government-owned property, cost over-runs, heavy corporate lobbying and
public relations efforts. A campaign to stop the B-1 almost necessarily exposes
these.
Most of this campaign's conversion work has been educational. One tactic has
been particularly successful. Many campaigners have organized peace conversion
In the Northwest section of Philadelphia, for
fairs, or "Fair Shake Festivals."
instance, a group of neighborhood people and I estimated how much money their
community would pay if the 8-1 system were built--approximately $19 million. We
then approached local organizations with this information and asked them to join
us in a Festival to demand a "fair shake" for all. Each participating group prepared a booth in which it demonstrated the kind of work it was doing to meet the
needs of the community and how it could use the millions of dollars which could be
"returned" to Northwest Philadelphia over the next thirty years if the 6-1 program
were terminated. Over forty organizations, ranging from peace groups to the
Germantown Home and School Association, participated.
The 8-1 bomber has proved to be a good "handle" for the conversion issue. As
the President and Congress reach a final decision on 6-1 production, however, many

organizers are developing conversion programs around local issues or institutions.
One such program is the Mid-Peninsula Conversion Project in California's Santa
Clara County. Corporations in this county hold more military contracts than those
in any other county in the United States. The project is reaching out to disaffected engineers and workers at many of these military plants through leafletting, a
monthly newspaper, meetings and support groups. One group of engineers left Lockheed and formed a small solar energy company with assistance from the project.
Many local conversion efforts are being initiated by B-l/ Peace Conversion
Campaign organizers. Inquiries about these programs can be addressed to: American
Friends Service Committee, Peace Education Division, 1501 Cherry St., Philadelphia,
PA, 19102.
As people become more concerned about the power of our enormous economic and
government institutions and about the serious human problems in our well-endowed
nation, the potential for meaningful change grows. Struggles to meet human needs,
establish sexual, racial and social justice, empower the oppressed, oppose unfair
taxes, create democratic economic structures and develop alternative institutions
all contribute to human security, which indeed should be the fundamental concern
of any conversion program.
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ECONOMIC CONVERSION, PRODUCTIVE EFFICIENCY
AND SOCIAL WELFARE

Lloyd J. Dumas, Associate Professor, Columbia University

Introduction
Traditional economic theory holds that there is a tradeoff between inflation and unemployment, and that accordingly price
stability (i.e. 0% inflation) can only be achieved at the expense
of increased unemployment, while jull
employment (corresponding to
an unemployment rate of about 3%)' requires acceptance of an ongoing
inflation.
In 1960, the noted economists Paul Samuelson and Robert
Solow published an analysis of annual data for the per d 1933-1958,
from which they quantitatively estimated this tradeoff.
It was
their rough estimate that the elimination of inflation would require
acceptance of a 5%-6% rate of unemployment while the achievement of
full employment would impose a continuing 4%-5% rate of inflation.
In a later study Lawrence Klein and Ronald Bodkin looked at quarterly data from 1946-57 and concluded that an unemployment rate of 6.9%
would have to be maintained In order to achiev price stability,
thus implying a slightly more severe tradeoff.3
The fact is that over the last several years, inflation and unemployment have both been persistently near, and often substantially
beyond, these high tradeoff limits simultaneously.
During the calendar year 1975, the U.S. national unemployment rate was averaging
8.5% at the same time the consumer price index was rising by 6.5%.4
Something had clearly changed in the U.S. economy to produce this
unprecedented high inflation/high unemployment situation.
The
question is what?
An important part of the answer lies not in the events of the
last few years by themselves but rather is rooted in a much longer
process of cumulative economic deterioration stretching over the
past few decades.
Furthermore, this process does not derive from a
fatal flaw in the workings of the U.S. economic system. It is
neither necessary nor inevitable.
Rather it Is the unintended result of a conscious decision, with broad popular support, to adhere
to a system of national priorities which has given primacy to the
development and maintenance of a sector which is particularly unproductive from a purely economic viewpoint -- the military.
When
the U.S., for the first time in its history, entered into a protracted era of high military spending following the close of the
Second World War, it sowed the seeds of the economic decline whose
bitter harvest it is just beginning to reap.
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The initial section of this analysis traces the mechanism by
which the persistence of high military spending has played a major
role in producing the economic deterioration underlying the present
U.S. recession/inflation, and highlights the implications of this
deterioration for social welfare. The second section deals with the
nature of the serious economic and political barriers that have
developed to the reversal of this economic and social decline.
Finally, we consider the kinds of policies which should be effective
in overcoming these barriers and accomplishing the transition from
military to civilian orientation which is a necessary pre-condition
of a serious and successful effort to improve the economic and social
welfare of the people of the United States. Some of the plethora of
conceivable productive uses of the resources freed from the military
are discussed.
The Economic Effects of Military Spending
The idea that persistently high defense spending could play a
major role in producing economic decline flies in the face of one of
the most deeply ingrained and widely held economic beliefs: that a
capitalist economic system benefits from (or at the very least is not
harmed by) high levels of military expenditure. From the far left to
the far right, there seems to be consensus on this one point. But
the fact that a belief is deeply ingrained and widely held does not
make it true.
Interestingly enough, Adam Smith, regarded as the father of
rough and tumble laissez faire capitalism, did not share this view.
On the contrary, Smith apparently saw military spending as economically parasitic, writing in his epic The Wealth of Nations (published in 1776):
0...the whole army and navy are unproductive labourers...
Such people, as they themselves produce nothing, are all maintained by the produce of other men's labour. When multiplied
...unproductive hands, who should be maintained by a part only
of the spare revenue of the people, may consume so great a
share of their whole revenue, and therefore...encroach...upon
the funds destined for the maintenance of productive labour,
that all the frugality and good conduct of individuals may not
be able to compensate the waste and degradation of produce
5
occasioned by this violent and forced encroachment.0
There are essentially four reasons why the maintenance of high
levels of military expenditure in the U.S. over the past thirty years
has produced both inflation and unemployment. These are: (1) the
economic nature of military goods; (2) the way in which military procurement has been conducted; (3) effects on the international balance
of payments; and (4) effects on civilian technological progress.
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6
Each of these is now considered in turt.

The Economic Nature of Military Goods. Military goods are those
products purchased by the military which are to some degree specialized to military use. Thus, tanks, rifles, bombs, fighter planes,
etc. are military goods, while milk, meat, detergents, etc. purchased
by the armed forces are not.
Military goods so defined are peculiar in that they neither contribute to the present standard of living (as do consumer goods,
housing, health care, etc.) nor to the economy's capacity to produce
and distribute "standard of fling'
goods and services in the future
(as do industrial machinery, trucks, warehouses, factories, school
buildings, etc.).
That is not to say military goods are useless, but
merely that they do not augment the present or future standard of
living in the way that the various consumer goods, producer goods and
social services do, and thus do not possess the same kind of economic
usefulness. However, despite the fact that they do not produce economic value in the above sense, they do require valuable economic resources for their production, and therefore impose a real cost on
society. This cost is best measured not purely in terms of money,
but rather in terms of the sacrifice of the economically useful social
and economic goods and services that could have been produced with the
labor, materials, energy, machinery, etc. which were instead devoted
to military production.
Because the money paid out to the producers of military goods
does not call forth a corresponding production of goods and services
which can be purchased by business firms and consumers, the conditions
are created whereby there may be an excess of demand relative to supply of goods. If this occurs, it will produce pressure toward a rise
in the general level of prices, i.e. inflation. This potential contribution to inflation is the easiest part of the military spending
problem to handle for two reasons:
(1) it is only a serious problem
when employment is full or near full; and (2) it can be offset, say
by raising taxes sufficiently to remove enough money from the rest of
the public to balance the flow of funds being spent on military goods.
However, during periods of full employment, the money flows for the
military have not been fully offset, and so have contributed to producing inflation.
For example, during nearly all of the latter
part
of the decade of the 1960's, when the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam
War was intensifying, the unemployment rate was under 4%.7 Military
spending was not offset, agd between 1965 and 1969, the rate of inflation more than tripled.
Military Procurement Practices. Whatever the payment formula forMally written into major defense procurement contracts, they have all
in practice been what are known as 'cost plus' contracts.9 These are
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contracts in which the producing firm is paid an amount equal to its
total cost of production (whatever that eventually turns out to be)
plus a profit. Operating under such a system, the firm involved not
only has no risk, but also has no incentive to hold its costs down.
To the extent that the firm wants to increase its sales revenue, it
will have a very powerful incentive to run its costs up in order to
achieve the highest possible payment for its product. U
Combining this incentive system with the very large amounts of
money made available for military procurement year after year by the
Congress has created a situation in which military industry has bid
up the prices of key resources. Chief among these are engineering
and scientific personnel, and some grades of highly skilled production labor. Aside from its direct effects in increasing the cost of
these resources to civilian industry thus adding to the pressure toward inflation, the purchasing power of defense firms, backed by
their rich customer (the Federal Government), has completely preempted a substantial amount of some of these resources, with serious
long term effects on the health of the civilian economy.
For example, by one crude and conservative estimate nearly onethird of all the engineers and scientists ii the United States were
engaged in defense-related work as of 1967.1 Assistant Secretary
of the Treasury Murray Weidenbaum had earlier put the figure at
12
The pre-emption by the military of such a large fraction of
52 %.
what we will subsequently see is a critical resource in a modern industrial society, cannot fail to have significant effects on the
functioning of that part of the economy that produces goods and services which do contribute to the standard of living and the quality
of life.
International Balance of Payment Effects. From 1893 through 1970,
year by year the U.S. had a balance of trade surplus, i.e. the U.S.
exported a greater value of goods and services than it imported.
Since exports bring foreign currency into the U.S., while imports
send U.S. dollars abroad, if this had been the only aspect of the
U.S.' international transactions, there would have been a considerable
accumulation of foreign currencies (or gold) in the U.S., and a comparative shortage of U.S. dollars abroad.
Consequently the U.S. dollar would have been one of the strongest (if not the strongest) currencies in the world. However, the balance of payments includes not
only money flows related to trade, but alother international money
flows as well, and the U.S. balance of payments has been in continuous deficit for many years.
What role has U.S. military expenditure played in this situation?
It has affected the U.S. international economic position directly
through outflows of U.S. dollars for defense expenditures abroad, and
indirectly through its effects on the balance of trade, chiefly via
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its influence on the competitiveness of U.S. civilian industries in
foreign and domestic markets.
In the table below are presented some basic U.S. Department of
Commerce data which bear on the direct effects of military expenditures abroad and on the U.S. international financial situation. We
note that the entire cumulative balance of payments deficit for the
period 1960-1970 (inclusive) was $35 billion, whereas over the same
period total direct defense expenditures (net after military sales
abroadl were more than $30 billion. Hence, U.S. military expenditures abroad accounted for 86.61 of the entire U.S. balance of payments deficit during that period.
During the years 1955-1970 (inclusive) there was a huge inflow
of foreign currencies into the U.S., represented by a cumulative
balance of trade surplus of nearly $62 billion. But during those
same years, net military expenditures abroad were responsible for an
outflow of dollars from the U.S. amounting to more than $43 billion.
The outflow of U.S. currency owing to military spending abroad thus

wiped out 69.9X of the balance of trade surplus, 1955-1970.
Perhaps an even more striking fact is that total net direct
defense expenditures abroad over the entire 20 year period from 1955
to 1974 were more than 10% greater than the total balance of trade
surplus.
These comparisons greatly understate the magnitude of U.S. defense expenditures abroad, because they do not include outright U.S.
grants of military goods and services. Since they involve no international flows of currency, these gifts of military equipment and
services are not involved in the balance of money flows. However if
included, the total of almost $34 billion worth of such grants recorded during the years 1960-1974 would increase the military expenditure figures given for that period by more than 80%.1B
It is clear from these data that direct outflows of dollars In
the form of U.S. military expenditures abroad played a major role in
destroying the favorable balance of trade surplus, and contributed
to the severe weakening of the U.S. dollar. This substantially
raised the price of imported goods (including oil) upon which the
nation's business and consumers have become increasingly dependent in
the past few years.
This massive outflow of military spending abroad
has directly and substantially contributed to the generation of inflation within the domestic U.S. economy.
Milita Expenditure and Civilian Technological Progress.
Technological progress is one of the cornerstones or modern industrial society.
It is often seen as a kind of unidirectional force,
which presses onward, almost with its own imperative, compelling
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U.S. Military Exoenditures Abroad and the International
Balance of Payments
Vear 1

9alance
of Trade
($millions)

1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960

1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
TOTAL

Balance of
3
Payments
($millions)

Net Direct Defense 4
Expenditures Abroad

($millilons)

2,897

2,501

4,753
6,271
3,462
1,148
4,892
5,571

2,627
2,466
2,835

2,503

-3,667
-2,252

4,521

-2,864

5,224

-2 713
-2,696
-2,478
-2,151
-4 683
-1,611

6,801
4,951
3,817
3,800
635
607
2,603
-2,268
-6,409

955
-5,528

2,752
2,596
2,449
2,304
2,133
2,122

2,935
3,226
3,143

-6,081

3,328

-3,851
-21,965
-13 829
-7,651

3,354

-19,043

2,159

48,703

2,893
3,621

2,316
54,263

Notes: 1. Problems of data availability and comparability complicate
a more complete analysis over the entire post World War II
period.
2. Exports-imports, merchandise, adjusted excluding military
(minus implies deficit)
3. Net liquidity balance (minus implies deficit)
4. Direct defense expenditures - military sales (does not include military grants of goods and services)
Sources:

Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce,
Business Statistics (1973), pp. 13-14, and Survey of Current
Business (June 1975), pp. 26 and 30.
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people to adjust themselves to the kind of world it produces.
Actually nothing could be farther from the truth. There is
nothing mystical about the development and application of new technical knowledge -- it is merely the product of individuals, trained
in the appropriate scientific and engineering disciplines, trying to
solve the problems toward which their attention is directed. Technology has no initiative of its own, nor is it unidirectional. Its
advance can be accelerated or slowed by altering the magnitude of resources devoted to that purpose. It may be channeled in many different directions by changing the nature of the problems set before
the engineers and scientists who develop it.
Technology is not a
single lane road down which we must travel at a speed beyond our
control. It is a complex interconnected network which is explored at
a pace and in a pattern largely determined by social decision, within
the limits placed upon us chiefly by the availability of appropriately trained engineering and scientific personnel.
The critical functions of civilian technological development in
a modern society are to enhance the quality of products available and
to improve the efficiency with which these products are produced.
Here the word 'products' is defined broadly to include not merely manufactured goods, but rather the whole range of goods and services,
power supply, transportation etc.

As the cost of labor, fuel, raw materials, machinery and other
productive resources rise over time, they exert an upward pressure on
the cost of producing any given product, and hence on its price. The
only way this pressure can be relieved, i.e. the only way the production cost per unit of product can be held down in the face of rising
input costs is by finding more efficient ways of utilizing these inputs.
If, for example, an improved production technique were developed which allowed us to produce 10% more output from the same combination of inputs we had been using, we could offset up to a 10% increase
in the cost of every input by implementing this technique, and therefore hold production cost steady despite the rise in labor, fuel, etc.
costs. Accordingly there would be no cost pressure to raise the
product's price.
Thus cost increases can be offset by increases in
This latter
quantity is known
the output produced per unit of input.
as productivity.
Particular attention is often focused on the rising cost of the
labor resource, and therefore on the behavior of its potential offset,
iabor productivity,
Civilian technological progress plays a crucial
the improvement of labor productivity.
On the one
to-sited roleIn
hand, direct improvements in production techniques increase the outOn the other hand, techput obtainable from a given amount of labor.
nological progress in the industries that produce the machinery and
equipment used in the production of all goods and services make the
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purchase of that machinery and equipment more attractive to all producers by holding down its price (through improvements in production
techniques) and enhancing its quality. As labor prices rise, the
availability of relatively inexpensive high capability machinery will
lead producers to purchase more and better machinery, thus increasing
the output produced per worker. Therefore, both directly and indirectly civilian technological development plays a vital role in
maintaining the economy's ability to offset higher labor (and other
resource) costs, and removing the "cost-push" pressures toward inflation.
We have noted that between one-third and one-half of the engineering and scientific personnel in the U.S. have been directing
their attention to the development of technology oriented to military
uses. The magnitude of this diversion is even greater than these
quantitative estimates Indicate, since the combination of high prestige and high pay associated with military-related work have tended to
attract the top-ranking graduates in the various disciplines into this
area. The pre-emption of such a large portion of the nation's technological talent by the military cannot fail to have a strong adverse
impact on the rate of civilian technological development.
The argument is often made that the technology developed in the
pursuit of military oriented goals can also be applied to civilian
purposes. To be sure there is some occasional "spillover". But what
is found is strongly conditioned by what is sought. Advances in civilian technology, whether they be improved techniques of power generation or food preservation, will typically be found faster and at a
much reduced expense if they are pursued directly. Furthermore, to
the limited extent spillover exists between military and ci ylian
technological developments, it operates in both directions.' " At any
rate the acid test of the high spillover argument is essentially an
empirical one: if it is true, then the pre-emption of technological
resources should not have substantially diminished the rate of civilian technological progress.
By early 1976, the indications of decline in U.S. civilian technological development were so manifest that they could no longer be
ignored by either business people or the science establishment. The
February 16, 1976 issue of Business Week carried an article entitled
"The Breakdown of U.S. Innovationw, the introduction of which included the following, '...from boardroom to research lab, there is a
growing sense that something has happened to American innovation..
the country's genius for invention is not what it used to be." 15 The
following month, the release to Congress of the seventh annual report
of the National Science Board, the governing body of the National
Science Foundation, was reported in the New York Times under the headline "U.S. Science Lead is Found Eroding". The news account began,
"The international predominance of the United States in science and
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technology has suffered erosion in the past 15 years...l

6

Several years earlier, a special report in Business Week detailed the increasing difficulties being encountered by industry
after industry in the U.S. as a result of the decline of U.S. civilian technological progress. U.S. heavy machinery builders were running into fierce foreign competition on price and design as early as
the early 1960's. U.S. companies increasingly licensed the rights
to European developed technology in such high technology industries
as chemicals and electrical equipment. In shipbuilding and electrical power transmission, American firms adopted improved methods developed by Swedish firms. In steel manufacture and in construction,
U.S. industry lagged behind Japanesy and European industry in the
application of improved techniques. 7
The economic and social effects of this civilian technological
retardation are very serious. Since civilian-oriented technological
progress is a key element in the productivity process, which is in
turn critical to the economy's cost-offsetting capability, the slowing
of that progress directly implies that rises in the costs of labor,
fuels, materials, etc. will increasingly result in higher production
costs for a whole range of products. In the case of goods and services produced by private enterprise, these production cost increases
must evegtually
be passed along to consumers in the form of higher
prices. 1o In the case of governmentally provided transportation,
health care, educational and other social services, taxes will have
to be increased to pay for increased costs, direct charges that may
in some cases be levied on users of these services to cover a portion
of their cost will have to be raised, and/or services will have to be
curtailed.
Publicly provided or subsidized social services, which would not
normally be expected to experience substantial cost-offsetting technological progress in the absence of this military diversion of technologists, e.g. education, suffer considerable cost-push inflationary
pressures as a direct result of the retardation of civilian technological progress elsewhere. The cost of every material input they require, will be rising because of the failure of technological advance
in the industries which produce those inputs.
The failure of the cost offsetting mechanism implied by the military's pre-emption of a large share of the nation's engineers and
scientists thus clearly leads to a substantial and ongoing inflation.
But, at the same time, it also plays a major role in generating unemployment.
On the one hand, the rising costs of publicly provided
economic and social services may persuade or compel state and local
governments to curtail these services because of the real or perceived
Intolerance of their constituents for tax increases sufficient to
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maintain them. This directly results in the loss of jobs by those
individuals who were formerly engaged in providing these services.
The rising prices of domestic private producers of goods and
services make their products less and less competitive in both foreign and domestic markets, especially relative to those foreign producers in nations which continue to place sustained emphasis on the
development of civilian-oriented technical knowledge. The relative
loss of markets by domestic producers to foreign firms, both in the
U.S. and abroad, results in cutbacks in domestic production which in
turn generate unemployment even in the face of relatively high product demand. Hence extraordinary situations of simultaneously high
demand and rising unemployment can develop, such as the existence, in
July 1971, of 16, unemployment in Detroit (and near 10% in Michigan
as a whole) during the best auto sales year in the nation's history
to that date. 1 9
The loss of foreign markets by U.S. producers shows up as a decline in exports, the loss of domestic markets as an increase in imports. But falling exports and rising imports result in a deterioration of the balance of trade.
So it was in 1971 that the balance of
trade finally turned against the United States, after more than threequarters of a century of continuous annual surplus. Clearly this further aggravated the balance of payments deficit, weakened the dollar
and hence constituted yet another indirect contribution of the military to inflation.
Faced with a progressive inability to offset high resource costs,
particularly that of labor, U.S. business firms began moving their
operations to areas in which labor costs were much lower than in the
U.S. This substantially aggravated the nation's unemployment problem.
A few of the numerous examples of this "export" of jobs from the U.S.
are the loss of 2000 machinists' jobs in Utica, New York as a consequence of General Electric's transfer of its operations to Singapore
between 1966 and 1972; General Instrument's closing of plants in
Massachusetts and Rhode Island and subsequent hiring of more than
7000 workers in Taiwan; and the complete transfer of all of its consumer electronic components manufacturing operations overseas by
Westi nghouse. 0
Thus, for a number of reasons the decline in civilian technological progress resulting from the relative concentration of U.S. technological talent on military research is perhaps the most important
of the severe inflation and unemployment generating effects of the
past three decades of persistently high military expenditure.
It has
resulted not merely from the gross military pre-emption of engineers
and scientists, but also from the feedback effect that pre-emption has
had on engineering and scientific education in the United States.
This feedback has to some extent affected even those technologists who
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have opted for civilian-oriented research.
Social Welfare Implications of the Economic Effects of Military
Spending. To the extent that an individual's income rises at least
as fast as the price level, that individual will be partly protected again§l the erosion of his or her ability to purchase goods and
services.
Hence, that person should be able to maintain or improve
that part of his or her material standard of living that is related
to the direct acquisition of those products in the market place. However, any individual whose income is not keeping pace with the inflation will experience a lessened ability to buy goods and services and
thus a reduced standard of living. Those living on essentially fixed
incomes will suffer the most severe decline.
For various reasons, the people whose incomes rise the most slowly or are totally fixed, tend to be those lowest on the economic ladder to begin with, e.g. the elderly, the chronically unemployed, the
unskilled. And for such individuals, the loss of purchasing power resulting from inflation is not merely a source of inconvenience or discomfort, but of real deprivation.
The inflation-related rise in the cost of state and local public
services, such as fire and police protection, education, mass transportation, health care, etc. particularly in the presence of continued
diversion of the lion's share of discretionary Federal funds to military programs, must lead to higher taxes and/or increasingly severe
cutbacks in services provided. Curtailments in such essential services diminish everyone's well-being both in the short and long run.
The economically underprivileged, because they lack alternatives,
tend to be the most dependent on publicly provided services as well as
direct public support. They are most severely burdened by state and
local governmental cutbacks. Those in the economically middle class
undergo a two-sided squeeze, bearing a large part of the growing tax
burden required to cover the rising costs of state and local services,
while not being sufficiently wealthy to protect themselves against at
least some of the service cutbacks without real sacrifice (say by removing their children from deteriorating public schools and placing
them in high quality private schools). Even higher income individuals
suffer as a result of reduced police and fire protection.
As to unemployment, the economic damage caused by sustained high
military spending is again disproportionately borne by those least
able to economically cope with it. Low income workers are in that
status partly because of a lack of skills, partly because of various
types of ethnic discrimination, and partly because they are either
unorganized or organized into relatively weak unions. They are normally considered the most marginal laborers, and are accordingly the
first to be laid off as production is reduced in response to lowered
sales.
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Another very important social effect which has developed as a
result of the unemployment effects of prolonged military emphasis is
the potential for reversal of the labor force gains made by some
ethnic minority groups and women during the past decade. The widespread, nearly pervasive practice of laying off those workers with
least seniority first has put at greater risk all those who have
made recent penetration into employment areas formerly closed to them.
Unemployment always diminishes not only the economic and social
welfare of those who are unemployed, but also of society in general.
It represents a failure to develop and fully utilize labor, and as
such implies the sacrifice of a part of the potential contribution
to economic and social wellbeing of which that resource is capable.
Ongoing excessive inflation, high unemployment, rising taxes,
curtailment of basic and essential state and local government services, a continuing deterioration of a substantial part of the nation's economic and social infrastructure -- these are the legacy of
thirty years of excessive military expenditure. Far from being economically beneficial, high defense spending has been a cancer on the economy and on the society.
And like a cancer, the damage it does will
compound as long as we permit it to persist.
The Nature of the Conversion Problem
It is perfectly possible to return the economy to its previous
civilian orientation without producing severe economic and social
dislocations during the period of transition. But there are real
economic, political and social obstacles to overcome. The nature of
the distortions produced in the economy by the long term emphasis on
military expenditure are such as to require structural intervention
to correct. Simple macro-economic policies like manipulating the
money supply, cutting taxes, offering investment tax breaks to business, etc. may be helpful, but they cannot conceivably come near
being sufficient to produce a smooth transition. We will see why, as
we consider, in turn, some of the major components of the conversion
problem.
The Conversion of Engineers and Scientists. Since so much of the economic damage inflicted by high military spending has resulted from Its
adverse effects on civilian technological progress, the successful
conversion of engineers and scientists from military-related to civillan-oriented research is especially critical to rebuilding the nation's
economic strength. Since society has an enormous investment in the
training of these individuals, it would be extraordinarily wasteful to
merely find any sort of civilian job for them.
For both these reasons, we will assume that the conversion process is required to provide these engineers and scientists with the kind of civilian work
which utilizes their skills.
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A very important part of the problem of converting technologists to civilian research is rooted in the differences between requirements for successful military and civilian technological development. Present day high technology military products are extremely
complex, and are designed with an effort to squeeze every possible
ounce of performance out of the product. Whether or not this extra
performance capability actually has military significance, the presumption that it does c arly underlies the practice of weapons reThis has led to the assignment of large
search and development.
teams of technologists to the design of weapons systems, each, in
effect, developing and designing a part of a part. Accordingly, the
need to become expert in a very narrow range of knowledge has led to
extreme specialization of engineers and scientists engaged in military-related work. In addition, the extreme priority attached to
military funding, combined with the common practice of procuring weapons on an effectively cost-plus basis and the pressure for even small
increments in weapons capability, has led to a virtually complete deemphasis on the cost implications of design. In fact, more expensive
designs will certainly result in increases in sales revenue and typically in profit as well to the firms which generate them.
Successful design for the civilian market place, on the other
hand, requires very heavy emphasis on the implications of the specific design for the cost of producing the ultimate product. This implies that designers, rather than being extremely specialized, should
have a fairly clear concept of the overall design of the product and
the interactions of its subcomponents. This, together with a basic
understanding of the effects on cost of modifying the design in one
way or another, will enable them to trade off changes in one part of
the design against changes in the other to achieve desired product
performance at the lowest possible cost. Keeping production cost down
enables the price to be kept at a level which will make the product
attractive to potential customers, and hence bring expanded sales and
profit to the firm.
Because of these differences, engineers and scientists performing
defense work must be retrained and re-oriented before they can be
They do not need to
successful in civilian research and development.
be completely retrained because much of what they already know is alBut their overspecialization needs to
so required for civilian work.
be undone and they must be sensitized to the cost issue, and thus put
in touch with civilian design realities.
The conversion process must also be extended to the educational
institutions responsible for the training of engineers and scientists.
These institutions have, altered their curricula to emphasize specialization, especially in areas and sub-areas of interest to the military, and strongly de-emphasize training in cost-related matters.
Instruction in mundane civilian-oriented areas like, for example,
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power engineering was curtailed or eliminated, particularly at the
'best' schools. All this was an appropriate institutional response
to the changing shape of the high-pay/high-prestige opportunities
available to their graduates. And yet, these changes meant that
even those engineers and scientists who did go directly into civilian
areas were to some extent less than optimally trained for the development of civilian-oriented technological progress. Therefore, this
response served only to exacerbate the deterioration of U.S. civilian
technology and thus the nation's economic problems.
The inability of military-oriented engineers and scientists to
move into civilian-oriented research and development without conversion retraining is indicated by the commonly observed tendency of
technologists, laid off because of the termination of a defense contract, to either move to another geographic area in which defense
firms have just received new contracts, take jobs which do not involve engineering and scientific work or simply remain unemployed until the contracts return. This tendency has been read by some as an
indication that civilian technology is not starved by the diversion
of engineers and scientists to military areas as we have argued, since
they are not 'grabbed up* by cilian industrial research programs
when they do become unemployed.
But, that the failure of these technologists to be readily absorbed into civilian industry is due to the
inappropriateness of their training and not an overall lack of demand
is illustrated, for example, by the development of a critical shortage of enginprs qualified to design new power plants reported in the
early 1970's", side by side with the existence of an unemployed pool
of military-oriented engineers.
Management Conversion. The management of military industrial firms
operate in a very different atmosphere from that which prevails in
civilian-oriented enterprise. Defense firms have, in practice, only
one customer -- the United States Government. They cannot sell their
products to civilian customers in any case, and can sell to foreign
governments only with ge direct and specific approval of the U.S.
Department of Defense.
Even so, weapons sold to foreign governments
were originally designed, developed, and produced for sale to the U.S.
Government.
The one-customer orientation produces a very different sales and
marketing situation from that faced by civilian firms. Rather than
knowing how to run an effective electronic and print media advertisIng campaign, how to survey markets for public acceptance of a new
product line, how to price a product for penetration into new markets or expansion of existing ones, etc., it becomes critical to know
the minute detail of the Armed Services Procurement Regulations, to
develop good working relationships with key government procurement personnel, and to be able to lobby effectively with members of the Congress,
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Anothe-r critical difference is that the single customer does not
itself tave to sell its product in a market place.
it does not therefore have to worry eith_r about the effects on the ultimate price of
its "product* of paying too much for the goods it buys, or the danger
of its being forced into loss or bankruptcy by a drop in its sales if
the equipment it purchases does not perform well.
"his strongly interacts with a third critical factor, the extremely high priority accorded to defense procurement, currently supported by at least national public acquiescence, if not implicit consensus. This not only assures that the Lefense Department will contirnue to be a very rich customer, but also that its purchase decisions
will be readily validated by both the ConE-ress and the I-resident.
Thus, thne wealthy customer that military industry services faces no
economic market test, and only the very loosest political constraints.
-he net effect of these last two factors has been to guarantee
at least higher revenues and typically higher profits to those military firms which are most effective in running up the cost of the
oroducts which they are contracted to produce, often regardless of
whether or not these products perform as they were supposed to.
A
management operating in such milieu will become very effective at finding ways of producing at high cost.
But this sort of management trainIng and experience is completely inappropriate to successful operation
in civilian markets, where holding costs down, is the crucial skill.
Cne of the most striking examples of the contrast between the way
in which products get produced for militarY as opposed to civilian
markets lies in the comparison of the Boeing 747 and the Lockheed C5A
carro plane.
Both of these are jumbo jets of roughly comparable size,
but the former was designed and produced for sale to the airlines and

the latter for sale to the Air Force. The 747 is a smooth flying,
hizhly reliable aircraft flown daily by nearly every majcr airline in
the world, and is as energy efficient when fully loaded as a Volkswagon beetle carrying only its driver. -he C4A has been plajued by
severe operating difficulties including cracking of the wing pylons,
crash-producing failures of the rear cargo door, and considerable
landing gear problems. The Air Force has acknowledge-thatg cargo version of the 747 could carry a larger payload than the C5A.11 In 1971,
the 747 sold at about 23 million per plane, the C5A about jLO mil-,
lion per plane. -urthermore, wing defects on the CfA which reduced'2
Its estimated service life by more than 70, were projected to cost
1.3 billion
repair, nearly doubling the original cost estimates for
the program.-]
That managements of military firms are rewarded for high cost,
despite low product quality and poor performance, is illustrated by
the following listing of article headlines excerpted from the New York
Times:
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(l) "Nine Spy Planes Lost in Crashes, Pentagon Says" (March 23,
1970) -- these planes were developed by Lockheed.
(2) IX Factor Continues to Raise Luftwaffe's Starfighter Toll'
(July 4, 1972) -- report of the 154th crash of this plane,
designed by Lockheed.
(3) "Lockheed's Step Is Costliest Ever: $800 Million Write-Off
on Tristar..." (November 23, 1974) -- report of loss by
Lockheed in its development of the L1011 commercial jet.
(4) "Lockheed Says $22 Million Went to Officials Abroad"
(August 2, 1975) -- payments to foreign officials and
political organizations to obtain weapons contracts.

(5) "C5A Jet Repairs to Cost 1.5 Billion" (December 5, 1975)
(6) 'Lockheed Rises to Top as Defense Contractor" (December 11,

1975).
All this involves the same defense firm that was given a $250 million
loan guarantee by the Federal Government.
Nowhere but in military industry could a management avoid financial disaster, much less achieve ascendancy, by performing so poorly,
for so long. Clearly, one cannot expect managers accustomed to operating in a situation in which there is no risk, high costs are not
merely tolerated but become the path to success, and only one rich
customer need be serviced, to operate successfully in risky, cost
sensitive, multicustomer civilian markets without substantial retraining and re-orientation. When unconverted military industrial managements have turned their attention to production of civilian products
for state and local governments, the results have borne a striking
resemblance to their military operations in both cost and performance.
Consider, for example, the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) system in
San Francisco whose prime contractor was the Rohr Company, a firm
which made its reputation in aerospace and related operations. Although the system was supposj to be in operation by 1968, prototypes
were still crashing in 1971."' A few weeks after it opened in 1972,
the computer-controlled network experienced a number of breakdowns,
including one instance in which a train "failed to slow down at the
end of the line, barreled through a sand barrier, and did a nosedive
into a parking lot. " 3 1 As of late 1975, up to half the cars were out
of service at any given time, 'causing delays and standing room only
for San Frncisco commuters, who have dubbed it Bay Area Reckless
Transit. "
By 1971, estimates for he cost of the system had grown

from $792 million to $1.4 billion.35

There is little question, that whether military oriented managements are turned to the supervision of the production of goods and
services sold in the civilian market place or for civilian use by
government, they must be retrained and re-oriented as a prerequisite

for successful conversion.
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Conversion of Production and Low-Level Administrative Workers.
With the possible exception of a few highly skilled workers, the
primary problem in channeling production and administrative workers
into civilian oriented work lies not in the need for re-education,
but rather in the numbers of people involved. By 1971, at least
six million people in the United States were directly employed in
military-related work -- 3.8 million by th Pentagon, and another
2.2 million by military-oriented industry.
Clearly, the bulk of
these employees are production workers and low level administrative
employees, including clerical workers.
Re-orientation to the standards of work of civilian enterprises
will undoubtedly be required, and it is possible that additional vocational training will be required for some of these employees. This
latter training is not so much to undo the effects of having been employed in military-related work as such (as in the case of engineers,
scientists and managers), but rather to bring their skills into more
perfect congruence with the best civilian opportunities available.
The transition problem is simpler here because of the less involved
nature of the re-education required, but more difficult because many
more people are potentially involved.
The fact that many of the workers involved in defense production
are unionized also presents a barrier to conversion, to the extent that
the leaders of these unions take an inordinately short term and parochial view. The problem is that the civilian re-employment of the
workers displaced by cutbacks in military expenditures may involve
their transfer into industries or lines of work in the jurisdiction
of unions other than those to which they currently belong. Because
this tends to reduce the membership of defense industry related unions
to the extent that it occurs, the leaders of these unions have an incentive to oppose this transfer and thus potentially the entire economic conversion process, pressing instead for continued high military
spending. Such a position tends to be attractive to the membership
of these defense unions, since it appears to be in their direct, short
term interest. But, as we have seen, continued high military expenditure is economically destructive, and in the longer term its inflation
and unemployment-generating effects hurt defense workers as well as
the large numbers of nondefense workers who constitute the vast majorIty of the U.S. labor force. It is therefore only in the most, narrow, nearsighted and parochial sense that any union membership benefits from the continuation of high defense spending.
Capital Equipment and Facilities. Some of the industrial equipment
and facilities currently employed in the service of the military are
sufficiently general purpose in nature to be directly usable in civilian-oriented work. But some, such as certain types of extremely high
Capability machine tools, specialized shipbuilding facilities and
military bases are not so directly transferable. To the extent that
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some of this machinery suffers primarily-from the excessive cost related with its excessively high performance capability, the equipment
should be usable for civilian operations if some sort of special
write-offs or tax breaks are allowed to overcome the cost penalty.
Those industrial facilities which do not so much possess excess
capabilities as the wrong capabilities will have to be reconstructed,
but that cannot be effectively done until specific plans have been
developed for the particular alternative purpose to which those facilities are to be turned. Similarly, military bases are unlikely to be
appropriate, without some degree of alteration, for efficient performance of a civilian oriented activity.
Intra-Reaional Concentration and the Conversion Problem. Military
bases and the facilities of military-industrial firms are not spread
evenly throughout the United States, but are rather concentrated in
certain areas within the various regions of the country. Every major section of the country contains some geographically small pockets
of major military or military-industrial employment. Examples include
the San Francisco Bay area, parts of Long Island, Seattle, and the
Boston-Cambridge area. This combination of high concentration and
geographic dispersion has important political and economic implications.
Politically, one would be hard-pressed to devise a geographic
pattern which would provide better leverage. The Congressional representatives elected by constituencies which include one or more of
these pockets, feel themselves compelled to support military programs
that they perceive are in the interest of the people by whom they were
elected, providing them with continued employment. They come to believe, that their continued election depends upon the effectiveness
with which they can aid in at least maintaining, if not expanding the
flow of military funds to their district. Accordingly, they may become salespeople for the military industry in their area.
Through the usual type of legislative agreements, the support of
these legislators from various key areas for various military programs
becomes multiplied into broad Congressional support for the funding of
virtually any program the military can put forth. Legislators who do
not go along can be punished by merely withdrawing military funds from
their areas (e.g. by closing bases, cancelling contracts), or switching promised new funding to other regions. In the absence of prior
serious conversion planning, this kind of 'cold turkey' cutoff of
funding will produce real economic difficulties and this is not conducive to re-election.
The primary economic implication of the geographic pattern
military-related facilities is that macroeconomic policies such
come tax reductions and money supply increases cannot cope with
problem of stimulating the economy so as to effectively produce
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smooth absorption of the resources freed -from military use into civilian activities.
Such policies average their effects broadly over the
nation. But what is required here are policies which will reach specifically into these pockets of military concentration and redevelop
them. Only in this way can the temporary economic dislocation which
accompanies any major structural change be held to a minimum, and the
economic reconstruction of the United States thus accomplished without real hardship.
Policies for Successful

Conversion

An economically and socially successful conversion process requires considerable planning and preparation. First, a careful analysis must be performed to identify appropriate civilian alternatives
into which the resources released from military-related activities
may be effectively channeled. Second, a program for efficiently preparing the resources for their new civilian-oriented functions must
be carefully developed. Finally, in the case of the human resources
involved, various social services must be provided during the period
of transition including income maintenance, employment services, and
relocation and educational assistance where required. We shall consider each of these problems in turn.
Civilian Alternative for Military-Related Resources.
In a broad
policy sense, it is not at all difficult to identify economically and
socially productive alternatives for the employment of resources now
devoted to unproductive military use.
One need only consider those
vital social services and important areas of the economic infrastructure that are either presently in an advanced state of decline or
clearly undergoing serious progressive retrenchment.
Urban mass
transit, housing, intercity rail transportation, police and fire services, mental and physical health care, standard education and vocational training, special education, care for the elderly, day care,
etc. all would benefit enormously from a transfusion of resources
from military programs, and that would clearly produce a major increase in the nation's economic and social welfare.
It is possible to get a very rough but concrete idea of the kinds
of tradeoffs which exist between military and civilian programs by
comparing the funding requirements for a series of specific a~ernatives.
A list of a dozen such tradeoffs is presented below:
(1) Impounded federal housing funds, 1972 = $130 million =
8 F-14 aircraft
(2) Vetoed EPA plan to de-pollute the Great Lakes = $141 million
= 1 B-1 bomber plus 1 DD963 destroyer
(3) National solid waste treatment program = $43.5 billion = B-1
bomber program
(4) Unfunded program to upgrade rural American life = $300 million
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= 5 C5A aircraft
(5) Child nutrition programs funding cut = $69 million
DE-1052 destroyer escorts
(6) To brina all Americans above the poverty line, 1971
billion = B-l bomber program, low estimate

2
=

$11.4

(7) To eliminate hunger in America = $4-5 billion = C5A aircraft
program
(8) Philadelphia 1971 schools deficit = $40 million = 2 F-14
aircraft plus 2 Main Battle Tanks
(9) Graduate fellowships funding cut, 1973 = $175 million = 1
nuclear attack submarine
(10) 1973 cities' needs to rebuild blighted areas = $3 billion = 1
nuclear aircraft carrier, equipped, and escorts.
(11) 1972-73 cut in federal mental health budgets = $65 million =
1 C5A aircraft plus 5 Huey helicopters
(12) Construction of a 584 bed general hospital in San Francisco =
$41 million = 1 B-1 bomber
Besides such directly socially conscious alternatives, general redirection of resources into the production of "standard of living'
goods and services, from machine tools to bubble gum, would revitalize
the civilian economy. This revitalization would play a major role in
creating the conditions under which the goal of full employment without significant inflation becomes economically achievable. And major
gains in social welfare would clearly follow this kind of economic redevelopment.
But while broad prescriptions are important from the viewpoint of
policy and perspective, an effective conversion process requires the
detailed specification of particular alternatives for each facility,
and each area undergoing this transformation. Let us assume that we
are focusing on the development of specific civilian alternatives for
a particular industrial facility or military base complex. What do
we do?
The first step is to analyze the nature and quantity of all the
productive resources involved in the transformation: the types and

numbers of machines and their capabilities, the sorts of buildings
(including their layout), the skill and experience mix of the labor
force, and the characteristics of the site, including its size, terrain and location. The second step is lay out a list of alternatives
whose requirements for productive resources most closely correspond
with what is currently available, as indicated by the resource analysis of the first step. Seeking alternatives which best match the
capabilities of the present mix of resources minimizes dislocation
and disruption by reducing the need for labor force hiring, firing,
and retraining, and new equipment purchases. This tends to minimize
the social cost of transition, as well as its direct financial cost.

Furthermore, playing to the strengths of existing capabilities also
increases the probability of success in the new activities. To some
extent, the initial resource analysis will in itself, suggest at least
broad classes of feasible alternatives. For example, a manufacturing
firm which owns considerable metalworking equipment and employs a fair
amount of machinists would be more likely to convert successfully to
the manufacture of metal office furniture or railroad cars than to
the production of detergents or cosmetics.
We should not conceive of this list of alternatives in purely industrial terms. Public and private nonmanufacturing projects, in
areas such as pollution control, education, transportation, etc. are
also major alternative productive uses of resources. For example, it
may well be that the prime civilian-oriented use for a particular
naval facility may be as a major sewage treatment complex, medical center, or new university campus, rather than as an industrial park. It
would be a serious mistake to think too narrowly at this critical stage
of developing alternatives.
Finally, the 'success potential' of each of the alternatives
should be evaluated. In the case of conversion of industrial facilities to civilian production this rrimarily involves a study of what
is called the 'marketability' of the product, which involves an analysis of the demand for the product at the ranges of price that would
permit a sufficient margin of profit (after covering costs) to make
this product line attractive to the producer. In the case of public
or non-profit projects, the evaluation should involve an analysis of
the social need for such a project in that region, as well as its estimated cost. In either case, the accuracy and realism of estimates
of both one-time conversion costs and subsequent continuing post-conversion production costs play a critical role in determining the
feasibility and attractiveness of any proposed alternative.
To the extent that there is less than a perfect match between the
labor requirements of even the best civilian altcrnatlves for a given
military enterprise and its pre-conversion labor force, there may be
a need to channel some of the labor force Into productive civilian
activities wholly outside of that particular enterprise. For example,
it is extremely unlikely that all, or even most, of the engineers and
scientists currently employed by military Industries would be required
for any reasonable civilian alternative activities to which these industries would turn. This is no particular problEm, in the sense that
there are many civilian activities outside these particular converted
industgies in which the services of such personnel would be of great
value.37 We need to think in terms of sufficient alternatives to productively re-employ all of the resources (particularly labor) released
from military activity, and not simply sufficient alternatives to convert present military bases and military-industrial firms Into civilian facilities.
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Preparing Resources for Conversion. Conversion of the labor resource
requires different amounts and kinds of retraining and re-orientation
depending on the original function of that resource in the militaryrelated activity. Fersonnel employed in the development of technology, i.e. engineers and scientists, will as has been argued, generally require despecialization training in their fields, along with reorientation to the cost implications of their work. The specific
course work required, however, will differ somewhat depending upon
the particular new civilian direction in which any given individual
will be heading. For example, mechanical engineers who will become
involved in the development of urban mass transit systems should not
follow exactly the same program as those who will be designing home
appliances. Therefore, in order to avoid one of the most common fatal
flaws in well-intentioned occupational training programs -- training
people into areas in which insufficient employment opportunities exist -- it is necessary for planning purposes to know what civilian
employment opportunities are available. This is one of the reasons
why the analysis of civilian alternatives discussed just previously is
a key prerequisite for successful conversion.
It is important to understand that for any given individual a
specific program, built around his or her past experience and training, and tailored for entry into the area that he or she prefers
(given the available opportunities), can be developed by direct personal consultation with an educational advisor. What is needed for
general conversion planning purposes is a clear idea of how many people from each field and level of education will be involved, and which
broad areas of opportunity will exist for absorbing them into productive civilian activity. In this way, sufficiently accurate estimates
may be made of the time, funding, and personnel requirements of this
conversion retraining to permit an effective, intelligently designed
re-education program to be developed.
The educational component of the conversion process for management decision makers will on the whole be somewhat simpler because it
can be considerably more general. Within limits, the kind of re-orientation to cost minimization and civilian type marketing, sales, etc.
functions they require will be valuable to them regardless of what
civilian activity they subsequently manage. At least insofar as formal training requirements are concerned, there is a greater similarity between effectively managing a paper manufacturer or computer company, than between effectively designing appliances or rail systems.
Existing business schools will probably prove competent to accomplish the kind of management re-orientation required. Existing engineering schools, however, will themselves require some redirection before they can effectively accomplish the required re-education of
technologists. Though it might involve some trauma, there is every
reason to be confident that these institutions can make the necessary
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changes without excessive delay.
Individuals in production and lower level administrative functions can most probably be given the kind of re-orientation to civilian standards of performance they might require in an on-the-job situation. Formal occupational retraining will be needed only to the
extent that the best civilian alternatives available to them in the
economy at the point of conversion require somewhat different skills
from those which they currently possess. It is undoubtedly a good
idea, to provide some vocational retraining programs for such individuals, but it is unlikely that these will need to be anywhere near
as intensive or extensive as the programs for engineers, scientists
and managers. Even so, clear knowledge of the civilian alternatives
available is once again critical to the economic and social effectiveness of retraining.
Preparing capital equipment and facilities for conversion is
primarITY a matter of assessing In detail what changes in layout,
direct equipment and facilities, and supporting equipment and facilities are implied by the chosen civilian alternative. Given such an
assessment, it should not be difficult to estimate both financing requirements and the time needed from start to finish for the actual
physical conversion. This will in turn enable development of a financial plan, as well as effective coordination of this phase of the resource conversion process with the others.
Transition Support Services. Workers undergoing occupational transitlon, whether or not it is part of a process of conversion from military to civilian economy, must find ways of connecting with new job
opportunities, getting whatever retraining is necessary, financing a
move when relocation is required, and keeping body and soul together
during the period between jobs. The burden of meeting all these needs
can be greatly eased by the availability of appropriate social services.
Not all of the workers involved in the conversion process will
be changing employers, and those who will not do not have to worry

about locating new job opportunities or maintaining their income.
They may or may not require retraining, and probably will not require
relocation, but even when retraining or relocation is necessary it
should be possible to finance them at least partially through employers, though perhaps with some public supplementation.
Those individuals who must change employers will generally have
much greater need for social services. Besides direct income maintenance assistance, they will likely require temporary public replacement of some employment fringe benefits -- in particular group medical
and dental insurance plans. An effective public program of employment
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services will be critical in making them aware of the nature arid location of the new employment opportunities which best match their skills.
Along with counseling services, this will be of vital importance in
enabling them to plan whatever specific retraining they may need. In
addition, the employment service will facilitate the process of direct
placement of dislocated employees into new jobs. To make the transition even smoother, the government could provide special tax or other
incentives for employers to sign conditional employment contracts with
potential employees during this period that in effect guaranteed the
prospective employees a job with that organization upon successful
completion of a mutually agreed upon program of retraining. In this
way, individuals requiring retraining that could be expected to
stretch over a period of from six months to a year would have some
assurance that undertaking training into a particular area of civilian expertise would provide them with attractive re-employment.
Aside from any direct government benefits, private enterprises
(whether businesses or private nonprofit institutions) would gain
from the increased certainty in planning such agreements would imply.
Operating the entire conversion process along the lines suggested
will tend to minimize the amount of geographic relocation required.
This is important because moves over extended distances tend to be
very disruptive of family and friendship ties. While people develop
social roots after living in an area for a prolonged period, their
ability to re-establish roots in a new area should not be underestimated. This is particularly true of young people, who often actively
seek a new area in which to live and grow. In fact, the general population of the United States is normally highly geographically mobile.
For example, in 1970 more than 40% of the U.S. population lived in a
different house than that in which they lived in 1965, and nearly 45o
of this group had moved to a different county or a different nation.iAt any rate, the high degree of geographic concentration of military-related facilities virtually guarantees that some relocation will
be required for some individuals. This is particularly true for engineers and scientists since they are concentrated within pockets of
defense industry much more highly than they would be likely to be in
any civilian-oriented industry. But, the engineers and scientists
who work in military industry have already developed a pattern of
extraordinarily high geographic mobility as a result of their occupational need to follow the shifting defense contracts. So the prospect of one more move, coupled with the enhanced likelihood of future
geographic stability, should not be, for them, an overly difficult
thing with which to cope.
Expenses incurred in relocation for the purpose of re-employment
in a new area are already tax deductible as a matter of course. Supplemental government relocation allowances for one time, conversion-
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connected single moves, along with aid in locating new housing,
should go far in further easing the difficulties of relocating for
those who must do so.
It is extremely important to the successful revitalization of
the U.S. economy and society that the conversion process have a defined end. In order to avoid establishing new kinds of unhealthy dependencies, any effective conversion process must be designed to put
itself out of business. The permanent existence of a very small version of the machinery for easing economic transitions may be of real
value in a dynamic economy, but great care must be taken to avoid
giving birth to large, new, self-perpetuating conversion bureaucracies.
Developing a Consensus for Conversion
As long as this nation remains a democracy, no process of economic conversion requiring the broad intervention of government can
hope to be successful without the development of a political consensus to support it. This was true for the conversion to a militaryoriented economy, and it is just as true for the conversion back to a
civilian economy. The present consensus supporting the continuation
of high levels of military expenditure derives primarily from two widely held beliefs, one economic and one military: (1) Military expenditure is economically necessary and beneficial; (2) Expansion in the
quantity and quality of weapons systems and other components of national military forces increases national security. Both of these beliefs
are wrong, in the most straightforward sense of the word -- they are
simply at variance with the facts. It is for this reason that I believe the education of the general U.S. population to the objective
economic and military realities of the present world is a critical
pre-condition to the development of broad-scope support for the process of economic conversion discussed here.
Attention has been focused in the present paper on the economic
side of the issue. It has been argued that the actual economic
effects of sustained high military expenditure are highly destructive,
and that these effects go far in explaining the unprecedented simultaneous high inflation/high unemployment which has become a fact of
life in the U.S. With respect to weapons of mass destruction, the expansion of military systems reduces the security of the nations engaged in building up their forceg, because they become increasingly
endangered by their own weapons.P) There is a great need for further
exploration of both these areas of research, and perhaps even more
critically for the popularization of the arguments and evidence developed by such work.
There is neither any need nor any value in conducting the educational process required for the development of a conversion consensus
in a propagandistic fashion. I believe the clear presentation of the
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objective facts, the logical linkages between them and their implications is more than sufficient to break the power of the illusions
that have so long supported the continuation of high military expenditure.
In order for this educational process to have the maximum chance
for success, it should not be completely confined to the presentation
of scholarly treatises and the writing of journal articles. It must
stimulate debate not only at conferences of academicians, but also at
political gatherings, in school classrooms, union meetings, mass media
programs, etc. Such grass roots debate is in the best traditions of
U.S. democracy, and should at the very least raise the awareness of
the public with respect to these critical issues.
It should be pointed out that the development of plans for the
conversion of military-oriented resources to civilian activities is
of considerable value even in the absence of a curtailment of military
spending. Since military contracts periodically shift from one place
to another, it would clearly be in the best interests of the workers
in defense industry to have detailed plans for turning to the production of civilian-oriented goods and services when military contracts
are terminated or lost by their firm. In this way, they could avoid
being laid off until the defense contracts return. The availability
of such ready plans is also an advantage to society in general because
it permits some productive purpose to be served by these workers between defense contracts, and avoids the need to pay them unemployment
compensation. Thus, it would make sense for unions to support at least
conversion planning, even if they were not initially willing to support full-scale economic conversion.
As a rough estimate, the entire economic conversion process can
be expected to take from two to four years.
It will involve a great
deal of detailed planning (mostly on a local basis) and careful implementation, at the cost of a considerable investment of time and effort.
However, the economic and social benefits which will accrue as a result of this investment are truly enormous. The smooth and efficient
transition to a civilian-oriented economy can be accomplished, but it
requires nothing less than a national committment to insure its rapid
and successful completion.
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THE SOFT SPOT:

HOW TO ATTACK THE PENTAGON
MARION ANDERSON
THE PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP IN MICHIGAN

Have you been wondering why al I the ideas you learned in Economics I haven't
been working? Why the forecasts made at summit meetings of economists seem
to go wrong? Why the U.S. economy, in utter disregard of all the rules of
classical economics, suffers rising inflation and rising unemployment at the
same time?
Well, there are reasons.
Reasons that establishment economists have not wanted
to face, and sti I I refuse to face, because the great myth of the last three
decades would then be exposed. The myth is that we are so rich, so productive
and so favored that we can have both a huge and growing military establishment
and simultaneously a healthy society replete with booming industry and all
the social services we need.
This myth, born of a brief experience, and nurtured by those whom it benefitted
has pervaded the American scene since 1945.
People emerged from World War II
with this experience imprinted in their minds:
Five years ago they were
standing in lines outside that said "No Help Wanted."
The war came, some went
into the Army, some went to work in war production, but everyone went to work.
Moral: wars, or at least military spending, is aood for the economy.
A number of big companies learned something too. They learned that cost-plus
contracting is the businessman's bonanza. Just get that contract, and rake
it in. Cost-plus means you get a guaranteed profit.
In fact, if the price
of overhead, materials, or labor goes up, you make even more money as Uncle
Sam--i.e. the U.S. taxpayer--not only will absorb the extra cost, but increase
your profits. A 10% profit on a $100 million contract is $10 million, but if
expenses go up and you have an overrun, 10% of $200 million is a profit of
$20 million.
The bin corporations which had been making record profits during the war were
loathe to get off the gravy train and go back into the more uncertain joys of
free enterprise, where you didn't always make money.
In fact, sometimes you
lost it.
So, in 1948, the National Security Council, a small group of Presidential
advisors closely tied to the Pentagon, met and decided in secret that from then
on, into the indefinite future, 10% of the GNP should go to the Pentagon for
personnel and for arms production.
This momentous decision to allocate not a fixed sum of money, not a budgeted
amount, but a percentage of the GNP, was unique in American history.
From
it have come many of the strains and the troubles this nation has experienced
in the three decades since World War II.
Since 1950, over two-thirds of the top technical and scientific talent of
the U.S. has worked for the Pentagon and its contractors.
This drain upon
Civilian industry is one of the reasons why we have not fully developed
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alternative sources of energy, first-class high speed trains, and adequate
housing at reasonable costs. The people to do this research have been busy
elsewhere. They have been designing missiles, "smart" bombs, and flights to
the moon.
The economy could survive the strain of this drain-off of talent for some
years. We were the only major incustrial nation to emerge from the war in
1945 not only unscathed but with a newly tooled and booming industrial plant.
However, as the years passed and the Common Market nations plus Japan retooled
their plants, we began to meet even stiffer competition in world markets. We
became increasingly expert at building arms, while they were building ships,
It is no accident that when the
trains and the whole array of civilian goods.
Shah of Iran was making his vast outlays, he bought military aircraft from
us, but an entire system of electrified trains from the French.
As federal taxes were being pulled in huge quantities from the industrial
states and, through military contracting and payrolls, redistributed to the
South and West, the Northeast, and Middle Atlantic and the Industrial Midwest
began to decline. M4ichigan, for instance, pays over $16 billion in taxesI but
gets back only $9.6 billion in federal spending, a loss of $6.4 billion.
This means that $1,000 per person in the Detroit area is sucked off to Washington never to return in any form--social security, HEW, education--anything.
That money is gone, a net loss.
Even states as rich and productive as New York, Ohio, Michigan, and Illinois
cannot sustain this kind of loss decade after decade without showing signs
of the severest strain. The 1976 Detroit municipal budget deficit of $100
million is what the Pentagon takes out of Detroit every three weeks. And
Detroit is now suffering an unemployment rate of about 30%z.
The high taxes paid over the years and redistributed to the military and
civilian
hence to the Sun Belt states have also had depleting effects upon
3
industries. They simply have not had enough money to reinvest.
Unable to buy the newest machinery and faced with the high wage demands of
American unions, many companies have moved their operations abroad to lower
wage areas, thus accelerating the decline of many cities. George Meany, an
unreconstructed Cold Warricr, instead of attacking the root problem, shouts
loudly for protective tariffs which no doubt would have the same salutory
effect on American industrial production the Smoot-Hawley tariff had in 1931.
The industrial depletion, closing factories, and declining income in civilian
industry has been inexorably followed by more poverty, anger and despair.
As job opportunities are reduced for the middle class, a sort of "bumping"
goes on in which college-educated young people drive cabs, wait tables, and
tend bars, thus disclacino working class young people to the unemployment lines.
But everyone isn't suffering equally. The states with large amounts of military
industry and huce military bases have been the beneficiaries of this redistribution of taxes. Durina the years that Lyndon Baines Johnson occupied
the White House, the military contract going to Texas quadrupled from $1 billion
to $4 billion. Georcia, doubly blessed with Rep. Carl Vinson presiding over
the House Armed Services Committee and Sen. Richard Russell chairing the
Senate Armed Service Committee, is similarly dotted with bases and lucrative
contracts. A quick reference to the accompanying U.S. map will show which
states have been gaining money and jobs during these years.
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So, two big changes took place in the American economy between 1950 and
1975: the movement of capital and technical talent from the civilian sector
of the economy into the military sector; and the movement of tax money from the
industrial states of New England, the Middle Atlantic states, and the industrial
Midwest into a belt beginning with Virginia and going south and west to California.
Strange economic symptoms have shown up during the past decade. Inflation,
historically low in the U.S. except in wartime, has risen to unprecedented
heights. Bouts with wage and price controls have been a little like giving
aspirin to a patient with pneumonia: the fever goes down temporarily and masks
the causes of the disease, whi le the patient's condition continues to deteriorate, The second system of a decaying economy-unemployment-remains stubbornly high in just those cities which once were Meccas for the poor of Europe
and the South.
The industrial depletion described above is one of the causes. The other
is the Defense Department budget itself. Spending money on the DOD has the unique
characteristic of simultaneously causing unemployment and inflation. Inflation
results because people are being paid to produce products which no one can buy.
After payday, workers in military factories go out and buy from the same stock
of food, housing, and medical care as do the rest of us. But their work has not
increased the common stock of needed goods and services. The prices for all these
items are therefore bid up--hence, inflation.
Spending money on the military causes unemployment because fewer jobs are
created for each billion dollars spent on the military than if the money were
spent in any other way.
Table I. Jobs Created Per Billion Dollars of Expenditure

Jobs created by:

If spent to create
jobs in industry

$I billion spent
in civilian sector

65,000 jobs

$1 billion spent
in military sector

55,000 .obs

Jobs foregone by
spending on the
military

10,000 jobs

4

If spent to create
Jobs in government

5

100,000 jobs

6

79,000 jobs

7

8

21,000 jobs

If money were taken out of military contracting and--either through a tax
cut or reallocation to other governmental programs--put toward civilian needs,
the nation's economy would benefit. Depending on exactly how the money were spent,
this could create at least 10,000 more jobs per billion dollars transferred and
Possibly 20,000 or more.
If instead of military contracts we reduced the number of armed forces
personnel, both civilian and military, and used the same money to hire more firemen,
teachers, state parks personnel, and other state and local government employees,
the economy would gain 21,000 jobs per billion dollars transferred.
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Thus, each billion dollars which has gone to the Pentagon over the years has
cost the economy a minimum of 10,000 jobs. The $104 billion Defense Department
budget requested by President Ford in 1976 will cost the economy over 1,000,000
jobs.
The combination of factors--the widespread acceptance of the myth that
military spending was good for the economy; the anxieties caused by the Cold War,
Korea, and Vietnam; and the symbiotic relationship of the military and its contractors--has allowed the rise of the Military-industrial Complex. Institutionalized
in the Pentagon, the CIA, the National Security Agency, and the armed forces
lobbying organizations, it grew and prospered virtually untouched and unmolested
until Vietnam.
President Johnson perhaps personified the hope and the contradictions
mid-century America. Born poor, he ascended to the White House determined
something for the Blacks and the poverty stricken of our country. Yet the
tendencies, which so often have led men to war, made it impossible for him
no to the advisors urging him into Vietnam, thus simultaneously destroying
Great Society and his presidency.

of
to do
"machismo"
to say
his

Johnson could not or would not face the fact that he had to make a choice:
The Great Society or Vietnam. His deception extended even to his own advisors.
He never allowed Secretary of Defense McNamara to tell the Council of Economic
Advisors how much the war was costing. Their predictions, upon which much economic
policy was based, were erroneous. This, of course, exacerbated economic problems
then, and since.
By 1965, a considerable portion of the society had been co-opted either by
choice, by geography, or by economic circumstances into the Military-Industrial
Complex.
A number of unions with membership working in military industries could always
be counted on to plead vigorously for a continuation of their current contract
or to press for a new one. Military, management, and the unions were thus united
in their desire to continue and increase military spending. When a major portion
of a union is pleading for more contracts, it becomes difficult for the top
officers to lobby against the military budget as a whole.
This dilemma, combined with George Meany's well publicized support for every
type of military expenditure and venture, made most of the labor movement
quiescent until Vietnam.
Many academics were also silent. If you inquired you would find out that
a neighbor in the physics department had just gotten a nice DOD contract, or that
a social science department was hoping to get a little research money from the
Air Force. Presidents of great universities scrambled to get on the contract
gravy train, and then screamed when dumped off unceremoniously as the war in
Vietnam consumed all the available money.
However, enough of academia was either not getting much contract money, or
was touched by the anguish of their students being drafted to fight in a war
they abhorred. Many colleges and universities became major bastions of resistance
to the war in Vietnam. So the universites were only partially co-opted, but it
took Vietnam to jar them loose from their contract-fed complacency of the fifties
and mid-sixties.
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With cities and states, the splits became more evident every year.
Southern and many Western mayors are all for a continuation of high military
spending. The Northern and Midwestern mayors--faced with layoffs, unprecendented
deficits, and fiscal crises--finally, in 1976, passed a resolution saying that the
cities should get as much money as the Pentagon. Except for a occasional ideologue,
the split here is predictable: the mayors whose cities get the military money
think that the present arrangement is fine; those who don't want a change.
Members of Congress follow similar lines of thinking. Some, like Sen. Robert
Griffin of Michigan, or Sen. James Buckley of New York, will vote for every nickel
that the Pentagon wants no matter how much it hurts their states. Others, like
Proxmire of Wisconsin or Bayh of Indiana display a sustained and healthy skepticism
toward the voracious demands of the Pentagon. They realize that as the Pentagon
prospers, their states decline.
Let us examine briefly some big American institutions and their stands on
the Military-Industrial Complex.
Business has historically been sympathetic to Pentagon demands, although
many individual businessmen are not. The trade union movement is split with some
portions now aware of the military's economic stranglehold. Churches, except for
the historic peace churches and the actions of the main line denominations during
the Vietnam war, have remained largely quiescent.
The universities now contain a good many faculty members who came of age
politically during the events of the sixties, and who have a new and more realistic
view of the society. They do not, of course, form a majority of university
presidents, deans, or department heads. Most professional associations do not see
this as a big concern. However, the layoffs of teachers are becoming so severe
in many areas that the National Education Association and some local and state
teachers' organizations may be ready to move.
Congress is split. As in the early days of the Vietnam war, many more
Representatives and Senators are against a growing military than will vote against
it when appropriations time comes. There is not, however, the deep ideological
Cold War mentality that was so pervasive during the fifties and early sixties.
Key votes, such as on the B-I bomber appropriation, are now down to a 10 vote
margin in the House instead of 200 to 300 vote margins of a few years ago.
So where is the soft spot in all this armor? We may now be coming to an era
of new attitudes. A new look is needed at the budget of the Department of Defense,
that $100 billion annual bill that gets handed from the Pentagon to the White
House to the Congress to the American taxpayer. There is now skepticism about one
keystone to approving these monstrous sums year in and year out--the argument that
it created jobs, that it was good for the U.S. economy.
Two years ago, I found the facts to disprove this argument, to unmask it for
the myth it was, and to turn the tables on the contractors, the generals, and the
highly paid lobbyists who make so free with our tax money.
One day while reading the manuscript of a new book, I came across a statistical
regression analysis showing over a thirty-year period what happened to various
sectors of the economy when the military budget went up or down. Professor Bruce
Russett of Yale had done an analysis which showed the following:
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Table 2. Expenditures Foregone by Sector of the Economy
for each Billion Dollars Spent on the Military
$187,000,000
163,000,000
128,000,000
114,000,000
110,000,000
97,000,000
71,000,000
68,000,000
48,000,000
25,000,000

on
on
on
on
on
on
on
on
on
on

services
durable goods
state and local government consumption
residential structures
producers durable equipment
exports
non-durable goods
non-residential structures
federal civil purchases
imports

If Dr. Russett could show how much money was not spent (foregone) for these
sectors of the economy, it seemed that it might be possible, with a careful
methodology, to show how many jobs were foregone in each of these sectors. After
about nine months of work, we computerized the data and, at one a.m. on a freezing
Michigan February night, the MSU computer began to spit out the data, state by state.
Until we added up the totals on a state by state basis, we never knew whether
the Pentagon's spending created or cost more jobs in the nation as a whole. We
had factored in the pay of uniformed and civilian military personnel in each state,
and all the jobs created by military construction and military industry in each
state. We subtracted all the jobs lost in durable goods, non-durable goods, services
residential construction, nonresidential construction, and state and local government
as a result of tax money syphoned off to the Pentagon budget. So we ended up with
a net figure for the U.S., and for each of the fifty states.
We found that the military budgets of around $80 billion from 1968 to 1972
had cost the economy 844,000 jobs. Each additional billion dollars to the Pentagon
caused about 10,600 jobs to disappear. We also found that 60% of the population
live in states which suffer a net loss of jobs when the military budget goes up.
The results are even more dramatic when viewed regionally. The Middle Atlantic
and the East North Central states together lose over one ane one-quarter million
jobs. The Great Plains states lose. The South Atlantic
I0 and West Central states,
on the other hand, gain over one-quarter million jobs.
The state-by-state figures on net jobs foregone take on a more human meaning
when compared to their average employment during the years studied. For five of
the largest industrial states--New York, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania-the jobs foregone becuase of high Pentagon budgets averaged 85% of their total
unemployment between 1968 and 1972. This means that military spending had an
enormous impact upon their unemployment insurance costs, their welfare expenditures,
and the state services never provided because of a lowered tax base and higher
social welfare costs. The relationship of jobs foregone to unemployment in each
of the states which suffer a net loss of jobs is shown in table 4.
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Spending Annual Average, 1968-1972.

State
1. New York
2. Illinois
3. Michigan
4. Ohio
5. Pennsylvania
6. Wisconsin
7. Indiana
8. New Jersey
9. Minnesota
10. Tennessee
11. Iowa
12. Massachusetts
13. Oregon
14. Florida
15. West Virginia
16. Nevada
17. Arkansas
18. Connecticut
19. Louisiana
20. Vermont
21. Nebraska
22. Idaho
23. Maine
24. Delaware
25. Wyoming
26. South Dakota
27. Missouri
28. Montana
29. Rhode Island
30. New Hampshire
31. Arizona
32. Maryland
33. Alabama
34. New Mexico
35. North Dakota
36. Kentucky
37. Kansas
38. Mississippi
39. Utah
40. Washington
41. Colorado
4Z. Alaska
4 . Oklahoma
44. North Carolina
45. South Carolina
46. Hawaii
47. Georgia
48. Virginia
49. California
50. Texas
UNITED STATES TOTAL:

Number of Jobs Foregone or Gained
-426,000
-174,000
-172,000
-146,000
-127,000
- 72,000
- 57,000
- 53,000
- 47,000
- 40,000
- 37,000
- 35,000
- 33,000
- 23,000
- 22,000
- 15,000
- 12,000
9,000
9,000
- 4,400
4,200
4,000
3,800
1,000
- 1,000
-

100

+ 1,500
+ 2,000
+ 4,800
+ 5,500
+ 7,700
+ 8,000
+ 9,000
+ 10,000
+ 10,000
+ 14,000
+ 16,000
+ 17,000
+ 19,000
+ 2?,000
+ 25,000
+ 29,000
+ !2,000
+ 31,000
+ 36,000
+ 38,000
+ 55,000
+ 56,000
+ 97,000
+133,000
844,000 jobs.
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Table 4.

State
New York
1llinois
Michigan
Ohio
Pennsy Ivan ia
Wiscons in
Indiana
New Jersey
Minnesota
Tennessee
Iowa
Massachusetts
Oregon
Florida
West Virginia
Nevada
Arkansas
Connecticut
Louisiana
Vermont
Nebraska
Idaho
Maine
Delaware
Wyoming
South Dakota

Jobs Foregone as Percentage of T tal Unemployment.
Annual Average, 1968-1972.1

Number of
Jobs Foregone

Average Number
of Unemployed
Persons

Jobs Foreqone
as % of
Unemployment

426,000
174,000
172,000
146,000
127,000
72,000
57,000
53,000
47,000
40,000
37,000
35,000
33,000
23,000
22,000
15,000
12,000
9,000
9,000
4,400
4,200
4,000
3,800
1,000
1,000
100

382,000
191,000
230,000
171,000
207,000
83,000
92,000
175,000
71,000
68,000
41,000
143,000
50,000
90,000
41,000
14,000
35,000
83,000
79,000
9,000
19,000
15,000
24,000
10,000
6,000
9,000

112%
91%
75%
85%
61%
87%
62%
30%
66%
59%
90%
25%
66%
26%
54%
107%
34%
11%
11%
49%
22%
27%
16%
10%
17%
1%
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Of the 60% of U.S. citizens who live in states which suffer a net job loss,
the overwhelming majority of them live in highly industrialized states which do not
contain large military bases.
During the period studied, 1968-1972, most of the New England states were
net loss states. Only Rhode Island and New Hampshire showed slight gains. The
region as a whole lost about 42,000 jobs annually. This was true even when
Connecticut was getting heavy military contracts because of the Vietnam war, and
Massachusetts was getting substantial contracts for research and development.
In the Middle Atlantic region, every state lost, with New York losing more
jobs than any other state in the country--an astounding 426,000. New Jersey and
Pennsylvania lost heavily even though they received substantial military contracts
and both states host some military bases. The losses they sustained in civilian
industrial production, coupled with the very large number of jobs which they had
to forego in services and state and local government, resulted in 53,000 jobs
foregone in New Jersey and 127,000 in Pennsylvania.
The Great Plains states showed a more varied picture. Although the region
as a whole showed a net loss of 60,000 jobs, some states gained. The industrial
belt suffers the worst: 621,000 jobs were foregone in the East North Central
states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin. This region, the
industrial heartland of the nation, showed a net loss of over 360,000 jobs just
in the industrial sectors rf its economy (durable and non-durable goods). With
relatively few military bases to compensate and a very substantial number of jobs
foregone in servic " and state and local government, this region was the hardest
hit in the nation. i
The states which showed net gains in jobs from military bases and industry
form a geographic band which begins in Maryland and extends south to Georgia
(Florida is excluded), west to California (excluding Louisiana), and north to
Washington (omitting Oreqon).
The South Atlantic region, which includes Delaware, Maryland, Virginia,
West Virginia, and Florida, qained 142,000 jobs. Delaware, West Virginia, and
Florida lost jobs; the other states gained heavily. Virginia, North and South
Carolina and Georgia had almost 427,000 military personnel stationed within their
borders. Over 105,000 military personnel were living in Florida, but their presenc(
was not sufficient to overcome the large job losses in residential construction
and services.
Texas led the West routh Central section with a net gain of 133,000 jobs.
Texas was receiving an averaqe of $2.5 billion worth of military contracts
during these years, generatinq about 88,000 jobs a year. There were also 247,000
uniformed and civilian military personnel stationed there each year. Therefore,
Texas' net gain was large, the largest in the nation. Oklahoma also gained,
about 32,000 jobs. Arkansas, however, lost almost 12,000 jobs during each year
of the period studied.
Washington, with both troops and contracts, and Alaska and Hawaii, with
large military bases, were all net gain states. Only Oregon of the Pacific
Coast States lost jobs--33,000 of them.14
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It is important to analyze, both by state and overall, the totals by sector
of the economy.

Jobs Foregone by Sector of the Economy.
15
Annual Average, 1968-1972.

Sector

Gross Jobs
Foregone

Durable Goods
-796,000
Non-Durable Goods
-353,000
Residential Construction
-428,000
Non-Residential Construction -253,000
Services
-1,528,000
State & Local Governm't
-1,012,000

Military
Jobs Created
+806,000
+ 52,000
+ 58,000
+ 11,000

Jobs foregone in industry, services,
and state & local government:
Uniformed and non-uniformed
military personnel employed
in the United States.
NET JOBS FOREGONE NATIONWIDE

Net
+ 10,000
-301,000
-370,000
-242,000
-1,528,000
-1,012,000

-3,443,000

+2,599,000

+2,599,000
-844,000

Thus, the construction industry loses over 600,000 jobs when the military
budget is $80 billion. There are over 1,500,000 fewer jobs in services and over
1,000,000 fewer jobs in state and local government.
If a person lives in a net loss state and wishes to find out how many jcbs
a one billion dollar rise in DOD spending will cost4 simply take the net loss
figure for that state n the table and divide by 80 . For New York with a
426,000 job loss, the loss per billion dollars is 5,500 jobs. Thus President Ford's
demand for a $104 billion Pentagon budget will cost 146,000 more jobs in New York
state, or a total net loss of 572,000 jobs.
This data is, of course, politically significant. It can be used in a number
of ways. Senators, Representatives, mayors and candidates for public office
can all be asked before and after elections and on specific votes if they really
want to cost their own constituents jobs. Elected officials are very sensitive
to this. In preparation for testimony before the House Armed Services Committee
last winter, I did an analysis of the Congressional District of each member of
that committee who came from a net loss state. I found the following:

$80 billion was the average DOD budget for the years studied, 1968-1972.

Congressman
and
Party
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.

Melvin Prince, D.
F. Edward Hebert, D.
Charles Bennett, D.
Samuel Stratton, D.
Lucien Nedzi, D.
Robert Mollohan, D.
Les Aspin, D.
Bob Carr. D.
Tom Downey, D.
David Treen, R.
George O'Brian, R.
Robin Beard, R.
Donald Mitchell, R.
Elwood Hillis, R.

Rep. Richard Schulze, R.

Location
and
State

Number of Jobs lost in
District Due to an $80
Billion Military Budget

E. St. Louis, Illinois
New Orleans, Louisiana
Jacksonville, Florida
Albany, Schenectady, N.Y.
Detroit, Michigan
Wheeling, Parkersburg, W. Virg.
Racine, Kenosha, Wisconsin
Lansing, Jackson, Michigan
Suffolk County, New York
New Orleans, Louisana
Chicago, Joliet, Illinois
Memphis, Clarksville, Tenn.
Rome, Utica, New York
Anderson, Marion, Indianapolis,
Indiana
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

7,800
1,200
900
8,600
10,300
6,500
7,100
8,300
9,800
800
8,200
4,900
9,500
5,000
4,900

I released these findings to the Washington press corps and to the Congressmen's local newspapers cn the morning of my appearance. By the time I appeared,
many of the fifteen Congressmen had been inundated with calls from their hometown
newspapers, "Mr. Price, I understand that your votes are costing us 7,800 jobs
a year." Both incumbents and challengers have used similar analyses, based on
the data in my study, in electoral campaigns.
Governors and mayors from net loss states, if they understand this data, can
also be expected, even urged, to bring pressure on Congressional delegations to
vote against excessive military expenditures.
Unions whose members are suffering considerable unemployment are often
responsive when they understand the problem. Rank and file members want to know
the causes of their economic troubles, and are open to ways of curing them.
Most of the 1,500,000 member United Auto Workers, the constructions workers, the
ILGWU, teachers unions, and the many other non-military unions lose jobs because
of high Pentagon budgets. The nation's fastest growing union, AFCSME (American
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees) has taken leadership in
educating its members and the public about this problem.
Union leaders are using this data to make three main points:
I) There is enormous waste in the military budget. There are more officers
now with a 2,000,000 member peacetime army than when we had in an II,000,000
member army during World War II. There is no need to increase the overkill.
Terminate cost-plus contracting--it makes a few executives rich and causes you to
be overtaxed.
2)
1960 and
be voted
income.

tax between
We are overtaxed. All (yes, 100%) of the U.S. personal income
income to
more
allow
would
cut
tax
federal
1974 went to the Pentagon. A
for state and local taxes and to be spent by individuals as disposable
Both uses of the money would create more jobs.

3) We must have conversion legislation. This would simultaneously deprive
the Military-Industrial Complex of some of its most vigorous lobbyists--union
members who fear unemployment--would help the economy.
The responses on the part of union audiences have varied from warm to enthusiastic.
The mystique of the generals and of the Pentagon is gone, buried in the mud
and despair that was Viet Nam. The cities and the country are crying out for
change. The data which are presented can be used in homes, in union halls, in
elections, to destroy the keystone of the MIC. America is waking up to the
realization that billions for the Pentagon means millions of unemployed.
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SOCIAL WELFARE AND SOME IMPLICATIONS OF NON-VIOLENCE

Mulford Q. Sibley
University of Minnesota

A new journal has made its appearance. It is called Soldier of Fortune and
is devoted to the concerns of "professional adventurers"--that is, to those who
would like to become hired violent fighters in various parts of the world. The
journal opens its columns to their advertisements: "Ex-marine seeks employment as
mercenary, full-time or job contract, prefers South or Central America but all
offers considered." "Experienced mature fighter/seeks assignment anywhere.... "
In defending his journal from the charge of encouraging brutality, the founder
says: "After all, booze is brutal, cars are brutal, sex is brutal.
There's a need
for guns and explosives, and for adventure in foreign lands ....Sure, some of the
guys who buy it are flamboyant, devil-may-care people, and some are brutal, but
life is brutal, isn't it?" The editorial board is composed of specialist heads of
departments: thus there is a "knives editor," a "terrorism editor," and so on. 1
The new journal simply reflects a prevalent extensive commitment to violence
throughout the world and particularly in the United States. Ruth L. Sivard,
author of the recently published World Military and Social Expenditures, 1976,2
dramatizes this devotion against a background of eroding education and social
welfare and of poverty on a gigantic scale. Thus the world as a whole expends
each year some $300 billion on preparation for war and about 60 million persons
throughout the globe owe all or a substantial part of their livelihoods to the
military. During all the period of the SALT talks, armaments continued to increase. In two years of the negotiations, the United States added 2,000 nuclear
weapons to its stockpile (the number went up from 6000 to 8000 strategic nuclear
devices). In the same period, the Soviets escalated, too, although at a somewhat
lesser rate. Total nuclear weapons in the world increased from two in 1945 to
some 12,000 today. Even with such agreements as the nuclear test and nonproliferation treaties, armaments continued their upward climb.
In this country, two-thirds of all national government employees work for
the Department of Defense.
And the great bulk of the national debt was accumulated for warfare, not welfare.
The United States furnishes arms to a wide variety of countries--to both
Jordan and Israel, for example; and the sales (perhaps $12 billion during the
current year) continue to mount, government authorities often defending them on
the ground that they help correct the international "imbalance" of payments.
Domestically, of course, we need only remind ourselves of what is familiar to
every well informed person. Police armaments have escalated during the past five
years, crimes of violence show little indication of sharply declining, and the
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kinds of subtle yet terrible violence reflected in the disintegration of cities
have mounted. And social workers are thoroughly familiar with the increase in
child abuse.
A variety of conditions, of course, contributes to these phenomena. The arms
race, while it exacerbates violence, also reflects international social and
political tensions. Police violence, although it probably does nothing to abate
violent crime as a whole, reflects the genuine concern of citizens for the escalation of violence in general. The advertisements in Soldier of Fortune can perhaps be connected with a kind of distorted desire to find life exciting--an
effort to break out of our bureaucratized civilization, an endeavor to discover
in killing and intrigue the adventure so often lacking in a complex technological
world.
The pioneers in social work were, of course, familiar with wounds inflicted
by violence in their time and at the same time with the futility of utilizing
violence to heal those wounds. Leaders like Jane Addams and Lilian Wald saw the
poor and the powerless as victims of a violent world--a world which could be met,
not on its own terms, but only under the guidance of a radically different ethic.
They had a vision of humankind which was far in advance of the views prevalent in
their generation. Thus Jane Addams refused to be deceived by the argument that
World War I could in any way contribute to the cause of democracy and peace, even
though she was often ridiculed for her position.
In our day, those devoting their lives to social welfare have a special
responsibility to think through the implications of war and violence--and of
non-violence--for individuals, for groups, and for nations. Among the questions
they should ask themselves are: Why should we be expending 6 to 7% (and upwards
of 10% a bit earlier) of our Gross National Product on the military, as against
about 1% in the last days of Calvin Coolidge as President? What is the relation,
if any, between the commitment to violence and the starvation of social services?
Is there a connection between domestic violence and public commitment to the
international arms race? What are the respective faiths of violence and nonviolence?
It is to the latter question that this paper is centrally devoted, although
in the process we shall be referring to several of the others as well. We
maintain that while disintegrating institutions, conflicts within the psyche, and
many other factors are, of course, important in accounting for the violence of our
world, still that world would not exist without a profound if often unarticulated
faith in the efficacy of violence. Likewise, while the achievement of a nonviolent world will depend upon many institutional and psychological factors, it
cannot be attained unless and until we think through and commit ourselves to a
basic faith in non-violence. The issue, in other terms, is between two faiths-on the one hand, a devotion to certain myths which sustain violence; on the
other hand, and in sharp contrast, confidence in a series of reverse propositions.
We escalate the arms race because of a faith; and the only way in which we can
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de-escalate it will be to develop a counter-faith from which a non-violent world
will emerge.
What are some of the central elements of this faith in non-violence and its
implications for the practical issues confronting society?
We deal with this question by first turning to a provisional definition of
non-violence; then suggesting some implications of non-violence for personal
relations; and finally, examining its meaning for the social and political world.
Throughout, we shall be insisting that we cannot have it both ways:
we cannot
combine social welfare, in the long run, with reliance on violence; nor can we
develop a non-violent society in the absence of an expansion of social welfare in
its several dimensions. And we can no more usher in a world of social equity
through violence than we can speak of "hot ice."
1.
As a kind of provisional or working statement, we may suggest that nonviolence is a view, reflected in practice, which insists that in human relations-whether personal or socio-political--we respect human beings as ends in themselves
and that we so intend and act that we do not seriously injure them in body, mind,
or spirit. There are two basic elements in this statement:
(a) that we do not
intend to injure seriously or irremediably; and (b) that we seek intelligently to
engage only in those actions which will in a particular situation not injure in
fact. Gandhi used the word ahimsa, without harm or injury. We are suggesting
that intentions are never enough; one also has a duty, insofar as one can, to
select consciously and with knowledge only those methods which are likely to lead
to the goal of "harmlessness." This implies that we have a broad and sophisticated
awareness of what the often-complicated consequences of a given act are likely to
be.
The statement, of course, bristles with ambiguities. So long as life exists,
for example, and no matter how careful we are, our means may sometimes lead to
violence. Does this mean that we should therefore give up the attempt to be nonviolent? Of course not. For inaction, by seeming to tolerate the violence built
into the status quo, might itself be encouraging a violence-prone society.
Then, too, the statement in itself says nothing about "force" and "coercion,"
which are themselves very ambiguous terms. Sometimes "force" and "violence" are
equated. We are not doing so. Force and coercion of some kind--physical,
intellectual, spiritual, economic, social--would seem to be inseparable from human
existence, as are "individuality" and "conflict." But not all physical force or
coercion, for example, is violent. When it is used under restrained and circumscribed conditions for the purpose of benefiting the individual involved or at
least for ends which do not entail his serious injury, it may be legitimate: the
context of the act is vitally important. When I forcibly pull a child from the
pathway of an automobile, I am not being violent, any more than when I carefully
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but forcibly keep a temporarily deranged person from slashing his wrists. When a
policeman pushes two potential antagonists apart, he is not being violent but
rather is endeavoring to prevent violence. Acts of these kinds are to be sharply
differentiated from, let us say, the bombing of a city, the killing of a "criminal"
by the State (euphemistically called "execution"), or the toleration of social
conditions which lead to gross disrespect for human personality. Shooting a public
official in order to reform society cannot be equated morally with refusal to
co-operate with his illegitimate acts. Both torturing a prisoner and conscientiously boycotting a dime store may be regarded as coercive; but surely there
is an important moral distinction.
Applying tests of these kinds, of course, is not always easy.
But the drawing
of lines in any application of ethical norms is never without its hazards. All we
can expect of ourselves as rational beings is that we endeavor to be clear in our
own minds about the standards we are seeking to apply and as well-informed and
intelligent as possible in implementing those standards.
But it is extremely important that we have standards of some kind; and the
quest for criteria of non-violence is one which seeks to recognize this importance.
Violence itself may often be due to the fact that we have few if any standards, so
that when we are confronted by a crisis situation we often succumb to the pressures
of the moment which make for violence.
Both from a general viewpoint and particularly from the perspective of social
welfare, it is important to recognize the significance of what is called institutionalized violence. Built into the structure of institutions themselves may be
patterns of severe exploitation and inequity which undermine the norms we have
sought to suggest. A revolutionist hurling a bomb may be protesting an institutional structure more violent than his own act.
The advocate of non-violence must
be fully aware of this; and while he will repudiate the methods of the revolutionist,
he will sympathize with his objectives. Non-violence does not imply passivity.
Indeed, it suggests constant activity against injustice, exploitation, war, and
militarism but only by means which differentiate themselves from the spirit of
these phenomena.
Thus the worker against injustice will not employ methods which.
themselves tend to encourage injustice (perhaps of another kind); and the advocate
of peace will not use war in a futile effort to gain his end.
To wage war tends
to produce more war; to kill or to threaten to kill (whatever the excuse) encourages the desire to kill, not the impetus to respect human life.
2.
Now it is with some such conception of non-violence that we approach the
question in terms of personal relations. The ethic of non-retaliation is an
exemplification of the notion of non-violence: I shall not reply in kind to your
failure to show respect for me as a person. If we are seeking the "rehabilitation"
of an individual, we ourselves must be impeccable by setting the standard for nonWe cannot teach a thief to be honest by stealing from him; a
retaliatory action.
person to be loving by exemplifying hate; or a victim of an exploitative social sys-

tem to gain self-respect by treating him as if he were not worthy of respect. The
only hope is to make a kind of leap of faith and to see in the thief a person who
can transcend his past; in the person consumed by hatred an individual who has
possibilities of exemplifying love; and in the victim of exploitation, one who
can rise above his low self-esteem if only others treat him not so much as the man
he is but as the man he can be. In all these situations, imagination is an
important ingredient of non-violence and non-retaliation. The unimaginative individual is one who cannot see beyond the present to the potential. There will, of
course, be failures if we act in this manner; but the failures will be far greater
if we implement the reverse attitude.
One of the interesting but unsolved problems (at least it would seem difficult
to subject to a scientific test) is the effect of public violence on the domaip of
personal violence. If the State and public officials are committed to an ethic of
retaliation or of violence, is it not reasonable to assume that their prestige
will affect the ways in which we treat one another in private relations? If the
State threatens to wipe out Moscow under certain circumstances, why is not this
a kind of moral license for me or my organization to threaten to obliterate my
enemies under specified conditions? When a gang "rubs out" the leaders of an
opposing organization, it may be reinforced in its action by the fact that the
government "rubs out" its international supposed enemies.
After all, what is
the difference morally between a plan to kill Castro or thousands of Japanese in
Nagasaki and a scheme of the "Cosa Nostra" to liquidate physically those who
challenge it? During the Vietnam War, I remember asking a social psychologist
whether there was a relation between the terror bombings and massacres being
carried out in Vietnam under the auspices of the government and the seemingly
increasing disrespect for human life within the United States. His reply was that
he saw every reason for assuming this to be true. Confucius would apparently have
given the same answer, for much of his political philosophy is rooted in the notion
of the ruler as "exemplar." The Emperor in his official acts must set the example
for his subjects in their private relations; for while institutional authority-that which goes beyond any given ruler--is important, still if the ruler himself
sets the wrong example, how can one expect his subjects to act rightly?
At least this is a hypothesis worth considering.
To be sure, the incidence of public violence may also be affected by the prevalence of private violence. The police become more menacing in response to the
growth of crime; and reliance on international weaponry is part and parcel of the
ethos of private violence. We can admit all this and still plausibly contend,
however, that the probability is that the influence is heavily weighted the other
way. Rulers and political systems carry with them the prestige and the authority
of a whole society and so there is a tendency on the part of private individuals to
conclude that if a thing is permissible in public action, it must also be morally
acceptable (if not legally so) in private affairs.
There is some evidence, for
example,--although it should not be considered conclusive--that, other things being
equal, countries enforcing the death penalty encourage murders. We do know that
the death penalty apparently does not discourage killing.
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We might also observe that insofar as we already adhere to the ethic of nonviolence in private relations, it is not primarily as the result of threats by the
police but rather because, to a very widespread extent, even in a violent culture,
most human beings have the faith, exemplified in habit patterns, that all human
beings are capable of love and intrinsically worthy of respect. Generally speaking,
if we trust the other person, he will justify that trust; and while there will be
many exceptions to this rule, without its presence anything resembling a human
community would be impossible. Insofar as the police are "effective," it is
because a sufficient level of community exists to make them so.
Implicitly, the profession of social work is committed to the notion of nonviolence in personal relations, else it denies its reason for being. Whatever
the context might be, it, above all professions, should be anchored in the faith
that there is that within each human being, however it may have been suppressed or
concealed by institutionalized exploitation and violence or psychological factors
or misfortune, which makes for the possibility of rationality, love, and nonviolence. One way of uncovering this quality is for others to see it even before
the individual is aware of it himself. The individual can regain his or her
self-respect if others show their respect for him not as he apparently is in the
existential situation but rather as he can become. When he is at length aware
of others' respect and confidence, demonstrated through actions and not merely
talk, he will eventually re-discover his own worth and rebuild his own respect.
Whether the individual be a murderer, a welfare mother, a poverty-stricken child,
or an individual distraught by psychological conflicts and guilt, a key factor in
the philosophy of social work is the restoration of self-respect. And this can
be accomplished only in close association with the principles of non-violence.
But so closely are public and private realms associated in the modern world
that the very basis for non-violence and self-respect in personal relations is
heavily conditioned on our attempting to implement the principle in the public
realm as well. So long as we are strongly committed to the ethos of violence in
politics and the organization of society, we shall be limited in what we can do
to develop justice and non-violence in the private sphere. This is true first of
all because, as we have suggested, the public example will tend to affect practices
in the realm of personal conduct and, secondly, because heavy commitment to violence will, both financially and psychologically, deprive social welfare broadly
conceived (social work, education, mental health, and so on) of indispensable
resources of scarce goods and equally essential resources of spirit and morale.
3.
In a celebrated passage, the late R.H. Tawney comments, in the context of
sixteenth century economic development, on the human race's proclivity for wasting
its substance through violence and war:
Mankind, it seems, hates nothing so much as its own
prosperity. Menaced with an accession of riches which would
lighten its toil, it makes haste to redouble its labors, and
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to pour away the perilous stuff, which might deprive of
plausibility the complaint that it is poor. Applied to the
arts of peace, the new resources commanded by Europe during
the first half of the sixteenth century might have done something to exorcise the specters of pestilence and famine, and
to raise the material fabric of civilization to undreamed-of
heights. Its rulers, secular and ecclesiastical alike, thought
otherwise. When pestilence and famine were ceasing to be
necessities imposed by nature, they re-established themselves
by political art.
The sluice which they opened to drain away each new
accession of superfluous wealth was war. 3
Tawney's observations about the sixteenth century are fully applicable to the
past century and a half of modern history.
We might even expand the analysis: not
only does war drain away the "surplus" of wealth, but it also frustrates social
reform and tends to promote social chaos. Violent revolutionary forces are released and family life is disrupted.
The problem of non-violence in the public order is whether we can reverse
these historical trends. It will not be easy, for even the history of the United
States, which we have often thought of as relatively immune from many of the main
currents of world history, reveals the tendency.
Recall, for example, American experience in the twentieth century. The early
part of the century was characterized by considerable expansion of the economy and,
after 1913, by important social reform measures which, had they been continued,
might have resulted in some genuine re-distribution of wealth and power. But
these possibilities were frustrated when the country entered World War I, which
greatly enhanced the resources and power of the wealthy and brought an end--as do
most wars--to any desirable social reforms. Perhaps all this might have been
justified, according to some, had the war accomplished much that was worth-while;
but it did not: it neither made the world "safe" for democracy nor brought about
a situation in which war was less likely in the future. And the resources
destroyed by the war, whether in the United States or elsewhere, were staggering.
A monetary world cost estimate of $400 billion scarcely does justice to the fact
that many of these resources were irreplaceable; and it speaks not at all of the
tens of millions of human lives wiped out.
Or again, World War II came to the United States after a period of social
reform--some of it surely desirable--which the war promptly halted while providing
a facade of "war prosperity." The destruction wrought by World War II was far
greater than that of World War I and the net benefit to the world or to the United
States even more dubious. Psychologically, perhaps, American entry could be
partly interpreted as an effort through war to counteract or plaster over the
failure to take the United States out of the Great Depression without war. The war
virtually eliminated unemployment, which was still 9 million at the end of 1939,
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but at a fearful price.
But no more than World War I did it make the world "safe for democracy." While
it appeared to destroy one "totalitarian" system--that of Nazi Germany--it did so
at the price of greatly expanding the power of another--the Soviet Union. And
its temporary solution for the problem of unemployed men and women--in the war the
solution was that men were employed blowing other men and natural resources to bits-.
was followed by chaos and many smaller though often ferocious wars throughout the
earth. While the violence of the war helped force Hitler's death, it left many of
the basic issues confronting mankind unresolved or exacerbated. A tyrant died but
tyranny proliferated. The war gave birth, moreover, to the atomic bomb, which has
cast its shadow over the entire period since World War II.
During the period between 1961 and 1964, there seemed to be some promise
again of using vast potential resources for human welfare, through the "war on
poverty," the development of civil rights, and imaginative schemes like some of
the housing programs. But again the potential was in considerable measure
frustrated when the United States began its massive violence against Vietnam--at
an ultimate cost of perhaps $150 billion. 4 And after the war--as has been usual
in wars from ancient to modern times--came the inflation which eroded the savings
of millions of the poor and middle classes and, accompanied by another "recession,"
severely restricted possibilities for social justice. And the Vietnam war, like
its predecessors, gave no evidence that it had improved the lot of humankind in
any significant ways.
During the Vietnam War, it was first believed that we could have both "guns"
and"butter."
But it soon became evident that, whatever the possibilities from a
strictly economic and financial point of view, in terms of psychology it was difficult if not impossible to combine the huge commitment to violence with serious
efforts for social welfare.
And now, in the post-war period, educational budgets do not keep pace with
inflation, the war against poverty continues to be undermined, and social service
work in many of its most vital aspects is curtailed. Moreover, numerous sections
of the central cities remind one more and more of urban areas that have been bombed
or otherwise destroyed in war. Yet the shopping list for armaments continues to
grow.
To be sure, we are told that military violence and its threat promote "security."
But the meaning of this statement is not at all clear. If it implies that
once we have a certain level of "over-kill" (the ability, let us say, to wipe out
the "enemy" five or six times over), we shall no longer be fearful and can halt
the arms build-up, it would seem obviously to be a false proposition; for it would
appear that the higher our arms levels, the more fearful we become that they are
not high enough. Expansion of armaments, far from reassuring us, seems to
stimulate still more expansion. The greater the "over-kill" capacity, the more we
feel the need for additional and even more monstrous weapons. It is almost certain
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that a citizen of the United States feels far more insecure with respect to external
"enemies" than the citizen of a third or fourth rate "power" like Denmark.
Perhaps, though, possession of great arms in face of the enemy's escalation
will deter from war.
But this would seem very unlikely. While we can never prove
beyond the shadow of any doubt that large armaments and arms races do not prevent
war, since there are so many variables, the experience of the arms race before
World War I is not reassuring.
Far more plausible is the proposition that if a
nation prepares for war through arms escalation, it will eventually be tempted to
use those arms.
But if war does come, it may be urged, surely great armaments will tend to prevent invasion and to protect human beings. But there is little if any evidence to
show this, particularly in the modern age. In World War II, for example, both
Denmark and Norway, with tiny military forces, were invaded; but so were Germany.
France, Poland, and the Soviet Union, ,ith huge military establishments.
As for
protecting human life in time of war, even the best military "defense" cannot prevent millions of deaths: in the United States, for example, writers speak in
terms of fifty or more millions. 5 Under these circumstances, it is a mockery to
speak of the military preserving human lives.
We argue, then, that build-up of armaments in today's context promotes fear
and insecurity among citizens of Great Powers, including the United States; that
large armaments will not deter from war but, on the contrary, will probably constitute a temptation to initiate it; and that once a nation enters war large armaments
give no assurance whatsoever that the country will not be invaded or that millions
of its citizens will not die. Armaments, in other words, have very little to do
with "security." On the contrary, they probably exacerbate insecurity.
But if we reach this conclusion, it would seem to be useless to maintain military forces. If their existence does nothing to allay fear, probably cannot deter
from war, and can neither prevent invasion nor protect human beings, it would seem
unreasonable to retain them.
In other words, if we are convinced that public violence and its threat are
not only immoral but inefficacious (in terms of worth-while objectives), then a
nation is foolish to rely on them even if other nations choose to do so. Willingness and readiness to disarm unilaterally would seem to be a part of practical
wisdom as well as a requirement of any commitment to non-violence as a moral
principle.
Just what might unilateral disarmament imply in terms of details?
The policy might conceivably begin with a public announcement of what is contemplated.
A government just elected on a platform of unilateral disarmament
would state that it had lost all confidence in military violence and was determined
during the course of, say, five years to divest itself of all military weapons. It
would invite representatives of all countries to observe the process. Among the
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first steps would be abolition of the CIA and other secret intelligence agencies.
Then gradually, year by year, armaments in all categories would be reduced. Gradualness would be desirable to permit orderly economic and social adjustments.
Meanwhile, as part of the process, there would have been an announcement that
the resources saved by unilateral disarmament would not lead to a reduction in
taxes but rather to alternative expenditures on what might roughly be called
"social welfare"--education, counselling services, exportation of skills to develop
trained manpower in parts of the world requesting it, rehabilitation of cities,
and the organization of a system of non-violent resistance to any invasion. There
might be a pledge to devote approximately one half of all present military
expenditures to international purposes (under the control of an international
agency) and one half to domestic goals for a generation. This would mean that
each year during the disarmament process, about 10% of existing "defense" expenditures (over $10 billion) would be contributed for world purposes and 10% to
rehabilitating a sorely disintegrating domestic society. At the end of five years,
each segment would be receiving at least $50 billion annually for a minimum of at
least a quarter of a century.
If one attempts to spend $50 billion for non-military purposes, even in an
age of inflation, one is startled by what one can buy. For example, one could
support 200 large universities; or provide 12 million full scholarships for college students; or establish some half a million to a million substantial day care
centers; or pay the salaries of more than three million special education teachers
to stimulate gifted children and assist the retarded; or furnish over three
million social workers in such fields as psychiatric social work, family welfare,
and many others; or finance between three and four million national park attendants;
and so on. One can work out one's own calculations and no matter what they are,
they must be astounding. And these are figures only for the domestic side; an
equal sum would be available for the international and it would probably go even
further.
Sometimes it is argued that without heavy emphasis on "defense" and on war
preparation the unemployment problem would necessarily be much worse than it is
today. But the fact is that, on the average, a given sum expended in the civilian
sector will produce more employment than if used by the military. Moreover,
civilian employment tends to be less inflationary than "defense" employment.
Explains an economist who has studied the problem: "I think economists would
generally agree that it is a misconception that defense creates more jobs ....
Defense, particularly modern defense, is a high technology business. Defense
production tends to require more highly skilled people but to employ fewer people
per unit of output that civilian industry. It also puts pressure on prices. It
creates buying power, but does not produce goods that can be bought in the6 market....
High defense spending for these reasons has an inflation-inducing effect."
We cannot predict with any exactitude, of course, what reactions a program of
unilateral disarmament by a major nation would provoke. But one thing would seem
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to be certain: the situation of today, based as it is on competitive armaments
and an almost irrational confidence in military might, would be drastically
altered both psychologically and sociologically. In many parts of the world,
including the Soviet Union, there would probably be strong domestic pressures
to emulate the United States in its unorthodox actions; for it is notorious that
the clamor for more consumers goods in Russia and elsewhere is already very strong.
A unilateral initiative of this kind might, in fact, lead to competitive disarmament. But even if this response did not occur, the unilateral disarmament
would continue, on the premise that it was soundly based, both in morality and
in terms of practical efficacy.
Those with a deep commitment to the principle of non-violence would hold,
of course, that a policy of this kind would be far more effective as a national
defense measure than all the armaments we presently possess. But whether or not
one agrees or disagrees with this conclusion depends in part on how one thinks of
Here we define it roughly as "The preservation and enhance"national defense."
ment of human life and of the basic morally defensible institutions and practices
of a nation." This definition would exclude from the term international economic
exploitation, military power as an end in itself, or the quest for dominion over
others. The new utilization of the resources formerly devoted to the military
would defend in a number of ways: first, moral duties to mankind would be much
more emphatically recognized than today and a by-product of this would probably
be that any possible justification for invading the country (always a specter
for those insisting on military national defense) would be reduced to the vanishing point; secondly, the new outlook would understand that perhaps the greatest
menace to the life and institutions of a people comes from within rather than
from without--from deteriorating cities, hopeless young people, absence of constructive challenges, unemployment, inadequate education, human alienation, and
7
thirdly, the policy, by confining "defense" to vindication of those
so on;
things that are worth-while and excluding those objectives which make for injustice would clearly see that genuine peace and national defense depend on the
establishment of justice.
Part of the policy, of course, would be provision for non-violent resistance
to any possible invasion or occupation. Those committed to non-violence would
believe that if other elements of the policy were implemented, the necessity for
Nevertheless, provision would be made
non-violent resistance would be remote.
for it, as an aspect of the whole scheme.
Basically, non-violent resistance would be a program in which several
thousand selected individuals would be highly trained to lead the population in
campaigns of non-co-operation with invading or occupying forces. Strategies and
tactics involving the strike, the boycott, and the withholding of moral support
would be planned for; and training would be rigorous. No occupying force can
long hold a country if non-violent non-co-operation is widespread and if human
beings are willing to die (but not to kill) for their country. The whole training of non-violent resisters would be premised on such propositions. If one
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leader were to be killed by the army of occupation, the "game plan" of non-violent
resistance would provide for immediate succession of another. The professionals in
non-violent resistance would, of course, guide the non-professionals in the tactics to be used. The budget would include an item of, let us say, $5 billion a
year for non-violent resistance training. One of the military service academies
8
would be retained to help educate leaders of the new strategy.
Does a policy of unilateral disarmament involve risks? Of course. But we
contend that the risks are far fewer than those entailed by a commitment to violent
defense. It could be that under a scheme of unilateral disarmament, some nation
would become utterly irrational and seek to invade the country. But surely
this is much less likely than with present policies. In an atmosphere of competitive armaments, irrationality is much more apt to erupt than in one where a
prominent nation has renounced violent defense. What possible purpose would be
served by a military invasion of the United States? After all, it would already
be sharing its resources on a large scale, would have indicated its non-aggressive
intent by unilateral disarmament, and would have opened all of its genuinely public business to world scrutiny. If under these circumstances another nation still
contemplated invasion, it would have to weigh the costs of occupying a country in
face of the most effective form of resistance, that of the non-violent type.
The notion of unilateralism is, we are contending, entirely compatible with
hard-headed military and political realism. The unrealistic, in fact, are those
who think that preparation for military violence has anything to do with national
defense. After studying military history for a lifetime, the late Walter Millis,
perhaps the United States' greatest twentieth century military historian, maintained that "a good theoretical case can be made for the proposition that a
unilateral divestiture.. .would in fact redound more to the real security and welfare of the American people than any other course.. ."9 While Millis thought that
the American people were not yet ready to accept such a policy, this did not
detract from its soundness; and one might well ask Walter Millis why, if he
could be convinced of its soundness, the American people could not be.
A policy of unilateral disarmament within the context suggested here would
greatly strengthen the health, welfare, and spirit of the American people--surely
one of the central objectives of genuine national defense. In a context where
"defense" is largely identified with military violence, the tendency is to forget
the limitations of military power and at the same time the possibilities of nonviolence. The public mind, moreover, is split--on the one hand, it repeats that
its objectives are peace and non-violence; on the other hand, it devotes a substantial proportion of its resources to means which are the antitheses of these
objectives. This hardly makes for a state of public mental health. In a context
of unilateralism, this split public personality would be eliminated and the very
"nakedness" of the country in terms of possessing military weapons would tend to
produce a psychology of security. Every encouragement would be given to nonviolent solutions. Once faith in military violence had been completely eroded,
the way would have been paved for a commitment not dependent on the shallow faith
in violence.
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In personal relations, we often say: "Jones was utterly disarming," meaning
that he was not close-minded, not fearful, and not aggressive; instead, he opened
the way to full communication with and understanding of others. A like principle
might apply in the context of unilateralism. The nation would be literally disarmed and would therefore be disarming, with consequences not unlike those we
think of in personal relations. This is not to equate personal with corporate
relations in all circumstances but simply to suggest that in the context of disarmament a similar consequence would probably follow.
It should be emphasized, of course, that unilateralism is dependent on a
basic change of attitudes and values in the country as a whole.
It would not
"work" if substantial segments of the population continued actively to commit
themselves to violence.
It would entail, in other words, a fundamental alteration
10
of public opinion.
To be consistent, too, it would need to be accompanied by other measures
exemplifying non-violence in the public arena. For example, the police would
have to be disarmed and individuals, too, would have to renounce their "right"
to bear arms.
Any thought of "capital punishment" or killing by the State would
have to be eliminated; and some of the worst outrages going on under the name of
"prison" would need to vanish.
We should also have to reduce the gap between
lowest and highest incomes.
Not that all these transformations would need to
come about immediately but rather that they would be seen from the beginning as
essential if policies of non-olence were to be fully implemented.
Overly simplifying, we can say that there are two basic views of the State
and of law. One thinks of them as repressive--as essentially existing to suppress
the evil in man. Here the accent is on force and negation and even violence. The
other view would see the State and law as potentially positive--as devices for
helping to release the good in human beings and to organize the community in such
a way that evil is overcome not by repression but by so accenting the constructive
that the darker side of human nature fades into the background.
The notion of nonviolence would obviously fit into the latter paradigm, as would, if the interpretation of this paper is correct, the philosophical foundations of social work.
Obviously, both of these paradigms are present in the State and law of our
day. When law facilitates the making of agreements, the organization of public
enterprises for public benefit, and arbitration procedures, the second is obviously
involved. When it sends a person to a prison which will obviously not "reform"
him, the first is present. When the State provides an educational system, the
second is predominant; when it orders me to kill, the first is ubiquitous.
The task of those committed to non-violence in the public realm is to explore
all of the avenues open through the second paradigm and to insist that the conception of non-violence, contrary to writers like the late Reinhold Niebuhr, is
applicable not only to personal matters but also to group relations and in
politics.11 In the process of attempting to implement the second paradigm
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imaginatively, social workers and others strengthen not only the cause of nonviolence but also that of social welfare in its broadest dimensions. But they
should be consistent: non-violence is a philosophy which must be applied universally and not in such a way that some areas of human life are exempt from
its impact. We cannot consistently promote it in personal relations and then
attack it by supporting violence and its threat in the international sphere.
4.
We began by calling attention to some of the striking exemplifications of
the modern world's faith in violence and suggested that non-violence implies a
counter-faith. We then explored the elements of that counter-faith in terms
of defining it; of suggesting its application to personal relations; and of
outlining a few of its implications for the public sphere.
We have not denied that a gigantic leap is necessary to move from the faith
in violence to the counter-faith of non-violence. Nevertheless, we stressed that
in most relations of life, even today, there is at least a semi-commitment to
non-violence. Our task, whether as social workers or as citizens, is to extend
that faith into areas where up to now it has seemed unthinkable.
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relations from potentialities in group or political relations, particularly
in Moral Man and Immoral Society (N.Y. : Scribner, 1932) but also in many other
works. In terms violence and non-violence, his expectations for groups and
nations were much lower than those for individuals.
While he makes an important
point in emphasizing that institutions and organizations are not persons and
cannot be said to be capable of love, still
it is also true that individuals
(who admittedly are capable of love and non-violence) work within the frameworks of institutions and organizations and have the capacity for transforming
the latter. There would be no groups if individuals did not exist; and while
group life has an autonomy of its own, still,
we may say to Niebuhr, the attitudes and convictions of individuals surely have an impact on the group, and
their ideals, however "impossible," can change the nature of group relations.
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ANTI-WAR WORK BY DISCOURAGEMENT OF WARRIORS
A CRITIQUE OF ANTI-WAR TACTICS USED AMONG NAVAL PERSONNEL IN THE VIETNAM WAR
Orabelle Connally, Ph.D.
Everett Community College

"Wars will end when men have ceased to fight" was a popular slogan of the
anti-Vietnam War movement.
It sounded quite practical and almost true on its face.
However, we now have considerable information about wars and how people have refused
to fight, and the relationship between them is not well described by this phrase.
The specific military technology in use, the social organization of military authority, and the division of labor in producing war, all make a difference in the posCampaigns emphasizing this
sibility of stopping a war by many refusals to fight.
tactic may even strengthen the organization of military authority. This seemed to
be the case in the anti-war campaigns directed at crewmen of attack aircraft
carriers.
In 1971 and 1972 there were campaigns to stop the sailing for Vietnam of the
USS Constellation, the USS Kitty Hawk and the USS Coral Sea. These were studied
along with a later series of strikes of 130 Black sailors on the Constellation, a
racial fight of over 200 on the Kitty Hawk and the anti-war movement defense of a
The study was
sailor charged with sabotage on the USS Ranger (Connally 1976).
based on documents produced by people involved in maintaining authority as well as
in resisting it.
These accounts and analyses appeared in military journals, GI
papers, campaign literature, daily newspapers and in a report of Congressional
Navy manuals and handbooks on ship organization
investigation of this resistance.
and authority practice were also studied.
STOP THE SHIP CAMPAIGNS
The Kitty Hawk and Constellation campaigns in San Diego were directed at the
community as well as the sailors on the ship and included a city-wide straw vote
to "keep the Connie home."
The organizers announced that they would use 'nonviolence' as their method of resistance, and consistent with this, individual conscientious objection to military participation was encouraged. A community peace
group sponsored a project house as a campaign center and social gathering place.
Another group offered para-legal counseling for enlisted people at a downtown store
front and published a GI paper, Up From the Bottom. The campaigns involved months
of organizing on and off the ships with meetings, rallies, folk and rock concerts,
leafleting and publicity. Following the eventual ship departures, nine men in one
case and eleven in the other took 'sanctuary' in local churches instead of returning to their ships. Each time they were arrested and flown to the ships. They
Church sanctuary was used to
were eventually discharged after some time in prison.
make a moral statement against the war and encourage others to resist. It was also
used to establish the sailors' claims to discharge as conscientious objectors.
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The campaign literature, GI, and underground press gave a libertarian
analysis of military authority and the Vietnam War. Along with the arguments
against the war and the humanistic accounts of suffering, there was ridicule of
named senior NCO's and ship's officers. Their insistence on deference, their
regulation of haircuts and their officiousness at inspections were all complained
of.
Specific orders were cited as self-serving for the NCO or officer or as
harassment of the men.
The Coral Sea Save (Stop) Our Ship Campaign (SOS) in the San Francisco Bay
Area differed from the San Diego campaigns in that the early organizing was not
publicized in the civilian community.
The campaign literature was more anti-navy
than anti-war, non-violence was not specifically approved as a method and conscientious objection and the use of church sanctuary were not encouraged. Solidarity in action with other enlisted people was urged. It was expected that large
numbers of the crew would simply not return to the ship when it was ready to sail.
When the ship did sail, SOS people claimed over 250 sailors had purposely missed
the ship.
The Navy claimed there were only the usual number of UA's (Unauthorized
Absences), thirty-five.
BLACK UPRISINGS
The racial fight on the Kitty Hawk and the series of strikes on the Constellation happened without prior planning. On the Kitty Hawk the fight began while
the ship was in action off Vietnam. Blacks were leaving a meeting where they had
protested the handling of discipline related to a shore fight in the Phillipines,
and as they left some walked through the hanger deck where they were met by a line
of advancing marines.
Some picked up hardware and fought, others ran through the
ship shouting "they're killing our brothers."
This precipitated a general fight of
over 200 sailors that lasted for a number of hours and produced serious injuries.
The initial attack by marines was the result of a confusion in orders between the
captain of the ship and his Black executive officer (House Armed Services Committee 1973).
Many of the charges were reduced, when, much later defense attorneys
and civilian groups protested.
The strikes on the USS Constellation developed after a series of meetings of
Blacks to consider grievances including a rumor that undesirable discharges were
to be given to certain Blacks. At the last of these meetings, representatives were
sent to the Captain to ask him to meet with them. He refused, was asked by other
representatives and continued to refuse. One hundred and thirty Black sailors
stayed at the meeting place, the main mess decks, all night. The ship was ordered
into San Diego and in the morning the sit-in group agreed to go ashore, expecting
to receive a hearing for their grievances. The shore discussions were not satisfactory to the 'strikers' and five days later they were ordered to return to the
ship. One hundred and twenty-nine men met on the dock, held their own muster and
flag salute and refused orders to board the ship, and instead sat down on the dock
In addition to the
for six hours until the Navy promised to meet their conditions.
Captain, his superiors in the Pacific fleet and the Chief of Naval Operations and
The men boarded busses
the Secretary of the Navy were involved in the decision.

-627-

and expected to arrive at one base for settlement. They found instead that they
had been separated into three groups and taken to three different bases where they
were individually given hearings, charges and relatively mild punishments.
There was a Congressional investigation of these two Black uprisings and the
report was soon made public.
It blamed the Chief of Naval Operation's policy of
"permissiveness" and the Blacks for the trouble. Reports from the Black participants and their supporters were carried in the daily press and in GI newspapers and
underground papers. Their complaints were against institutional racism in the Navy.
They identified certain of their respective captain's policies as adding to this
but they located discrimination in the institutional system for assignments of
specialties, training and punishments. They thought this happened as a result of
the use of civilian records for decisions on punishment, promotions, assignment
and discharge and was compounded within the Navy by racially biased personnel
evaluations.
IDEOLOGIES OF AUTHORITY
Officers, who wrote articles and letters in their journals about these
resistance events and the practice of military authority, used one of two well
developed ideologies. Each ideology included prescriptions for practical actions
thbught necessary to establish and maintain authority; and each justified authority, that is, the right of a few to demand compliance of many (see Bendix 1960 for
this definition of ideology).
One of these was a militarist perspective similar
to what Vagts has identified as militarism (1937) and the other resembled the
managerial ideology of civilian corporate management (Janowitz 1960).
It is
necessary to consider how these two ideologies affected actual practice of authority on the ships to understand how the resistance actions, in turn, affected
navy work.
The militarist ideology assumes that authority is manifested by an inferior's
exact obedience to a superior's commands in a face-to-face setting such as the old
navy sail ships.
Heroes of the old sailing days are often quoted. The maintenance
of caste differences are thought necessary for military discipline.
Officers are
believed to comply as gentlemen who value honor and who are devoted to their
country and the Navy. Enlisted people, on the other hand, only cooperate because
they are trained in obedience and fear punishment. Militarists think the
differences in pay, quarters, personal services and privilege are appropriate and
also necessary to maintain discipline.
They complain of efforts to increase the
"habitability" of enlisted quarters on the ships.
Senior NCO's, particularly chief petty officers, are set apart as more
responsible and more deserving than lower rated enlisted people.
They have direct
authority over the crew although subordinates do most of the supervision. They
are responsible for the living arrangements of the sailors as well as for the
direction of work. For instance, there are detailed rules even about the way
sailors' clothes are to be folded and stacked within drawers. The personal neatness and haircuts of sailors are also subject to navy standards.
Militarists

-628-

expect chiefs to get compliance by being "tough."
They worry that some chiefs
may become "nice guys" in a mistaken effort to be liked by their crew.
Orders, coordination and information are expected to go through a chain of
command. Appeals, protest or additional information from lower levels are to go
up the chain step-by-step.
The use of this chain is seen as absolutely necessary
for the integrity of the authority of the particular officer at each level.
Communications from level to level involve rituals of personal deference. Enactment of these rituals are interpreted as evidence of the superior's authority.
If there are lapses in deference or outright refusals or avoidance, then authority
is thought to be in mortal danger:
sailors will observe that the superior does
not have absolute power to produce obedience and become disobedient themselves.
Authority is thus a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy that only works so long as
there is unanimous agreement that it does.
The managerial ideology is very different from this.
It identifies authority as the administration of institutional processes so that they result in compliance of personnel. Control is essentially by manipulation of career opportunities and possibilities of unfavorable discharges. The relationship between ranks
is to have the appearance of cordiality. "Teamwork" is often used to describe the
social situation. The senior NCO's are expected to refrain from being authoritarian, but they are nonetheless held responsible for the administration of the
work and control of the personal living behavior of enlisted people. There is a
de-emphasis on military caste:
both enlisted people and officers are thought to
work on the same basis, career opportunity.
The actual control mechanisms are impersonal and do not rely on face-to-face
interactions. Orders come as paper authorizations for work assignment, transfer,
promotion, pay, leave and discharge.
It is the content of each person's personnel
file that is the key to opportunity or punishment rather than face-to-face negotiation. Each file includes evaluations by the immediate superior, past records of
test results, training, experience, history of disciplinary actions and school and
court records from civilian life.
Compliant behavior is necessary if the enlisted
person or officer wishes future promotions or to ward off unfavorable assignments,
punishments or discharges.
In addition to control by this channeling of behavior,
counseling programs and group sensitivity workshops are used to reduce discontent
or, "turbulence," as the managerial officers refer to it. The existence of covert
surveillance is also publicized as a further persuasion to compliance.
Besides these two ideological 'recipes' for authority there is the actual
The organization plan
organization of the work and living situations on the ship.
was originally based on the militarist organization of sailing ships, where there
was face-to-face command (Melville 1850).
As technological changes occurred,
modifications were made in work organization. Some changes were informed by the
managerial perspective, others were simply ad hoc efforts to solve problems presented by the new ship technology. Today work on the huge aircraft carriers
consists largely of maintenance of complex machinery and electronic and electrical
systems.
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The skills for doing the various jobs are not widely understood or shared
among the crew. On the old sailing ships each sailor had a well rounded understanding of the total work involved in sailing and the skill to accomplish much of
it. An officer could give a general order and expect his men to know immediately
how to do it.
The work today is divided into simple tasks and job skill is
acquired through training and from manuals and specifications by the manufacturer
of the equipment.
Technical bureaus off the ship also issue instructions. The
actual work orders for an individual may be on a printed card which specifies
what to do, where to get the tools and how to put them away.
In this way many jobs
There still
are assigned and completed without direct person-to-person contact.
are occasions for face-to-face commands on modern aircraft carriers, but these
happen more often during the supervision of living arrangements such as in inspection of quarters or of person, than in the doing of the actual work.
AUTHORITY VIEWED FROM THE RANKS
Enlisted people often criticized the administration of navy authority; they
pointed to arbitrariness and officious actions of TICO's and officers; they called
career navy people "lifers" derisively; they considered many orders as exploitive
and based on aggrandizement of the officer's career rather than for practical need
for the work. They particularly objected to the controls on personal living,
haircuts and deference etiquette.
They saw all of these as humiliating; however,
in spite of this libertarian critique their basic idea of how authority works was
the same as the militarists! They assumed that power of navy authority depended on
their use of the etiquette of deference and their obedience to face-to-face
commands.
The Black movement sailors shared some of this anti-authority view but
identified channeling by manipulation of career opportunity as the fundamental
method of control.
Their analysis developed as part of the identification of
institutional racism. The Black movement sailors, then, clearly shared the
managerial model of how authority was constructed.
RESISTANCE PRODUCES CONFLICT BETWEEN MANAGERS AND MILITARISTS
The anti-war campaigns, the Black movement action and the general antiauthoritarian mood of enlisted people had an indirect effect on authority. The
Chief of Naval Opexations at this time was Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, a strong spokesperson for the managerial ideology.
There had been a serious drop in reenlistments in the Navy, and Zumwalt had ordered a series of reforms to make the Navy
more attractive and to solve the "retention" problem. The reforms, which were
labeled, Z-Grams, modified certain regulations known as "chicken regulations" that
were generally considered harassing for enlisted people. The Z-Grams were not
intended to encourage political expression of enlisted people or to make changes
in the naval hierarchy. Several of the Z-Grams were explicitly directed against
racist practices.
These included establishment of race relations councils that
could carry information up the naval hierarchy without going through the chain of
command.
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These reforms created problems with the traditional militarist practices of
authority. Many militarist officers and NCO's were more alarmed at the occasional
rudeness, grudging cooperation and frequent infraction of the rules of deference
etiquette than they were by the direct anti-war actions. When a sailor failed to
salute they viewed their authority as under attack. Their ideology of authority
prescribed immediate and forceful action in response to these threats. When
Zumwalt's policies prevented these responses, he and the managerial position of
permissiveness that he represented to them,came to be seen as a serious threat to
naval authority. The senior NCO's were in the position where there was the most
pinch. They were responsible for seeing that their crews were prepared for
inspections and that the many exact regulations were followed. Under the managerial
policy of Zumwalt they were to continue to carry out these responsibilities but
at the same time they were to avoid alienating the enlisted people. They were the
last link in an authoritarian system as they passed on unwelcome orders from above
for reasons unrelated to the immediate interests of the crew. It wasn't easy to
get compliance by persuasion. They had depended on their own toughness and on its
being backed by officers.
Zumwalt's managerial policies threatened to deprive them
of this support.
Black uprisings of themselves were not seen by militarists as a direct
challenge to authority. The militarist ideology does recognize this kind of threat,
but there are prescribed responses to it, that is, punishment. The really serious
problem to them was the managerial leadership which prevented the punitive action
they thought necessary. Militarist ideology does not recognize a valid basis for
Black solidarity or a problem of injustice in how Blacks are treated by the Navy.
Militarists interpreted Black resistance as evidence of the danger of permissiveness. They believed punishment would have worked both as prevention and as control.
Because they were not in complete charge they were saved a test of this. Failures
at ship level could be blamed on their hands having been tied by higher managerial
authority.
The Kitty Hawk fight and the Constellation strikes had deeply alarmed the CNO
(Chief of Naval Operations) and his managerial group. These events encouraged them
in their view of the absolute necessity of eliminating racism. Zumwalt publicly
blamed his top officers for not taking vigorous actions to eradicate it.
Militarist admirals counter-attacked.
They asked for support from Congress and got
a Congressional investigation.
The Congressional committee found in the militarists
favor and declared that the problem was permissiveness not racism. Various recommendations from a militarist point of view were made such as to tighten dress codes,
lengthen training and restrict recruitment (House Armed Services Committee 1973).
In spite of this report and the eventual incorporation of these measures into the
Navy, the managerial officers continued to be in charge of personnel policy where
they made decisions on promotions, retirement and discharge for officers as well
as enlisted people.
The practical results of this internal fight in terms of navy-wide insecurity
of NCO's and officers and the effects of this on their work must have been considThe basic cause of
erable. There were many complaints from officers on the ships.

these tensions was the resistance of enlisted people, but they produced this quite
unintentionally. Authority was shaken not by withdrawal of subordinates' participation in the construction of authority, but by uncertainty about the basis of
authority among those who were expected to exercise it.
This was the indirect
impact of the anti-war and Black movements on the naval hierarchy.
DIRECT EFFECTS OF ANTI-WAR TACTICS
The anti-war movement in the Navy probably added strength to the civilian
peace movement but produced virtually no direct effects on navy participation in
the war. The direct purpose of the campaign had been to stop the ships from bombing Vietnam. The anti-war movement simply assummed that individual and group
challenges to authority in face-to-face situations would lead to immobilization of
the ships as enlisted people either left the Navy or refused to cooperate. How
was this to be brought about?
Quitting The Navy:

Conscientious Objection

Some non-violent resisters refused on grounds of conscience to continue work
in the Navy. By doing this with the use of church 'sanctuary' they also managed
to get excellent publicity for the civilian peace movement and civilians became
supportive of UA's and deserters as well as the sailors who resisted openly. But
when anti-war sailors applied for conscientious objector discharges they also were
following the paper procedures established by the military.
As more people applied
for this status and as court cases developed, the procedures were formalized and
widely recognized by ship officers. The steps for getting conscientious objector
status usually involved disobeying a specific order followed by a sentence of one
or more months in the brig.
The paper history of this entire application, prder
refusal and acceptance of punishment were all necessary for the final discharge to
be authorized. The managerial leadership did not really object to these people
leaving the Navy. The conscientious objectors were thus very obedient as they
followed the forms.
This legitimized.the navy procedures.
quitting The Navy:

Walking Away

Some servicemen went UA or deserted altogether.
This may have been more of
a practical problem for the Navy and a challenge to its legitimacy. Movement
enlisted people and the ex-CI's in the movement debated these tactics.
Going UA
rather than taking sanctuary was encouraged in the campaign aboard the Coral Sea.
Sanctuary offered good initial publicity but the later arrests and final disposal
of the resisters could be manipulated for the Navy's benefit.
This happened to
the Kitty Hawk resisters. Navy negotiation convinced the movement people behind
them to drop publicity in order to get the men discharged without extra punishment. Some of the movement people thought that large numbers of UA's might
actually interfere with the ship's sailing; however, an excess of men are assigned
to ships as part of military planning for battle losses and, in addition, extra
personnel can be quickly sent from shore bases and other ships. Only if there
were a widespread walk-out throughout the Navy could a ship be held up for lack of
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personnel. Another problem with Unauthorized Absences is that reports of the
number who are gone are questionable.
It was impossible for the SOS people to
know the total of UAs in the Coral Sea campaign. The Navy reported 35, they
reported 250. Sailors on the ship would have certainly noticed if any of their
buddies were missing, but they did not have communication networks across the
ship to add this up to a perceived challenge to legitimacy of authority.
Quitting The Navy:

Getting an Early Discharge

Other servicemen tried for an early discharge from the Navy. Discharges
before a term of enlistment expires are allowed under certain conditions including
conscientious objection. For instance, the Navy may give administrative discharges for physical or mental disabilities and "for the good of the service."
Sometimes a sailor could qualify for a disability discharge or convince the Navy
that he would be less harmful to them out than in. Doing this was rather tricky
because certain transgressions could lead to a long jail sentence or a punitive
discharge.
Careful use of navy rules and knowledge of the Navy's options were
necessary in order to avoid this.
Anti-war groups regularly provided para-legal
counseling to make it easier for enlisted people to confront the military and,
hopefully, to get out.
The counseling service was backed by consultation with
civilian attorneys and was organized nationally with updating of materials,
counselor training workshops and reports of recent court decisions.
Counseling
services were in continual demand, they were the most popular offering of the antiwar movement.
To some extent the counseling upheld the legitimacy of the Navy as counselors
explained how to carefully follow regulations. As sailors learned their rights
many became more 'uppity.'
There was a proliferation of 'sea lawyers,' an increase
in court cases and discharges.
This alarmed the militarists, but not the managerial
leaders, who themselves used discharges to get rid of political organizers and
other troublesome persons. It did become necessary for the Navy to augment their
legal personnel.
Attacking Military Law
In addition to helping servicemen to secure discharges, legal defense was
provided to many anti-military GIs.
The defense usually challenged the military
for not following their own procedures or challenged the military code for denying
When the Navy attempted to
the constitutional rights guaranteed to all citizens.
press charges as an object lesson to Gls,
the movement made it difficult by
skillful defense and sometimes by successfully appealing the case to civilian
courts. However, in some cases, movement publicity and defense probably led to a
more severe sentence than if the case had been defended quietly (Sherill 1970;
Finn 1971).
The steady challenge to military practice and military law resulted in
changes in practice and in the Uniform Code of Military Justice (the military law).
Militarists were again alarmed by the court decisions that limited punishment and
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procedures of charging and sentencing, but managerial officers simply worked out
other ways to punish, for instance administrative procedures could accomplish the
same result. The skillful use of "building a record" in a troublesome individual's
personnel file could lead to a punitive discharge.
Raising Consciousness
The anti-war people capitalized on the widespread anti-lifer sentiments.
They tried to build a stronger anti-military consciousness among enlisted people
by publishing GI newspapers and establishing GI anti-military social centers.
Although both militarists and the anti-war enlisted people reported an increase
in anti-military consciousness together with a decline in observance of deference
rituals in face-to-face interaction with officers, this did not interfere with
navy authority. The militarists thought it would; however, and put more pressure
on chiefs to get the sailors to act with proper humility and discipline.
No effort was made by the anti-war movement to gain the support of these
chiefs. This may not have been a realistic possibility. In any case, it was not
tried. Instead the anti-war tactics attempted to create opposition to them by
face-to-face 'uppityness'; but this, apparently, did not affect the ability of the
Navy to participate in bombing in the Vietnam War. What 'uppityness' did was to
push senior NCO's toward stronger support of the militarist position in the inside
battle between managers and militarists.
The managerial officers dealt with anti-war and anti-authority organizing on
several levels. They avoided any acknowledgement of resistance or of libertarian
criticism. The situation was referred to as "turbulence" in the fleet. The antiwar argument, not having been recognized, did not have to be dealt with. The
anti-authority sentiments were expected to be reduced by the Z-Gram reforms, a
quiet way of handling the problem; however, paper manipulation was the major tactic.
As enlisted men or young officers were thought to be successful in organizing a
ship, they would be transferred or discharged by paper authorizations without fuss
and without risking the reaction of a solidary group. Through the control of
channels of communication the administration could prevent any effective feedback
to the resisters and isolate potential sources of trouble within the ships. In
addition, personal counseling and police and secret service surveillance were increased.
THE BLACK CHALLENGE TO AUTHORITY
The Black movement presented a much more serious challenge to naval authority and particularly to managerial forms of control. It was much less readily
handled by 'managerial' strategies than the anti-war movement. It took the form
of a direct withdrawal of cooperation of a kind that the anti-war movement would
have liked to achieve but never could. Black resistance did actually threaten
naval authority directly and the Navy even found it necessary to slightly modify
its plans for ship movement as a result. The fight on the Kitty Hawk was a situation temporarily beyond managerial control. A group of men actually fighting
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throughout the ship had a potential for interrupting the bombing runs of the planes
on the flight deck. The sit-down strike on the mess deck in the Connie and the
later dockside strike in which the Blacks held their own muster and flag salute was
even more challenging because of the solidarity of the group, and in the second
strike because of their use of a parallel authority structure. Paper manipulation
could not handle these immediate situations.
Furthermore the charge of racism in career administration was a direct denial
of managerial legitimacy. The promise of career opportunity was not simply one
among many rewards offered by the managerial system of control: it was its basis.
The contingencies of career were what they manipulated. The promise to deliver job
training or a career in the Navy on a basis of equal opportunity was their justification for authority.
As Blacks openly and with much publicity insisted that they
had not shared this opportunity, managerial legitimacy was brought into question.
The measures available within the managerial system of authority were likely to
confirm the Black critique of the Navy as discriminating against them. Direct
measures of control of the kind that the militarist ideology would recommend tended
to exacerbate the situation. A different response, to correct the situation directly by meeting Black demands for the elimination of racism in the Navy, was made
difficult because of the entrenched racist position of the militarists. The
managerial method of handling the situation was to promise, not to threaten, but
later to divide the group. Solidarity was further weakened by separate trials and
mild punishments. The latter tended to diffuse protest by the civilian Black
community. But the potential for Black challenge to Navy authority continues.
RESISTANCE AND SOLIDARITY
Both Black and anti-war movements of enlisted people shared common problems
of organizing.
Enlisted people were dispersed throughout the ship as well as on
different ships with little opportunity for contact. Communications were controlled
by the naval authorities and there was continuous surveillance and active repression of potential trouble. In this situation, however, Black consensus was
crucial to organization and coordinated action. Roberta Ash in her model of movement action has stressed the need to investigate the link between shared conditions
and the emergence of collective actions (1972). Black individual experiences
result in a shared interpretation common to members of the group. The effectiveness
of the Black movement in coping with a highly controlled and repressive context can
be understood in these terms. Black enlisted men already shared 'Black experience'
as civilians.
They shared the experience of having believed recruiters when they
promised equal opportunity and they also had similar disillusionment as they found
they were assigned to the least desirable jobs. When later on the ships the use of
Black power gestures and Black haircuts were outlawed their indignation was shared.
It was not necessary for them to talk to each other to find this out. Their
recognition of their common situation included recognition of common understanding.
As the stories of the shore fight of the Kitty Hawk crewmen and the punitive discharges of the Constellation reached Blacks, there was one response, anger. Neither
long discussions, social gatherings, charismatic leadership nor persuasive argument
were needed for action. The only question was what to do. On the Kitty Hawk even
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this was not a question.
was the common response.

The situation was perceived as attack, and self-defense

What the Blacks did in both events was to create mutinous situations unThe Navy was able to gain control but not
precedented in American naval history.
until some hours and days of delicate management. I think this ability of Blacks
to act together rested on the solidarity of common understanding as well as on
shared identity. "Consciousness raising" occurs during recruitment to identity
movements and may take considerable time, but once the new movement replaces the
New situations can be correctly
into place.
established ideology, the pieces fall
interpreted from the new view without consultation with other members.
This form of shared interpretation was not available to anti-war sailors. The
anti-war position had not developed as part of a common civilian experience or even
There were some shared elements of a positive expecidentical military experience.
tation of life
in the Navy followed by disappointment as military methods were
encountered.
The content of the expectations and the later
re-orientation varied.
There was a shared anti-military view but this was not interpreted as fundamental
to their own life
situations.
The anti-war perspective centered on a concern for
other people who were suffering and dying in Vietnam. Action was based on a
recognition of complicity in harming them. Individual soul searching was necessary
to produce this insight as well as imagination in making the connection between
daily navy assignments and the bombing of people.
This also required vicarious
participation in others' oppression. All of this went on in individual imaginations rather than as a shared actual experience. Even though there was'talking with
each other' it couldn't approach the shared understanding available from common
direct experience.
The anti-war sailors did not respond to attempts to block their organization
with indignation and anger as did the Blacks.
They were aware of some direct
oppression but they felt
this was as a consequence of their organizing and they
didn't feel that it was extremely unfair.
They protested their treatment and often
took legal action on the basis of their constitutional rights, but they were not
indignant nor surprised when the Navy made countermoves.
There was even a minor
sense of triumph because the Navy had noticed and been annoyed with their actions.
People who had developed opposition to the war and were taking serious resistance
actions had often experienced emotional anguish as they reached their decisions to
act, but by the time of actual confrontation this was usually diffused. They were
more likely to meet the events with a sense of tragedy than of anger.
To activate the anti-war resistance it had been necessary to do continual
organizing, individual counseling and building of community support.
The straw
vote to keep the Constellation home included votes of twenty-two percent of the
crew. The nine who took sanctuary were less than one percent of the crew. There
were occasions when large numbers of anti-war protestors came together including
meetings on the ship, but these did not develop into resistance.
Even when arrests
Were made at the sanctuary churches there was not more than symbolic resistance.
The anti-war appeal to conscience does not seem to be an adequate base for mass
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resistance.
It may prepare people for action as individuals on the basis of
conscience, but spontaneous cooperative action can only be taken if there is social
Such supportive
interaction continually supporting the mutuality of understanding.
interaction is not necessary for resistance based on common experience and shared
identity.
CONCLUSION
In spite of an anti-authoritarian mood among enlisted people, individual
resistance, absences without authorization, many applications for discharge and a
large civilian peace movement, the anti-war campaigns were not successful in stopping or delaying carriers from returning to the Western Pacific theater and continuing their role in the bombing of Vietnam. Anti-war tactics that included use of
legal and administrative channels did not challenge managerial control. The navy
managers developed an administrative procedure for handling conscientious objectors
which was effective in avoiding adverse publicity and at the same time was a means
of removing potential sources of troublemakers.
A better understanding of the social construction of naval authority might
have produced other, perhaps more effective, tactics. The anti-war protesters did
not distinguish between the situation of enlistedmen on a modern aircraft catrier
where their technical work was far removed from a battlefield and separated within
the ship from face-to-face contact with superiors while working, and that of enlisted men in the infantry in Vietnam (Jay and Osnos 1971) or the long-ago sailors
The effect of resistance actions depends at least
of the old navy (Melville 1850).
in part on the relevance of the specific tactic to the actual way that authority is
constructed and maintained. As it was, the anti-war tactics probably tended to
consolidate naval authority rather than produce more resistance.
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COMON 14001S AND FUNCTIONS OF THE WARFARE AND WELFARL STATE*
by David G. Gil
Brandeis University

Warfare and welfare are usually assumed to serve contradictory
ends and to hierooted in antithetical values, institutions and
dynamics. In this essay, I propose to challenge this notion and
to advance, instead, the thesis that, in spite of significant differences betwcn them, warfare and welfare serc, nevertheless,
identical and colilementary functions, and are both rooted in
identical socittal values, institutions and dynamics.
As with othr phenomena which are considered to be "social prollems,"
such as poverty, crime, unemployment, inflation, mental illness, etc.,
but which aic irurcly by-products of the "normal" workings of certain
social systems, arfart and welfarc can not be understood and overcome
unless their philosophical and institutional roots and functions are
first unraveled. This requires studying warfare and welfare from a
holistic-cxolutjonaz% perspective which treats social, economic, political,
psycholegical, ind ideological dimensions of human societies as vauial-les
rather than as cL;:tants, settled once and for all. When warfare and
welfare art: exlcricd in this fashion and are placed within the context
of uni\crsal efistential processes, the extent to which they tend to
fit the internal logic of certain patterns of these processes should
become disucrnal:lc, and their presumed inevitability can then be demystified.
What, then, are tie general functions of warfare and welfare, and
from what philosolhical roots and values do they derive? To explore
these questions, I %ill focus first on welfare and then on warfare.
Welfare as a Societal Institution
In discasiig welfare I am concerned primaril) with formal, institutionali:ed -ractices as reflected in social policies and services
of "welfart-states," whether the services are administered directly
by units of government, or indirectly by government-chartered, "voluntary"
agencies. I am only tangentially concerned with attitudes and acts
of spontaneous and systematic cooperation and mutual aid within families
and among friends, neighbors, and members of communities. There is
historical and philosophical continuity and interaction between cooperation and mutual aid, and welfare-state policies and services. However

*This essay was originally published in the author's book, The Challenge
of Social Equality, Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman Publishing Co., 1976.
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for purposes of the present exploration, I am concerned with aspects
of welfare state policies and services which differ, in a fundamental
sense, from acts of cooperation and mutual aid. For these differences
contain the clues to the philosophical roots and societal functions
of welfare as an institution.
Acts of spontaneous and systematic cooperation and mutual aid
represent transactions among individuals and groups of essentially
equal social, economic and political standing. They derive from a
sense of mutual caring and responsibility, a shared human and community
identity, common perceptions of interests, and value positions tending
toward equality, liberty, self-reliance, cooperation, and collectivity
Implicit in these acts is respect for the autonomy and
orientation.
The
individuality of all those involved, helpers and helped alike.
function of spontaneous and systematic cooperation and mutual aid is
to compensate individuals for temporary or extended handicaps or
disadvantageous conditions inherent in certain stages of the life
process, or caused by natural phenomena and by the vicissitudes of
living. The aim of such cooperation and mutual aid is to assure
normalization of circumstances and fullest possible integration and
participation in community life of those affected by adverse circumstances.
Policies and services of welfare-states, on the other hand, involve
usually transactions among individuals and groups of essentially
unequal social, economic, and political standing. While these
services can be, and often are, administered in a humane fashion, and
while they can, and often do, improve the circumstances of deprived
and disadvantaged individuals and groups, their underlying function
is, nevertheless, to serve as a balance-wheel for social orders based
on injustice, privilege, force and structural violence. The values
implicit in, and promoted by, welfare-state policies and services are
inequality, domination, competition, and self-orientation. To support
these assertions I will first clarify my understanding of the terms
"welfare state" and "welfare," and will then sketch the evolution,
dynamics, and social philosophy of welfare states. Welfare states
are states in which:
1. tile majority of the population are excluded from free access
to, and use of, natural and human-created, productive resources;
2.

such access and use are controlled by a small segment of the
population who own productive resources, and/or by a state
bureaucracy on behalf of the "people-as-owners;"

3. the majority of the population can not be self-reliant through,
and self-directing at, work since they depend on "employment"
by private and/or public owners and controllers of productive
resources who also determine most aspects of production and
work;
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4.

a system has been instituted for distribution, in kind or
through money, of "essential" goods and services to "unemployed"
or otherwise needy segments of the population, and for allocation
of work roles under specified circumstances.

Goods and services distributed, and work roles allocated, in
accordance with institutionalized arrangements of welfare states
constitute the "welfare" portion of the provision system of these states.
Welfare provisions vary widely among welfare states at any point in
time, and over time within each welfare state, in terms of type and
scope, circumstances of eligibility, and characteristics of eligible
segments of populations.
Modern welfare states vary also in economic and political institutions
and philosophies. They include oligopoly-capitalist democracies such
as the United States, mixed capitalist-socialist democracies such as
western and northern European states, and state-monopoly-capitalist,
socialist states such as the Soviet Union and certain eastern European
states. A common characteristic of modern welfare states, irrespective
of economic and political institutions and philosophies, is the
emergence of large, hierarchically structured bureaucracies who administer
the welfare services of the state and who regulate the access of depeldent
individuals and groups to needed provisions, services and/or work roles.
People in welfare states tend to develop a sense of dependence and
insecurity in relation to the work context and to welfare services.
Also, since the institutions and philosophy of welfare states sanction
and promote manifold inequalities among individuals and groups in
society, human relations tend to be competitive, individuals and groups
act selfishly, and the existential milieu is alienating and not conducive
to human self-actualization.
Modern welfare states tend to be industrialized, urbanized and secular.
They are often labeled "developed." However, while industrialization,
urbanization, secularization, and "development" have been important
factors in the evolution of many modern welfare states, they are not
essential aspects. Different variants of welfare states predate those
processes and many contemporary welfare states rank low on some or all
these dimensions. It seems that the only essential aspects of welfare
state societies are dispossession and separation of most people from
productive resources, legitimation of such expropriation and separation
as "law and order" by the state, and institutionalization of compensatory
and control mechanisms by the state to protect the status-quo and,
simultaneously, to assure the survival of a dependent, but conforming,
population.

The Evolution of Welfare States
All social orders are creations of the human mind and of human
actions, or rather of the thoughts and actions of countless humans
communicating and interacting through space and time. Social orders
emerge through the gradual institutionalization of collective responses
to existential imperatives intrinsic to the human drive to survive
in natural settings which are always characterized by relative
scarcities of life-sustaining resources, and which always require
human work to secure such resources. Essentially then, different
social orders are different solutions to the same existential problems,
namely, to satisfy the biological, psychological, and social needs
of their members. Societies can, therefore, be compared and evaluated
in terms of the extent to which they succeed or fail to satisfy these
needs.
There are four related existential domains for which social orders
must evolve institutional structures and dynamics to assure their
continuity and viability: management of resources, organization of
work and production, distribution of rights, and governance. Parallel
to their institutional structures, social orders require a "symbolic
universe" which interprets, justifies and sustains these institutions,
shapes the consciousness of people, and also interprets nature, the
supernatural, the concept of human nature, perceptions of interests
and value positions relevant to the institutional order. The legitimation of the social order, socialization into it, and social control of
individuals living in its orbit, are the result of mutually reinforcing
interactions of a society's "material" institutions and "symbolic
universe".
Before describing the emergence of institutionalized welfare and
the evolution of the welfare-state, some observations are indicated
on the notion of self-reliance. Self-reliance is the opposite of
dependence and thus the real antidote of welfare, since dependence is
the condition which leads inevitably to the institutionalization of
welfare measures. The self-reliance of individuals and of human groups
is possible when they are in a position to satisfy their needs by
producing for themselves life-sustaining and life-enhancing resources.
In order to produce needed resources, individuals and groups must have
free access to, and free use of, natural resources such as land, water,
air, sunlight, minerals, wildlife, vegetation, energy, and humancreated resources such as tools, scientific knowledge, technology and
skills, for all production involves bringing together natural resources,
human-created resources, and human capacities. Self-reliance then
requires freedom to bring these components together in ever new
combinations.
It is important to note that self-reliance does not require that
individuals or groups produce everything needed for their existence, for
self-reliance is not the same as self-sufficiency or autarky. However
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self-reliance is predicated upon exchanges among different individuals
and groups of their respective products on fair, non-exploitative,
flexibly-egalitarian terms. Rough measures for fair exchanges are
the equivalence of efforts invested in products, the importance of
products in terms of a hierarchy of human needs, and the degree of
scarcity of natural resources used in production.
Institutionalized welfare measures commonly associated with the
welfare state are rooted in societal processes, structures and
dynamics which first undermined, and eventually prevented altogether, opportunities for genuine independence and self-reliance
on the part of major segments of populations. The evolutionary
process leading to this outcome will now be sketched.
The first and most fundamental step in the fateful process which
eventually destroyed opportunities for self-reliance for the
majority of individuals in many human groups, and which then led
via charity to the welfare state, was the establishment by individuals
of claims to exclusive control over territories and natural resources
on these. This step was also the beginning of a process leading to
warfare and the warfare state. Appropriations for use by one individual
and his family was one feasible, and sensible, approach to solving the
issues of resource- management and provision during early stages of
human evolution. The purpose of this solution was to assure owners
and their relations a steady flow of life-sustaining, needs-satisfying
provisions, and thus to reduce existential insecurity. This choice,
at the dawn of human history, became gradually the root of the powerful
institution, ideology and dynamics of exclusive property rights, the
archetype and core of many ancient and modern societies.
The choice of individual appropriation of life-sustaining resources
was by no means inevitable, nor is it inherent in human nature as is often
erroneously' assumed. There is ample evidence throughout history, all
over the world, that many human groups created social orders using an
opposite principle, according to which life-sustaining resources of
nature should not be appropriated by individuals for exclusive use and
control, but should be freely available for use by all members of a
group to sustain and enhance everyone's existence. Hindsight suggests
that this egalitarian, cooperative, collectivity-oriented approach to
solving issues of resource management and provision constituted a far
more sophisticated choice than appropriation for exclusive individual
use of resources especially when these alternative approaches are
compared and evaluated in terms of the extent to which human needs
are satisfied throughout a population, and in terms of efficient use
of scarce resources.
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The principle of private property as a basis for individual
security has had significant institutional, ideological, psychological,
and behavioral consequences for human groups who evolved their social
systems around that principle. Since owning land and other natural
and human-created resources was considered desirable, owning more
such property came to be considered even more desirable. This attitude,
and actions based on it led to efforts to increase one's holdings, to
the emergence of an acquisitive, selfish and competitive mentality,
and to human relations shaped by these practices and mentality. As
long as enough resources were available for everyone to appropriate
a sufficient share to assure his existence, this system worked
adequately. However, when all available resources had been appropriated,
the mentality and dynamics of acquisitiveness and competition caused
people to try to increase their holdings by taking from others by
force and cunning.
As the holdings of some people increased while those of others
decreased a new, serious problem emerged: Who would work with the
natural resources to assure the continuous production of needed
provisions? Up to that stage in evolution everyone had worked with
his own resources preserving thus his independence and self-reliance.
Yet,as the holdings of some individuals increased~they could no longer
put them to effective use, working by themselves. Besides there was
also the problem of guarding and defending the holdings amassed in
competition with others who constituted an ever present threat, especially
since their own holdings were no longer large enough to sustain their
existence through work. One ingenuous solution to these complementary
dilemmas seems to have been to induce the losers in the competition for
property to work on, and to guard, the property of the winners. In
this way additional human capacities would be available to the owners
of property, while the owners, in turn provided work opportunities and
a limited share of life-sustaining products to those who had lost
control of sufficient natural and human-created resources, to sustain
themselves, and who had consequently nothing left but their own human
capacities. This arrangement became the second major step on the road
to dependence and welfare, for it gradually accomplished the complete
structural separation of major segments of the population from the real
sources of genuine freedom, independence, self-reliance, and selfdetermination through self-directed work, namely equal access to, and
use of, productivenatural and human-created resources and facilities.
In passing, mention should be made here of an early variation on
the themes of increasing property holdings and recruiting a willing
work force from among expropriated segments of the population. This
variation was the organization of expeditions for the purpose of expanding
control over territories and resources beyond the domain of one's own
group and recruiting by force an enslaved work force from among the
inhabitants of conquered lands; that is, institutionalized warfare
emerged.
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An essential next step on the road to the welfare-state were
efforts to condition and control the property-less and severely
deprived masses of slaves and workers on whose work everyone,
including the property owners, depended for survival. The solution
to this difficult problem was found in hierarchical organization
of work and authority which involved a fine gradation of privilege
and power filtered down to workers as inducement for loyalty to
their masters, the owners of property. This system resulted in
multiple divisions of the work force into competing vertical segments and horizontal strata which received different material and
symbolic rewards and power, exercised different levels of authority,
and developed different interests, life-styles, aspirations, motivations, reference groups and loyalties.
One further important mechanism for solving problems of conditioning and controlling the work force was to withhold opportunities for
work and survival from a sizable segment of the work force, except in
times of war. The ever present prospect of unemployment and its
disastrous existential consequences posed a constant threat, especially
to the lowest layers of the work force, those who were expected to
perform the least desirable work. That threat, and the frequent
experience of actual unemployment, developed not only into a major
mechanism for disciplining the work force but also for keeping the
shares of workers in the aggregate product of their work relatively
low, ensuring thus the continuation of wealth accumulation on the
part of owners.
The developments sketched here schematically in an oversimplified
manner have taken thousands of years. They were far from smooth and
were accompanied by fierce conflicts and struggles within and among
various human groups. Empirical evidence of the stages mentioned in
this sketch can be found throughout the history of many civilizations
all over the globe. However, with time a societal pattern began to
emerge with which we are now very familiar, a social order in which
the ownership and control of natural and human-created wealth are
concentrated in the hands of a small segment of the population while
the rest of the people are essentially deprived of productive resources
except for their human capacities which, in the case of most of them
are usually not fully developed. Those who own no property can not be
self-reliant through self-directed work, the fruits of which they may
enjoy proudly. They are forced to depend for their existence on work
opportunities provided by property owners on terms that suit the owners'
interests to further increase their wealth and control through profitgenerating, rather than needs-satisfying, use of pr6ductive resources.
Furthermore)the propertyless work force continues to be divided into
countless layers and interest groups through differential rewards,
opportunities, and penalties built into the system, and they are forced
to compete among themselves to obtain the rewards and avoid the penalties.
Sex, race, ethnicity, nationality, age, formal education, certification,
and licensing are all used to increase the internal divisions of the work
force, and to prevent its unification and organization around its under-
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lying, true existential interest: to liberate the productive
resources and facilites in order to achieve self-reliance,
freedom and self-determination through self-directed work.
Most now existing social orders have come a long way from
the earliest steps of appropriation of territories and natural
resources. They evolved through many social, cultural, scientific,
and technological stages, from a gathering and hunting economy to
agriculture and industry, and from slavery to serfdom and wagelabor. However the basic organizing principle of property rights
and relations has remained relatively constant as the core of the
changing social-economic orders. Those who managed to own and
control productive resources appropriate for the time and developmental stage of their societies gained usually also political
influence and power. This, in turn, enabled them to assure the
legitimacy of the established divisions of wealth, division of
labor and organization of productionland distribution of goods,
services, civil and political rights, and social recognition and
prestige. Those who gained political influence and power also
created the concept, the institution and the ideology of the state,
the central function of which became to assure and protect the
status-quo of privilege, injustice, inequality, domination and
exploitation in every sphere of life, which had emerged over
hundreds of generations. The state defined the status-quo as
"law and order" and thus legitimated the results of ages of lawlessness and disorder, injustice, force, violence, and cunning.
The state was committed to maintain and defend the established
order by all possible and necessary means, including covert and
overt force, against any attempt to bring about significant
changes in the prevailing distributional patterns, policies, and
processes.
Certain aspects of the "symbolic universe" and of the consciousness and psychology of people, which evolved in interaction with
the institutional developments sketched above, should now be noted.
The emerging social orders came to be thought of as "natural" and
as the only "right" orders. Eventually they were interpreted as
the "will of God," and their rulers were believed to hold office
"by the grace of God."
Priesthoods, at first hesitatingly, and
later enthusiastically, bestowed their blessings and full support
on established orders and affirmed the sanctity of private property
and its guardian, the state, inspite of contrary prophetic messages
in the Scriptures and other sacred sources.
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Humans were thought to be unique, at the peak of nature, apart
from the rest of nature rather than harmoniously integrated into it,
nature's nasters designated by God. These notions led in time to an
exploitative attitude toward natural resources, and to mindless
waste and destruction. Human nature was thought to be evil, and,
indeed, humans displayed evil attitudes toward one another, and
tended not to trust others. Furthermore, humans came to be thought
of as unequal in worth and as entitled to different rights, depending
on the amount of property and power they managed to acquire. Success
in the acquisitive drive was interpreted as indication of superior
qualities, as evidence of virtue and of God's blessing, and hence,
as a basis for social recognition and prestige. Conversely, failure
in the acquisitive drive was interpreted as due to individual shortcomings, to sinful ways, to God's condemnation and rejection, and,
hence, a basis for societal contempt, disapproval and rejection.
Life itself came to be viewed as a permanent contest in a zerosum game, with everyone struggling "to get a larger piece of a finite
pie."
People developed selfish, inegalitarian and competitive
attitudes toward one another and a jungle mentality of mutual fear,
suspicion, and mistrust, envy and jealousy. They came to view themselves as subjects and everyone else as potential objects to be
used and exploited. They manipulated one another pragmatically,
in accordance with "the rules of the game" for their individual ends.
They related to one another through formal roles rather than as
whole, feeling and caring human beings. They became lonely, isolated
and alienated. To compensate for their emotional deprivations they
escaped into substitute gratifications, illusions, drugs, alcohol,
and mental ills.
Attitudes toward work came to reflect the emerging institutional
contradictions. Originally, work was respected as an important
source of human wealth and as the means for human survival and for
the enhancement of the quality of life. There was also pride in a
well executed job and the resulting product, and enjoyment of the
fruits of their labor. These original and functional attitudes
towards work, the original work ethic, were destroyed when people
were expropriated, their access to resources and productive facilities
was subjected to control by others, direction of their work was
removed from them, and products were taken away from the producers,
in short, when work became exploitative. These developments caused
work to be viewed as an unavoidable chore and evil. The joy of
creativity had gone out of it. Besides when owners of wealth began
to withdraw from work and to develop a cult of leisure and an ethic
of work avoidance, according to which engaging in physical labor was
debasing and demeaning of the person, negative attitudes toward work
began to permiate the consciousness of the population. Henceforth,
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people tried to work as little as possible and to shift work onto
others, especially when it was intrinsically unpleasant and dangerous.
Gradually also, in order to increase output, profit, and efficiency
measured by economic criteria only, most work processes were
structured in a manner that undermined the possibility of intrinsic
gratification. Work became boring, mind-killing, and offensive to
the senses. Using the worker's intellect at work became counterproductive, an obstacle to speed and efficiency. Furthermore, work
took place within the general competitive context of the struggle
for survival and advancement and within hierarchically structured
huge bureaucracies. This too added to the oppressive experience of
work and increased alienation from work and frustration from the
unrewarding human relations of most work places.
Clearly, institutional developments had resulted in massive
disincentives to work. To counteract these trends a work-ethic had
to be resurrected on an illusionary base. The only real work incentive
given the institutional reality and ideological developments, was
the fear of starvation. To this a myth had to be added, according
to which hard work was a direct road to success and wealth as well
as an indirect road to salvation, for after all, work was "sacred".
With the aid of this myth the commitment to work on the part of
those who had to work was to be shored up. There was enough truth
in this myth to render it believable in spite of overwhelming contrary
evidence. And so the myth continued to survive and to sustain
exploitative work processes of a production system where labor, a
function of humans, is employed by capital - lifeless matter, in the
interest of the owners of capital. This production system is a far
cry from a mode of production fitting the original work-ethic, a
system where whole humans freely employ resources to advance their
existential interests.
Having sketched the institutional evolution and the symbolic
universe of social systems organized around privately owned and
controlled productive resources and facilities, the functions of
institutionalized welfare policies and servicesin such societies
can now be spelled out. Essentially, institutionalized welfare fits
into such social systems as a safety-valve or balance wheel. It
constitutes an effective and even "efficient" line of last defense
which can be adjusted flexibly to changing circumstances and to
recurrent threats to the systems stability.*
Social orders fitting more or less the dynamics discussed here
have caused throughout their evolution, and continue to cause at
present, immense suffering of many millions of propertyless and
income-less human beings. When people have no wealth and when

*Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Regulating the Poor:
Functions of Public Welfare. New York:
Pantheon, 1971.
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The

their income ceases, or is insufficient to sustain a minimal
existence because of age, illness, accidents, death of breadwinners, unemployment, low wages, lack of education and skills,
discriminatory practices, etc., all of which are quite "normal"
occurences in these societies, their very survival would be
threatened, unless they received voluntary aid from relatives,
peers, neighbors, and other caring individuals, or unless some
formal institutional mechanisms are established to assist them.
No doubt institutionalized charity and welfare are rooted partly
in the neighborly, humanistic response to suffering, in a common
human identity, in a collective sense of guilt, and in a desire
to stop suffering and to satisfy human needs. Yet these humanistic
elements were never strong enough to bring about an open challenge
to the systemic roots and forces which render dependency and its
correlates and consequences inevitable.
Yet institutionalized welfare does not merely refrain from
confronting and challenging the structural obstacles to self-reliance
and human liberation which are inherent in the social orders of
welfare states. Being themselves created and maintained by these
social orders, welfare institutions and their policies and services
aid in many ways in the preservation of these social orders and
their ideologies. A central function performed by the welfare
system is the pacification of suffering and oppressed groups during
periods of potential rebellion, a cooling off of potentially
explosive moods. No doubt, were the entire welfare system to
cease to function tomorrow, those now dependent upon it for sustenance and survival could not be stopped from rebelling and from
severely threatening the prevailing social order. Clearly then,
by assuring through the welfare system an utterly inadequate mode
of existence for masses of deprived individuals and groups in the
population, the privileged segments of welfare-states succeed to
assure the maintenance of the existing inegalitarian order at
relatively little cost.
Further contributions which the welfare system makes to maintenance of the prevailing social order of welfare states are the
socialization and control of marginal segments of the work force.
These people are blamed through the ideology of the welfare system
for their failure to be self-supporting and self-reliant in a context
which is structured to prevent them from ever becoming self-supporting
and self-reliant.* They receive some minimal aid from the welfare
system in a dehumanizing manner that tends to undermine their self
respect. That aid is kept systematically below the level of the
lowest going wages, and as soon as some undesirable jobs become
available assistance is withdrawn and people are forced back into
the marginal positions of the productive system. This kind of
*William Ryan, Blaming the Victim, New York:
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Pantheon, 1971.

assistance is actually an indirect subsidy to businesses who depend
on this marginal work force. Frequentlyalsothe welfare system
provides more direct subsidies to businesses, through tax-cuts
and wage support for "manpower" training programs, in accordance
with a theory according to which benefits would "trickle down"
to poor segments of the population from stimulation of business
activity and greater profits.
The controls used to discipline the marginal segments of the
work force reach, however, far beyond those directly affected.
Segments of the work force slightly above these marginal segments
live under the constant threat of being pulled down to the welfare
level unless they work diligently at their jobs. The treatment of
those receiving welfare is designed to deter those slightly better
off from ever applying for welfare and to differentiate themselves
in any possible way from welfare recipients. The only way to stay
off welfare and off unemployment compensation is to hold on tightly
to available jobs, however frustrating these jobs might be.
It may be noted in support of the characterization of institutionalized welfare as serving primarily system-maintenance functions
that even progressive proposals for welfare reform such as massive
income re-distribution do not challenge the principle of private
ownership and control of productive resources, which is the central
obstacle to human liberation and to the establishment of an
egalitarian social order in which alone people can regain selfreliance and self-determination. Further evidence comes from
welfare states with the most liberal welfare policies and services
such as the Scandinavian countries. These societies too, maintain
privileged segments within their populations and although the circumstances of the non-privileged segments tend to be far more tolerable
than in less developed welfare states, the fundamental issues of
human liberation, namely, free access to productive resources, selfreliance, and equality of rights to free and full-development and
self-actualization through self-directed work, remain essentially
unresolved.
Summing up the discussion of institutionalized welfare in the
context of welfare states, we found that the key institutions of
human existence in welfare-state societies function in a manner
which assures privileged conditions in all spheres of life for a
small segment of the population at the top of a finely graded
pyramidal social structure, and enforced dependence and severe
deprivation for a fairly large segment of the population at the
bottom of the pyramid.
People between the group on top and that at
the bottom find themselves in a continuous competitive struggle to
move upward and to avoid being pushed downward.
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The severe deprivation experienced by those at the bottom has
often been interpreted as violence inherent in the very structure
of the system, a form of violence that does not destroy life with
a single blow, but which obstructs the full and free development
of the life potential of many millions of people through the "normal"
processes of the social order. Many minds and souls are slowly
being killed as one of the externalities of the workings of welfarestates. Moreover, not only the most severely deprived segments suffer
from this "violence of peace". The whole order seems to be maintained
in balance, and everyone's development seems inhibited, by ever
present latent force and by ideological indoctrination. It is highly
unlikely that human beings would otherwise submit themselves voluntarily
to conditions of severe injustice which prevent the full actualization
of everyone's human potential.
The policies and services of institutionalized welfare in the
welfare state were shown to fit into this system like a hand fits
into a glove. Welfare is an essential component of a broad range
of mechanisms through which the inegalitarian, oppressive and
covertly violent social orders of welfare states pacify, condition,
and control their populations, and defend and perpetuate their social
systems. Clearly,these systems could not survive without elaborate
defenses. The conclusion is inevitable: a central function of
institutionalized welfare is the defense of privilege, the perpetuation
of dependence and injustice, and the prevention of genuine selfreliance. Its roots are a philosophy, consciousness, values and
dynamics of inequality, acquisitiveness, selfishness, domination
and competition.
Warfare as a Societal Process
While welfare tends to destroy human life potential slowly and
somewhat covertly, warfare employs overt, destructive force and
violence for the same objectives, the attainment and defense of
privilege at home and abroad. Warfare, although its dynamics and
ideology are not less complex and contradictory than those of
welfare, may nevertheless be less difficult to comprehend, since
its roots, functions, and values are usually less disguised.
As indicated, when discussing the evolution of the welfarestate, claims to exclusive ownership and control of territories and
natural resources are likely to have been first steps on a course
that has often led to warfare. Such claims by individuals and
groups of humans imply the establishment of a privileged position
in relation to others. If others respect such claims, and if similar
claims by others are also respected, no conflict leading to warfare
need arise, especially if every group manages to sustain its
existence on the territory it claimed, and if exchanges of different
goods and raw materials take place among different groups on fair,
egalitarian terms.

-651-

History suggests, however, that relations among humans all
over the globe were frequently defined and perceived in conflict
terms and many groups permitted their conflicts to errupt into
"cold" and "hot" warfare, rather than settle them by attempting
to redefine the context in common human interest terms.
Conflicts that lead to warfare were always related to efforts
to defend or increase existing privileges with respect to control
over territories or natural and human resources, to establish such
new privileges, or to challenge privileges and claims established
previously by other groups. It seems that the declared causes of
warfare were hardly ever valid in an objective, absolute sense.
Rarely if ever, was warfare the only available course toward survival
and enhancement of the quality of life for the groups involved.
However, in the subjective perception of those involved warfare
usually was viewed as the only alternative open to them.
Warfare is more likely to be initiated by human groups who
developed internally in accordance with inegalitarian and acquisitive
institutional patterns and values, than by egalitarian and cooperative
societies. Warfare in such cases is merely an extension outward
of the behavioral patterns and the mentality that shapes internal
human relations and institutions. Inegalitarian, acquisitive groups,
as we have seen, are divided and polarized internally and will often
engage in internal "civil" wars. Extrapolating the conflict model
of human relations, and of the life context in general, unto external
relations appears to them perfectly logical and natural. When those
in power in such groups present an external war as being in the
interest of the whole group, or in the "national interest," they
are consciously or unconsciously distorting reality. While they
may believe their own claims, warfare is unlikely to ever be in
the true existential interest of those who are induced or forced to
do the actual fighting. Those who do derive advantages from warfare
are less likely to do the actual fighting. For the only ones who
tend to come out of warfare with advantages and increased privileges
are rulers, planners, commanders, providers of war supplies, and
owners of productive resources. The fighting men, the ones who
take the risks and losses, are usually members of propertyless
groups who also tend to be deprived and oppressed during "peaceful"
periods at home. External warfare may also be used to deflect public
consciousness from internal grievances and from intense internal
conflicts between small, powerful, dominant elites, and the rest of
the population. At such times, phrases like "national security" and
"national interest" become important codewords and myths. Illusions
of "national unity" are fostered and people's minds become confused
as to the real dynamics of the situation. Appeals to nationalism
prior to and during times of war, usually succeed to interrupt
efforts concerned with real internal problems of a population,
partly, also because warfare tends to eliminate unemployment and
thus can create illusions of prosperity.
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Presumed threats to the national security and suspicion of foreign
secret agents, and of foreign enemies, are also handy excuses for
secret, and, at times, open repressive measures at home, and for
equating internal critics and opponents with foreign enemies which
makes it more easy to deal with them as enemies.
This brief discussion of selected aspects of warfare suggests
that it is always related to the creation, maintenance and protection
of privilege, occasionally for an entire group, but usually for the
privileged segments of groups organized on inegalitarian, acquisitive
principles, and guided by conflict and zero-sum models of human relations and human existence. Such human groups are usually organized
as formal states, and they are thus the very same social systems we
encountered under the label "welfare-states" in the preceeding discussion. Clearly, warfare serves indentical and complementary ends
to welfare and both derive from the same roots, dynamics, values
and ideology. Both have also domestic and foreign versions. In the
case of welfare, the foreign version is called "foreign aid" which
comes never without strings, the strings being protection of the selfish interests of the donors and their privileged circumstances.
In the case of warfare, the domestic version is forceful repression
of rebellious groups and civil wars, which are intended to maintain
the status-quo of privilege at home.
Warfare and welfare also interact in many ways and thus reinforce each other as they pursue their common objectives, at times
jointly, at other times separately. It is perhaps not mere coincidence
that the warfare establishment and the welfare establishment operate
through similarly structured bureaucracies, that they tend to use a
similar vocabulary, e.g. "target populations," "intervention strategies,"
"war on poverty," etc. and that top officials will move in the United
States, a leading example of the warfare-welfare state, from the
Department of State, to the Department of Defense, and from there to
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare and finally to the
Department of Justice, the one that defines institutionalized injustice
as the "law of the land".
The warfare and welfare state is designed to perpetuate inequality
and injustice among humans at home, and among the peoples of the world
abroad. It employs a multi-dimensional approach to defend the privileged circumstances and the corresponding power relations which emerged
over generations through systematic elaborations on the simple principle
of private ownership and control of scarce productive resources.
Epilogue
What suggestions can be derived on the basis of this depressing analysis
of the roots, functions, dynamics, values, and ideology of the warfare
and welfare state?
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Problems of welfare can not be fully comprehended, nor overcome
effectively, within the context of currently dominant conceptions
of the welfare state which treat the fundamental organizing principles of the social order as constants. Welfare state reforms
however comprehensive, merely introduce new variations on the underlying theme of managing dependence and preventing genuine selfreliance. Such reforms can not solve the fundamental problems,
although they may ameliorate deprivation and are thus desirable in
these limited terms.
Real solutions to welfare must begin with a radical redefinition
of the issues, goals and values. Dependence must be related to its
causes in the manner productive resources are now owned and controlled,
work and production are organized, rights and responsibilities are
distributed, and decisions are made and implemented. There is only
one solution to the welfare state: to abolish its institutionalized
version by liberating productive resources and assuring access to
these resources to all humans on equal terms so that they may become
free, independent, productive, and self-reliant citizens of selfdirecting, democratic and cooperative communities.
Problems of warfare too, cannot be overcome without fundamental
redefinitions of the issues. Here too, amelioration that moves toward
disarmament or reduction of war threats is desirable, but is only
a temporary answer. Issues of warfare cannot be solved by degrees
but only by qualitative changes. Like in the case of the welfare
state, the underlying causes must be confronted and eliminated. The
causes were identified as competitive pursuit of privilege at home
and abroad. Hence the answer is the elimination of all privileges
and equalization of access to the world's resources for all the world's
people within a context that stresses the underlying common existential
interests of all humans everywhere. Not surprisingly, the solutions
to warfare and welfare are identical since their roots, functions,
dynamics, and values were found to be identical.
Finally, it seems that solutions to issues of warfare and welfare
require the gradual transformation of the welfare state and its alterself, the warfare state, since states are the guarantors of privilege
and injustice. The competing welfare-warfare states which now
dominate the world with disastrous consequences for the quality of
life of all humans, including the most privileged segments, and which
threaten the chances of survival of humankind, will have to be
transformed into a coordinated, egalitarian, cooperative federation
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of self-reliant, free communities, each directing its own affairs
and life-style through genuine democratic processes, each
guaranteeing to its members equality of rights and responsibilities, and all participating in exchanges of raw materials
and human-created goods and knowledge on fair, egalitarian terms.*
These then are the logical conclusions of reasoned analysis.
Transforming this logic into new existential possibilities, in
spite of overwhelming odds, is the crucial task for political
practice by humanistic movements committed to genuine liberation
and self-actualization for humans everywhere.

*For a systematic discussion of solutions to the problems of the
Warfare-Welfare State see the essay, "Resolving Issues of Social
Provision," in my book The Challenge of Social Equality, Cambridge,
Mass.: Schenkman Publishing Co., 1976; see also my essay, "Social
Policy and the Right to Work" in Social Thought, January, 1977.
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A DISARMED WORLD:

PROBLEMS IN IMAGING THE FUTURE

by Elise Boulding
University of Colorado, Boulder
One of the major handicaps to scholars, activists and would-be policy makers
associated with the post-World War II peace research and peace action movements has
been the inability to construct coherent and believable images of a post militaryindustrial United States society. Even at the height of the economics of disarmament studies in the I960s' the most that economists could demonstrate was that
disarmament could take place without severe economic dislocations, and that resources released from arms could be used for improving the global standard of
living. The new peace research movement was also producing books in the sixties
showing that it was possible to replace a technology of warmaking with a technology
of peacemaking, but what the new society would look like, no one could spell out.y
A week-long seminar on Images of a Disarmed World held in Denmark in the summer of
1963 3 generated a great deal of analysis by the socialist and nonsocialist economists participating, but not one word about what the future would look like. This
was typical of such seminars in that decade.
If any intellectual discipline today cculd contribute to imaging a disarmed
world one would expect that the new field of future studies would do this. Yet
futurists as a group, with two important exceptions, have to date failed signally to
come up with such images. The exceptions are the World Order Models Project of the
Institute of World Order, which includes disarmament as one of the values to be
incorporated in its models of preferred future worlds 4 and the futurists associated
with the international peace research movement. 5 These scholars regresent a specialized branch, however, rather than the mainstream, of futurists.
The general
failure of futurists to deal with disarmament is to a considerable extent because
their techniques involve projections based on past trends in a select class of
variables, from which disarmament is excluded. When futurists whose expertise is in
weaponry provide insight into future handling of world security systems, the tendency is to predict weapons breakthroughs rather than disarmament proposals.
It is ironic that public debate on two major policy issues in the United States
today: (1)whether to aim for a no-growth economy and (2) whether to go all-out in
thedevelopment of nuclear power sources, hardly touches on one major U.S. energy
constraint: military commandeering of fuel sources. The energy that goes into
protesting civilian nuclear energy seems disproportionate to the paucity of protest
over nuclear weapons. Only when hitherto non-nuclear states want nuclear plants is
concern expressed over military uses of nuclear energy.
Given the general lack of discussion of arms policy, public debate on alternative futures for the year 2010 seems woefully incomplete. The resolution proposed
recently at the June 1976 national mayor's conference suggesting that national arms
expenditures be reduced and the resulting savings be channeled as aid to U.S. cities
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as a better investment in national security than weaponry, may foreshadow more
realistic imaging of alternative futures on the part of policy makers in the
future. On the whole, however, since technological futurists can only visualize a
future world based on a power structure substantially similar to that of today,
they leave armament levels carefully to one side.
In a sense, American society is trapped by its own rhetoric at this point in
history, since we have dealt with the pain of the numerous contemporary social
upheavals by talking a great deal about alternative futures. In practice, few
persons can imagine anything between the present way of life and catastrophe. The
"alternative futures" explored turn out to be elaborations of present ways of life
based on a series of miraculously appearing technological breakthroughs. The
other type of alternative future, involving recycling, the simple life and a backto-the-land movement, certainly has some serious exponents, but more people like
to read about it than do it. A well-thought out concept of disarmament, either as
a process or a a social condition, does not accompany any of these alternative
future images.
Does it matter whether we can create mental constructs of a disarmed world or
not? Is it not enough that we develop some sense of being in touch with ameliorative processes and then work ahead realistically with one-year, two-year and fiveyear plans? Is not this the way social "evolution" actually works? The answer to
this question depends on one's reading of history.
The reading of history given by the Dutch sociologist Fred Polak, one of the
first major twentieth century futurists, tells us that over the millennia those
societies have flourished that have generated visions of something quite different
than the immediately experienced reality. These visions have historically been
subject to a process of social selection that leaves the field to certain images
having a powerful capacity for social resonance. These images act as generators
of social energy and actually draw societies toward their realization. In the
macrohistorical Image of the Future, PolakO shows how each great civilization of
the past has been shaped by resonating images of the future that preceded it. In
bringing us to the twentieth century, Polak pictures a decline in the West of that
imaging capacity through the very realization of the potent images of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. Planning, the socialist world's gift to this century, has squeezed out the visioning process and we are left with moment-ridden
societies. It is nevertheless not too late, says Polak, to regain the visioning9
capacity by recognizing what we have lost and consciously cultivating it again.
We might well ask, why bother to reconstitute the visioning capacity if it is
only to lead us anew to where Enlightenment visions have already brought us? A
critique of past imaging indicates that the bulk of past images seem to present
themselves in the language of conquest: conquest of nature, of territories, of
people, of ideas. We have experienced a great deal of conquest imagery, in our
learning of history, in the sequence of conquest empires rising in the lands bordering the Mediterranean and in Asian lands over the last five millennia, and more
recently in Europe and the Americas. Any history book provides a wealth of materia
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on kings and kingdoms, of wars of expansion, of technologies of resource utilization that accompanied them, and technologies of social organization that made the
administration of new territories possible.
What if the last wave of conquest imaging that led to the industrial revolution should turn out to be an evolutionary dead end? Are all images of the future
conquest images, or only some of them? Pessimists would say that we have two
alternative dead ends ahead: destruction or decay. Hazel Henderson writes of the
danger that the end-game of industrialism might be the condition of the entropy
state,
a society at the stage when complexity and interdependence have
reached such unmanageable proportions that the transaction costs which
are generated equal or exceed its productive capabilities. In a
manner analogous to physical systems, the society winds down of its own
weight and the proportion of its gross national product that must be
spent in mediating conflicts, controlling crime, underwriting the
social costs generated by the "externalities" of production and
consumption, providing ever more comprehensive bureaucratic coordination, and generally trying
to maintain "social homeostasis," begins to
0
grow exponentially."'
Such a society must eventually peter out from exhaustion of all social and physical resources. Most of the ameliorative technologies produced to deal with
contemporary American problems are thought likely to hasten the entropy state.
Yet many of us will intuitively reject the notion that industrialized societies are at a dead end. This intuitive rejection of the entropy state concept is
based on something more profound than a denial of the problem of running out of
fossil fuels. We have lived with concepts of progress and development and the
power of specialization and differentiation for so long--they can't be simply
erased. The intuition that there are human continuities that carry us through
drastic changes is sound, and forms an important part of the critique of "futures
thinking." It may be that the historical record can provide us with other sets of
images of the future besides the conquest images, constructs that have retained
some kind of cultural viability through the centuries of conquest and might provide a resource for visualizing futures that minimize violence, are more conserving of the planet, and offer higher levels of human welfare.
It is obviously impossible to provide a complete survey of non-conquest
images of the future contained in the historical record in this paper. However,
even a cursory glance at materials from antiquity reveals recurring images of
human beings living peacefully together "in a garden." In this garden there is
abundance, there is sharing, there is joy. The nomads of the Middle Eastern
deserts, the Greeks who farmed the stony soil of Attica, and the norse who farmed
even stonier soil by the North Sea, all knew the image of the abundant and peaceful garden. Both nomads and settled folk had the image. Sometimes these images
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are of a golden age in the past, sometimes they represent visions of a coming
age or an after-life. What is interesting is that they all have in common an
idea of human togetherness and sharing; fighting to kill or take captive is
eliminated from the scene. One might label these legends cultural potentials
for peaceableness. They are in various ways reflected in the ideal social order
of each imaging society, in its laws, and in its treaties with other nations
after wars. The fact that such images come from well-known warrior societies
makes them all the more interesting. It is noteworthy that these images are
describing warriors who have become androgynous beings, embodying the nurturant
and the assertive traits of humanity.
Sacred Images of the Peaceable Garden
Spencer gives us the dream of universal peace of the ancient Romans in the
passage "all loved virtue, no man was afraid of force
.no war was known...
peace universal reigned amongst men and beasts ....... . Before the Romans, the
Greeks posited a place to which warriors sometimes found their way. Meneleaus,
returning from the Trojan Wars, was told that the gods would take him to the
Elysian fields where a "fresh singing breeze blows from the sea and renews the
spirits of men.' 12 . . .Aeneas, actually taken to these groves, "saw the founders
of the Trojan State . . .and gazed with admiration on the war chariots and
glittering arms now reposing in disuse . . . .-13 The Norse knew of such a
place, to be found at the center of the universe in the Plains of Ida. From its
great hall, Valhalla, Odin sent women who had been earthly heroines to bring in
fallen heroes from earth to a paradise of alternate feasting and fighting which
14
represented a compromise scenario for the peaceable kingdom.
In Hindu mythology, replete with many warriors and battle scenes, Vishnu
appears as Kalki at the end of the present age of the world to destroy allvice
and wickedness, and restore mankind to virtue and purity. The theme of restoration of goodness on the earth is also the theme of ancient Jewish prophecies,
'and they shall beat their swords into plowshares. . .
The Christian vision
of the good place in Revelations centers around the rivqp of life whose fruit
and leaves were for the feeding and healing of nations. "
In the Islamic
vision, God has recompensed his people with a garden. 17 The delights of fountains, shade trees, soft breezes and abundant food change behavior such that
"should an ugly word fall from someoQ 's lips. . .the answer from the other
shall be nought but 'peace, peace. ' 13 The fact that all these images of the
good place appear as gifts of the gods in diverse traditions, takes nothing from
the significance of the fact that a non-militaristic welfare state was conceived
as desirable in the intellectual imagination of antiquity.
Images of Peace in Statecraft
However, images of a just and peaceful social order are not confined to the
religious domain, to the utterances of prophets and priests. In every age,
there have been rulers and advisers to rulers who have seen as their secular
task the creation of an envisioned social order in their own domains and beyond,
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through the creation of just and peaceful relationships with the peoples around
them. Less celebrated than the practitioners of Realpolitik throughout history,
they have nevertheless made their mark on every century.
King Hammurabi, who ruled in Babylon from 1730 to 1685 B.C., issued a Code
of Laws which stands as one of our earliest evidences of the responsibility of
governments for a beneficent social order. Hammurabi described himself as one
who caused "righteousness to appear in the land, . . that the strong harm not
the weak.' 19 Iknahton and Nephretite, who rules Egypt from 1375-? to 1358-?
B.C., made the decision to withdraw their troops from their conquered lands,
leaving only ambassadors to represent them. All the lands were given autonomy,
Iknahton and Nephretite retaining only advisory control in a structure that
2 0 was
essentially a federation. The federation lasted until Iknahton's death.
From 776 to 168 B.C. the Greek City States made one effort after another to form
leagues to control their own militarism, though they had little success.
Yet those struggles bore many fruits. Many centuries later, Aristotle
purportedly conceptualized the world as a garden in which justice rules this
world. 21 King Darius, who rules Persia from 522 to 486 B.C., had inscribed on
his tombstone that "it is not my desire that the weak man should have wrong done
to him by the mighty; nor. . .that the mighty should have wrong done to him by
the weak."" While the Greek City States sought to create order among themselves, and Darius sought to create order by conquest, China was undergoing a
similar struggle. Out of the Chinese struggles came the writing of four great
ancients: Lao-Tzu, Confucius, Mencius, and Mo-tsu, each of whom questioned the
need or validity of violence and warfare. They looked beyond a simple acceptance of human conflict to theoretical principles and actual behaviors that
would lead to a just and peaceful social order with shared abundance. Lao-Tzu
inthe sixth century B.C. warned against war as an instrument of social policX. 2 3
Mo-tsu in the fifth century B.C., recommended love as a political principle.H.
India also struggled with acute problems of social disorder in these
centuries, and by the third century B.C. Emperor Asoka foreswore the sword as an
instrument for implementing the right. In his edicts he announced that all men
were as his children, and he wished for all peoples the good and the happiness
that he wished for his children; he valued neither gifts nor honq r so much as
"the promotion of spiritual strength among men of all religions.H In abjuring
conquest after his earlier military exploits, he announced that "conquest can be
regarded as having been really no conquest at all b ause it was characterized
by killing, death, or the captivity of the people."' 9
The image of the world as a family, and of the relationships between states
asultimately resting on the mutual acceptance of familial responsibility among
allhuman beings, is never totally absent from formulations about the human polity
from the sixth century B.C. on. The Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius expressed it
this way during his reign, from 121 to 80 B.C.:
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If our intellectual part is common, the reason also, in respect of
which we are rational beings, is common: if this is so, common
also is the reason which commands us what to do, and what not to
do; if this is so, there is a common law also; . . . if this is so
we are members of some political community; if this is so, the
world is in a manner a state. For of what other common political 27
community will any one say that the whole human race are members.
With the coming of Christianity the struggle to affirm world community and
peaceableness in a world habituated to violence did not lessen. Many advocates
of necessary violence and the just war have been found in both non-Christian and
Christian societies from the very beginning of the new era up to this present
time. By the second century Tertullian was sending men who would not serve in
the army. 2 8 By the fourth century St. Augustine's acceptance of "God's wars,"
and the "just war" based on analogies from the Old Testament 9 set the pattern
for the holy wars of the crusades, yet the voice of nonviolence was never wholly
absent in the Christian church.
Islam, sharing the same holy book, the Old Testament, with the Jews and the
Christians, experienced the same division over the role of war in establishing a
just social order. The doctrine of the Jihad, the holy war, must be seen over
against the many injunctions in the Koran to prefer for one's brother whatever
one prefers for oneself; and to do good, not evil. 30 The crusades brought out
all the unresolved conflicts in the religious teachings of both Christianity and
Islam, and showed the difficulty both of understanding visions embedded in other
cultural formats, and of translating utopian images into human strategies.
Women, who in every society have had a special part to play in briding the
gap between ideal and reality in their role as childbearers and nurturers of
families are rarely mentioned in chronicles of war. There were women's yoices
lifted among Moslems and Christians alike during the Crusades, however.3 The
often hidden role of women during and after war can be discerned by the seeker
of images of peace in the history of the queens of ancient Babylon and the royal
women of the Holy Roman Empire. In Europe's Dark Ages, Christian queens tamed
warlike kings and built a network of monastic centers of learning and healing
that were to contribute substantially to the great cultural flowering of the
later Middle Ages. Great peace queens arose in small European principalities
during the religious wars that tore Europe apart in the sixteenth century. In
North America in 1457, the Council of Matrons of the Iroquois accepted the task
of nominating the Civil Chief of the newly founded Peace Confederacy of the
Iroquois. The Constitution of the Five Nations committed the tribal leaders to
casting their "weapons of strife" into the "depths of the earth," thus establish
ing peace among a united people.32 Each political effort to create a peaceful
social order beyond the borders of the nation state foundered on the incapacity
of existing institutions to produce the order visualized. Yet the concept of a
new warless social order continued to evolve.
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From the Old Images of Peace to the New:
A Pluralistic Universality
The images of peace in the ancient world were images generated within one
culture, and based on that culture. Even the gentlest and most nonviolent of
the images assumed the acceptance of a certain world view. And when the ancients
used the term world, they knew very little of what they meant. They knew very
little of the world in its geographic and cultural immensity. Even Cruce and
Grotius who by the seventeenth century had begun to use the new infoi~i~ton
cominin from the increased contact with the Americas, Asia, and Africa, in
a
their work of mentally constructing a peaceful world order, still visualized
33
world based on the model of the Christian nations of Western Europe.
Europe was the center of the new "world club," and would simply invite all
other nations into the club. The charter for that club was being built up
gradually out of such major social achievements as the English Bill of Rights in
1689, the Virginia Bill of Rights in the new world in 1776, and the French
Declaration of the Rights of Man in 1789. It was constructed out of the various
efforts to end the slave tradeby the great powers from 1776 until 1890, at which
time a sixteen-nation multilateral agreement to end slave trade was signed. The
charter was built by way of interventions and treaties to protect minorities
that evolved during various minority persecutions in the latter part of the
nineteenth century, and by conventions about the treatment of the wounded beginning in 1864. Other nations were admitted to the public law of Europe, but it
was still Europe's law.
The first major breach in the all-European character of the world club (by
then including both Eastern and Western Europe) came in 1899 at the First Hague
Peace Conference, with the participation of the ancient Asian states of China,
Japan, Persia and Siam. At the Second Hague Peace Conference in 1907 Latin
American republics began to play a part. With the founding of the League of
Nations in 1919, Middle Eastern nations became active, including particularly
Egypt and Iraq. At this point socialist images of the future began taking
political shape in Eastern Europe, making visible long-ignored differentiations
ofeconomic-based class interests, as well as already acknowledged differentiation of cultural and religious interests. The next major breach came with the
founding of the United Nations in 1945, which now has 219 units relating to the
world organization as members or territories.
What has this brief historical survey demonstrated? That side by side with
theconquest tradition, which in its western industrialized form has brought us
face
to face with the alternative possibilities of nuclear destruction or a
petered-out entropy state, there is another set of traditions about the peaceable welfare state. Those traditions are in two forms: (1) sacred images of
thegood society and (2) political experiments on the part of visionary statesmen
andstateswomen. The richness of both the visions and the experiments makes it
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possible to utilize them as a resource in revitalizing the lagging creativity of
our own futures-imagining in relation to a more peaceful and just society.
Social Welfare Professionals as Creators of
Peaceable Futures
Demilitarization of an advanced technological society in a tightly interdependent militarized world presents problems at many different systems levels and
cannot be separated from the demilitarization of the world as a whole. Yet the
pressing ne,-d to decentralize, and to localize human production, distribution,
support services and social defense, requires that we learn to think locally and
globally at one and the same time. One of the most promising images of a peaceful future world to come out of the twentieth century, dealing directly 4with the
Parts
challenge of global localism, is David Mitrany's Working Peace System.
of this vision of a series of functional global networks to provide for humanity'
health, education and welfare needs were published as far back as the 1930s.
His vision of service-oriented networks providing so effectively for human needs
that states will wither away has always been treated as very naive politically.
Nevertheless, we have witnessed in this century a tremendous growth in transnational nongovernmental networks, all of them providing human services and
cultural enrichment of one kind or another. There are now roughly 3000 of these
transnational networks where in 1900 there were only a couple of hundred of
them.35
At the naticnal level, resource crunches will continue for all first world
countries including the U.S., and some federally administered services may well
begin to collapse in the next decade. Social workers will be in a unique position because of their rootedness in local communities and their membership in a
large number of transnational nongovernmental networks, to begin experiments now
with developing nonhierarchical communication channels inside these networks.
Nongovernmental institutional structures are fairly rudimentary in the 1970s.
To the extent that they are formalized they often tend, by default, to be traditional in organizational format. They are linked with the UN but are not administered by its agencies. Compared to governments, they have few vested interests
to protect. Innovation now, while they are still fluid, will be more possible
than later. ' they come to be more heavily used they will become more heavily
institutionalized. Local centers of these service networks will be able to link
with local, cultural and ethnic separatist groups which are increasingly on all
continents showing their desire to be disassociated from the nation state systems into which they have been more or less forcibly assimilated in recent
centuries. Where terrorism and violence has not yet erupted, these support
networks may provide alternative and nonviolent ways to accommodate desires for
autonomy of these separatist groups. This will be true in much of Europe and the
Americas, and parts of Africa and Asia. Where violence is already tearing apart
an unwillingly "integrated" society, these networks offer the possibility of
rebuildigg local community independently of governmental assistance in the
future.
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Disarmament is not likely to be adopted as national policy by any major
power in the near future. Increasing unwieldiness and ineffectiveness in both
military and civilian governmental structures can be anticipated. Given the
insecurity, fears, and economic uncertainties of both major and minor powers
today, the U.S. included, the time is very ripe for the creation of a variety of
images of a post-nationalist world based on a variety of nonviolent solutions to
the problems of economic productivity, social defense and human welfare. The
Mitrany image represents one possible future. The world order models of the
Institute of World Order, using various combinations of Mitranlan functionalist
networks, transnational associations, UN agencies and other organizational
innovations, provide others. They all have in common an emphasis on nonviolence
and local autonomy.
The rate of social innovation in the late twentieth century is extraordinarily high, and has been little recorded as a macrophenomenon. Most of these
innovations are byproducts of other problem-solving efforts, but may take on
increasing importance in the twenty-first century. Take for example the peacekeeping forces of the UN, created on an ad hoc basis from crisis to crisis over
the past twenty years, which now stand revealed through Charles Moskos' research
as having produced a constabulary ethic and a nQnviolent behavioral repertoire
in a group of soldiers all trained for combat.3 9 The new behavior was produced
in the field, independently of prior training, national, cultural or class
background, or any other differentiating social variable. It is out of such
discoveries that we will forge the less violent society of the twenty-first
century.
The work of imaging new institutions and new futures must accompany experimentation with the possibilities of existing nongovernmental and intergovernmental networks, and the creation--where necessary--if new ones. These are the
types of transition activities that will overcome the feelings of helplessness
and social paralysis that are bound to accompany the decline in quality of
governmental functioning for the rest of this century. These same activities
will help to bring about new types of social order more suited to human needs
and world resources in the twenty-first century.
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AGlimpse Back
The last decade of the 19th century and the years prior to World War I was an
exciting and fruitful period in United States history. It was a time of unrest, but
characterized by vigorous discontent, not cynicism or despair. There was an aggressive optimism that fostered confidence in social action, even to the belief that
poverty could be abolished. The failure to achieve that goal remains our burden
today, but to have begun the struggle then was a significant step. It was the
developing profession of social work that initiated that battle against poverty.
From the 1890's to 1917 there was a rapid spread of reform and social legislation, and social workers were there. The names -- Addams, Devine, Kelley and Wald -are but a few of those remembered. Tribute was paid by United States Senator
Robert F. Wagner, Sr., who said that "one could not overestimate the central part
played by social workers in bringing before their representativet in Congress and
in State Legislatures the.... insistent problems of modern life."
Social workers, along with populists, socialists, city reformists and progressives, were struggling to establish programs and institute policies which would
2
mitigate the negative effects of industrialization, urbanization and laissez-faire.
forces.
Social workers recognized the tie between social conditions and economic
They responded to the impact of the social sciences. They instituted surveys of
social institutions, Legislation was seen as a means of attaining social welfare
goals, Action organizations, on a national level, were established. In 1910,
Jane Addams stated social work'* goal to be "raising life to its highest value."
At that moment in history, and again in the depression of the 1930's, through the
leadership of Bertha Reynolds and her colleagues, the challenge was met. Where are
wenow?
Eduard Lindeman posed the question in 1946. "What part are we playing in determining the direction in which America is moving, with the clear presumption that
3
In 1951, the American
we must be involved in both the movement and its direction?"
Association of Social Workers offered an answer. The AASW Standards for the Professional Practice of Social Work stated that social work should be responsible for
modifying or reshaping social and economic institutions which are inimical to the
4
attainment of democratic goals."
The Current Crisis
The reshaping and recreating of those institutions, our professional charge of
almost twenty-five years ago, remains as the task in our current crisis. The present
Plight of our economy, of our cities, of our social service system demands basic
change. We need the skill, and the courage, to take on that responsibility.
We are in a desperate depression despite euphemisms to the contrary.
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Each day

we see how hard the economy hits the individuals, the families and the communities
with whom we work. There is a chilling fear that the slump is to be long-term, and
severely and permanently damaging. Nationally, there are indications that the socalled "recession" of 1975 looks and feels like the depression of the 1930's. In
Detroit, a quarter of a million auto workers are unempl~yed. Busloads of people
have left that city to look for work in southern towns.
In Boston, over one
hundred demonstrators, angered ovgr proposed cuts in the welfare budget, stormed
the Massachusetts House Chambers.
The financial solvency of New York City is threatened. Layoffs of municipal
workers, cutbacks in funding of programs, rescindments of capital projects are all
orders of the day. 1here is talk of default and of bankruptcy. There is a lack of
confidence in the city, in the system, in ourselves.
Unemployment is at 9.2%. Even more disturbing is the record 1.2 million who
are the "discouraged workers wanting jobs, but who have given up looking." 7 And a
further measure of the depth of our trouble is the 331 jobless rate for Black teenagers. The Federal Administration insists it is concerned, but can do nothing Vithout rcgcnerating inflation. This is recklEssness, nct caution. Such a policy produces tension, resentment and trouble.
A bleak picture is on view in most communities throughout the country. One
wonders how families manage without, or even with, unemployment payments. There
are no statistics on how many families have been left without income from a job and
without benefits either. Of the 8,567,000 unemployed in June, 6,181,000 were drawing some kind of compensation. 8 We know nothing about the remaining two million and
more, except the assumption that they are mostly young people. Those who are on unemployment compensation average $69.00 per week, hardly adequate for decent living.
An additional aspect of the problem is revealed by a recent Labor Department survey
which showed that of unemployed married men, 59% had wives also unemployed or not in
the labor force. The latter category refers to housewives, the largest group of unpaid workers in our society.
Anyone working with jobless people is aware of the difficulties and disruptions
which permeate their lives. A recent bankruptcy in New York City's Bronx County
caused two hundred employees to lose their jobs, many after 25 years with the firm.
This group of Black and Hispanic workers, whose families numbered almost 1,000 peole
were forced into unemployment when efforts to save the business failed.
Aside from the casework skills and referral knowledge required to assist those
families, it was necessary to have an understanding of the economic factors involved
and essential to possess the political leverage needed to move elements of the
business community and the city, state and federal governmental system. The Borough
President's office provided guidance to the workers and their families, direction to
those in the public and private sectors attempting to save the business and leadership in pressing for financial and political support.
The effort failed because the economic interests were not prepared to finance a
workers' cooperative; an approach which had become the only feasible one for success.
And so we contribute to the extension of poverty, rather than to the expansion of
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opportunity, Nationally, as locally, we allow failure. The social venture we called
"the war on poverty" was "too limited in means, too timid in ideas" to have any
9
We remain too timid, too limited.
significant impact.
The intent, we were told, was to close the gap between rich and poor. Quite
the opposite has occurred. Inequalities in earnings in the United States have
widened since 1950.
In 1958, the bottom decile of the population had 14% of mean earnings; by 1971
its relative position declined to 8.6%. During the sme period, the top decile
improved its position from 197% of the mean to 2632.
A further demonstration of this inequality is seen in the fact that 18.9% of
the population hold 76.2% of the wealth. The wealthiest, the top one percent, own
26% of all private wealth. Thus, our present scene, one of depression and dismay,
is also one of dramatic distance between economic classes -- the rich and the poor.
For those at the bottom, those we label "clients," life is hard and unfair.
It is in the cities of our country where most of our people live; and our
cities are in deep trouble. But the hard and unfair life is in the suburbs and
rural areas as well. It is a condition of our society itself. Physical decay, an
aging population, drug abuse, a rising crime rate, and increased unemployment know
no geography, The problems are most intense and visible in our densely crowded,
older and poorer central cities.
The nation's troubled cities cannot recover by themselves and the Administration in Washington seems to be willing to let them sink. As usual, the poor are
chosen to pay, by cutting the services they need. Social service programs are
denied or restricted due, the President states, to the inflationary impact of the
The economy's improved health will come about by reducing taxes paid by
funding,
He
corporations and their shareholders, declares the Secretary of the Treasury.
proposed a plan to reduce corporate profit taxes by $7.5 billion a year, or more
than 10%, over a six-year period, beginning in 1977. The humanitarian concern
which gave rise to the approach is explained by the Secretary, who stated that
"corporations are people." 1 1
One segment of the nation's economy appears to remain viable. This summer
the Congress agreed on a military procurement measure that authorized preliminary
funding for production of a B-1 strategic bomber costing $84 million a plane and
construction of a $1.2 billion nuclear-powered cruiser for the Navy. The cruiser
project has since been dropped but the total amount appropriated for weapons was
$25.8 billion fi the current fiscal year. That is about one-quarter of the total
With expenditures for armaments at such levels, our priorities
defense budget.
are apparent. But a society's stability -- both economic and psychological -- cannot rest on its ability to produce weapons.
No single factor is sufficient to judge whether we are financially and mentally
healthy, but one measure of a society's worth is the way in which it treats its older
citizens. On that score we do poorly. The record reveals shameful deficiencies in
income levels, housing, nutrition, health care, and perhaps most damning, a lack of
-671-

a dignified role in society.
Another measure is the quality of health care and, here again, we do not do
well. "Whether poor or not, many Americans are badly served by the obsolete, overstrained health system which has grown up around them, helter-skelter, without
accommodating ....to changing
technology, expanding population, rising costs and
13
rising expectations."1
The cost of medical care in the United States is rising more rapidly than the
cost of living. A major cause of that increase is the reluctance of Blue Cross and
Blue Shield to impose cost controls on doctors and hospitals. A recent study by the
Associated Press indicates that billions of dollars could be saved annually if Blue
Cross would implement one of its original objectives to keep costs down. Health car
delivery, as well as its economics, is determined by the private sector which contra
Blue Cross and Blue Shield. The eighty-two million people covered have nothing to
say about the running of the 144 plans throughout the country. Each Blue plan is
dominated bz doctors and hospital officials, or by laymen chosen by medical

"Surely the care given to children is a measure of a good society. But good
care for children cannot be given by a poverty ridden, disease ridden, crime ridden,
despairing adult population. Nor can it be given by adults who find no meaning to
life beyond the purchase of equity in a suburban house from which their children wil
move away, leaving their
'14 lives, once narrowly devoted to their own children alone,
a
empty and meaningless.
As our deficiencies and inequalities become more apparent, we reach what Daniel
'1 4
b We are not what we foolishly
Bell calls "the end of American exceptionalism.
believed ourselves to be. Our .dominance in world affairs is ending; there is no
manifest destiny; there is no mission. We have not been immune to the corruption
of power. We have not been the exception.
Our common value is hedonism - the thoughtless pursuit of what we think is
pleasure, the idea of consumption and exhibition of our middle class culture - and
that provides no common purpose or common faith, only bewilderment.
Social Work Skills and Political Action
Whatever human services we assess in an attempt to measure our commitment to
improve individual and community well-being, we find a basic lack. It is evident
that the vast majority of people served by the social service system will not be
able to improve their conditions in life without a redistribution of wealth and powe
in our society.
The poor need money, jobs and power on a large scale; all three require equally
large shifts in the political, as well as the economic relationships between the poa
and the rest of society. The only way to manage the current crisis of increasing -and perhaps permanent -- unemployment and poverty is redistribution.
It is in this campaign for the redistribution of wealth and power that social

-672-

work has a significant role.
This is the time to carry out the responsibility
Lindeman identified.
This is the time to act on the AASW charge to us.
In this
effort, there are new skills
to be learned and old skills
to be revitalized.
Political action is the requirement and social workers must5 be ready and able.
"No
1
longer can social workers not be involved politically. "
Social workers must help to create a coalition of forces to carry on the fight
they began at the turn of the century the struggle to abolish poverty and to provide a living standard of the highest quality for all. To succeed in that struggle,
we must identify our enemies as well as our allies. We must recognize the seriousness of Lorenzo Traylor's observation in reaction to HEW's businessman's approach to
social welfare. "It is precisely the businessman's attitude and his lack of concern for the plight of others that has 1 contributed
to the conditions which make the
6
welfare system so desperately needed."
The newly elected President of NASW, Maryann Mahaffey, has stated what our role
should be.
"The problem in America," she declared in her 1975 address to the Delegate Assembly, "is that the overwhelming majority of people in policy making positions are oriented to the bureaucracy, to profit and to products.
We, the social
'1 7
That's why our input is crucial."
workers of this nation, are people oriented.
Powerful forces hostile to a humanitarian philosophy are in our society. They
fear democracy, freedom, equal rights and equal opportunity. It is a false idea
that the good society results automatically from technology and so-called "free
enterprise." The chief battle of our times is not with an external enemy; it is
with ourselves and our institutions.
Social work must play an active, aggressive and militant role in the political
arena. Politics is an indispensable activity in a democracy. To ignore political
turmoil around social work issues is to do a disservice to the field.
Our political program derives from what we know people need.
Beyond an improved system of social service, beyond greater accountability, we need basic
change. "We need tax reform and redistribution of wealth, power and income, so that
full employment, at socially useful jobs, can be provided in the public sector of
the economy. "18
The skills to achieve our political program are attainable. Social workers
must be able to speak with knowledge and understanding of the social and economic
issues of our time.
We must be familiar with the structure of our social institutions, the nature of our social forces, the functioning of our economic system.
Social workers must possess full knowledge of our political arrangements. The
organization of governmental activity, the role of political parties, the action of
political movements must be studied and well known. We must have the ability to
assess the scene quickly, formulate policy positions and fight for them on any level
Of government.
We must develop the talent to devise optional courses of action. We must learn
to create "up front" and "fall back" positions. Of special importance is the need
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to identify allies on an issue and be creative in developing alliances.
We must know how to organize and mobilize local groups. We must become skillful negotiators. We must be able to speak and to write with passion as well as wit
precision. We must be forceful and flexible, imaginative, inventive and innovative.
We must maintain our sense of purpose and direction. We must, as has been said of
Richard Titmuss, be "ideologically rooted but not doctrinaire."19
A commitment to planning should be part of our ideology. The crisis in our
nation, characterized by unemployment and inflation, has created a new interest in
economic planning. Legislation has been introduced in the Congress proposing varioul
20
forms of planning.
"The time has come to develop a truly home-grown American form
of national economic planning ....
a planning approach that will be American in char21
acter and democratic in nature."
Social workers should take an active role in support of national economic planning and incorporate social planning into the program. Social planning provides an
experimental approach to means. It allows for the abandonment of ineffective methods
and their replacement by new or modified ones which may be treated in relation to
changing social conditions. If a laissez-faire orientation continues, we will be
faced with the burden of unchanging means in a world of constantly changing circumstances.
None of the fundamental problems of the aged, the chronically ill, the physicall
and mentally handicapped, as well as the unemployed and under-employed, will be met
unless social work adds it 2 strengths to the development of national and local planning of the highest order.2 We can recognize the philosophic definition of planning
given our experience as practitioners -- "The method of creating new wholes out of
parts which have become so fractionalized as to have lost their functional relavancy. "23
The basic principle of democratic planning is "an awakening in the whole people
of a sense of common moral purposes. Not one goal, but a direction. Not one plan,
2
once and for all, but the conscious selection by people of successive plans." "
It has been said that all improvements start with an act of dissent, an act of
non-conformity. The story of human advance is the story of the unconventional which
has become commonplace, of The untried which has become routine, of the non-conformi
which has become customary.
What is needed is adventure in ideas--a creative rebellion against tradition and
the status quo, when these are obstacles to human welfare.
Social work is not rising to the challenge of the times. It is too routine and
unimaginative. Something good which characterized early social work pioneers has bee
lost. We must regain that early heritage and adapt their fighting spirit to our time
Our time is a time of crisis. It is not merely a fiscal crisis; it is another
dysfunctional phase of our economic system. What has been and is now crisis becomes
a condition, under which our social service structure suffers in a special way. Thos
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who utilize those services are those who are most hurt. The financing of public
services through investment by profit-making interests eventually benefits not the
poor, but the rich.
What we require is a change in our economic system from profit purpose to
people purpose. Let us advocate such a change to a socialism in the great tradition of Eugene Victor Debs.
"We tend to forget that preparation of life in a
democracy involves more than a narrow concept of
adjustment. It necessitates knowledge of political,
economic and social institutions, attitudes toward
them, skill in utilizing them, and skill in changing
them if they prove to be inadequate.... In a rapidly
changing world we must be courageous in interpreting
the changing scene and equally courageous and radical
in testing our new methods and new
hypotheses which
26
reflect the stream of changes."
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INFLUENCING WELFARE/WARFARE PRIORITIES
THROUGH THE NEW BUDGETARY PROCESS
Ann Blalock

In the previous article, Weinert challenged social workers, and other professionals in the area of social welfare, to commit themselves to greater collective
political action in the interest of substantial social change. He suggested that
there are many options for movement in that direction. This article briefly discusses one incremental option within the established political system, intervention
within the new Congressional budgetary process. This is not an insignificant
strategy. Its purpose is to influence the way the national budget is constructed.
The budget incorporates to an important degree the society's prevailing definition
of its priorities. Furthermore, future policy alternatives are vitally affected
by budget decisions, as mandated budget authority strongly restricts future social
policy alternatives.
Therefore, an understanding of the meaning of the new Congressional Budget Act
and some of the problems in its implementation is critical to developing an effective strategy for impacting that process. The Act offers a significant opportunity
to individual citizens and organized groups to change the direction of national
priorities, among them welfare and warfare. It provides a relatively fixed time
schedule around which collective action can be organized, and it identifies the
individuals and committees necessary to approach. A strategy built around this
process is appropriate to the social work profession. Many social welfare professionals are excellently qualified to perform the policy analysis tasks and to construct the crucial political coalitions which support this kind of intervention.
Social workers' knowledge of domestic needs, and of the strengths and weaknesses
of existing social service delivery systems, place them in a privileged position
to utilize the innovations provided in the new Act. Moreover, the implications of
their mobilizing around the budgetary cycle can extend well beyond the territory of
the federal budget itself.
Background of the New Budgetary Process
The federal government is the most significant financier for the military and
welfare sectors of the society. It is estimated that in fiscal '78 federal defense
allocations will be approximately 130-150 billion, and social welfare expenditures
approximately 190-240 billion. 1 Responsibility for the research, planning, and
management of such enormous federal outlays is constitutionally shared among the
executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. The Constitution proposes a set of initiatives and constraints within this responsibility, to be translated into national administrative law. However, the actual relationship among
these branches has been uneven, and the budgetary process less than open.
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The search for more effective budgetary methods in Congress was stimulated in
contemporary history by controversy over national priorities, including warfare/
welfare, and by the impoundment of funds. It was an undeniable legacy of Watergate
However, there has been a perennial consciousness that Congressional budget reform
was critically needed. Much has changed in the two centuries of American governmental existence, but the formal division of responsibilities has remained intact.
Money expenditure was to be a two-stage process: first the Congress would appropriate funds, and only afterwards would the executive spend them. Not only was
Congress to decide how much would be spent, but more importantly for what purposes
The demands of this essential role of Congress were admittedly not being met
by past policies or methods. As long as the federal budget was small, it was rational for Congress to control expenditures by means of line item appropriations,
and restrictions on the shifting of funds among categories. But the tremendous
growth of the federal budget has required a broadening of the units of appropriations and more transfer flexibility. 3 As the federal budget increased in size and
importance, a growing inequity in influence evolved between the executive and the
legislative branch.
The formulation of the President's budget recommendations employed the analytic expertise of a large and powerful budget staff with vast informational
sources, a resource particularly exploited during the Watergate period to enhance
executive authority.4 The effect was disadvantaged Congressional competition with
the executive. Over-burdened staffs of individual committees were forced to rely
primarily on executive agencies for information. Whereas the President had an
eighteen month period to develop a budget, Congress was required to compress crucial budget decisions into a few months, and often became dependent on continuing
resolutions as a means of funding federal agencies and programs. As program and
financial policy-making became more concentrated in the executive, the budgetary
process grew more fragmented in the Congress. The inevitable consequence was a
serious imbalance of power. This became translated into welfare/warfare terms
because Presidential budgets tended to emphasize a heavy commitment to the militarl
which Congress was unwilling or unable to challenge.
Therefore, a severe erosion occurred in Congressional capability for assessin
program priorities effectively, and in establishing overall budget policy. Congres!
was clearly not able to decide among competing claims on the budget in a comprehensive manner. The basic assumption in the growing movement for budget reform
was that the federal budget had in actuality become the primary tool for determining governmental goals, and was progressively passing beyond Congressional control
Not simply its growth, but more so the directions it would take, were at stake.
The augmentation in the portion of the budget which was relatively "uncontrollable
under existing law, magnified the significance of the issue. 5 It was becoming increasingly more difficult to deal with carryover
balances where appropriations,
outlays, and budget authority failed to mesh. 6
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The search for improved budgetary methods ultimately settled within the Joint
Study Committee on Budget Control. Out of months of deliberation over alternatives,
the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 surfaced into law.
The Act radically modified the Congressional budget process, and provided controls
over the presidential impoundment of funds. It established new Budget Committees
in the House and Senate, responsible for setting federal budget priorities, and
created a new Congressional Budget Office. The primary intent of the legislation
was to re-establish Congressional power over the federal budget. The outcome has
been to provide new citizen access to the policy analysis and decision-making
process, and to introduce greater transfer possibilities into revenue allocations.
The Content of the New Process
The new budget process requires an unprecedented effort simply in meeting the
series of negotiation deadlines in the mandated timetable for decision-making, beginning October first and ending the following September 30th, a timetable which
essentially constitutes a stringent set of policy guidelines. The public visibility
of this timetable allows for its strategic use. The process requires the following
steps: 1) prior to the regular Presidential budget presentation, the President
must provide a budget which projects expected outlays in the upcoming fiscal year,
assuming all programs are to be carried on at the same levels without policy
changes; 2) the first concurrent resolution of the Congress then makes explicit
the specific levels of budget outlays and new budget authority, both in total and
for each of sixteen major functional expenditure categories. This involves the
amount of any deficit or surplus, the recommended levels of federal revenues, and
the public debt ceilings. When finally negotiated and passed, this resolution
sets the overall budgetary parameters for the Budget Committees; 3) the Committees
are then to work toward completing action on bills that provide new budget authority
and spending authority; and 4) the second concurrent resolution reaffirms or revises the first concurrent resolution, and any differences between the House and
Senate must be reconciled by the end of September. 7 Thus the new Act has presented
challenges to historic positions, and compelled the Congress to make distinctive
policy decisions.
The most profound role defined for the new Congressional Budget Office in the
Act was the development of an annual report that not merely identified alternative
levels of spending, revenues, and tax expenditures, but discussed national budget
priorities, including "alternative ways of allocating budget authority and budget
outlays for the fiscal year among major programs or functional categories, taking
into account how such alternative allocations will meet major national needs and
affect balanced growth and development in the U.S. ' 8 As with the Brookings analyses,
the report was to speak to objectives, priorities, and alternative choices, but not
9
to specify preferred alternatives among the feasible options.
Successful implementation of this commitment of the Congress to accrue greater
power over the federal budget was considered related to the pragmatic requirement
that Congress install what Walter Williams has termed a "new institutional process"
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that would significantly alter the previous balance of power in governmental
decision-making, and assemble the high level staff needed to make expert information and analyses an integral part of this process. 10 The new CBO was viewed by
political policy analysts as an essential tool in making this substantial shift
in Congressional life style, in particular its anticipated role in information
analysis in the service of setting national budgetary priorities. 11 Crucial to
its success, they predicted, was a staff comparable to that of the executive
branch in size and substantive diversity, in professional competence and wisdom,
in political and bureaucratic management skills, in information synthesizing and
processing technology, and in collective influence. It also had to exhibit the
capability of providing at optimum times the products of its efforts to the HousE
and Senate Budget Comirittees. The premise was that the executive branch's enjoyment of superiority in the effective use of policy analysis had been the major
variable in the power inequity.
Developing such a staff proved a challenging task. But there have been an
array of other problems in implementing the Act's intended purposes, not least
among them the level of utilization of the fruits of such policy analysis by indi
vidual Congressmen, the extent of their commitment to the long-range view which
lies at the core of competent policy analysis, and the depth of their perception
of the need for analysis of non-incremental alternatives. 1 2 The latter is a
measure of the will of Congress to participate intelligently in what Lindblom has
called "the partisan mutual adjustment process" in a democracy. 1 3 In the case of
federal budget decisions, this adjustment process required changing complex relationships in Congress' external organizational environment that in turn involved
intricate internal changes. Inasmuch as such basic changes contained costs to
particular Congresspersons, the pattern of history has been one of resistance to
such change.14 The primary struggle with the executive branch has therefore beer
complicated by the inevitable struggle within the Congress. The lack of clearly
specified decision-making roles for the new organizational structures within the
Congress, goal conflict and territoriality problems between "old" and "new" struc
tures, a lack of coordination and cooperation in the relationships between preexisting and new staffs, and differences in the methodology used for performing
essential policy analysis tasks 15 were formidable problems anticipated to plague
full implementation of the Act.
The Trial Run
The nine-month "trial run" of the new budget process was completed with the
passage of a concurrent resolution in December, 1975, which established spending
limits for the remainder of fiscal 1976. This provided an opportunity to more
clearly evaluate whether Congress could actually agree on budget spending limits,
deficits, whether the Budget Committees could become part of the power hierarchy
and more importantly whether the process was capable of yielding a reasoned consideration of priorities rather than simply limited debate over budget figures.
Assessment of the trial run revealed both the great potential of the Act and some
of the anticipated conflicts between the demands of the new legislation and the
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pre-existing authority structure of the Congress, "its privileges, style of operation, and staffing patterns.,,16 It therefore identified likely impediments to the
effectiveness of public strategies for influencing the budget process.
Deep differences surfaced between House and Senate perceptions of the new
budgetary process--in terms of its intent (budget control versus setting budget
priorities), and the qualifications of the CBO staff (Congressional trustworthiness
versus analytic credentials). There were differences in leadership strength, and
the nature of the internal conflicts within the new committees. 1 7 Though it tested
whether the new process would produce Congressional budget control, the trial run
did not really test whether the more basic purpose of the Act, general Congressional budget reform had been realized. Nevertheless, the trial run was generally
considered to indicate an important positive flexibility, a capacity for learning
and modification--largely through the actions of the Budget Committees.
The CBO, as a non-partisan analytic unit serving the entire Congress, was
viewed more critically. Though the staff was considered excellently qualified,
it performed no major policy analyses during the trial run, and its economic forecasting, which emphasized economic stimuli to combat recession rather than economic restraint to control inflation, had diverse results. This was not unrelated to Congressional concerns over the staff's potential power. The general
consensus, however, was that its leadership was being looked to as a major influence on future governmental economic policy. Furthermore, the CBO had developed
an analytic staff comparable in expertise (and nearly in size) to those in the
executive branch. Williams credited it with establishing "the base to do competent economic forecasting, sophisticated budget analysis and policy analysis,"
which he feels are the key parts of the process of developing more responsible
government. The net assessment was slightly more than a moderated optimism about
the outcomes of the first full budget cycle beginning October, 1975, with all the
deadlines of the timetable in force.
The First Implementation of the Full Cycle
On schedule, the House-Senate Conference Committee approved on September 10,
1976, a federal budget ceiling of approximately 413 billion for the fiscal year
beginning October first, settling on a deficit of 50.6 billion. The ceiling in
this Second Concurrent Resolution reflected only minimal differences between the
House and Senate versions. The budget compromise raised 362.5 billion in revenues
and provided 451.5 billion in new budget authority, some of which would be spent
in future years. Both Congressional versions involved essentially all the money
President Ford requested for defense, but provided for more than he requested for
jobs and other domestic programs, and rejected 10 billion in newly-proposed tax
cuts. Negotiation had successfully produced a concrete collective decision within
the timetable.
On the surface, such similar Budget Committee conclusions lacked the transparency that would reveal the truer machinations of the new budget process which
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committed the Congress for the first time to a study of the aggregate effect of
all new legislation having an impact on spending. The House Budget Committee's
chairman, Brock Adams, claimed that the final Congressional budget differed
sharply from the approach favored by the White House, emphasizing programs to
fight unemployment and rejecting some of the President's initiatives in the area
of taxes and domestic programs. Not all analysts agreed with his assessment.
The balance of power had clearly been redressed to some extent. More critical,
however, in terms of the effectiveness of the first full cycle in implementing
the main intent of the Act, was to critique the extent to which the Congress had
taken responsibility for setting national priorities.
Some analysts felt that the Pentagon lobby, and the political makeup of the
Senate and House Budget Committees, interfered with this primary responsibility,
giving the balance of power to conservative Republicans and southern Democrats.
Congressional leadership was also faulted for sacrificing policy to process.
Senator Mansfield, for example, was quoted as saying "I do not intend to vote for
any amendment no matter how meritorious.. .I intend to support fully what the Budget
Committee has recommended because if we do not, then I think we might as well
abolish it, and go back to our old ways."18
The Transfer Amendment
On April 29, 1976, prior to the development of the First Concurrent Resolution, Representative Holtzman, Conyers, and Ottinger jointly proposed a transfer
amendment to the House Budget Committee's first resolution, a resolution which
had contained the largest increase for military expenditures in peacetime history-an 11 billion increase in budget authority and 8.7 billion in outlays. The critical importareof this amendment is that it asked for a substantial shift of budget
authority and outlays from one functional category to others: from defense to
domestic programs. Such an amendment was made possible, and even desirable,
within the context of the new process. It demanded that the House Budget Committee
go beyond a concern for simple budget control, to a change in the rank order of
national preferences. It took the unequivocal position that the Committee had not
discharged its mandated obligation to provide rational alternatives to the President's definition of priorities, a definition Holtzman felt was tragically narrow
and unresponsive to human needs. The Holtzman amendment, and its destiny in the
Budget Committee,is illustrative both of the strength of the new Act and of the
resistances to its full implementation.
However, in proposing a transfer amendment, Representative Holtzman was
actually implementing the intent, and maximizing the flexibility, in the new
budget prQ ess: she was insisting on an official re-allocation of national
revenues.?5 Even though the amendment was rejected, its impact was catalytic.
It served as a general legislative model for future transfer amendments, both
within the Congress and among the organized public. It suggested that a very
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sophisticated understanding of the welfare/warfare tradeoff was essential, as well
as a careful preparation of the case for change in commitments among budget categories. It revealed the necessity of forming political coalitions in support of
this change. And it identified the time period in the new budgetary process which
was most significant to affect.
Several organizations and coalitions have since drafted their own transfer
amendments around the social service/defense issue, which they hope to use as one
intervention in the federal decision-making process. The Coalition for a New
Foreign and Military Policy has recently drafted a transfer amendment to the
First Budget Resolution suggesting specific cutbacks in budget authority for
defense, and a transfer of the majority of this amount to domestic programs related to economic recovery. The Friends Committee on National Legislation has
also directed energy toward using a transfer amendment as a strategy for altering
national welfare/warfare priorities.
It is time for social welfare professionals to take appropriate parallel
action. Sixteen functional policy areas within the budget are delineated within
the new Act, and political intervention with respect to the categories most related to the interests of particular groups can be productively mounted. The NASW
has recently developed a set of specific policy positions on a large number of
national priority issues. This represents an important tool in organizing a concerted effort to affect the political process through the budget cycle. Professionals working in the social welfare field would fail to make maximum use of this
opportunity to impact the political system if they neglected to communicate expert
opinion to relevant Congresspersons at the most critical junctures in the budgetary
timetable. To plan a rational political strategy around the timetable in fact
suggests a new approach in the profession's efforts to have a genuine influence on
social policy.
Conclusion
The federal budget in many ways mirrors our predominant value system as a
society. There is serious question as to whether that set of values has tended
toward an enlightened form of humanism or has placed a disproportionate political
value on destructive capacity. A somewhat novel opportunity has been provided by
the Act for collectively and individually communicating reasoned, well documented
policy positions to key decision-makers at vulnerable and receptive times in the
political process. These are periods in which the profession and individual citizens can feel they are making some measurable impact on American social policy.
Below is the Congressional budgetary timetable for your consideration and use
as a strategy for social change. Within this framework, the most important contacts will be the new House and Senate Budget Committee chairmen and committee
members, and perhaps most significantly the new Congressional Budget Office staff.
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STAGE I: CONGRESS SETS BUDGET TARGETS
November 10: President Submits Current Services Budget.
Submission of the Current Services Budget represents the initial step in the
new eleven-month budget timetable. The budget projects the cost of maintaining
current Federal programs at existing levels through the next fiscal year, adjusting spending to take account of economic projections. In this way, it provides
Congress with an early look at anticipated shifts in Federal program costs resulting from such factors as inflation, pay raises and changes in beneficiary
levels.
15th Day After Congress Convenes: President Submits His Budget.
The President must now include in his annual budget complete spending and
revenue projections for the next five years. He must also set forth the anticipated levels of tax expenditures for this period.
March 15:

Appropriations, Legislative, and Joint Committees Submit Spending and
Revenue Estimates to the Budget Committees

Each standing committee of the House and Senate, the Joint Economic Committee,
and the Joint Committees on Atomic Energy and Internal Revenue Taxation, must submit by this date its views and estimates of the aggregate spending and revenue
levels in the Congressional budget for matters within its jurisdiction. Reports
of each standing committee must also contain its estimates as to the spending
levels either authorized or provided in legislation it intends to become
effective during the next fiscal year.
April 1:

Congressional Budget Office Submits Annual Report to Budget Committee

The Congressional Budget Office was established to provide the Budget Committees, and Congress, with a non-partisan source of budgetary and fiscal analysis.
Each year the CBO director is required to submit to the Budget Committees a
comprehensive report on the next fiscal year's budget. The report must include
an analysis of fiscal policy, a discussion of national budget priorities, and
alternative ways of allocating budget authority and budget outlays.
In addition to its annual report due April 1, the CBO is required to provide
the Budget Committees on a regular basis with information, data and analysis on
budget-related matters.
April 15:

Budget Committees Report First Concurrent Resolution

The House and Senate Budget Committees must each report by this date a First
Concurrent Resolution on the next fiscal year's budget. The Resolution sets forth
appropriate levels of total new budget authority, total outlays, total revenues,
Federal deficit or surplus and public debt.
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The Resolution also sets appropriate levels of new budget authority and outlays for each of the budget's functional categories: national defense, agriculture, income security, etc. (Budget authority is authority provided by law to
enter into obligations which generally result in immediate or future outlays of
governmental funds. Outlays are the actual Federal payments which result from
budget authority.)
The Committee reports accompanying the First Concurrent Resolutions must
include a tax expenditures budget which enumerates such expenditures by
functional category.
May 15:

Final Day for Reporting of Legislation Authorizing New Budget Authority
It is not in order for either House to take floor action on measure authorizing the enactment of new budget authority for the coming fiscal year unless
that measure has been reported in that House by May 15. This rule applies to
both new program legislation and legislation re-authorizing existing programs.
May 15: Congress Completes Action on First Concurrent Resolution
The May 15 deadline applies to final adoption of any House-Senate conference
report on the First Concurrent Resolution.
The joint explanatory statement ("statement of managers") accompanying a conference report on a Concurrent Resolution on the Federal Budget must include an
estimated distribution of the appropriate new budget authority and outlays on the
basis of committee jurisdiction (this allocation by committee jurisdiction is
termed "crosswalking").
The Appropriations Committee in each House is required to further allocate
the new budget authority and outlay totals among its subcommittees' jurisdictions.
Other committees having jurisdiction over measures providing new budget authority
must also make allocations by subcommittee or by program. These allocations must
be reported promptly to each house.
Subsequent Concurrent Resolutions on the Budget
At any time after the First Concurrent Resolution has been agreed to, the two
Houses may revise the Resolution by adoption of a subsequent concurrent resolution
on the budget.
STAGE II:
May 15:

CONGRESS CONSIDERS INDIVIDUAL BUDGET MEASURES

Congress Begins Floor Action on Spending and Revenue Measures

It is not in order for either House to consider any measure providing new
budget authority for a fiscal year, new spending authority to become effective
during a fiscal year, a change in the level of revenues of public debt limit to
become effective in a fiscal year until the First Concurrent Resolution for that
fiscal year has been adopted.

-685-

This rule does not apply to measures providing new budget authority which
first becomes available, or a change in revenues which first becomes effective,
in a fiscal year following the fiscal year to which the Concurrent Resolution
applies.
Spending authority, as defined in the Act, represents any of three kinds of
"backdoor spending"--legislation previously enacted outside the normal appropriations process. These are contract, borrowing , and entitlement authority.
Contract authority is the authority to enter into contracts or other obligations prior to an appropriation. Such legislation does not provide funds to
actually pay such obligations; it has required a subsequent appropriation to
liquidate them.
Borrowing authority is statutory authority that permits a Federal agency to
incur obligations and to make payments for specified purposes out of borrowed
funds.
The Budget Act "closes the backdoor" as far as both contract and borrowing
authority are concerned. (The Act places more limited restrictions on the granting of entitlement authority.) It requires that any measure providing new spending authority of these types contain a provision limiting such authority to the
amounts provided in advance by appropriations acts.
Entitlement authority is legislation that requires the payment--the budget
authority for which is not provided for in advance by appropriation acts, of
benefits to any person or government meeting the requirements established by
such law.
The Act places two restrictions on this form of backdoor spending:
--that all new entitlement authority not become effective before October 1 of
the calendar year in which the measure is reported by committee;
--that any such measure requiring new budget authority in excess of the subcommittee and committee allocations associated with the most recent Concurrent Resolution must be referred to the appropriations committee of that
House. The appropriations committee is then required to report such a
measure within 15 days or be discharged from further consideration of it.
(The appropriations committee has jurisdiction to report amendments to such
measures limiting the total amount of spending authority it provides.)
*Exceptions: The above restrictions on new spending authority do not apply to
Social Security Act trust funds; trust funds where 90% or more of the receipt
represent earmarked taxes (received under specific provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954); amendments or extensions of the State and Local Fiscal
Assistance Act of 1972 (General Revenue Sharing); mixed-ownership or whollyowned government corporations, or where the spending consists exclusively of
proceeds from gifts to the U.S. for a specific purpose.
7th Day After Labor Day:

Congress Completes Action on Spending Measures
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STAGE III:

CONGRESS ESTABLISHES BUDGET LIMITS

The Second Concurrent Resolution required by the Act must either revise or
reaffirm the budgetary targets set in May.
September 15:

Congress Completes Action on Second Concurrent Resolution

Reconciliation Process:
To the extent necessary, the Second Concurrent Resolution may also specify
the extent to which budget authority, spending authority, revenues, or public
debt limitations within the jurisdiction of particular committees should be
changed. In these cases, the Resolution will direct such committees to determine
and report out measures needed to accomplish such adjustments.
September 25:

Congress Completes Action on Any Reconciliation Measures

Should the Second Concurrent Resolution contain a "reconciliation" provision
as described above, the committee or committees receiving such directions must
report recommendations promptly. If only one committee receives a reconciliation
direction, it reports such a measure directly to the floor. Should more than one
committee be directed to make such recommendations, these are reported to the
Budget Committee of this appropriate House, and the Budget Committee must then
report these recommendations to its House without any substantive revision.
Neither House may adjourn until action on the Second Concurrent Resolution,
together with any reconciliation measures, has been completed.
Legislation Subject to Point of Order:
Once Congress has completed action on the Second Concurrent Resolution and
any necessary reconciliation measure, it is not in order for either House to take
floor action on any measure providing new budget or spending authority, or reducing revenues, should the enactment of such measure cause the total new budget
authority or total outlay level set forth in the Second Concurrent Resolution
to be exceeded or its revenue total to be undercut. In enforcing this procedure,
budget aggregates and the projected costs of legislation shall be determined on
the basis of estimates by the Budget Committee of the appropriate House.
October 1:

New Fiscal Year Begins

(The source of the entire text of the budget timetable is a recent memo from
the Senate Committee.)
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FOOTNOTES
1. The Budget of the U.S. Government: Fiscal Year 1976, (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1976).
2. See Public Law 93-334, 93rd Congress, July 12, 1974, Legislative History
section.
3. Annual increases in federal expenditures have been 15-20 billion, more than
was spent in the first century of American government.
4. The 1921 Budget and Accounting Act vested the President with the responsibility
to prepare and transmit to Congress an annual budget, in the nature of a recommendation. It equipped the President with a Budget Bureau and established the
General Accounting Office.
5. The official estimate is that 75% of the budget is relatively uncontrollable,
and uncontrollables are the fastest rising part of the budget, claiming each
year a larger share of new funds. See PL 93-344, op. cit.
6. By outlays is meant how much money will be obligated in a particular year--not
how much will be spent then. By authority is meant authorization to agencies
to spend in future years.
7. P.L. 933-344, op. cit.
8. Ibid.
9. The Brookings Institution annually publishes books analyzing the federal- budget.
10. See Walter Williams, The Congressional Budget Office: A Critical Link in Budget
Reform. Public Policy Paper No. 6, Institute of Governmental Research,
(University of Washington, July 1974).
11. Ibid.
12. See Charles Schultze, The Politics and Economics of Public Spending. (The
Brookings Institution, 1968). He points out that a significant number of
policy decisions in recent years have indeed been non-incremental--i.e. have
departed sharply from past practice, or have required large increases or
decreases in the allocation of resources to a particular area. These kinds of
policy alternatives, Schultze contends, are most in need of explicit expert
study.
13. See Charles Lindblom, The Intelligence of Democracy, (The Free Press, 1965).
14. Williams, op. cit.
15. However, Williams points out that observations of the policy analysis process
in government since 1965 indicate that attempts toward greater rationality,
though occurring in agonizingly slow steps, have had a substantial, positive
impact on decision-making.
16. See Walter Williams, Congress, Budgetmaking, and Policy Analysis: A Critique
After the Fiscal Year 1976 Budget Trial Run, Public Policy Paper No. 9,
Institute of Governmental Research, (University of Washington, February, 1976).
17. Ibid.
18. See the Holtzman context and testimony in this journal.
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WHICH SIDE ARE YOU ON?

The sabres rattle
(on one aide of the
as military Finery
hones
to their Glory
of Destruction,
of wantoneas,
and waste,
of human needs,
and cities,
and homes.

to sow care,
which
beings could reap
and re-aow,
again,
for their labor.

ill)

But it's People!
Multitudes!
Everywhere!
(no matter their station)
who identify
with others,
as one human race.
It's People!
who move mountains.
People!
cross the seas.
And only
People!
You and !
who
I
can Make the Peace!

The Other aide
Speakers clearly
of Construction!
To heal,
to unify the lands,
to plant
seeds of love
upon which
our wasted youth
to grow,

- Olga J. Northwood
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Call for Papers

The Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare will publish a
special issue on symbolic interaction and social welfare.
Papers shwuld reflect the application of a symbolic interaction
perspective to issues of importance in social welfare. Especially desired is work which highlights the distinctive aspects of' symbolic interaction in application including papers
which emphasize the meaning of using the person as a unit
of analysis, methodological and substantive papers on the life
histories of "social persons", and those which explicate the
emphasis on change, freedom, and democracy contained in the
Papers
philosophy on which symbolic interaction theory rests.
should be sent to both editors of the special issue with a
covering letter indicating that they represent a submission for
the special issue on Symbolic Interaction and Social Welfare.
1,alph Segalman, Department of Sociology, California State
University, Northridge, California 91330
11arris Chaiklin, School of Social Work, University of Haifa,
1ount Carmel, Haifa, Israel (use overseas air mail)

CALL FOI

PAPERS

The Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare is calling for
unpublished papers. 5,000-8,000 words in length, for a Special
The Editor
Issue on "Social Gerontology and Social Welfare."
of the issue is Margaret Hartford, Leonard Davis School of
ferontology, University of Southern California, Associate
Editor is Jordan I. Kosberg, School of Applied Social Sciences,
Case Western Reserve University. The Special Issue is
scheduled for publication in early 1978.
Articles are solicited about the social welfare ramifications
from empirical and analytical explorations of the problems and
characteristics of the aged, as well as on policy and program
issues related to the care and treatment of the aged.
Two copies of each manuscript, or inquiries, should be
directed to Margaret !fartford, Leonard Davis School of
,;erontolojy, University of Southern California, University
Park, Los Angeles, CA 90007.
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